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2004 (9) TMI 673 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... be served and curtails it by setting off the period of detention undergone by the accused person during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case, and therefore, question of giving any retrospective operation the said provision does not arise. 16. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner prisoner is entitled to the benefit of set off under Section 121A of the B.S.F. Act read with Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore, the question framed has been answered by us in the affirmative. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside and we direct the respondents to grant set off for the period of pre-trial detention from the term of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner on conviction, under the provisions of Section 428 of the Code and Section 121A of the B.S.F. Act. Sentence imposed on the petitioner be construed accordingly. 17. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.
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2004 (9) TMI 672 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI BENCH
Validity of the extraordinary general meeting held on 17-5-2002 - Allegations of misappropriation of funds by the second respondent - Legality of the removal of the second petitioner as a director -manipulation and false documentation - Claims regarding unpaid remuneration - Allegations of diversion of business by the second respondent - HELD THAT:- The plea of the second respondent that the shares were not issued as per the Articles of Association in view of the fact that the Company was incorporated for his sole benefit and further that the sole proprietary concern of the first petitioner was not taken over by the Company are not only contrary to the materials on record but also remain unsubstantiated. Moreover, the Managing Director is in a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the Company and must act bona fide in the exercise of his fiduciary responsibilities for the benefit of the Company in further allotment of shares. There exist a relationship of a trustee and cestui que trust as between the directors and Company. If this trust is found to be violated, the action of Managing Director is liable to be intervened by the Company Law Board. The responsibility of the Managing Director towards members becomes more onerous in a private company and therefore the courts have applied the quasi-partnership theory in such cases in the past and have granted appropriate relief if the parity is sought to be disturbed.
It is settled proposition of law that further shares could be issued only for the benefit of the Company and not with a view to create a new majority, even if the powers to issue shares is vested in the Board. If the purpose of allotment of shares is for upsetting the existing shareholding to the detriment of one group, then such an allotment of shares, is to be held an act of oppression, whether or not partnership principles are applied.
It is not under dispute that the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the Company were approved and adopted since the very incorporation of the Company by the members and the Board of directors, including either of the petitioners, till their exclusion from the management of the Company in May, 2002. Nevertheless, the petitioners having failed to exercise due diligence before approving the accounts at the relevant point of time and having found that the petitioners are found guilty of negligence and acquiescence of the alleged wrongful acts prior to their removal from the post of director cannot be favoured by way of granting any relief in this behalf. The claim of the petitioners towards their remuneration since April 2002 not being disputed is justified.
On account of the foregoing conclusions the following directions are given:-
(i)The second respondent shall, out of 12000 equity shares held in his name, transfer 5267 shares in favour of the first petitioner and 1466 shares in favour of second petitioner maintaining parity in tune with article 5(a) of the Articles of Association of the Company.
(ii)The Board of directors of the Company shall be reconstituted by the petitioners and the second respondent with immediate effect, while the third respondent simultaneously shall cease to be a director of the Company.
(iii)The management of the business of the Company shall vest in the Board of directors who may exercise all such powers and Company all things within the framework of the Act. The Articles of Association of the Company shall suitably be amended.
(iv)The Company shall pay the remuneration of the petitioners since April 2002 at the rate of ₹ 1,30,000 per annum for the first petitioner and at ₹ 1,39,000 per annum for the second petitioner.
(v)M/s. Rao & Gopal, Chartered Accountants, Chennai are appointed to scrutinize all payments and receipts on account of the Company with reference to the books of account, financial statements, bank statements, vouchers and any other records of the Company which may be found necessary, for the period between 1-4-2002 and 31-8-2004 and also take into account the submissions of the petitioners and the second respondent so as to ascertain whether any money of the Company has been misappropriated by the second respondent. If so, the second respondent shall reimburse the misappropriated amount with interest at the rate of 10% simple in favour of the Company, within 30 days of receipt of the report from M/s. Rao & Gopal, whose remuneration shall be borne by the Company. While all the interim orders are vacated, the Board of Directors will decide about use of the Maruti Car now in possession of the first petitioner.
