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Showing 341 to 360 of 382 Records
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1990 (11) TMI 42 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... nfirmed the order without noticing the grave irregularity committed by the assessing authority, namely, the agricultural Income-tax Officer, Hassan. Therefore, we have no choice but to set aside the orders of the Tribunal as well as the other orders which merged in the Tribunal s order. We may also add, having regard to the period of limitation prescribed for exercising jurisdiction under section 36 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time, namely, three years, the assessments done in 1983 were beyond the period of three years. The last assessment was concluded in the year 1979 on the first batch of returns filed. Therefore, even if there had been jurisdiction with the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Hassan, that was barred by time and as such he could not have initiated action even if there was material to do so. We, therefore, allow these revision petitions and set aside the orders as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Option To Freeze Value, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ? In the present case, the executor was also the beneficiary under the will of the late owner. The Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that the benefit under section 7(4) of the Wealth-tax Act was attracted. The Department is laying emphasis on the fact that the respondent was the executor of the will but it seems to ignore the fact that, as held by the Tribunal, he is also the beneficiary under the will and he has himself occupied the premises for 12 months. He was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of section 7(4). The answer to the question proposed is self-evident and, therefore, need not be called for.
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1990 (11) TMI 40 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... different aspect of the matter, that the losses incurred by the company subsequent to 1983-84 are not relevant, that the assessee-company was getting refunds under section 141A of the Act from 1978-79 to 1982-83 and the events show that there was a pre-planned attempt to understate the total income and, in this view, exhibits P- 13 and P-15 are not open to any objection. We are satisfied that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have, on a factual analysis, held that proceedings under section 179 of the Income-tax Act were justified and the appellants, as directors, should be held jointly and severally liable for the tax arrears during the time they were directors of the company, Rajmohan Cashews (P.) Limited. The above finding was arrived at by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of innumerable materials, which have been adverted to in the orders passed. Exhibits P-13 and P-15 were rightly held to be beyond challenge by the learned single judge. We dismiss the writ appeals in limine.
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1990 (11) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have pointed out how the firms stood dissolved on August 4, 1973, on the death of one of the partners and, thereafter, the business was continued by the surviving partners till August 31, 1973, and thereafter, another firm had come into being from September 1, 1973. In view of what we had earlier stated regarding the dissolution of the firms on August 4, 1973, and the coming into being of another firm from September 1, 1973, it follows that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in making single assessment, but the assessments will have to be made for the three different periods as indicated in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and affirmed by the Tribunal. For the same reasons, the view of the Tribunal with reference to the third question referred to us has also to be upheld. We, therefore, answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of these references. Counsel s fee Rs. 500, one set.
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1990 (11) TMI 38 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ok of the board of directors. It has been found as a fact that the minutes book was interpolated. Of course, reference was made before the Tribunal to the fact that, in the following two years, there has been a large scale expansion. This may be so but the question still remains whether, in the year in question and specially when the annual general meeting is held and the directors are deciding whether to distribute the dividend or not, there was any material at that point of time which would show that expansion of the business was envisaged. As the Tribunal has noted, the Commissioner of Income-tax took into consideration the fact that the capital of the petitioner was only Rs. 3,000 , and apart from one interpolated minutes book, there was no other document on the record at that point of time which would indicate that expansion was envisaged. The conclusion of the tax authorities is based on appreciation of evidence and, in our opinion, no question of law arises. Dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 37 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Income ... ... ... ... ..... April 1, 1970, and agricultural land would, be regarded as a capital asset. It may be that the profit in question could have been taxed as capital gain but, as rightly pointed out by the Tribunal in its order passed under section 256(1), the Department at no stage raised any contention to this effect. Neither before the Income-tax Officer nor before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), nor before the Tribunal, was it ever submitted that even if the excess is not taxable as business profit, nevertheless tax should be levied on capital gains. As this question was neither raised nor argued nor dealt with by the Tribunal, the petitioner cannot raise this contention for the first time by way of an application under section 256 of the Act. The only contention raised by the Department is already covered by the earlier decision of this court in D. L. F. Housing and Construction (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1983 141 ITR 806 and following that, we decline to call for a reference in this case.
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1990 (11) TMI 36 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Entertainment Expenditure, Perquisite, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) increased this figure to 35 . This increased figure has been maintained by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In our opinion, no question of law arises for the simple reason that, even as per the Income-tax Officer, some of the expenses of Rs. 1,07,133 would fall under Explanation 2 to section 37(2A). How much is the amount which will fall under that Explanation 2 is a question of fact. The conclusion of the Tribunal that it is 35 which will fall under that Explanation is a finding of fact and no question of law arises. The facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the earlier case. In the present case before the Income-tax Officer, the break-up of the expenses was given and, thereafter, it is a finding of fact as to how much amount would fall under Explanation 2 to section 37(2A). In our opinion, question No. 2, however, is a question of law and we direct the Tribunal to state the same and refer it to this court.
