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Showing 41 to 60 of 887 Records
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2008 (1) TMI 964 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ter the day today affairs of management, it is not legally permissible for the Board of Directors to circumvent the General Body and to take a unilateral decision. The Court was not considering the scope of Section 30B of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. Therefore, this decision does not advance the case of the petitioners. In Telecom Employees Co-Operative Housing Society Limited's case , a Division Bench of this Court was considering the power of the Government to issue directions to make bulk allotment under Section 65 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. The language employed in Section 30B of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, which is under consideration in this writ petition is not in pari materia with Section 65 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. Therefore, this decision also will not assist the petitioners. 21. I do not find any error in the impugned orders. In the result, writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 963 - SUPREME COURT
Adjudication of disputes and claims - Arbitration Agreement - acknowledgement of liability - claim of the contractor was barred by limitation - Validity of Arbitral Award - arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding huge amounts towards alleged extra work, even though there was nothing to indicate that conditions contemplated in proviso to Clause 11 (relating to additional work) - Interest could be awarded by the arbitrator only from the date of reference and could not be awarded in regard to any pre-reference period - HELD THAT:- In this case, the cause of action accrued on 14.4.1977 when the final bill was signed by the contractor. It is not in dispute that the final bill showed that a sum of ₹ 17,69,608.73 was payable to the contractor (after giving credit to the payments made and after withholding a sum of ₹ 7,45,953.83 as 5% security deposit). Towards the said sum of ₹ 17,69,608.73. ₹ 17 lacs was paid on 25.2.1976 and ₹ 70,000/- was paid on 6.8.1977.The contractor had made some claims and OMC wrote a letter dated 28.10.1978 in regard to the pending claims of the contractor.
In view of the acknowledgement in writing on 28.10.1978 and payment of the ₹ 3,50,000/- on 4.3.1980, it can be said that in regard to the pending claims of the contractor, the limitation stood extended by three years from 4.3.1980 and at all events by three years from 28.10.1978. It is not in dispute that the contractor issued the notice invoking arbitration on 4.6.1980 and immediately filed a petition under section 8(2) of the Act for appointment of Arbitrator which was allowed on 6.10.1980. Therefore, whatever claims were made before the Arbitrator which was part of the claim of ₹ 50,15,820, was within time, having been made within three years from 28.10.1978 and 4.6.1980.
Out of the claim of ₹ 95,96,616 made by the appellant before the Arbitrator, the claim for only ₹ 28,32,138/- was not barred by limitation. The remaining claims of the appellant aggregating to ₹ 67,64,488/- out of the total of ₹ 95,96,616/- being fresh claims, were not pending claims in respect of which the acknowledgement was made. Therefore the said fresh claims aggregating to ₹ 67,64,488 made for the first time in the claims statement filed on 27.6.1986 were clearly barred by limitation.
learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the limitation would begun to run from the date on which a difference arose between the parties, and in this case the difference arose only when OMC refused to comply with the notice dated 4.6.1980 seeking reference to arbitration. We are afraid, the contention is without merit. The appellant is obviously confusing the limitation for a petition under section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 with the limitation for the claim itself. The limitation for a suit is calculated as on the date of filing of the suit. In the case of arbitration, limitation for the claim is to be calculated on the date on which the arbitration is deemed to have commenced.
Therefore, the period of limitation for filing a petition under section 8(2) seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be confused with the period of limitation for making a claim. The decisions of this Court in Inder Singh Rekhi vs. Delhi Development Authority [1988 (3) TMI 446 - SUPREME COURT] and Panchu Gopal Bose vs. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta [1993 (4) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT] also make this position clear.
