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Showing 361 to 380 of 432 Records
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1996 (3) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Interest On Securities, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... before this court in the case of the same assessee for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1973-74, wherein this court in CIT v. Madurai District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. 1984 148 ITR 196 held that the assessee is entitled to deduction of interest on securities and subsidies received from the Government under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In so far as item No. (iii), namely, the dividend received by the assessee is concerned, it came up for consideration before this court in T. C. Nos. 1153 and 1154 of 1982 in the case of CIT v. Ramanathapuram District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. 1997 224 ITR 226, wherein by a judgment dated January 10, 1996, this court held that the assessee is entitled to deduction with regard to dividend received by the assessee under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. In view of the decisions cited supra, we answer the question referred to us in respect of all the three items in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 72 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Original Order, Rectification Of Mistakes ... ... ... ... ..... ified in holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax had jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings under section 263 of the Act and to revise the original assessment order when such an order was not in existence at the time of initiation of the proceedings. Consequently, we have no option but to answer the question in the negative, i. e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. However, law and justice are not distant neighbours. We, therefore, deem it proper to part with this case with the observation that as the order of rectification is no longer in existence, the appropriate authority shall be at liberty to resort to appropriate proceedings with reference to the order dated March 30, 1982, if otherwise not forbidden under the law. This miscellaneous civil case is thus disposed of as noted above, but without any orders as to costs. Counsel fee for each side is fixed at Rs. 750, if certified. Transmit a copy of this order to the Tribunal in accordance with law.
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1996 (3) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Limitation For Levy Of Penalty, Penalty Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... ax Officer to complete the penalty proceedings after the two-year period prescribed under section 275(1) of the Act, such an order is a valid order and it is not hit by the provisions of section 275 of the Act as per the decisions cited supra. Accordingly, the order passed by the Tribunal, cancelling the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Act is not in order. In that view of the matter, we answer the first question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Department. Inasmuch as question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the Department, it is not necessary to answer question No. 2, which is of academic nature. No costs. Under these circumstances, it is open to the assessee to contest the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, on the merits, while the Tribunal proceeds to pass the consequential order in pursuance of the order passed by this court in this tax case.
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1996 (3) TMI 70 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... ame was rejected for the aforesaid reason, it is not proper for this court to take a different view. Before parting, we may mention that in another case of (Mohd. Hanif v. CIT 1997 223 ITR 317--M. C. C. No. 270 of 1987), which came before us under the wealth-tax reference, we have found that some of the parties have utilised the amount for the benefit of their business. Therefore, it would be open to the assessing authorities to probe into the matter and if it is found that this amount kept reserved under the statutory liability under the Madhya Pradesh Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, has not been disbursed to the workers towards their wages and the same is found to have been invested in the business, then it would be open to the authorities to proceed under the relevant provisions of law for assessment of the liabilities. However, so far as the present case is concerned, we answer the reference in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (3) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appellate Authority, Business Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred, Rent-free Accommodation, Special Deduction, Tax Authorities
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1996 (3) TMI 68 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... e find that the questions as proposed and projected do not arise as questions of law and the conclusions of the Tribunal are based on appreciation of the facts and the decided cases as noted above. No perversity or illegality is demonstrated. The orders are thus based on appreciation of facts. In CIT v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. 1976 103 ITR 543 (SC) and CIT v. Kotrika Venkataswamy and Sons 1971 79 ITR 499 (SC), it is held that the conclusion based on question of fact does not give rise to any question of law. In view of the aforesaid position, on the facts and in law, we are satisfied with the correctness of the orders rendered by the Tribunal and hold that the present application filed by the applicant under section 256(2) of the Act is meritless and does not make out any case for a direction to state a case. In the circumstances, we dismiss this application as devoid of merit but with no order as to costs. Counsel fee for each side is, however, fixed at Rs. 750, if certified.
