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Case Laws
Showing 361 to 380 of 459 Records
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2000 (2) TMI 100 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE
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... ... ..... the petitioners, but their claim for refund of that duty was wrongfully disallowed by the Assistant Commissioner. There has been indeed, culpable delay in making the refund on the part of the respondent inasmuch as the refund was not granted even after passing of the order-in-appeal on 30-8-1985 until on 12-4-1989 when finally the refund was granted. Under the circumstances of the present case it appears just and proper to allow interest 12 p.a. from the date (30-9-1980) when the claim for refund of the amount was wrongly rejected by the concerning authority till the date of actual payment. 9.Accordingly, the petition is allowed and it is directed that the respondent shall pay to the petitioners interest 12 p.a. with yearly rest on the said sum of Rs. 2,00,240.89 from 30-9-1980 till 12-4-1989. The respondent shall also pay Rs. 1,000/- to the petitioners towards costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, paid by the petitioners shall be refunded to them on verification.
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2000 (2) TMI 99 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... egal entity which owns the factory. But the question is Who maintains the factory ? There is no evidence upon the record in this behalf. It is, therefore, necessary to set aside the order of the Tribunal under challenge and of the authorities below and to remand the matter to the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Gwalior, to hear and decide the matter afresh only insofar as the maintenance of the factory is concerned. The parties shall be at liberty to lead further evidence in this behalf. 3. Order on the appeal accordingly. 4. No order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 98 - SC ORDER
Appeal to Supreme Court - Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... opinion that it will be appropriate and in the interest of justice if the appeal filed by the appellant before the Tribunal is heard without the appellant being required to pay the disputed amount of excise duty. 3. The appeal is disposed off. No costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 97 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Import trade control - Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... attracted at all. It is stated in the writ petition that action had already been taken against the petitioner under the provisions of the Customs Act. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the petitioner cannot be better of as compared to a person who obtained a licence. According to the learned counsel the petitioner did not obtain a licence and at the same time indulged in importing goods contrary to what is permissible under the rules. If the petitioner violated any conditions regarding import of goods, it has been dealt with under provisions of the Customs Act. It is not necessary that petitioner must be dealt with under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act as well. The argument raised by learned counsel for the respondent in our view has no force. The case does not fall within the ambit of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned orders are hereby quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 96 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Safeguard duties ... ... ... ... ..... spects. In our view the provisions of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 give ample powers to the Director General to consider all the aspects of the matter before making recommendation about levy of Safeguard Duty. The use of the word recommend coupled with the fact that under the rules the Director has to consider other aspects, shows that the Director is not bound to make recommendation for levy of duty. The Rules envisage that he may not recommend levy of Safeguard Duty inspite of finding of serious injury to domestic industry and the causal link. We are unable to find any fault with the decision of the Director General in not recommending levy of Safeguard Duty. We cannot accept the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that in the event of recording a finding about serious injury to the domestic industry, the Director General has no jurisdiction except to make a recommendation for levy of Safeguard Duty. 9. The petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.
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2000 (2) TMI 95 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ties it appears that under no circumstances ice-boxes can be classified as furniture. It has no attribute of a furniture as commonly understood. On the other hand, it is a household article in which ice is kept for the purposes of use. In our opinion, therefore, the Collector s appeal was right in classifying ice-boxes under Heading 39.24. We, therefore, hold that the order of the Tribunal classifying it under Heading 94.03 is not correct and the proper classification is 39.24. 4.The Tribunal had disposed of the appeal by classifying the ice-boxes under Heading 94.03. It did not consider the other contentions which had been raised before it by the appellant. In view of the fact that the decision of the Tribunal is being set aside, it will be appropriate for the Tribunal to consider the other contentions which had been raised by the parties. We, therefore, remand the case to the Tribunal for decision on the other questions raised before it. The appeal is disposed of. No costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 94 - SC ORDER
Appeal to Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... the facts of this matter. It is, therefore, in our view, appropriate to set aside the judgment and order under appeal and to restore to the file of the Tribunal the appeal before it (Appeal No. C/415-V/95-Bom.) for being heard and decided afresh. Due attention shall be paid to the facts of the case, to the judgment in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra and, indeed, to the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Maruti Udyog Ltd. - 1987 (28) E.L.T. 390 which was approved by the order of this Court on 26th April, 1989. 3. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 93 - SC ORDER
Valuation (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... ent to the price of goods of German origin. But that is not to say that, in the circumstances, the transaction value ought not to have been rejected and the appropriate value placed on the imported goods. 3. It shall be open to both parties to place appropriate evidence before the Tribunal and the Tribunal will hear and decide the appeal afresh in the light of our observations. Having regard to the time that has elapsed, this should be done as expeditiously as possible, and within four months. 4. The appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. Appeal No. 149/95A is restored to the file of the Tribunal, New Delhi to be heard and disposed of afresh as aforestated. 5. No order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there has been under valuation of blast furnace equipment covered by the contract MD 302?