Under section 19 a payment made on account of a debt, enables a fresh period of limitation being computed. Therefore, the letter of OMC dated 28.10.1978 and the payment of ₹ 3,50,000/- by OMC, would result in a fresh period of limitation being computed only in regard to the 'existing debt' in respect of which acknowledgment and payment was made. Admittedly, as at that time, the claim of the contractor was only for a sum of ₹ 50,15,820. Therefore, the letter dated 28.10.1978 and payment on 4.3.1980 extended the limitation only in respect of the claims which were part of the said claim of ₹ 50,15,820. Therefore, the fresh claims of ₹ 67,64,488/- (out of the total claim of ₹ 95,96,616) is barred by limitation and the award made in that behalf is liable to be set aside.
Consequently, we hold that only that part of the claim before the Arbitrator which was part of the claim of ₹ 5015,820/- made by the contractor, that was existing or pending as on 28.10.1978 and 4.3.1980, namely ₹ 28,32,128 (out of ₹ 95,96,616) could have been considered by the Arbitrator.
Relief to the parties - Whether the award is liable to be set aside on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction? - When the claim made in the claim statement is after adjusting ₹ 149,88,566.90 paid by OMC towards the work, the arbitrator cannot proceed on the basis that only ₹ 120,01,659.90 was paid towards the work. As a result though the Arbitrator found that the amount payable towards claims at Items 1 to 16 was only ₹ 365,862.18, he awarded ₹ 32,83,243/- to the appellant, thereby increasing the liability of OMC by ₹ 29,86,871/-.
By awarding more than what was claimed in the claim statement (by showing a lesser amount as having been paid by OMC though claim statement showed a higher amount), the Arbitrator clearly exceeded his jurisdiction. The Arbitrator thus committed a legal misconduct and the award to that extent is liable to be set aside. Therefore the amount awarded in respect of claims at items 1 to 16 by the Arbitrator is to be reduced by ₹ 29,86,871/-.
The Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in another respect. The total claim made by the contractor before the Arbitration was ₹ 95,96,616/- (excluding interest). But the amount awarded by the arbitrator towards the said claim was ₹ 1,02,66,901/36 (excluding interest). Making an award in excess of the claim itself by ₹ 6,70,285 is a clear act of exceeding the jurisdiction and amounts to a legal misconduct and to that extent of ₹ 6,70,285/- the award is invalid.
In regard to item 35, that is escalation in cost, the claim in the claim statement was at the rate of 15% for the value of work done in 1972-73, 28.5% in respect of value of work done in 1973-74 and 32% in respect of work done in 1974-75. But the Arbitrator has awarded escalation at a flat rate of 32.6% on the entire cost of work done from 1.4.1973 and thereby awarded an escalation in excess of what was claimed. This also amounts to exceeding the jurisdiction and therefore legal misconduct. The award in excess of what was claimed was invalid.
The award of the arbitrator in respect of time barred claim of ₹ 67,64,488 is an error apparent on the face of the award. Award of amounts in excess of claim (referred to in paras 22, 23 and 24) clearly amount to exceeding the jurisdiction. All these, that is awarding amount towards time barred part of the claim of ₹ 67,64,488, and awarding amounts of ₹ 29,86,871, ₹ 670,285 and escalation in cost at a rate more than what is claimed, are all legal misconducts and the award in regard to those amounts are null and void. There is however some overlapping of the aforesaid amounts.
That part of the award which is valid and separable can be upheld. That part relates to the claims which were validly before the Arbitrator, which were part of the existing or pending claims of ₹ 50,15,820 and which were not barred by limitation. Only the amounts awarded by the Arbitrator against those claims can be considered as award validly made in Arbitration, falling within jurisdiction. They are clearly severable from the other portions of the award.
Thus the total amount awarded by the Arbitrator against claims which were not barred by limitation was only ₹ 13,93,373.50. The award to this extent is not open to challenge. This part of the award does not suffer from any legal misconduct. There is also no error apparent on the face of the award in respect of the amount. It is not open to challenge. Therefore, the Award of the Arbitrator has to be upheld to an extent of ₹ 13,93,373.50.
Thus, we allow these appeals in part, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct a decree in terms of the award for a sum of ₹ 13,93,373.50 with interest at the rate of 12% P.A. from 1.8.1977 to date of award (28.11.1986) and at the rate of 6% P.A. thereafter, that is from 29.11.1986 till date of payment.
