|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 381 to 400 of 492 Records
-
1998 (2) TMI 113 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Chief Commissioner, High Court, Income Tax, Offences And Prosecution, Retrospective Effect, Territorial Jurisdiction, Writ Petition
-
1998 (2) TMI 112 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Law Applicable, Net Wealth, Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... s have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them. There cannot also be two opinions that the choice of the options available is of the authority and the court/Tribunal cannot substitute its view as to what is reasonable. Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 (1997 7 SCC 463. Had the appropriate authority arrived at a reasonable decision, we would not have interfered with the decision of the appropriate authority. In our view, the decision arrived at by the appropriate authority is unreasonable as he has allowed irrelevant considerations to go into his decision and, therefore, this court in exercise of its powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India, can interfere with the decision of the appropriate authority and set aside its unreasonable decision. In view of the above, it follows that the petitioners are entitled to succeed and the writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. The impugned order is quashed. Advocate s fee Rs. 500.
-
1998 (2) TMI 111 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Earlier Decision, High Court, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... hich the legislation is enacted. As to the marginal note to the section, their Lordships have held that they cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section but can be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or to show what the section is dealing with. As to the circulars issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes, their Lordships have held that they are valuable evidence of contemporaneous exposition but must give way where the language of the statute is unambiguous. We do not think that the principle abovesaid can lend strength to any of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the assessee in view of what we have already stated hereinabove. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not correct in forming an opinion that the deposits made by the directors and shareholders were not covered by section 40A(8). The question is, therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1998 (2) TMI 110 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Deductions In Respect, Standard Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... connection with an agreement to live apart. In this case, the assessee has miserably failed to show that he was remitting money to his wife for adequate consideration than natural love and affection or meeting his conjugal obligation. Again, no legal document has been brought on record to show that the assessee was remitting money to his wife in connection with an agreement to live apart . It is evident from the findings recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the money was transferred by the assessee to his wife, otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart. That being so, the case of the assessee clearly fell within the ambit of section 64(1)(iv) of the Act and the Tribunal was clearly right in taking the view that the assessee was liable to assessment in respect of the interest income of Rs. 14,652. The question referred to this court is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1998 (2) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appellate Authority, Stay Of Collection Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ght about in section 16 is fully applicable to the case of the respondent-assessee, as we are concerned with the assessment year 1978-79. Thus the assessee was not entitled to separate deduction under section 16(i) on the amount of salary received by him from more than one employer. The deduction under section 16(i) was liable to be computed with reference to the aggregate salary due, paid or allowed to the assessee during the year relevant to the assessment year in question which could in no case be in excess of the amount specified in those provisions. We are supported, in our view, by two decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT v. P. S. Kalani 1986 159 ITR 681 and in CIT v. S. C. Deora 1987 167 ITR 682. The same view has been expressed by the other High Courts also, but it is not necessary to multiply the citations. In view of the above discussion, the question referred to this court is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1998 (2) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Evidence, Appeal To AAC, Dispose Of, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... ner of Income-tax (Appeals). It had no other income except the interest income on the basis of accrual, the balance amount of sale proceeds has not been paid in all these previous years, relevant to the assessment years. Even, no interest has been received from W. S. Cresswell and Co. Ltd. The services of the agent of the assessee were terminated. It appears that W. S. Cresswell and Co. Ltd. has gone into liquidation. There was no hope of recovery even of the principal amount, and the assessee switched over the system from the mercantile system to the cash system and had a bona fide belief that no interest income accrued. It has shown nil income and was assessed as such. No case of penalty or concealment has been made out under section 271(1)(c). For penalty under section 271(1)(c), the Revenue has to prove that the assessee has knowingly concealed his income. Accordingly, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
-