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1996 (3) TMI 67 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, High Court, Medical Expenses, Perquisite To Employees, Supreme Court
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1996 (3) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Fair Market Value, Immovable Property, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... r the transfer. Hence, even though, there is transfer, section 48 of the Act cannot be made applicable since it is not workable. But, in the present case, the facts are different. The assessee after selling the property for Rs. 1,20,000 credited the entire sale consideration in his capital account in the firm. Therefore, the assessee is forgoing nothing in that transaction. In fact, there is a difference between the sale consideration (actual consideration) and the fair market value to the extent of Rs. 26,098. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as there was actual capital gain in the transaction, section 48 of the Act is made applicable by the Income-tax Officer in levying capital gains tax. In this process, we see that there is no reason for the Tribunal to conclude that there is no transfer at all and the assessee is not liable to capital gains tax. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Department. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 65 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
A Partner, Inclusions In Total Income, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... etically and granted the relief. More so, section 54 of the Act of 1961 only says that within two years, the assessee should have constructed the house but that does not mean that the construction of house should necessarily be complete within two years. What it means is that the construction of house should be completed as far as possible within two years. In the modern days, it is not easy to construct a house within the time-limit of two years and under the Government schemes, construction takes years and years. Therefore, confining to two years period for construction and handing over possession thereof is impossible and unworkable under section 54 of the Act. If substantial investment is made in the construction of house, then it should be deemed that sufficient steps have been taken and this satisfies the requirements of section 54. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal is not correct. Hence, we answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (3) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Preliminary Expenses ... ... ... ... ..... uld not be possible for the Department to advert to that aspect. Since the assessee has not satisfied the condition prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 35D, the assessee would not be entitled to amortisation under section 35D of the Act even if the assessee proves that it is an industrial undertaking as contemplated under section 35D(1) of the Act. Under such circumstances, we consider that the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee is not entitled to amortisation under section 35D of the Act. However, we consider that the question as framed and referred to us would not reflect the real issue arising in this tax case. Therefore, we would reframe the question as under Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee is not entitled to amortisation under section 35D(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 63 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Sole Surviving Coparcener ... ... ... ... ..... , this reference has been made by the Tribunal at the instance of the Department. We have gone through the record and heard learned counsel for the parties. Baboolal Jain, being the sole surviving coparcener of the Hindu undivided family, was competent to gift away the property to his wife for love and affection and there is no prohibition under the Hindu law. The Gujarat High Court, in the case of Anilkumar B. Laskari v. CIT 1983 142 ITR 831 and the Bombay High Court, in the case of CIT v. Anil J. Chinai 1984 148 ITR 3, following the view taken by the Madras High Court in M. S. P. Rajah v. CGT 1982 134 ITR 1, have successively taken the view that the only male of the Hindu undivided family is competent to alienate the property. The assessee has alienated the property to his wife for love and affection which is not prohibited under the Hindu law. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal is correct. The reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (3) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... 263 of the Act. Now, learned standing counsel appearing for the Department, brought to our notice a decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. N. C. Budharaja and Co. 1993 204 ITR 412, wherein the Supreme Court held that when the assessee engaged in construction work, the assessee is not doing any manufacture or processing, and, therefore, is not entitled to investment allowance under section 32A. Therefore, in view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, we have to hold that the Tribunal was not correct in granting investment allowance under section 32A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee in the present case. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Department. No costs. However, now the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal on the question of jurisdiction exercised by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Act, on merits, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
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1996 (3) TMI 61 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Investment Allowance, Plant And Machinery, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ders were complete in themselves and no expenditure was involved in installation. The Tribunal held that gas cylinders are part of the plant and machinery for commencement of production of gas for marketing. The Tribunal thus held that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Act was meritless. On following the aforesaid two decisions, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. The application under section 256(1) of the Act was rejected on the ground that the points are covered by the aforesaid two decisions and, therefore, do not give rise to any referable question of law. On consideration, we find that the Tribunal committed no error in refusing to state the case. In view of the aforesaid two decisions, there are no referable questions of law arising out of the order passed by the Tribunal. Consequently we reject the application as being without merit. Counsel s fee for counsel for the applicant is allowed at Rs. 750, if certified.
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1996 (3) TMI 60 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Receipt, Revenue Receipt, Sales Tax Subsidy ... ... ... ... ..... o. 367/(Ind) of 1989, was dismissed by the Tribunal as under Finding of the Income-tax Officer as to the amount of sales tax subsidy being a revenue receipt has been reversed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) holding it as a capital receipt. The Department is, therefore, in appeal. 2. The point in issue is covered by CIT v. Dusad Industries 1986 162 ITR 784 (MP) against the Department. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal. 3. In the result the appeal is dismissed. As the order was based on the decision rendered by this court, the application seeking reference was also rejected. The point stands concluded by the aforesaid decision. Nothing substantial is urged to take a different view in the matter. We are thus satisfied about the correctness of the order passed by the Tribunal and hold that there are no referable questions of law, as noted above, The application is accordingly rejected. Counsel fee for the applicant is, however, fixed at Rs. 750, if certified.
