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Showing 341 to 360 of 418 Records
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1999 (4) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Manufacture - Exemption - Set off ... ... ... ... ..... y, 1981 by introducing sub-rule 2B, under which power was entrusted to the Collector both, to condone the defect of any procedure of sub-rule (2) and to confer benefit to such assessees. But we find this rule was amended only on 21st February, 1981 the period to which we are concerned is of the year 1976-77. Hence, appellant cannot claim benefit of this amendment. In view of this we do not find any error in the Tribunal s judgment when it did not grant set off to the appellant. Admittedly, appellant never applied or claimed for proforma credit of the differential amount, hence claim was rightly rejected. 3. We are also informed the decision reported in 1985 (20) E.L.T. 179 (S.C.) 1985 (3) SCC 314 - Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India on which the Tribunal relied has been upheld by the Constitutional Bench in the case reported in 1988 (38) E.L.T. 535 (S.C.) 1989 (3) SCC 488. Hence for all these reasons we do not find any merit in this appeal and is accordingly dismissed.
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1999 (4) TMI 77 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Limitation, Failure To Disclose Material Facts ... ... ... ... ..... ent year, as the case squarely fell under section 147(b), and not under section 147(a). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in reaching its conclusion that the initiation of reassessment proceedings in the case of the assessee for the two assessment years under section 147(b) was barred by time. It may be further noticed that since the submission of the statement of case the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Navnitlal Sakarlal 1980 125 ITR 67 has been reversed by the Supreme Court in Navnit Lal Sakarlal v. CIT 1992 193 ITR 16, which would support the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on the merits as well though for different reasons. In that view of the matter, truly speaking a question about the validity of the reassessment prima facie appears to have become academic. Accordingly, the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 76 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... ation the sense in which it is understood in the commercial world. In the instant case, it is difficult to say that the assessee, who is a consultancy firm, is engaged in the manufacture of articles or things. The statements, etc., prepared by the assessee with the help of the computer containing the result of data processing cannot be regarded as articles or things within the meaning of these words used in section 32A of the Act. It is thus clear that the assessee is not an industrial undertaking engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. That being so, the assessee is not entitled to investment allowance under section 32A of the Act. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal was not justified in granting the same. In view of the above, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited.
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1999 (4) TMI 75 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... sessee about its non-adjustment are not disputed. Law is well settled. When primary facts are disclosed, the duty of the assessee ends he is not further required to instruct the Assessing Officer what inference of law and facts may be or are to be drawn therefrom (see Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1961 41 ITR 191 (SC)). We are further informed that, as a matter of fact, ultimately a major portion of the refunds claimed by the assessee have been set at naught in appeals before the Supreme Court, which decision has been reported in 1997 91 ELT 13, and on further review filed by the assessee against that order has also been dismissed on September 30, 1997. Thus, no benefit as a matter of fact, to the extent refund order has not been sustained, has been obtained by the assessee. As a result, this petition succeeds. The impugned notices under section 148 relating to the assessment years 1988-89 to 1991-92 are quashed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 74 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reference, Firm, Registration, Finding Of Fact ... ... ... ... ..... which was found to be reciprocated by consideration as per market value of the goods purchased or sold. In our opinion, this question too is a question of fact depending upon the appreciation of evidence and inference drawn by the Tribunal. It cannot be said that the inference drawn by the Tribunal from the material before it was such to which no reasonable person could reach the conclusion to which the Tribunal has reached or that the findings of facts have been arrived at by ignoring relevant material before it or by irrelevant consideration, which would vitiate the finding of fact and require reconsideration of the facts by this court. The contentions raised by the applicants are all in the realm of appreciation of evidence which has been considered by the Tribunal. We, therefore, find that the Tribunal was right in law in refusing to refer all the questions under section 256(1) of the Act. Accordingly, there is no merit in these applications and they are hereby rejected.
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1999 (4) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income From Other Sources, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... nly of expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning such income . Such income refers to income from other sources . The expression for the purpose of business is narrower than the expression for the purpose of making or earning such income . In order that an expenditure may be admissible under section 57(iii) it is necessary that the primary motive of incurring it is directly to earn income falling under the head Income from other sources . That is not so under section 37 which allows deduction of expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business . Under section 57(iii), deduction will not be allowed if the expenditure is not incurred for the purpose of earning income falling under the head Income from other sources . In view of the above, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 72 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... Act must be held to mean such amount payable by a tenant in favour of a landlord which has been agreed upon or which has been determined as fair rent by the Rent Controller. Even in a case of assessment of fair rent, the same may be assessed with retrospective effect. Such fair rent may be determined by the Rent Controller after a long lapse of years and, thus, in such circumstances, income having not accrued only in this year when the amount was received or became receivable. Some amount of certainty, thus, in our opinion, should come into being. The answer to the questions thus, should be rendered in the negative. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the question referred by the learned Tribunal before us for our opinion in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. Let a Xerox copy of this order countersigned by the A. R. (C) may be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. D. P. SIRCAR-I J.---I agree.
