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2004 (12) TMI 696 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... sidering the deduction under sections 80J and 80HH of the Act with reference to an "Industrial Company". The said order of the Tribunal is not applicable so far as the interpretation of "Small Scale Exporter" is concerned. 5. In view of the finding that not only the manufacturing of production is necessary but such manufacturing of production should have been done in the assessee’s own undertaking and in the present case it is an accepted position that the assessee itself does not own any undertaking where manufacturing of production activity can be done; the Tribunal committed illegality in granting weighted deduction under section 35B of the Act to the assessee. 6. In the result, we answer the above question in negative i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee and it is held that the assessee’s case does not fall under the definition of ‘Small Scale Industrial Unit’. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 695 - ITAT GAUHATI
... ... ... ... ..... ot find any reason as to why the same reasonable cause cannot be accepted for the delay in obtaining the audit reports and furnishing the same to the Assessing Officer. Since once the reasonable cause has been accepted by the Revenue and in the absence of any contrary material brought on record by the Revenue and keeping in view the decisions as relied upon by the learned A/R of the assessee as mentioned hereinabove, we hold that the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause for getting the accounts audited and furnishing the audit report to the Assessing Officer beyond the statutory period and accordingly all the grounds 1 to 3 taken by the Revenue are rejected. 15. The assessee has filed the cross-objections supporting the order of the CIT(A). In view of our decision in the Revenue’s appeals as hereinabove and in the absence of any new ground the cross-objections of the assessee are rejected. 16. In the result, all the appeals and the cross-objections are dismissed.
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2004 (12) TMI 694 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... y amount is not verified, that amount will be adjusted towards the amount already deposited by the petitioner which is to the tune of ₹ 92,837.56 paise and then pass concequential order of refunding the amount if any amount found remaining with the respondents to the petitioner accordingly." 6. Aforesaid view of the Division Bench was followed by another Division Bench decision in the case of O.D. Industries v. State of U. P., reported in 1996 U.P.T.C. 307 and in the case of M/s. Agarwal Enterprises v. Trade Tax Officer, reported in 1997 U.P.T.C. 763 and subsequently, in the case of D.C.M. Limited, Daurala Sugar Works v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, reported in 1999 U.P.T.C. 1038 and the recent decision given by the Division Bench in the case of Pankaj Gas Cylinder Ltd. v. State of UP., reported in 2003 U.P.T.C. 499. 7. Following the aforesaid decision, the present revision have no force. 8. In the result, all the three revisions fail and are accordingly, dismissed.
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2004 (12) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act - Negligence and misconduct of the bus driver - Fairness of the domestic inquiry - principle of natural justice - Res ipsa loquitur - HELD THAT:- It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principle of Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry.
The tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned legal principles. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side of the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and then stopped at a distance of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently.
Res ipsa loquitur is a well-known principle which is applicable in the instant case. Once the said doctrine is found to be applicable the burden of proof would shift on the delinquent. As noticed, the enquiry officer has categorically rejected the defence of the Respondent that the bus was being driven at a slow speed.
In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court misdirected themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves correct questions. It is now well-settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, further more, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply the principle of Res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an irrelevant fact not garmane for determining the issue, namely, the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which in "preponderance of probability" and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out.
Thus, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
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2004 (12) TMI 692 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the Judgment or order passed by High Court in rejecting the election petitions based on the copies alleged to have been served or supplied - Validity of the Assembly election of Siolim Constituency, Goa u/s 86 of the Act - non-disclosure of any cause of action - non-compliance of sections 81(3), 83(1)(a)(c) and 83(2) - Whether the returned candidates proved that the election petitions were liable to be rejected u/s 81(1) read with section 86 of the Act by reason of it being barred by limitation?
HELD THAT:- We are unable to hold that in fact the copies alleged to have been served or supplied to the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 were at all served or supplied by the Registry of the High Court. That apart, from the records, it does not appear that there was any endorsement from the side of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 to show that he had received copies from the Registry on which they made out the case for rejection of election petitions. For the reasons aforesaid, we are therefore of the view that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the election petitions relying on the copies alleged to have been served or supplied to the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 without there being any direction to file vakalatnamas from the High Court. It is an admitted position that true copies of the election petitions were served upon the Respondent No.1 by the Court Bailiff. In the absence of any material to show that the true copies of the election petitions were not filed with the election petitions at the time of their presentation and in view of our discussions herein earlier that no reliance could be placed on the copies relied on by the High Court, we are unable to sustain the orders of the High Court. We are also unable to agree with Mr.Thali that no reliance could be placed on the true copies served by the Court Bailiff because they were served after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is difficult to understand that the period of limitation shall start from the date of serving the copies and not from the filing of copies of the election petitions. From the records it does not appear that such copies were filed after the period of limitation.