Held that:- The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside. The case is sent back to the Tribunal to entertain and examine the plea of the Revenue if the contract DM 302 is undervalued on the basis of the material already available on record. The Tribunal shall consistently with the observations made and findings recorded in this judgment hear and dispose of the appeal before it within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. The bank guarantee furnished by the appellant shall be kept alive and the amount deposited shall also continue to remain in deposit till the date of decision by the Tribunal whereafter the bank guarantee and the deposit shall be dealt with consistently with the order of the Tribunal.
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2000 (2) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of the Collector should be upheld or not?
Whether the question of acceptability of the licences covering the import of the TDMs should have been remanded by the Tribunal?
Held that:- The two Members misread the order of the Collector completely. The Collector had referred to the date of L/C only in connection with applicability of paragraph 4 of the Public Notice and not in connection with the valuation at all. They also misconstrued the statement of the Collector relating to the fall in prices. What he had said was that the fall in price of TDMs was manipulated because of the change in the import policy by which the import of TDMs was restricted considerably. We would, therefore, uphold the finding of the Collector that the unit price of the TDMs for S $ 343.45 as also his further order regarding payment of differential duty.
It is not clear on what basis the High Court was persuaded to allow the import licence to be produced subsequent to the importation of the goods. However in directing the matter to be proceeded with in accordance with law, it is clear that the High Court did not decide finally whether the licences could, at all, be relied upon by the respondent No. 1 for avoiding their liability for contravention of clause (3) of the Control Order. The adjudicating authority will, therefore, have to decide (i) whether in law, a licence subsequently produced in respect of items already imported is acceptable in law, (ii) If so, whether the licences in fact covered the items imported and are otherwise valid.
We make it clear that there was no finding by the Tribunal that the penalty imposed was unreasonable. On the other hand, the dissenting Member who had opined against the remand, had held, in our opinion correctly, that in the circumstances of the case the quantum of the penalty was justified. Appeal partly allowed.
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2000 (2) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is necessary that the publication of notification should be proved to have been brought to the knowledge of the accused?
Whether or not mens rea?
Held that:- The case at hand is one where through the writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court the liability to pay customs duty at the rate of 25 per cent. of the value of the goods was sought to be avoided and the goods were sought to be released from detention of the customs authorities. In such a case the publication of notification in the Government Gazette in the manner contemplated by section 25(1) of the Customs Act would be enough to import the liability to pay customs duty without regard to the enquiry into the fact whether the notification had actually come to the knowledge of the importer or not. It is not the respondent's case that the relevant Gazette has been published ante-dated. What will be the impact of publication in the Government Gazette though the Gazette in spite of having been published was not available to be seen by the persons affected when criminal consequences are sought to be inflicted---is a question which should in my opinion be left open to be gone into in an appropriate case. Non-availability of the Gazette carrying the notification may provide foundation for a defence plea of innocence where mens rea is an ingredient of offence committed by breach of notification. Where mens rea is not an ingredient, want of circulation of the Gazette may still be a reason for leniency in punishment. These are the questions which need to be left open.
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2000 (2) TMI 88 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be paid by him to the Department and it will be preposterous to suggest that income-tax should still be recovered. The licence fee is therefore not a part of the amount payable at the time of the sale of country liquor. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that the amount payable in section 206C of the Act does not include the licence fee which has to be paid by the licensee to the State Government. The Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax was in error in including the licence fee in the amount payable under section 206C of the Act and the Excise and Taxation Commissioner was not required to collect 10 per cent. of the licence fee from the L-14A licensees like the petitioners and it follows that the petitioners were not liable to deposit that amount. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned notices issued to the petitioners requiring them to deposit 10 per cent. of the licence fee as income-tax quashed. There is no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 87 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business, Income From Business ... ... ... ... ..... icer that when the income is not taxed in the hands of the assessee who is liable to pay tax under the Act, can that be taxed in the hands of any other person, only on the ground that the income has not been taxed in the hands who is liable to pay tax under the Act, 1961 ? He failed to show any provision to this effect. Considering this factual position and the provision of the law, we found no substance in the view taken by the Tribunal that if income has not been taxed in the hands of A who is liable to pay tax under the Act, that can be taxed in the hands of B , when under the provisions, that is not taxable in the hands of B . In the result, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue for the period uptill September 30, 1977, and thereafter it be taxed in the hands of the assessee. The application is accordingly disposed of. All parties are to act on a xeroxed signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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2000 (2) TMI 86 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... of hearing to the assessee, and material, it may be observed that the observations made, hereinbefore, may not come in the way of the point/issue being decided on the merits as ours is a prima facie view in the absence of material. In fact, this requires no clarification, as such. However, this court has dealt with the point prima facie, at the interim stage, i.e., at the stage of issuance of notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, where the party has to appear and show cause, the decision on the merits will be upon the material that may be placed/submitted. So, the observations made, at this stage, obviously, would not and should not influence and colour the vision of the competent authority while making the final decision upon the merits after hearing and considering the materials. In the result, these petitions are dismissed. Notice in each petition shall stand discharged. Obviously, interim relief, if any, would not assume any survival value. No order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 85 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Firm, Business Expenditure, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... op who could possibly get the work of fixing gadgets or electrical fittings done through someone else and may be able to claim deductible expenditure for such work which he may get done, cannot claim such deduction when he himself does such work, a partner who does the work of his firm in fact does his own work and would stand on the same footing as an individual doing his own work. If deductions were to be allowed for remuneration given to a partner for doing the firm s own work, by creating an artificial distinction of his having worked in a different capacity, the very purpose underlying the provision of section 40(b) will be frustrated. The result of the above discussion is that the question referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this court is answered in the negative. It is held that the Tribunal was not correct in allowing the deduction of Rs. 12,107 in the computation of the assessee s income for the assessment year 1973-74. The reference is answered accordingly.