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1999 (4) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... und that part of it was used by the assessee for payment of taxes. In the instant case, there is no borrowing for the purpose of payment of taxes. The debit balance in the account had been there right from the beginning and there were withdrawals as well as deposits in the said account. There is no direct nexus between the withdrawals and the payment of tax. Even if the withdrawals are held to be borrowings and it is held that the interest paid on the borrowings made in the past for payment of taxes is also a permissible deduction, in the instant case, there is nothing to show that the borrowings were for payment of taxes under the Act. The controversy in this case is squarely covered by the decision of this court in Hindustan Cocoa Products Ltd. v. CIT 1999 236 ITR 140. Following the same, the question referred to us, is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Revision, Jurisdiction, Draft Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... our of the Revenue and against the assessee. Mr. Mistry, learned counsel for the assessee, contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the order of the Income-tax Officer cannot be held to be erroneous which is a condition precedent for exercise of power under section 263 of the Act. This submission, in our opinion, is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present reference. The controversy in this reference is limited to the question whether it is open to the Commissioner to exercise revisional powers under section 263 of the Act in respect of an order of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer under section 143(3) of the Act following the directions of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 144B of the Act. The controversy sought to be raised by Mr. Mistry is wholly outside the scope and ambit of the question referred to us. We, therefore, need not go into that question. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 69 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... on was also directed towards valuation of closing stock in respect of pending assessment years including the assessment year 1994-95. For the purpose of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme which gives relief in the matter of clearing the arrears of tax already determined under the provisions of the Act, the requirement is not that the assessment should be made directly as a consequence of the search relating to the assessment year in question. It is sufficient if the determination of assessment for the relevant assessment year is on the basis of material information and opinions formed relating to the practice followed by the assessee in the matter of maintaining accounts that provides nexus between the search and the determination of tax if that nexus is established the designated authority was justified to determine the amount payable under the claim on that basis. That being the case, in the present case, we find no case for interference. Dismissed summarily. Notice discharged.
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1999 (4) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e-tax Officer to stipulate any such condition. It was at the request of the assessee the accounting year had been altered. The assessee cannot take advantage of such alteration to claim interest on the amounts, which by its own showing were amounts which were not required to be paid in that financial year though they had been paid. The assessee could only take refund of the amount and the Department was not required to pay any interest on that amount. The Commissioner of Income-tax was perfectly right in revising the order of the Income-tax Officer and in holding that the assessee was not entitled to the interest that had been allowed by the Income-tax Officer. The questions referred to us in the Tax Case No. 820 of 1988 and those raised in T. C. P. No. 410 of 1986, and which are treated by us as having been referred to us, are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue shall be entitled to costs in the sum of Rs. 2,000 (rupees two thousand only).
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1999 (4) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Writ, Notice, Reassessment, Full And True Disclosure ... ... ... ... ..... gatives the reason of the escapement being attributed to failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary, the further consequence is not in dispute. The initiation of proceeding under s. 147 could not have been beyond four years from the end of relevant assessment year that is to say within four years from 31st March, 1988, which will expire on 31st March, 1992. The impugned notice initiated action on 27th June, 1993, beyond four years from the end of relevant assessment year and would be inhibited under proviso to s. 147. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned notice having been issued after 31st March, 1992, the AO had no jurisdiction to initiate action under s. 147 and to proceed further in furtherance of that notice. 13. Accordingly this petition succeeds. The impugned notice and the subsequent proceedings taken in furtherance thereof are all quashed. 14. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 66 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Recovery, Attachment And Sale ... ... ... ... ..... ed on the ground that property in fact belong to the present petitioner which has been acquired by her from her own resources it became the bounden duty of the AO as adjudicator to adjudicate that objection of the petitioner objectively and then to proceed in accordance with the finding arrived at on such adjudication. That adjudication would have given right to further remedy by way of appeal or revision as the case may be to the petitioner if she were aggrieved by that, By abandoning that procedure and carrying on with recovery proceedings cannot be allowed. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The respondent AO/TRO is directed in the first instance to determine the objection of the petitioner as to the availability of the property in question to be attached for recovery of arrears of M/s Komal Tea Co. of which she is not a partner before proceeding further with recovery in pursuance of the attachment made by the TRO. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Tax Deducted At Source, Opportunity For Rectification, Minor Defects, Natural Justice, Adverse Consequences, Assessee In Default