Thus, we may safely conclude that the election petitions were not liable to be rejected relying on the copies of the election petitions alleged to have been served upon the Respondent No.1 especially when true copies of the same were duly supplied to the Respondent No.1.
In this case, the Respondent No.1 having failed to discharge such onus, it is not open for the Respondent No.1 to say that true copies of the election petitions were not filed at the time of presentation of election petitions. It is not in dispute that true copies of the election petitions were duly served upon the Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 before the preliminary hearing of the Election Petitions. According to Mr.Thali, that could not cure the defect in supplying to the Respondent No.1 a true copy of the election petition as such petitions were served on the Respondent No.1 at a time when the elections petitions became barred.
In the absence of any material to show that true copies of the election petitions were also not filed at the presentation of election petitions, we are unable to hold that there was non compliance of Section 81(3) of the Act inasmuch as the copies alleged to have been supplied to the returned candidate were not true copies of the petitions.
In this case admittedly note of the Registry of the High Court clearly says that requisite number of copies had been duly filed and the election petition was in order. That being the position, we are unable to agree with Mr.Thali as well as the High Court that the onus was on the election petitioners to prove that true copies of the election petitions were duly filed by him. Furthermore, in view of our discussions herein earlier, the true copies have been duly filed as admitted by the Respondent No.1, even subsequent to the filing of the election petitions and in view of the decision of this Court in Anil R.Deshmukh Vs. Onkar N.Wagh, we are also of the view that since true copies were duly filed before the preliminary hearing of the Election Petitions the defects even if there be any, were thus removed, the election petitions could not be rejected on these grounds.
Thus, we are unable to sustain the judgment of the High Court in rejecting the election petitions for non filing of requisite number of copies thereof as well as the copies alleged to have been served on the Learned counsel for the respondents were not true copies. Accordingly, the two common questions as framed herein earlier and decided by the High Court in favour of the Respondent No.1, are decided in favour of the appellants. Therefore, the election petitions were not liable to be rejected on the reasons given hereinearlier.
It is not impossible that when on 16th July, 2002 the election petition was filed, it could be filed alongwith Exhibit F which came into possession of the election petitioner on the same day i.e. on 16th July, 2002. That apart, assuming that the Exhibit F was defective, even then mere defect in the verification as held herein earlier was not fatal for which the High Court was justified in rejecting the election petitions for non-compliance of section 83(1)(c) of the Act. For the reasons aforesaid, we therefore hold that the question No.3 which was found in favour of Respondent No.1 by the High Court must be answered in favour of the appellants and against the Respondent No.1.
Hence, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 691 - SUPREME COURT
Application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' - Recruitment of Amins under the Land Records and Surveyors, Directorate, Government of West Bengal - Notification No.5472-F issued for different scales of pay, prescribed for Surveyors and Amins working in different Departments under Government of West Bengal - Whether the Amins and Surveyors discharge the same duties or not -Whether the Amins are entitled to the same pay scale i.e. Scale No.9 of Surveyors - HELD THAT:- The Surveyors are fully qualified in the engineering surveys whereas the Amins are not supposed to be so qualified. Therefore, looking to the nature of duties which is being discharged and the instructions which have been issued go to show that the Amins and Surveyors are not discharging identical duties. Therefore, from the nature of duties and the qualifications required for both the posts, it is absolutely clear that they are separate and it is not wrong when it was submitted that the work of Amins starts after the work of Surveyors ends. The Technical Rules and Instructions of the Settlement Department as mentioned above, clearly show that the work and duties which are being discharged by the Surveyors are of technical nature by use of sophisticated instruments as against the Amins who do the job with the aid of relatively simple equipment as they are not equated with that of the Surveyors. The qualifications prescribed for the Surveyors and Amins are also different. The Surveyor is supposed to be a technically trained person and as against this, the Amin need not be. The Amins have to undergo related course of a duration of six months or so, as against the Surveyors' two years certificate course. Therefore, from the survey of this discussion we are of opinion that the Surveyors stand on superior footing than that of the Amins and they cannot be equated from the functional point of view as well as qualification point of view. Therefore, we are of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court that the Amins cannot be equated with the Surveyors is correct.