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2000 (2) TMI 84 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Firm, Assessment, Two Firms With Same Partners ... ... ... ... ..... rtnership or two different assessable entities being two separate distinct partnerships unconnected with each other, has to be determined by the income-tax authorities for the purpose of computing the assessment under the Income-tax Act but not under the general law governed by the provisions of the Partnership Act. (10) The finding of the Tribunal about the object and intendment of the partnerships and the businesses and the factum or otherwise of the interlacing and interlocking of the funds between the two partnerships is a question of fact and such finding would be binding on the High Court in a reference unless there is no material in support of it. In the light of the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as confirmed by the Tribunal that there was no interlacing and interlocking of the two firms and applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, these references are answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2000 (2) TMI 83 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... ealt in automobiles and spare parts and had subscribed to certain Government loans. It sustained a loss of Rs. 53,650 while selling them and claimed that the loss was a revenue loss. The Appellate Tribunal found that having regard to the sequence of events and the close proximity of the investment with the receipt of the Government orders for motor vehicles, the conclusion was inescapable that the investment was made in order to further the sales of the appellant and boost its business and that the investment was made by way of commercial expediency for the purpose of carrying on the business. Therefore, the loss suffered by the assessee on the sale of the investment was a revenue loss. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court. Having regard to the facts found in the present case it has to be held that the amount of Rs. 31,911 was rightly allowed by the Tribunal as revenue loss. The reference is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2000 (2) TMI 82 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... three months, what would be the position is a different aspect. As far as this case is concerned, no such ground is available to the petitioner. As regards the observations made in the said judgment that the last date for deposit of tax along with interest would expire on March 31, 1998, with great respect, we are unable to agree with that observation which goes plainly contrary to the relevant provisions of the statute, viz., section 67(1) and (2). The further observation that the provisions of taxing statute are to be construed liberally does not accord with the accepted principles of interpretation of a taxing statute. We respectfully differ with the aforesaid observations made by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. We, however, see no legal bar for refunding the tax, which has been tendered by the petitioner. Section 70 of the Finance Act does not obviously come in the way of the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed with the above observations.
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2000 (2) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Wealth Tax, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... this court in the case of CIT v. E. I. D. Parry Ltd. 1995 216 ITR 489. The above decisions explain the meaning of the expression, mistake apparent from the record found in section 154 of the Income-tax Act. There is no dispute that the conditions specified in section 35 of the Wealth-tax Act should be satisfied, but it would depend upon the facts of each case to find out whether there is a mistake apparent from the record or not. We are satisfied on the facts of this case that there is a mistake apparent from the record and the Wealth-tax Officer was justified in rectifying the same, invoking his power under section 35 of the Act. We hold that the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that there was no mistake in the orders of assessment apparent from the record. Accordingly, we answer the common question of law referred to us in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue would be entitled to costs in the sum of Rs. 1,000 one set.
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2000 (2) TMI 80 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Wealth Tax, Reference, Valuation Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... x Act has also prescribed the procedure. Schedule III has to be considered as procedural and not substantive as the market value has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the said rule. All matters which were pending on April 1, 1989, therefore, have to be covered by the said rule. There is another reason for taking this view, i.e., if there are two provisions, the interpretation which is beneficial to the assessee has to be taken in accordance with law. The decision in CWT v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup and Saris 1994 210 ITR 886 (SC), since the provisions for determining the market value have been considered to be procedural law and applicable to all the pending cases in which no right can be vested in respect of the procedure, the procedure as prescribed by Schedule III of the Act has to be applied. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in rejecting the application under section 27(1). This civil petition is accordingly dismissed.
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