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2008 (1) TMI 962 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under Section 13(4) of the Act. 26. The respondent Bank in the present case has thus failed to act in accordance with the letter and spirit of Section 13(3A) of the Act as has been propounded by the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (supra). In that view of the matter, the notice dated 26.4.2007 warrants interference and is thus set aside. 27. The respondent Bank would take an appropriate decision on the petitioners represantation dated 14.2.2007 and communicate the same to the petitioners within a week from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. Needless to say that depending on the decision so taken, it would be open for the parties to take necessary steps thereafter in terms of the Act. In the face of this conclusion, it is considered inessential at this stage to deal with the competing assertions bearing on the norms and the status of the borrower's account on the basis thereof. 28. In the result, the petition is partly allowed. No costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 961 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... exercise its discretionary as the original documents were not produced and, thus, the plaintiff is called upon to prove that the documents are lost in the criminal proceedings. 13. In view of the fact that no application for leave was filed, it is not possible for us to consider submission of Mr. Naphede in regard to the presumptions arising under Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 128 of the Code or purported acknowledgement contained in the balance sheet of the respondents. We, however, are of the opinion that the question as to whether the respondents should be put to any terms or not should be determined afresh by the High Court as the High Court did not address itself on the aforementioned question. We, however, express no opinion thereupon. 14. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment warrants no interference at this stage. The appeal is dismissed accordingly, subject, however, to the aforementioned observations. No costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 960 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainable or Not to challenge an Award of the Permanent Lok Adalat - No compromise or settlement is signed by the parties - conciliation proceedings mandatory under Section 22C of the Legal Services Act 1987 (LSA) - Appeal filled by Legal heirs of the deceased for enhancement of compensation - Women died in a motor accident involving a Punjab roadways bus - Punjab Roadways (second appellant) filed an application to set aside passed by the Lok Adalat, as it was passed without their consent - HELD THAT:- It is true that where an award is made by Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties, (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds.
But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and disposed of the appeal on merits.
But the travails continued. In view of the order dated 11.9.2002 passed by the learned single Judge holding that a petition under Article 227 has to be filed to challenge the order of the Lok Adalat, the appellants filed a petition under Article 227. But the said petition was dismissed by another single Judge on the ground that the order of Lok Adalat passed on 3.8.2001 had attained finality as the objections to it were dismissed on 11.9.2002 and a petition under Article 227 was not maintainable to challenge the order of Lok Adalat. He failed to notice that the order dated 3.8.2001 was neither a decision nor had it attained finality. He also failed to notice that the objections to the order were not rejected by the High Court after consideration on merits. He also overlooked the fact that the learned Judge who decided the appellants' application, had directed that the order of the Lok Adalat should be challenged by filing a petition under Article 227. Be that as it may.
Thus we find that the Lok Adalat exercised a power/jurisdiction not vested in it. On the other hand, the High Court twice refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, thereby denying justice and driving the appellants to this Court. In this process, a simple appeal by the legal heirs of the deceased for enhancement of compensation, has been tossed around and is pending for more than eight years, putting them to avoidable expense and harassment.
We therefore allow this appeal and quash the order of the Lok Adalat as also set aside the orders of the High Court. As a consequence, the High Court shall hear and dispose which continues to be pending on its record, on merits in accordance with law.
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2008 (1) TMI 959 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nation that the departmental authorities were pressuring him for surrender, and it was 9.30 PM that the assessee eventually succumbed to the pressure, and made the surrender, and therefore, it has been found by the learned Tribunal that the assessee was justified in retreating from his surrender, which has been found to be based on no evidence. In our view, the findings are pure findings of fact, and do not involve any substantial question of law. The appeal thus, has no force and is dismissed summarily.