While the work and duties performed by the Amins and Surveyors are not identical, there is no question of giving them the equal pay for the equal work. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' depends upon the nature of duties performed by a particular category of posts and the qualifications for their recruitment. From the above discussion, it is clear that neither the duties nor functions are identical nor the recruitment for the posts of Amins and Surveyors is identical as the qualification for recruitment for both the posts is different.
In the present case, there are categorical finding that both the categories of posts discharge different functions and duties and there is no question of granting equal pay on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work.'
Once it is held that the Amins perform different duties and different functions then how can we go back and say that because the qualification of the Surveyors is school final pass or Madhyamik with practical experience, they are given pay scale No.7, similar pay scale No.7 be given to Amins as they are also required to have same qualification is not correct. It appears that it was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of the High Court that for three categories of Surveyors i.e. persons having certificate from Survey School, School Final with Practical experience and with practical experience only no recruitment has been made since 1981. While dealing with the comparative pay scales of Amins and Surveyors as reproduced above since independence there is note given below that recruitment with this qualification has been abandoned since 1981. It appears this fact was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of the High Court.
The attention of the Division Bench was not invited to this note. In fact recruitment to the posts of Surveyors with these qualifications has already been stopped since 1981. As such the Division Bench while dealing with the Amins with these qualifications has granted the pay scale No.7 which, in our opinion appears to be totally incorrect appreciation of fact. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court directing the State Government to grant the Amins the minimum pay scale of No.7 does not appear to be justified and accordingly, we allow the State appeal and set aside the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court granting the Amins the pay scale No.7.
Thus, we allow the appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court granting pay scale No.7 to the Amins is set aside. We dismiss all the appeals filed by the private appellants but direct that the benefits which have been accrued to the Amins of all those 36 writ petitions, no recovery shall be made till the date of this judgment and all these Amins should be given the pay scale Nos.6,7, & 8 as per the qualifications and their pay shall be fixed at the appropriate stage in these pay scales and they will be entitled to further career advancement scheme. There will be no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 690 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... order was obviously mis-conceived because admittedly there is no power of review under the Customs Act. We are also in agreement with a view of the learned Single Judge that the bereavement if any, that occurred in the family of the Managing Director of the Company could not have prevented from filing the appeal within time when it continued pursuing the other applications particularly those pertaining to renewal of its licences. Be that as it may, the Tribunal exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and declined to condone the delay. The learned Single Judge was right in observing that such an order cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Single judge was therefore right in dismissing the write petition and we find no ground to interfere in appeal. 3. In the result, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 689 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ... ... ... ..... he purpose of levy of service tax on a part thereof. This decision of the lower appellate authority was based on the Tribunal’s decision in Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CCE 2003 155 ELT 457 (T). Revenue, in the present appeal, states that the department has filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against Daelim Industrial Co. (supra) and, therefore, the Tribunal’s decision has not reached finality. This, in fact, is the only ground raised in this appeal, all other "grounds" being only references to the facts of the case. 2. The above ground raised by the appellant stands dislodged with the dismissal of the department’s appeal by the Supreme Court. A copy of the Supreme Court’s order in S.L.P. No. 24294/2003 filed by the department against the above decision of the Tribunal in the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. has been produced by the counsel. This is an order of dismissal, on merits, of the S.L.P. 3. In the result, the appeal is rejected.
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2004 (12) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... r has been brought down one feet below the road level. Similarly certain alterations were made in the structure by removing pillars with a view to give a wider frontage to suit the convenience of the appellant. On the findings arrived at by the Courts below, no substantial question of law arises. The High Court was therefore, justified in dismissing the Second Appeal. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed. Counsel for the appellants submitted before us that he is willing to obey the decree of the Courts below and comply with the directions contained therein. He submitted that since execution has been laid he is under constant threat and warrant of attachment has been issued. We have no doubt that if the appellant takes steps forthwith to comply with the decree passed against him, the executing Court on being satisfied about his bona fide and genuineness, may grant him time to complete the work and permit the decree to be executed.
