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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 437 Records
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1997 (3) TMI 606 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... pecialities Ltd. - 1985 (22) E.L.T. 324 (S.C.), we see no merit in this appeal filed by the Revenue and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 605 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r of such Special Magistrates required to deal with the pendency of petty cases and take immediate steps to appoint them. (4) In cases where the High Court(s) has already received such a letter and has initiated action to appoint such Special Magistrates, it will, within one month, determine the total number of such Special Magistrates needed to dispose of the pendency of petty cases and ensure appointments at an early date, and (5) The High Courts will also ensure that after the regular Magistrates are relieved of petty cases, they would dispose of a larger number of more serious cases so that the offenders are brought to book at an early date and the innocent are not unnecessarily vexed for long spells. 26. With these directions we terminate both the proceedings. We direct each of the Respondent States covered by direction No. 2 to pay a sum of ₹ 10,000 each to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee by way of costs. Both the Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 604 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ne before directive reinstatement of appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary Government servant, The power being available under Rules, it is always open a temporary Government servant, the power being available under rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the service of the employe instead of conducting there enquiry or to continue in service a Government servant accused of defalcation of public money. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriating of public money. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench of the High court was clearly in error in directing payment of the compensation which amounts to premium for misconduct. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench stands set aside and that of the learned single Judge stands confirmed. The writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 603 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he corrupt activities of the petitioner. He honestly assessed that the petitioner would prove himself efficient officer, provided he controls his temptation for corruption. That would clearly indicate the fallibility of the petitioner, vis-avis the alleged acts of corruption. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the remarks made in the confidential report are vague without any particulars and, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is seen that the officers made the remarks on the basis of the reputation of the petitioner. It was, therefore, for him to improve his conduct, prove honesty and integrity in future in which event, obviously, the authority for the subsequent period. The appellate authority duly considered and rejected the contention of the petitioner. Repeated representation could render little service. Rejection, therefore, is neither arbitrary nor illegal. The special leave netition, therefore, does not warrant interference. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 602 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is already seen that the rule of reservation in promotions was in vogue in the State of Uttar Pradesh right from 1973 and the promotions came to be made from 1981 onwards to the respondents 2 to 10. The U.P. Act saves the existing policy of reservation in promotions. The judgment in Mandal case saves the promotions already made. In Sabharwal's case also a Constitution Bench has upheld the validity of the promotions given in excess of the roster; otherwise also those promoted on their own merit were held to be validly promoted. Even excess promotions remained undisturbed and the law became operative only from the date of the judgment. This Court upheld the previous promotions, though in excess of the roster system, as constitutional and valid. Therefore, we hold that the promotions of the respondents are legal and valid and they do not become void or unconstitutional as contended. Both, the appeal and the writ petition are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 601 - SUPREME COURT
Whether where bottles and crates were sold along with beer and had to be included in the sale price/
Held that:- In the present case the customers clearly know the price they will have to pay for the beer. They are required to pay an additional amount by way of deposit for taking away the bottle which is refunded if the bottle is returned. If the bottle is not returned, the deposit is retained as liquidated damages for the loss of the bottle. There is a clear intention not to sell the bottle. Hence, we are of the view that the deposit cannot be considered as price of the bottles.
We are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that the crates and the bottles were sold along with the beer. In the facts of this case, the deposits could not be treated as the price of the bottles and the crates.
We, therefore, set aside the judgments under appeal. The appeals are allowed
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1997 (3) TMI 600 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of Notification dated April 21, 1990 questioned - Held that:- We cannot agree that the rate of late payment surcharge provided by clause 7(b) is penal, but having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the fact that petitioners could possibly have understood their obligation to pay interest/late payment surcharge for the period of stay, we reduce the rate of late payment surcharge payable under clause 7(b) to eighteen percent. But this direction is confined only to the period covered by the stay orders in writ petitions filed challenging the Notification dated April 21, 1990 and limited to March 1, 1993, the date on which those writ petitions were dismissed.
For the above reasons, the appeals fail and are dismissed subject to the above mentioned direction with respect to the rate of levy of late payment surcharge under clause 7(b) of the Notification dated April 21, 1990.
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1997 (3) TMI 599 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the view taken by the majority that it is enough for a candidate to be qualified by the date of interview even if he was not qualified by the lasts date prescribed for receiving the applications, is correct in law and whether the majority was right in extending the principle of Rule 37 of the public Service Commission Rules to the present case by analogy?
Whether the direction of the Division Bench to treat the candidates who were not qualified by the lasts date of receipt of applications as juniors, as a class, to those who were qualified, was not a just one ?