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1990 (11) TMI 35 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... by the Supreme Court in L. M. Chhabda s case 1967 65 ITR 638. In L. M. Chhabda s case 1967 65 ITR 638, the benefit of deduction was not allowed because, in that case, it had not been held that the two different cinemas involved there formed part of the same business. In the present case, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal, on the evidence on record, have come to the conclusion that the two ventures at Delhi and Lucknow constituted one unit and, therefore, the business expenses relating to Lucknow cannot be disallowed. It has further been held that, even for the earlier years, this disallowance had been deleted and the same had been accepted by the Department. Be that as it may, whether the two cinemas are controlled and run as single unit or not is a pure question of fact and, in any case, it is not question which is sought for by the Revenue in the present case. In our opinion, no question of law arises. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 34 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ). Despite our drawing attention to the specific provision, learned Government Pleader, Sri Dattu, was unable to point to any of the provisions of the Act which empowered the Commissioner to set aside the grant of registration made by an officer even on a defective application in the exercise of his revisional power. If that power is wanting not only under section 35 but also under other provisions of the Act, then the Commissioner cannot assume jurisdiction in the manner he has done, directly or indirectly, suggesting that it should have been assessed as an association of persons. We, therefore, set aside that part of the impugned order which relates to the prejudicial aspect of the firm having been assessed as a registered firm for the relevant assessment years which was the subject-matter of the show-cause notice. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside to the extent indicated above. In other respects, the order remains undisturbed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... annot be cancelled at all. Similar would be the situation in these cases in respect of the assessment year 1964-65, in relation to which the Explanation stood attracted and for which the assessees did not come forward with any explanation at all. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was in error in cancelling the levy of penalty on the assessees in respect of the assessment year 1964-65. On a due consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the Tribunal was not at all justified in cancelling the penalty imposed on the assessees under section 271(1) (c) of the Act. We are also of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that there has been no concealment of income is not based on materials or evidence and is also not a reasonable view to take. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue will be entitled to its costs of these references. Counsel s fee Rs. 1,000 (one set).
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1990 (11) TMI 32 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment, Valuation Report ... ... ... ... ..... neering Corporation (P) Ltd. 1982 133 ITR 687 (MP)). Learned counsel for the Revenue reminded this court of its limited jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution and urged that as this court does not sit in appeal over a matter such as the present one involved in these cases, this court should not quash the notices issued under section 147 and it should direct the petitioner to raise the plea taken in these writ petitions in regular assessment proceedings which would be taken up in pursuance of the same. No one can dispute this proposition. Generally, there should be no interference by the High Court in a matter such as is involved in the present cases. But, it is demonstrated that the notices had been issued under section 147 in June, 1979, to cover up the illegalities. For what I have said above, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. Notices under section 147 of the Income-tax Act are quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to get costs from the respondents.
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1990 (11) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Perquisite ... ... ... ... ..... 1978 to 1981/MDS/1972-73), dealing with an identical question. That formed the subject-matter of a reference before this court in the decision in CIT v. Manjushree Plantations Ltd. 1980 125 ITR 150 according to which, in order to term a payment perquisite , it had to be a payment other than a cash payment, in pursuance of a contract of service. In this case also, it has been found that the payments were cash payments and as per the decision referred to earlier, such payments could not constitute perquisites and the Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the Income-tax Officer was in error in disallowing the sum of Rs. 40,910. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... his title to the lands, even though the lands were sold by him earlier. Hence, these expenses have to be regarded as expenses for getting income from agricultural lands. Otherwise, the appellant would have lost his title as well as possession of the lands. Hence, the claim is allowed. This court in CIT v. O. P. N. Arunachala Nadar 1983 141 ITR 620, has left no doubt as to the legal expenses incurred by the assessee to protect the source of his income or the title to his business or to preserve or maintain his business assets to be regarded as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of his business and, therefore, allowable as deduction for the purpose of computing the profits for income-tax purposes. This ruling has to be applied to agricultural income as well. The impugned order, in our opinion, does not suffer from any illegality or impropriety. The same is, accordingly, confirmed. This tax revision case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 29 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce before the Tribunal on which it, as a reasonable person, could come to the conclusion to which it has come. The Tribunal functions as a judicial body under the Act and it is invested with authority to determine finally all questions of fact. Change of perspective in viewing a thing does not transform a question of fact into a question of law. When a conclusion had been reached on an appreciation of a number of facts established by evidence, whether that was sound or not must be determined not by considering the weight to be attached to each single fact in isolation, but by assessing the cumulative effect of all the facts in their setting as a whole. For the foregoing reasons, the first question is answered by saying that the conclusion of the Tribunal was justified in law and is not unreasonable or perverse. The second and third questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -1 agree.