1998 (2) TMI 107 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Equity Shares, Investment Company ... ... ... ... ..... hich he could collect in the meantime. This case, therefore, will fall under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of rule 46A of the Rules. In any view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should have considered the evidence produced by the assessee in regard to the loan of Rs. 40,000 from Champaklal Dalpatrai. In view of the above, we answer question No. 3 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of the above answer to question No. 3, questions Nos. 1 and 2 need not be answered. So far as question No. 4 is concerned, we are of the opinion that the question referred to us is not a question of law. We, therefore, decline to answer the same. We, however, make it clear that so far as the addition of Rs. 40,000 being loan from Champaklal Dalpatrai is concerned, the same may be examined afresh in the light of the evidence produced by the assessee. This reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 106 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... thus cannot be included in their net wealth. Accordingly, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue. 15. Coming to the second question, as to whether a compulsory deposit made under the Compulsory Deposit Scheme (Income-tax Payers ) Act, 1974, is an asset within the meaning of s. 2 (e)(2)(ii) of the Act, learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the answer to the question stands concluded by our decision in WT Ref. Nos. 210-212 of 1987, dt. 17th Sept., 1996, in CWT vs. Seth Lalit Modi reported at (1998) 150 CTR (Del) 692 , wherein it has been held that the said deposit is not an annuity within the meaning of the said section and is an asset to be included in the net wealth of the assessee. 16. For the reasons given in the said decision, we answer question No. 2 in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. The references are answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 105 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Unexplained Money ... ... ... ... ..... ressed by this submission, though this submission was accepted by both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. But for the prohibitory law, any article being a property can be owned by a person. Simply because the law prohibits retention of a property, that does not mean that such property is without ownership. Even contraband or prohibited articles can be owned and possessed unlawfully. It is entirely a different thing that the law may not permit the owner of given articles to retain possession of them or the articles may be liable under law to be confiscated. It is, therefore, incorrect to contend that the gold articles in question could not have been owned by the assessee. 15. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the CIT(A) and the Tribunal erroneously deleted the addition of Rs. 40,37,351 made by the assessing authority under s. 69A of the Act. In the result, all the four questions are answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1998 (2) TMI 104 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Loss On Sale Of Shares ... ... ... ... ..... e-tax file number but it is not known when it was given and mere filing of the income-tax file number of the creditors is not enough to prove the genuineness of the cash credit. The creditor should be identified. There should be creditworthiness. There should be a genuine transaction. The income-tax file number has been given but that is not enough to prove the genuineness of the cash credit. Admittedly, there is no affidavit to this effect, by the creditor, on record. Considering these facts, we find that the finding of the Tribunal in this regard is perverse. The assessee has failed to prove the genuineness of the cash credit. Accordingly, we answer question No. 2 so far as it relates to whether the cash credit has been proved, in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and insofar as it relates to whether the finding of the Tribunal is perverse or not, we answer it in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1998 (2) TMI 103 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Notice For Reassessment, Adequacy Of Material ... ... ... ... ..... its return by disclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The belief is that of the Assessing Officer and the reliability or credibility or for that matter the weight that was attached to the materials naturally depends on the judgment of the Assessing Officer. This court in exercise of power under article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot go into the sufficiency or adequacy of the materials. After all the Assessing Officer alone is entrusted to administer the impugned Act and if there is prima facie material at the disposal of the Assessing Officer that the income chargeable to income-tax escaped assessment this court in exercise of power under article 226 of the Constitution of India should refrain from exercising the power. In the instant case, the case of the petitioner was fairly considered and thereafter the above decision is taken. For the foregoing reasons, both the writ petitions stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 102 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 9. Again the officer rejected its claim. The claim of the assessee was rejected up to the stage of the Tribunal. Thereafter, the matter came up on reference to the Madras High Court. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the expression bad and doubtful debt is descriptive of a debt which cannot reasonably be expected to be realised. It is not sufficient for the assessee to say that he became pessimistic about the prospects of recovery of the debt in question. He must feel honestly convinced that the financial position of the debtor was so precarious and shaky, that it would be impossible to collect any money from him. As already observed there is no material on record, in the instant case, on the basis of which it can be held that the debt is a bad and doubtful debt and as such the act of the assessee in writing off the said debt cannot be said to be an exercise of honest judgment. With the observation as above, I agree with the finding of my learned brother.