Held that:- Thirteen Years have passed by since their initial appointment. upturning the inter-se seniority at this distance of time would not be just and equitable. Having given our anxious and earnests consideration to the question and keeping in view the fact that we are sitting in review jurisdiction and that this particular aspect is a matter lying within the discretion of the Court, we do not think it appropriate to interfere with the unanimous opinion of the three learned Judges of this Court on this aspect. It is true that the Division Bench of the High Court had granted the relief not only to the four review petitioners/writ petitioners but to all the candidates falling in that category yet we cannot ignore the fact that even Sahai, J. who agreed with the review petitioners on the first issue, thought it just and proper not to disturb the inter-se seniority between these two groups of selected candidates. The said seniority was determined by the selecting Authority. Though certain allegations are made with respect to the fairness of the process of selection, that issue is not open in these review applications nor was it gone into by this court in the civil appeals.
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1997 (3) TMI 598 - SUPREME COURT
Whether industrial laminates and glass epoxy laminates cannot be considered as electrical insulators ?
Held that:- Mere cutting or punching holes does not amount to manufacture. These sheets have insulating properties and are used as electrical insulators. They cannot be taken out of the category of electrical insulators only because they have to be cut to the requisite shape or a few holes may be required to be required to be punched in them in order that they may fit into the electrical instrument/appliance in question.
the Tribunal has rightly classified decorative laminates under the Old Tariff Entry 68. The decision of the Tribunal, however, in so far as it classifies decorative laminated sheets are classified under Tariff Entry 3920.31/3920.37 of the New Tariff. In respect of Industrial laminates (paper-based) and glass epoxy laminates, the Tribunal has correctly classified these laminates under Tariff Item 68 of the Old Tariff and under Tariff Entry 7014/8546 of the New Tariff.
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1997 (3) TMI 597 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alteram partem rule, namely, qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera setquam licit dixerit, haud aequum facerit , that is, he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right . (See Bosewell s case (1605) 6 Co. Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words as it is now expressed, justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done . 12.. Judged in the aforesaid background, levy of penalty under section 13(5) of the Act without grant of opportunity cannot be maintained and is indefensible. The revisional authority has not taken note of this aspect in his revisional order dated March 25, 1994 (annexure 3), though specifically pleaded before him. Accordingly, the writ application is allowed, the order imposing penalty (annexure 1), and the impugned revisional order (annexure 3) are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. A. DEB. J.-I agree. Writ application allowed.
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1997 (3) TMI 596 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ich the apex Court has explained that so far as State is concerned there may be delay occasioned on its part because of the fact that the decision making process in the State to file a case involves layer after layer stages, which the papers must go through before final decision is taken to challenge an order, and that the question of condonation of delay in so far as the State is concerned should be viewed from that angle. Though we do not propose at all to say that the same approach must be adopted for private litigants also, yet we feel that the principle can be extended where a person has a good case on merits and the State should not take technical plea of limitation so as to deprive him of his just dues. Considering such fact, we set aside the impugned order and direct the Tribunal to reconsider the question of condonation of delay, in the light of the observations made above. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 595 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ceived, it cannot be said that the gunny bags were of insignificant value, when it is found that the value of the each gunny bag is estimated in the present case at as much as Rs. 8 per bag, while in our judgment dated January 22, 1997 the value was only Rs. 3 per bag. Further it is also found that the assessee has also purchased gunnies outright, from registered dealers. 7.. In the light of all the above features and the above referred decisions, we are of the view that the Tribunal has erred in law in coming to the conclusion it reached and we confirm the order of the assessing authority as in our view implied agreement to sell gunnies, could be easily inferred from the available materials and in the light of the above referred to decision and there is no need for any remand as held by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Accordingly, we allow this revision. No costs. Revision petitions allowed. Reported as State of Tamil Nadu v. Subramania Chettiar 1989 109 STC 52 (Mad.)
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1997 (3) TMI 594 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 7. Neither the contractor nor the contractee are the assessing authorities. It would be very difficult for the contractee to examine and for the contractor to specify all the deductions at the stage of intermediate bills. It appears to be in the interest of all concerned that the Legislature has fixed a percentage of deduction of tax at source. 5.. For all these reasons I do not find any grounds made out by the petitioner against the vires of section 7B. If the particular work undertaken by the contractor is not a works contract or that he is entitled to certain deductions or exemptions, it is open to the contractor to seek for payment without any deduction by obtaining a certificate issued by the assessing authority to the effect that no tax is due from him under sub-rule (2) of rule 22A. I do not find any ground to grant the relief sought for. Original Petitions are accordingly dismissed. Order on CMP No. 2875 of 1995 in O.P.No. 1590 of 1995-dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 593 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Those in-charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out. 21.. Therefore, both the applications for revision deserve to be dismissed. Revision allowed.