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2004 (12) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
Quantum of punishment - Legality of the punishment of removal imposed on the employee - Scope of judicial review in administrative decisions related to disciplinary actions - Application of the principle of proportionality in administrative law - HELD THAT:- In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision- making process and not the decision.
To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
In the case at hand, the High Court's judgment is full of ifs and buts. There is no definite finding recorded that the punishment is suffering from any infirmity. No basis has been indicated to direct re-consideration of the quantum of punishment. It is to be noted that the respondent had miserably failed to prove bonafides. Though he took the stand that he had informed the head office about the withdrawal, no material was placed before any of the authorities to prove it. It is to be noted that on the basis of material on record, it was concluded that the withdrawal was on 6.5.1992 and not on 9.5.1992 as was claimed. The respondent-employee has withdrawn a sum of ₹ 20,000/- from the account of bank with the State Bank of India on 6.5.1992 and had withdrawn a further sum of ₹ 5,000/- from the cash.
Above being the position the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and the same is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the respondent-employee, stands dismissed.
The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 686 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ver, revision nos. 1460 and 1464 of 1991 are dismissed. Revision nos. 1502, 1503 and 1504 of 1991 have been filed by the Commissioner of Trade Tax against the order of the Tribunal dated 27.04.1991, In the present case, Tribunal has deleted the levy of tax on the ground that the tax has been levied on the parchun goods while there is no goods in the name of parchun under the Trade Tax Act. It is true that under the Trade Tax Act, there is no goods in the name of parchun, but in commercial sense, parchun goods is commonly known as general merchandise goods, thus the view of Tribunal in this regard is not justified but since in all these cases also Form 34 and G.Rs have not been confronted and the revenue failed to prove that the alleged Form s34 have been obtained by the applicant and the alleged vehicles belonged to the opposite party, order of the Tribunal does not require any interference. In the result, revision nos. 1502, 1503 and 1504 of 1991 are accordingly, dismissed.
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2004 (12) TMI 685 - SUPREME COURT
Claim for excess of the "ceiling area" fixed under the Act or claiming exemption of any land as not falling within the ceiling area at all - Exclusion of 'fuel area' and 'rested area' from the plantation which is otherwise exempt from the limitation of "ceiling area" under the provisions of the Kerala Land reforms Act, 1963 ('the Act') - Applicability of the principle of res judicata and issue estoppel - HELD THAT:- To the extent that Tulak Land Board by its order dated July 26, 1980 upheld the claim of the appellant to 263.83 acres as "agricultural land interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated with plantation crops" cannot be failed. though under the heads 'fuel area' and 'rested tea area' there was difference of opinion among the Chairman and other members of the Tulak Land Board there was unamimity between them on the question of area of 263.83 acres falling under the head 'other agricultural land interspersed'. It cannot be said that Taluk Land Board, while determining this area, did not take into consideration relevant factors as mentioned in clause (c) of Section 2(44) of the Act. We do not think it was necessary for the High Court to lay down any further guidelines than what are given in the provision and for that purpose to remand the matter again to the Taluk Land Board. We would, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court to that extent.
Since the appellant never claimed exemption outside the ceiling area on the ground of cardamam plantation the question was never gone into in the earlier proceedings of this Court. This point, therefore, could not be agitated before the Taluk Land Board dealing with the matter on remand as finality attached to the areas under the fuel area and rested tea area for which exemption was not or fully granted. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to go into the question if cardamom plantation existed at the relevant time. We, therefore, uphold the judgment of the High Court on the extent of 'fuel area' and 'rested tea area' as determined finally by this Court and would dismiss the appeal limited to this extent.
Though we have upheld the order of the High Court mainly on the grounds of res judicata and estoppel, submission of the appellant commands to us that they have given opportunity to approach the State Government to seek exemption under provisions of Sub-section 3 of Section 81 of the Act. This is particularly so as a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that supply of fuel wood to employees is for the purpose connected with the plantation, which is a later decision of the two Judge Bench decision of this Court. Further that rested tea area is a part of tea plantation was not properly projected before this Court as has been rightly contended by Mr. Salve. It is a matter of experience and on reference to authoritative text books if rested tea areas are part of the plantation.
