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Case Laws
Showing 341 to 360 of 437 Records
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1997 (3) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
SSI exemption - Turnover ceiling ... ... ... ... ..... hat clause (i) is confined to specified goods whereas clause (ii) refers to excisable goods . Now all specified goods may be excisable too, but if one were to read clause (ii) as independent of clause (i) it would create an anomalous situation, in that, a manufacturer who is not eligible for exemption under clause (i) as the aggregate value exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs can still hop on to clause (ii) and contend that since the aggregate value of the specified goods which are excisable does not exceed Rs. 20 lakhs, he would still be entitled to exemption. Such an interpretation would render clause (i) redundant. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the goods, i.e., all items fall within the expression specified goods the case would be covered by clause (i), as in the present case, and not clause (ii). 5. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned orders of the authorities below holding that the case falls in clause (ii) are set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 96 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , not having been included in Item IA, would fall under Item 68 of the schedule, more so because it is commercially a distinct item. The Revenue contended that bubble gum was a gum like chewing gum and would, therefore, fall within Item IA(1) of the Schedule. This contention was negatived by the Tribunal firstly because it is not included in Item IA(1) and is commercially known as a different item altogether and is not the same thing as chewing gum. We see no reason why we should take a different view as the view taken by the Tribunal is a plausible view. We, therefore, do not see any substance in this appeal filed by the Revenue and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
Whether stainless steel circles imported by the appellants are classifiable under Customs Tariff Entry 73.15(2) instead under Tariff Entry 73.15(1)?
Held that:- As appeals deal with Tariff Entry 73.15 as it stood prior to its amendment with effect from 1-1-1981. Therefore, stainless steel circles imported by the importers in all these appeals are classifiable under Tariff Heading 73.15(1) and not under Tariff Heading 73.15(2).
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1997 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the calcium carbide manufactured was only an intermediary product which was used for generation of acetylene gas in the same factory and cannot be subjected to excise duty?
Held that:- Considering Mr.Sorabjee's as appearing on behalf of the company contention that the question of imposing excise duty is inextricably linked up with the concept of marketability of the goods. If the goods are not acceptable in the market as a commercial commodity, the "goods" could not be subjected to excise duty & reliance placed on a judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Moti Laminates Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad [1995 (2) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] in support of his contention we are of the opinion that these cases should be heard by a larger Bench. These matters may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for necessary directions.
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1997 (3) TMI 93 - SC ORDER
Penalty, Concealment Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... passed by the Income-tax Officer and not with reference to the date on which the penalty was imposed. This view of the High Court is in consonance with the law laid down by this court in CIT v. Dhadi Sahu 1993 199 ITR 610 wherein it has been held that once the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner has validly exercised jurisdiction to pass the order imposing a penalty, the Amending Act would not affect his jurisdiction. In view of the said decision, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... o. Ltd. 1992 196 ITR 149. Here the roads were constructed to approach about 500 trenches for dumping waste and night soil in the trenches and transporting the processed manure. The High Court while answering the said question has said that the roads could not be treated as building . We are in agreement with the said view of the High Court. In CIT v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1992 196 ITR 149 (SC), this court, while construing the expression building in section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has observed that the roads and roadways are adjuncts of the building lying within the factory area linking them together and are being used for carrying on its business by the assessee. In the present case, there is no other construction except the roads. It cannot, therefore, be said that the roads by themselves would constitute buildings. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 91 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... e Tribunal and also the High Court found that the assessee, Smt. Ansuya, had surrendered or released her life interest in the portion of the property and it enabled the releasees who were the beneficiaries to resume possession of the entire corpus of the property a little earlier. In other words, the interest of the beneficiaries in that portion of the property was accelerated. The transaction was held to be bona fide. It is an unilateral act. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was right in holding that there is "no transaction" exigible to tax within the meaning of the Gift-tax Act. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?
Held that:- Clause (2)(d) of article 323A and clause (3)(d) of article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under article 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under article 323A and article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.
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1997 (3) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in computing the chargeable profits of the assessee of a previous year, from the total income computed for the year under the Income-tax Act, the adjustment would be made in the case of the assessee in accordance with clause (vi) or clause (x)?