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1997 (3) TMI 592 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... es not confer the power to determine or shift the single point in a series of sales at which the tax is payable. Such power is conferred only by rule 15 read with section 5, RST Act. Section 4(2), RST Act, gives the power only to exempt or to cease to exempt. Therefore, even though the notification of March 8, 1968 spoke of cancellation of the notification of March 16, 1966 it could not have the effect of cancellation the second part of the notification of March 16, 1966 which was issued under rule 15 read with section 5, RST Act. The single point of taxation having been shifted as far as the goods in question were concerned to the last stage by the notification of March 16, 1966 it would remain there notwithstanding the notification of March 8, 1968. The notification of March 8, 1968 has the effect of only cancelling the first part of the notification of March 16, 1966. 16.. The revision stands disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 591 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng and who detected it on March 25, 1994 remains a mystery. If the file was with the Addl. S.R. till March 30, 1994, how another officer handled it to notice absence of signature. That has not been explained. If records have been manipulated, it is a very serious matter and needs an enquiry by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa. 11.. Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that fresh application shall be filed giving all the details for consideration by the Tribunal. Order dated April 5, 1995, passed by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in Second Appeal Nos. 386-87 of 1994-95 is set aside, matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. If any application is filed by the Revenue explaining the delay within three weeks from today, same shall be considered by the Tribunal on its own merits. The writ application is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The records be sent back forthwith. A. Des, J.-I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1997 (3) TMI 590 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is also stated that the Deputy Commissioners will acknowledge the receipt of the circular and obtain acknowledgement from their subordinates. As already stated, though this circular is not issued with reference to S.R.O. 968 of 1980 and though it is issued in the context of S.R.O. 499 of 1990 only on March 31, 1990, the said circular clearly shows how the notification on the aspect in question is understood by the authorities under the Statute. On a conspectus of the provisions of the Notification S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 and the understanding of the notification granting sales tax exemption to the small-scale industrial units contained in Circular No. 27 of 1993, we hold that the majority of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has correctly approached the question and arrived at the correct conclusion. There is no merit in these revisions. The revision cases are accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 589 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... there cannot be levy of penalty under section 10(b) of the Act since in such cases it is easier to accept the contention of the assessee that he bona fide believed that the goods purchased by him were covered by the goods described in his certificate of registration. 11.. Further, the above referred to G.O. Ms. No. 61, dated January 24, 1984, also enjoins the assessing officers to take a lenient view particularly when the assessee is eligible to have the goods purchased by him included in the registration certificate. In the present case, pursuant to the above referred to amendment sought for, non-ferrous metals also were included in the registration certificate Here italicised. of the assessee. This also shows that the assessee was eligible to have them included in his registration certificate. 12.. For all these reasons, we are unable to see any error of law in the Tribunal s order and hence we dismiss this revision. But, in the circumstances, no costs. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 588 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ated March 22, 1996. This application was presented under section 8 of the RTT Act on March 27, 1996. At the time of filing this application the petitioner-firm knew that the order of rejection was there. But this fact was not mentioned in the application. No relief is to be granted to the petitioner-firm in such a case. Lastly, the order of rejection has already been made on March 22, 1996. That order is appealable to the higher authorities. We are not in a position to express our opinion with regard to the merits of the case. Nor can we enter upon the discussion of the facts. 5.. The balance of convenience is also not in favour of the petitioner-firm. There is nothing on the record to show that the refusal to grant the stay as prayed for will result in the dislocation of the business of the petitioner-firm. 6.. In the circumstances mentioned hereinabove, we reject the prayer for stay of the assessment proceedings pending before the assessing authority. Ordered accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 587 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, this was not a fit case for dismissal of the petition in limine. 12.. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to discuss other points raised. Parties shall be at liberty to raise all the points before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge after hearing the parties may form his independent opinion as to the legality, propriety and necessity of raid including alleged payment of tax by the petitioner-appellant. We refrain from expressing any opinion on this point. 13.. As a result, the appeal succeeds. Dismissal of W.P. No. 736 of 1996 Aakash Namkeen Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1997 105 STC 441 (MP) in limine is set aside. The case is remanded back to the learned single Judge for a decision in accordance with law. Parties shall appear before the learned single Judge on March 27, 1997. No further notice would be necessary. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs as incurred. Appeal allowed.
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