We allow the appellant to approach the State government to seek exemption under Sub-section 3 of Section 81 of the Act.
With these observation the appeal stands partly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 684 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... pursuant to the impugned judgment will be subject to further orders in the appeal.
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2004 (12) TMI 683 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... tion since it appears that matter may be settled out of Court. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as withdrawn.
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2004 (12) TMI 682 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
... ... ... ... ..... irement and subject to the fulfilment of the other conditions laid down in section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act." 14. In the case of CIT v. R.J. Shahney 1986 159 ITR 160 (Mad.), it has been held that the words "whether on superannuation or otherwise" also includes the case of resignation. It has been held that a retirement may be of various kinds. It may be on superannuation or it may be voluntary. If there is any voluntary retirement from service, the provisions of section 10(10AA) would cover only such cases where there is severance of relationship of employer and employee. 15. The next case relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel. K. Gopalakrishnan v. CBDT 1994 206 ITR 1831 (Mad.) has hardly any application to the controversy involved in the present case 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the above questions referred to us in negative i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 681 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d maintained by the National Cooperative Union of India Ltd, New Delhi. 2. According to the assessee, this contribution is not a cess, tax, duty or fee and therefore Section 43B would not be applicable. However, before the Tribunal, the question has not been specifically raised by the revenue or by the assessee. It was submitted that in terms of Section 37, the amount of contribution to the said fund is an allowable deduction. The issue is that if section 43B is applicable then it will be allowed on actual payment basis only. If not, then it may be allowed on accrual bass. The key question is whether the contribution to the said fund is a ‘‘tax, duty, cess or fee’‘. This aspect has not been examined by the tribunal and, therefore, it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the tribunal to dispose of the same in accordance with law and to return a finding as to whether section 43B would be applicable or not. The Appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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2004 (12) TMI 680 - ITAT CHENNAI
Challenged the Order passed by CIT u/s 263 - assumption of jurisdiction u/s 147 - exchange fluctuation - Allowability of ESOP expenditure as a business deduction - depreciation on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) - validity of the invocation of Section 263 - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the use of the words 'pass such orders as the circumstances of the case justify' cannot give the power to do both the acts in one order not only for the reason that it will render the latter part of the section nugatory but also because once an assessment is set aside, such assessment is a nullity in law until a fresh assessment is made. In such a case it is not possible to direct an enhancement on an assessment, which is already cancelled. We, therefore, hold that the CIT in exercise of the powers under Section 263 can either enhance/modify or cancel and direct a fresh assessment. An offshoot of this conclusion will be whether in the instant case, where there is both an enhancement and a set aside of the assessment, the entire order of the CIT stands vitiated or whether only a part of such order will stand vitiated. We hold that the entire order will stand vitiated for it will not be possible to hold that only a part of the order will be vitiated; if we were to hold so it will not be possible for us to bifurcate and conclude as to whether the enhancement/modification is valid or the set aside is valid.
The only possible conclusion in these circumstances is to hold that the entire order would be invalid. There is no provision for setting aside an issue without setting aside the assessment. As we see it, an order passed u/s 143(3) which was otherwise final is sought to be modified by the CIT through the medium of Section 263. Once the said order is disturbed, either it is modified as desired by the CIT or set aside to be redone according to law and on the basis of directions contained in the order u/s 263. Section 263 itself, contains enough clues to this effect. In our considered view, the order as passed u/s 263 is unworkable, because once an assessment is set aside it has to be redone according to law, if it is not set aside, the assessment has to be modified as directed, in which event the CIT cannot set aside an issue for reconsideration or investigation.
In any case, since we have, on the merits of the directions made by the CIT, held that in each of the directions there was either no error or prejudice or both, we hold that the CIT was not justified in invoking his jurisdiction u/s 263, a detailed examination of this aspect of his order is purely academic.
In the result the assessee's appeal is allowed.
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2004 (12) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants were unable to produce even a scrap of evidence indicating that the land of the respondent had been taken over or acquired in any manner known to law or that he had ever been paid any compensation in respect of such acquisition?
Whether at the case projected before the Court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State?
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2004 (12) TMI 678 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... see no reason to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed
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2004 (12) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the fee of the nature impugned as a matter of fact, a tax in the guise of fee and whether it is so excessive or unreasonable as to loose the character of fee?
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