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1996 (3) TMI 59 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Provision For Gratuity, Quoted Equity Shares ... ... ... ... ..... 973, provision for gratuity liability even if it is an accrued liability still it is not an allowable deduction under the Income-tax Act since the company did not satisfy the three conditions specified in sub-clause (b) thereof. As already stated the provisions of the Income-tax Act have no relevance in determining the question whether the provision for gratuity is a contingent liability or not. For the above reasons, this contention also has no merit. We accordingly answer the questions referred to us in the following manner. We answer the first question in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the accountable person. In view of our answer to question No. 1, we decline to answer questions Nos. 2 and 3, which, according to us, are unnecessary for the purpose of this case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.
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1996 (3) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Fair Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... t the company would not suffer any detriment because of this transaction is also immaterial for taxing any benefit received by a director from the company. The intention of the Legislature was to tax any benefit if it is received by a director or by a relative of the director or such person, who is having substantial interest in the company, irrespective of the fact whether the director is an employee-director or the benefit received was in the nature of capital, or whether there is any direct receipt in the transaction or whether there is any detriment to the company or not in the transaction, or whether section 52(2) was held to be not applicable in the case of the company, since no extra consideration actually passed, under the provisions of section 2(24)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as deemed income. In view of the foregoing discussions, we answer the questions referred to us in the case of both the assessees in the negative and in favour of the Department. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 57 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Financial Year, High Court, Interest On Tax, Tax At Source ... ... ... ... ..... he situation of consequences and it cannot be said to be in isolation separating the question of interest altogether. Learned senior tax counsel strenuously submitted that the question does not seem to have been argued with reference to the question of interest. In our judgment, reading the reasoning, the question is not required to be considered in isolation and we agree with the reasoning of the above decision which is followed by the Tribunal. Once the tax is time-barred interest has no separate existence even in accordance with the natural course of observation as seen from the kid following the camel. For all the above reasons, we answer the above question in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. It is unnecessary to refer to other submissions of learned counsel. A copy of the judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin, for passing consequential orders.
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1996 (3) TMI 56 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... rce in the prayer made on behalf of the assessee that the assessment made had to be annulled and not set aside. We annul the assessment and allow the appeal of the assessee. There is no need to go into the grounds on the merits which were not gone into by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also. In Jai Prakash Singh v. CIT 1978 111 ITR 507 (Gauhati) it is laid down that if the estate of a deceased assessee is to be assessed to income-tax, the estate must be fully represented by impleading all the legal representatives by serving notices under section 143(2) and that in default of such a procedure, the assessment proceedings would be invalid and would become liable to be annulled. We are satisfied with the correctness of the order of the Tribunal. The questions, as proposed, thus do not arise out of the order passed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we reject this application but with no order as to costs. Counsel fee for the applicant is, however, fixed at Rs. 750 if certified.
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1996 (3) TMI 55 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Powers Of Tribunal, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... i D. D. Vyas, learned counsel for the applicant/ Department. None has appeared for the non-applicant/assessee. We are satisfied that the order of the Tribunal recalling its earlier order is based on appreciation of facts and, therefore, it does not give rise to any referable question of law. In fact, no adverse final order is passed against the Department inasmuch as the Tribunal by its order dated November 30, 1990, has merely directed for hearing the appeals afresh. The order of the Assessing Officer imposing penalty, therefore, still survives and the Department would be free to support the order before the Tribunal. In case the Department suffers any adverse order it may take recourse to the appropriate provision of the Act and seek reference to this court. For the present no referable question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. Consequently, the present application is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 750 is allowed, if certified.
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1996 (3) TMI 54 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... e assessee filed an appeal against the assessment, the additions made by the Assessing Officer would have been deleted. We refrain from making any comments on the finding of the Tribunal as we propose to make a direction to the Tribunal to make the reference. We are, however, satisfied that the order of the Tribunal does give rise to a question of law stated at No. 1 by the Department. The Department has, however, not pressed other questions (Nos. 2 and 3). We, therefore, allow the application in part and direct the Tribunal to state the case and refer the following question of law for the opinion of this court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was any material with the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal justifying cancellation of penalty under section 271(1)(c) ? The application accordingly stands allowed as aforesaid without any order as to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 750 is allowed, if certified. A copy of this order be transmitted to the Tribunal.
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