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1990 (11) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... High Court and the amount deposited by the assessee in pursuance of the court s order earlier was directed to be refunded. The date of refund fell in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1974-75 and was sought to be taxed in that year under section 41(1). The court found that the State of U. P. and the Central Government had filed appeals by special leave before the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court. The court observed that, in view of the fact that the decision of the court had not become final and was subject to appeals before the Supreme Court, there was no remission or cessation of the liability so as to attract section 41(1) of the Act. This case again is clearly distinguishable on facts as in the instant case, the appellate order has become final. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question referred in this reference in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J.-I agree.
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1990 (11) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Approved Gratuity Fund, Business Expenditure, Excess Gratuity Over 8.33 Percent ... ... ... ... ..... made by the assessee is in conformity with the rules or in excess thereof. The Andhra Pradesh High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gestetner Duplicators (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1979 117 ITR 1, where the Supreme Court while considering the approved provident fund held that if the provident fund contravenes any of the conditions to be satisfied for its recognition, the taxing authority may refer the question of withdrawal of recognition to the Commissioner, but until the Commissioner acting under the powers reserved to him withdraws such recognition, the taxing authority must proceed on the basis that the provident fund has satisfied all the conditions for its recognition in that year, and any other course is bound to result in chaos and uncertainty which has to be avoided. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. - I agree.
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1990 (11) TMI 26 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
CBDT, Return ... ... ... ... ..... h the petitioner had sought for at the hands of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The Board in this case had given an oral hearing and had also permitted the petitioner to file written arguments and, after considering the merits of the case, the Board had rejected the application filed by the petitioner. Learned counsel pointed out that no reasons had been assigned. In our opinion, when an application under section 119 of the Act is considered by the Board., the Board is not required to write an order recording reasons. What the Board, however, should do is to apply its mind to the merits of the case. In the present case, particularly having regard to the fact that an oral hearing had been given and written arguments were also permitted to be filed, we are satisfied that the Board had applied its mind to the merits of the case and had rejected the application of the petitioner on the merits. In the circumstances, we make the following order The writ petitions are dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accounting, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... m COPE Pool Account 24,28,172 In our view, although the amount was a liability for the assessment year 1975-76, in view of the fact that the assessee offered the entire amount of Rs. 68,75,654 for taxation in the assessment year 1978-79, the Incometax Officer was not justified in excluding the said amount from the assessment. The assessee has given an undertaking through Dr. Pal, learned counsel, that they will not object to the inclusion of the said amount of Rs. 24,28,172 in the assessment for the assessment year 1978-79, and the Income-tax Officer may take appropriate steps in this regard. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the negative, but in view of the undertaking given by the assessee, the Income-tax Officer is directed to revise the assessment for the assessment year 1978-79 including the said sum of Rs. 24,28,172 in the income of the assessee and take all consequential steps in this regard. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. - I agree.
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1990 (11) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... the computer and the data processing system, it cannot be said that they are office appliances. An industrial company is a company engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods. Data-processing means the converting of raw data to machine-readable form and its subsequent processing ( as storing, updating, combining, rearranging or printing out) by a computer. Computer means one that computes specifically a programmable electronic device that can store, retrieve, and process data . There cannot be any doubt that raw data cannot be equated with the result derived. It is different in form and substance. We are, therefore, of the view that the computer division is an industrial undertaking which satisfies the conditions mentioned in section 32A(2)(b)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the reasons aforesaid, the question in this reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. - I agree.
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1990 (11) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accounting, Income ... ... ... ... ..... r of 1978-79 which was included in the paper book filed before the Tribunal. It appears that the assessee offered for taxation the sum of Rs. 68,75,654 in the assessment for the assessment year 1978-79 out of which Rs. 44,47,482 was included in the assessment. Dr. Pal, learned counsel for the assessee, has given an undertaking to this court that the assessee has not challenged nor has the assessee challenged the inclusion of the said sum in the assessment for the assessment year 1978-79. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the sum of Rs. 44,47,482 cannot be included in the assessment year 1975-76 and, accordingly, the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, record the statement of learned counsel on behalf of the assessee that the said sum has been rightly assessed for the assessment year 1978-79 and such assessment has become final so far as the inclusion of the said amount is concerned. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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