Held that:- In the matter of computation of the chargeable profits of the assessee for the purpose of levy of super profits tax under the provisions of the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963, from the total income of the assessee computed for the year in question under the Income-tax Act, it would be entitled to the adjustment of the amount received as interest on securities derived from any security of the Central Government or the State Government as per clause (vi) of rule 1 of the First Schedule inasmuch as the said amount is chargeable under the Income-tax Act under the head "Interest on securities" which was in force at the relevant period and not under clause (x) of rule 1 of the First Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act as held by the High Court. The impugned judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside and the first question posed by the Tribunal is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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1997 (3) TMI 88 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Body Of Individuals, Carrying On Business, Minor Child, Representative Assessee
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1997 (3) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Wealth Tax Act, Wealth Tax Return ... ... ... ... ..... drawn from given facts. In this case, it is shown to us that ten persons (who are alleged to have advanced loans to the assessee in a total sum of Rs. 3,80,000 out of the total hundi loans of Rs. 8,53,298), were established to be bogus persons or mere name-lenders in the assessment proceedings relating to the subsequent assessment year. Does it not furnish a reasonable ground for the Income-tax Officer to believe that on account of the failure--indeed not a mere failure but a positive design to mislead--of the assessee to disclose all material facts, fully and truly, necessary for his assessment for that year, income had escaped assessment ? We are of the firm opinion that it does. The ratio of the above decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Following the same, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This reference is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 86 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessing Officer, False Return, Mens Rea, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... onducted on December 3, 1986. If that is so, from the statement vide exhibit P-13 dated March, 11, 1988, it is not known as to who has recorded it. At any rate, exhibit P-13 has not been proved by examining the person who recorded the said statement. The signature of the person found at exhibits P-34 and P-38 is entirely different from the one found at exhibit P-13. Thus, exhibit P-13 is not one such statement recorded on oath under section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, exhibit P-13 is not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the court below, having examined the entire evidence on record, found that there was no mens rea on the part of the accused in filing the alleged return and accordingly acquitted A-2. In the light of the admissions made by PW-1 that he cannot say whether there was any knowledge on the part of A-2 in filing the false return, I am of the opinion that the order of the lower court does not call for interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 85 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ntil it is shown that agriculture income is derived on behalf of both petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 jointly. Here, in view of the facts stated above, there is no scope to say that both the brothers have joint interest in either of the two halves. By virtue of the registered deed of gift which was executed by their father each has become an absolute owner of the portion which has been gifted to him. Therefore, the advantage of section 13 is not available to the petitioners. However, in view of the submission of Dr. Saraf that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 being the absolute owners of their respective shares they may be separately assessed, the revisional authority may consider this aspect if relevant documents, namely, records of right, records of mutation, etc., are produced before him. If mutation has already been done then in that case petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 will be entitled to be assessed to tax separately. With the above observation this writ petition is dismissed with no costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 84 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d rate . It is also observed by the learned judge that tax in local parlance also means nothing more than money which individuals are compelled to pay for public purposes. It is impossible, therefore, to distinguish tax from cess or duty. In view of the aforesaid decision particularly the observation of the Supreme Court as quoted above I am of the view that cess is also a tax. Therefore, in view of the provisions laid down under section 8(2)(e) the petitioner is entitled to get the deduction of tax from 60 per cent. of the composite agricultural income. The impugned letters, namely, letter dated January 25, 1994, contained in annexure-III and letter dated January 27, 1994, contained in annexure-IV are quashed. The respondents are directed to issue the tax clearance certificate provided the petitioner has paid the tax on 60 per cent. of the composite income after deduction of the cess amount. With the aforesaid order and direction this writ petition is disposed of. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 83 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Cost Of Acquisition, Mistake Apparent From Record, Tea Business
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1997 (3) TMI 82 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure, Fines And Penalties ... ... ... ... ..... s view, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v. CIT 1961 41 ITR 350, the Supreme Court has held that no expense which was paid by way of penalty for a breach of the law, even though it might involve no personal liability, could be said to be an amount wholly or exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business of the assessee within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the fine paid by the assessee was not an allowable deduction under that section. Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, corresponds to section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act. In this view, the opinion of the Tribunal that the fines in respect of municipal petty traffic offences cannot be held to be penalty within the term of infringement of law, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, question No. 2 is answered in the negative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 81 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Cost Of Acquisition, Mistake Apparent From Record, Tea Business
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1997 (3) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appellate Authority, Assessing Officer, Claim For Depreciation, State Electricity Board, Writ Petition
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1997 (3) TMI 79 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Central Government, Criminal Proceedings, High Court, Offences And Prosecution, Tax At Source
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1997 (3) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Or Profession ... ... ... ... ..... reciation would be allowed must be bulk purchase of a large number and that it would be disallowed if the purchase is of single items. There is no evidence that the bottles in respect of which depreciation was claimed were not the subject of bulk purchase. Even apart from it, a bulk purchase is merely individualised purchase made collectively and we do not find any distinction in the provisions of section 32(1) or the proviso, distinction possible to be drawn in the manner suggested. The only test is whether the article in respect of which depreciation is claimed is plant for the purpose of the business or profession. Individual items of purchase would also be plant , if it is integrally involved in the carrying out of the profession or business and depreciation could be claimed in respect of that. In that view of the matter, we concur with the view taken by the Tribunal and do not find any merit in the petition justifying the call for a reference. The I. T. C. is dismissed.
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