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2008 (1) TMI 958 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he said order, petitioner has filed the appeal before the appellate authority as referred above and the appellate authority, in turn, has disposed of the appeal holding that, the claim is within the wield of limitation. Subsequently, petitioner has submitted several representations and reminders Annexure P series but the second responder it has neither considered nor taken any decision on the same. Keeping the representations of the petitioner in abeyance and not taking decision on the same within the reasonable time, is not justifiable. 5. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the writ petition filed by petitioner is disposed of with a direction to second respondent to consider the representations submitted by petitioner vide Annexure P series and dispose of the same, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order, if not already considered aria disposed of.
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2008 (1) TMI 957 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tem (d) Bonus is concerned, it is submitted that the issue is still open. 5. In so far as question of law No.2 is concerned, a similar issue had come up for consideration before this Court in Income Tax Appeal No.72 of 1999 in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. The Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd., Mumbai which was disposed of on December 7, 1999. In that matter this Court did not interfere with the findings recorded by the ITAT. Considering the same in our opinion, in so far as Question No.2 as framed will not arise. 6. The amount of bonus as mentioned earlier is in a sum of ₹ 6,102/-. That issue can be left open for consideration in appropriate case as even otherwise the tax incidence in so far as this issue is concerned is less than ₹ 4.00 lakhs. 7. The question of law No.1, therefore, in so far as Guest House expenses to the extent of rates and taxes, repairs and insurance are answered in favour of the Revenue. Appeal disposed of accordingly.
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2008 (1) TMI 956 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 006 on either of the two grounds, namely, that the Hon'ble Chief Justice had ignored the import of the two letters dated 31.8.2000 and 30.11.2001 and that he had erred in holding that the claim was time barred and secondly, that he could not have passed the order since the Arbitrator was already appointed. As held earlier, as far as the first submission is concerned, it amounts to seeking substantive review, which is not permissible, and even on the basis that there is error apparent, it amounts to sitting in appeal and that apart, there is no error apparent on the face of record. The second submission is also without any merit. Besides, it was not canvassed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice at all and it cannot be permitted to be canvassed now. This is apart from the fact that both these submissions amount to seek a substantive review, which is not permissible. For this reason, the present application for recall cannot be entertained and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 955 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e the respondent is having mental disability of 40 to 70 , it would be just and proper to allow the operation of the order passed by the Commissioner so as to enable the respondent to get regular salary and after examination by the competent doctor appropriate duty may be assigned to her. 8. In view of the aforesaid, I am inclined to pass the following order - Rule. (a) By interim order, there shall be stay against the impugned order of the Commissioner to the extent that the petitioner shall not be required to pay any backwages to the respondent, but the petitioner shall reinstate the respondent in service by paying regular salary to her from 1.2.2008. (b) It is further observed and directed that the petitioner shall get respondent examined through a Government Doctor of their choice and if it is so opined by the doctor, such duty may be assigned to the respondent at a place or a nearby place, where she can comfortably and conveniently, in a safe atmosphere, discharge duty.