-
1998 (2) TMI 101 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... in its ordinary meaning is a word of wide import and it must be broadly construed having regard to the fact that articles such as books and surgical instruments were expressly covered within the definition of plant under section 43(3) of the Act. It was held that the word plant would include any article or object, fixed or immovable, used by a businessman for carrying on his business. It would not, however, cover his stock-in-trade, that is, goods bought or made for sale by the businessman. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that bottles and shells (crates) were plant within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act and that the assessee was entitled to 100 per cent. depreciation on bottles and shells (crates). Both the questions are, therefore, answered accordingly in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 100 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
HUF, Capital Or Revenue, Grant Of Jagir ... ... ... ... ..... e head Miscellaneous compensation by the Government 5. The annual payments of the compensation amount for life to the assessee in lieu of resumption of grant which consisted of a jagir of two villages known as Kapal Giras did not amount to any payment taxable as annuity under the Income-tax Act 6. The annual payment for life, in lieu of the resumed grant of the two villages, was clearly a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee. In view of the above discussion, we hold on question No. 2 that the Tribunal committed an error in holding that the cash annuity in resumption of two villages, was an income and not capital receipt in the hands of the assessee. In both the references, for the reasons given above, question No. 1 is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, and question No. 2 is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Both the references stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 99 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appropriate Authority, Scope Of Powers, Legality Of Transaction ... ... ... ... ..... s case 1992 197 ITR 609 were brought to the notice of the Division Bench but were distinguished as not applicable to the facts of that case. However, the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Delhi High Court s decision by a speaking order was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench deciding Madhukar Sunderlal Sheth s case 1992 198 ITR 594 (Bom). In our opinion, the abovesaid Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court proceeded on its own peculiar facts and cannot be of general application so as to govern the present case. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated April 27, 1995, passed by the appropriate authority is hereby quashed and set aside. As a period of two months from the date of the filing of the statement on October 25, 1989, has already elapsed, the appropriate authority shall issue to the petitioners within four weeks from today, a no-objection certificate in terms of section 269UL(3). No order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 98 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance, Borewell ... ... ... ... ..... ub-soil water drawn to surface ground, far from having a commercial potential, may be unwholesome and injurious to the surface environment. The Tribunal has not looked into the purpose of extracting water. In case the purpose of drilling was to win water the ratio decidendi in Super Drillers case 1988 174 ITR 640 (AP) shall apply. As the full facts of the case are not available, we decline to answer the question and remit the matter to the Tribunal with the direction to ascertain the purpose of boring and drawing water from underground. The Tribunal shall allow the parties to lead evidence if they so desire. There will be no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the Revenue has not controverted these facts. Accordingly, we send the matter back to the Tribunal with a direction to ascertain the purpose of boring and drawing water from underground and also to allow the parties to lead evidence in deciding the question afresh. The reference matter accordingly stands disposed of.
-
1998 (2) TMI 97 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Financial Corporation, Speculation In Shares, Interest On Borrowed Capital, Intercorporate Dividends
-
1998 (2) TMI 96 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Receipt, Revenue Receipt, Technical Know-how ... ... ... ... ..... ut by the Appellate Tribunal, collaboration agreements are generally vetted by the Central Government and the bifurcation of the amount paid into a capital part for parting with the know-how and revenue part by way of royalty for use of the patents and licences has been recognised. We do not think that the Department can try to convert the capital part into revenue part unless it can clearly be established that services were rendered in India, for which portion clause (vii) has been specifically introduced in section 9(1) of the Income-tax Act. In the present case, in view of the finding of the Tribunal that no services were actually rendered in India and no technical fee can be attributed to that clause, we agree with the Appellate Tribunal that the amount received as technical fee was only a capital receipt for sale of technical know-how abroad and, therefore, not taxable in India. The question, therefore, is accordingly answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
-
1998 (2) TMI 95 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Limitation, Condonation Of Delay ... ... ... ... ..... f Kerala 1997 6 Scale 209. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that no referable question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal and no fault can be found with the view taken by the Tribunal in rejecting the petitioner s application under section 256(1). Whether or not there was sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is basically a question of fact. The Tribunal has kept the law laid down by the Supreme Court in its view and then found that the benefit thereof was not available to the assessee-petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is well settled that the Tribunal is final fact-finding authority and a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be said to give rise to a question of law worth being answered by the High Court. The application under section 256(2) of the Act is, therefore, held liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.
-
1998 (2) TMI 94 - KERALA HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking, Sequence Of Deductions ... ... ... ... ..... t even upon consideration of section 80AB, the Appellate Tribunal would not have reached a different conclusion. Be that as it may, the fact remains that section 80AB which was relied on by the Rajasthan High Court to reach the conclusion that, for determination of the relief under section 80HH, the income eligible for deduction will be the net income and not the gross income, was not taken into consideration by the Appellate Tribunal. The case, therefore, requires reconsideration. In view of the above observations, the case in so far as it relates to the determination of deduction under section 80HH, is remitted to the Appellate Tribunal. While deciding the question whether for determination of the relief under section 80HH, net income or gross income is to be taken into consideration, the Tribunal amongst other materials will consider section 80AB of the Act and the above decision of the Rajasthan High Court. The question will then be decided afresh in accordance with law.
............
|