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1999 (4) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Carry Forward And Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... ove two views having regard to the decisions of this Court in CIT vs. Jaipuria China Clay Mines (P) Ltd. (1996) 59 ITR 555 (SC) TC 27R.625 and Rajapalayam Mills Ltd. vs. CIT 1978 CTR (SC) 167 (1978) 115 ITR 777 (SC) TC 25R. 837. We have extracted the relevant observations from both the judgments hereinabove, which say that the unabsorbed depreciation allowance has not only to be set off against other heads of income in the relevant previous year but where it is carried forward, it stands on exactly the same footing as the current depreciation. 7. In view of the aforesaid, we answer the question referred to us in negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by holding that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the set off of unabsorbed depreciation carried forward from earlier years could not be allowed against the income from other sources unless the assessee had income falling under s. 28 of the IT Act. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 63 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance, Actual Cost, Foreign Exchange ... ... ... ... ..... hould have disallowed depreciation allowance as well, provided of course, that this was the requirement of law. The fact that the Tribunal allowed depreciation allowance is indicative of the fact that the Department s contention in this regard was not accepted. In the above premises, the decision of the Tribunal disallowing investment allowance was not correct in law. Before I conclude I must mention that the claim regarding investment allowance on the increased liability in terms of section 43A has been allowed by the Tribunal in the case of the assessee-company itself for the subsequent assessment years, namely, 1990-91 and 1991-92, vide ITA Nos. 896 and 897/Patna of 1994 decided on March 19, 1998. In the above premises, the questions referred for the opinion of this court are answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. Aftab Alam J.-I agree.
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1999 (4) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Block Assessment, Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... he rejection of the declaration filed by the petitioner on the ground that there were no arrears. of tax as on March 31, 1998, is also not justified, and accordingly, the impugned order in W. P. No. 1424 of 1999 is also quashed. The result is that the designated authority under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme should proceed in accordance with the scheme and determine the liability of the petitioner for the assessment year 1994-95 under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. As I have already held, the assets seized are to be adjusted towards the assessment that may arise out of the block assessment and if any surplus remains after the adjustment of tax liability arising out of the block assessment, it is needless to say that the Assessing Officer is empowered to adjust the same towards the existing tax liability for any other assessment years. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. Rule nisi made absolute. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 61 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Condition Precedent ... ... ... ... ..... s not unexpected as the two seized letters explained the purpose of possession of the amount and, therefore, without anything more, the possession of cash cannot constitute information as such information cannot be treated as sufficient to bring home the inference that it was income which was not disclosed by the person in possession for the purpose of the Act. In view of the judicial pronouncement and the legal position discussed above, the conditions precedent for issuance of warrant of authorisation under section 132A(1) are fully absent. In that view of the matter the warrant of authorisation is set aside and the respondent authority is directed to release the remaining amount of Rs. 10,00,000 (ten lakhs). It is always open to the Revenue authority to make enquiry relating to the assessment of the amount as the petitioner is liable to show and explain the same in his income-tax return under the provisions of income-tax law. In the result the petition is allowed. No costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s it is apparent that the deletion of addition of Rs. 2 lakhs has been founded on the finding of fact that the promissory notes were executed somewhere in 1982 and the income represented by these promissory notes had been already subjected to tax for the assessment in the assessment year 1983-84. These findings do not give rise to any question of law. So also the disallowance of Rs. 24,000 on the supposed accrued income on the amount of promissory notes has been deleted on the ground that the assessee is not maintaining his accounts on the mercantile system, therefore, the income arising from the investment made in the panchnama should be taxed on the basis of actual receipts only also do not give rise to any question of law as the primary findings on the basis of which the answer depends is a finding of fact. We, therefore, are satisfied that the order of the Tribunal rejecting the application under section 256(1) is not erroneous in any manner. The application is rejected.
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1999 (4) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Draft Assessment Order, Revised Return, House Property, Deductions ... ... ... ... ..... 1978, relevant to the assessment year 1979-80 pertained to the period from April 1, 1976 to April 1, 1977. There is also no dispute about the fact that the demand in respect of the same was also made by the society on June 21, 1977. Thus, neither the demand was made in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, nor the liability pertained to the said accounting year. That being so, the liability was incurred by the assessee not in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, i.e., 1979-80, but in the earlier year. The Tribunal was right in holding that the above amount was not allowable as a statutory deduction in the computation of income from house property of the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1979-80. Accordingly, we answer this question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited.
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