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2008 (1) TMI 954 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f Mr. Godbole that no sufficient cause was made out. Thus, on facts the impugned order has not been questioned. It is only the lack of power that was put in issue. That being squarely and fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court (supra), there is no substance in the writ petition. 21. Rule is accordingly discharged. However, there shall be no costs. Ad interim order passed by this Court on 1st November, 2007 stands vacated. 22. At this stage Mr. Arjunwadkar for petitioner prays for continuation of the ad interim order. The said request is opposed by the first respondent. However, since a pure legal issue is involved, it would be in the interest of justice to continue the ad interim order for a period of eight weeks from today. Ad interim order is continued for twelve weeks from today Needless to state that no extension would be granted. Learned Judge to thereafter proceed with the election petition on merits and in accordance with law. Petition dismissed. No costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 953 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d with. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants has produced the cheques to show hitherto that the second respondent and the appellant were jointly signing the cheques and to authorise the managing director to operate the bank accounts would tantamount to authorising the managing director to take control of the affairs of the company by manipulating invoice. This contention does not merit acceptance. The impugned order was passed by the Company Law Board exercising its discretionary power to regulate the affairs of the company. It is also relevant to note that the impugned order contains a safeguard directing the second respondent to furnish statement of the bank accounts to the appellants. 10. No question of law, much less, substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. No substantial question of law is involved to entertain the C.M.A. 11. In the result, this C.M.A. is dismissed. Consequently, M.P. No. 1 of 2008 is also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 952 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s court. 2. We have heard learned Standing Counsel appearing for the department and learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The question raised is whether the estimation of income at 10 as fixed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and confirmed by the Tribunal applies to interest element of the award amount. According to the Revenue, interest is entirely taxable as it is an addition to the contract amount. However, we find that the issue is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Govinda Choudhurg and Sons (203 ITR 881) wherein the Supreme Court held that the compensation as well as interest have to be treated as contract receipts. Since the issue raised is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court, we do not think there is any scope for considering the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue in United Construction Contractors v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1994 (1) KLT 880). The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 951 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Addition of unexplained investments u/s 69B - Purchase of Agriculture land unexplained - Not allowed to retract from an earlier admission by mere statement - No opportunity provided for cross examination - seller admitted that he had sold the land in question at the rate of ₹ 4 lacs per acre, but the sale deed was got registered at the rate of ₹ 2.30 lacs per acre - subsequently retracted, assessed the value of the land purchased at the rate of ₹ 4 lacs per acre and framed the assessment while adding ₹ 38.65 lacs for the AY 2001-02 and ₹ 46,32,500 for the AY 2002-03 - Payment of the sale consideration from NRI account - Additions deleted by CIT(A) confirmed by the ITAT
HELD THAT:- It is undisputed/position that before the AO said Satinder Pal Singh did not appear and made any statement nor an opportunity was granted to the assessee to confront the sale deed and cross examine Satinder Pal Singh on the statement which he had made before the Assistant Director of Income Tax (Investment).
In spite of all this evidence, the AO made the addition under Section 69B of the Act only on the basis of conjectures while observing that it is a well known practice that the sale deeds of immovable properties are being registered at the much lower rates than the rates prevailing in the markets. It is also undisputed fact that after selling of the land, Satinder Pal Singh was assessed under the Act and at that time the sale value of the said land was taken as indicated in the registered sale deed and that assessment had become final.
In our opinion, the Tribunal has duly appreciated the evidence/material available on the record and various contentions raised by the parties, and then came to the aforesaid conclusion, which in our view, is a pure finding of fact which does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, in our opinion, in these appeals no substantial question of law is arising from the impugned order for consideration of this Court.
Hence, both the appeals are dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 950 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessing officer made the addition under Section 69B of the Act only on the basis of conjectures while observing that it is a well known practice that the sale deeds of immovable properties are being registered at the much lower rates than the rates prevailing in the markets. It is also undisputed fact that after selling of the land, Satinder Pal Singh was assessed under the Act and at that time the sale value of the said land was taken as indicated in the registered sale deed and that assessment had become final. In our opinion, the Tribunal has duly appreciated the evidence/material available on the record and various contentions raised by the parties, and then came to the aforesaid conclusion, which in our view, is a pure finding of fact which does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, in our opinion, in these appeals no substantial question of law is arising from the impugned order for consideration of this Court. 7. Hence, both the appeals are dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 949 - SUPREME COURT
Reference to arbitration - application under Section 34 - Validity of reconstituted partnership deed - non-compliance of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) - share of profits from the partnership business - HELD THAT:- For getting this relief, the plaintiffs undoubtedly rely upon the partnership deed dated 13.1.1989. However, this deed of 1989 could be relied upon and form the basis of the claim of the plaintiffs only if the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was declared as void. If the deed dated 17.2.1992 was not declared as void and remained valid and operative, the plaintiffs could not fall back upon the earlier partnership deed dated 13.1.1989 to claim rendition of accounts and their share of profits. Therefore, in order to get their share of profits from the partnership business, it was absolutely essential for the plaintiff appellants to have the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 declared as illegal, void and inoperative.
The relief for such a declaration could only be granted by the civil Court and not by an arbitrator as they or Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh through whom the plaintiffs derive title, are not party to the said deed. The trial Court had, therefore, rightly held that the matter could not be referred to arbitration and the view to the contrary taken by the High Court is clearly illegal.
There is no whisper in the petition dated 28.2.2005 that the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof is being filed along with the application. Therefore, there was a clear non- compliance of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of 1996 Act which is a mandatory provision and the dispute could not have been referred to arbitration. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that a copy of the partnership deed was on the record of the case. However, in order to satisfy the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, defendant no.3 should have filed the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof along with the petition filed by him on 28.2.2005, which he did not do. Therefore, no order for referring the dispute to arbitration could have been passed in the suit.
Thus, the appeal is allowed with costs and the impugned order passed by the High Court in Civil Revision is set aside.
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2008 (1) TMI 948 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Department or the Orders passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, we pass the following Order (1) The Writ Appeal is disposed of. (2) The first petitioner/first appellant shall deposit a sum of ₹ 24 Lakhs (Rupees Twenty four Lakhs) with the first respondent within fifteen days from today. If such deposit is made, the first respondent is directed to release the gold ornaments seized on 24.7.2006 either in favour of the first petitioner or in favour of the second petitioner. (3) Liberty is reserved to the Income Tax Department to recover any amount that may be found due after completing the assessment proceedings either against the first petitioner or the second petitioner. (4) First respondent is directed to complete the assessment proceedings initiated against the first or the second petitioner as expeditiously as possible and, at any rate, within six weeks from today. With these observations and directions, the Writ Appeal is disposed of. Ordered accordingly.
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2008 (1) TMI 947 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eading of that Section, does not require anything more than the Company having to deliver the share certificates after duly transferring the shares in favor of the transferee. There is no requirement in that provision for delivery of the share certificates after splitting them into the marketable lots. Since Section 113(2) is a penal provision which prescribes a punishment for violation of Section 113(1), it can only admit of a strict construction. A requirement not contained in the express wording of Section 113(1) cannot be read into it. 8. For the above reasons, the case against the petitioner for the offence under Section 113 of the Act is unsustainable in law and accordingly the impugned summoning order dated 12th July, 2001 issued by the MM and the complaint in so far as they concern the Petitioner are hereby quashed. 9. The petition is allowed and disposed of as such with no order as to costs. 10. A copy of this order be given dusty to learned Counsel for the parties.
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2008 (1) TMI 946 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... assessment of gift. No such position is emerging in this case. There is no allegation of any sort by Revenue for the donors were to be compensated by the assessee for a service rendered by them or otherwise to the assessee. This decision would also, therefore, be of no help to the Revenue. 17. In our opinion therefore the reopening of the assessments of the assessees are without any valid reasons and the information allegedly stated therein being irrelevant and not cohesive to the facts on record, there is no nexus between reasons recorded and the validity of the gifts received by the assessee. We therefore hold the reassessment to be invalid and quash the same. 18. In view of the assessment having been held to be invalid the other grounds on merits of the additions in assessees' appeals and the appeal by the Department on partial relief become infructuous and need not be gone into. 19. In the result assessees' appeals are allowed and Department appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 945 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which Tribunal had placed reliance did not take into consideration even this decision of the Supreme Court. It is for this reason and in the light of this decision of the Supreme Court, we record our dissent to the view taken by Madras High Court in Fenner India Ltd.’s case (supra). 21. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that Tribunal fell in error in holding that income earned by assessee by sale of gunny bags is an income earned from industrial undertaking within the meaning of section 80HH/80-I ibid and hence, entitled to claim deduction from their total income. We thus, reverse this view and set aside the order of Tribunal on our reasoning mentioned supra. 22. Accordingly, the appeal filed by revenue succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order of Tribunal is set aside. As a consequence, the substantial questions of law framed supra, are answered in appellant’s (revenue’s) favour and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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