The company petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2004 (9) TMI 671 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot;. according to the appellants, this approach road forms part of cts no. 256 and that by cutting out such a wide access the value of cts no. 256 would be reduced. it was also submitted that there was no need to provide access to cts no. 257 from the suren road as cts no. 257 was bordered by two main roads namely bajaj road and govindwadi road from which direct access could be obtained. the high court had also found that cts no. 257 was "independently connected to roads near govindwadi road and bajaj road". This aspect of the matter does not also appear to have been considered by the valuation officer. if indeed the approach road as delineated in the valuation report cuts through cts no. 256 it might reduce the value of the cts no. 256 unnecessarily especially when there may be independent access to cts (257) which has been directed to be sold. this aspect of the matter will also be looked into by the valuation officer within the aforesaid time. order accordingly.
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2004 (9) TMI 670 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... Delay condoned. The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 669 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 9; has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under this Act, he may seize such goods." The belief that the goods are liable to confiscation is to be formed, therefore, on the basis of reasons available at the time of seizure. In this case the officer, effecting seizure professed to have the reasonable belief that the polythene carry-bags were brought into India in violation of the notification referred to in the seizure memo. At the time of seizure the issue of thickness of the bags was nowhere in his mind. ( 10. ) On the basis of the discussions made above, the court comes to find and hold that the seizure of the polythene carry- bags under memo, dated 11.9.2003 was bad and illegal. The seizure and the resultant confiscation proceeding are accordingly set aside and the respondent authorities are directed to return the seized consignment to the petitioner without any delay. In the result, this writ petition is allowed but with no order as to costs.
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2004 (9) TMI 668 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... case of B.S. Hullikatti (supra) held in a similar circumstances that the act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent therein was not fit to be retained as a conductor. It also held that in such cases there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and thereby interfere with the quantum of punishment. As noted above, the Division Bench of the High Court did not dismiss the petition on the ground of delay but held it is not worthwhile condoning the delay because there was no merit in the appeal. Since, we have come to the conclusion that the findings of the Labour Court and that of the learned single Judge are unsustainable in law, the finding of the Division Bench also is liable to be set aside. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds. Impugned orders are set aside. We restore the dismissal order made by the disciplinary authority against the respondent herein. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
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2004 (9) TMI 667 - ITAT LUCKNOW
... ... ... ... ..... as will be evident that the disallowances have been made out of telephone expenses, travelling expenses and vehicle running expenses and commission expenses. Without any evidence on record, the Assessing Officer cannot say that certain income under these heads had escaped assessment. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Kalvinator India Ltd. 2002 256 ITR 1 has held that assumption of jurisdiction under section 147 of the Act on the basis of change of opinion was invalid. In the instant case, making ad hoc disallowances/additions out of telephone expenses, travelling expenses, vehicle expenses and commission expenses was merely on the basis of change of opinion. Considering the above facts, we hold that the initiation of proceedings under section 147 of the Act as well as the additions made in the re-assessment order are invalid. The re-assessment orders are, therefore, cancelled. 13. In the result, all the three appeals directed by the assessee are allowed.
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2004 (9) TMI 666 - CESTAT KOLKATA
... ... ... ... ..... der by this Tribunal in Order No. A-336/Kol/2003dated 11.04.2003. The Commissioner has observed that mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof of clandestine removal which must be supported by sufficient evidence. Clandestine removal is a positive act and the burden of proving the same is on the Revenue. In this case, I find that the Revenue has not produced any evidence to prove the charge of clandestine removal. Therefore, I agree with the Commissioner (Appeals) that the respondents case is squarely covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Kripal Springs (I)Ltd. reported in 2001 (133) ELT 782 (T). In that case, payment of duty has taken place before issue of demand. In the circumstances, both Section 11AC and Section 11AB are not attracted for imposition of penalty and demand of interest, as held by the Tribunal in various decisions. Accordingly, the Order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is upheld and the appeal filed by the Revenue is rejected. Pronounced.
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2004 (9) TMI 665 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity and vires of sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ("the Act") - Conditional Legislation vs. Delegated Legislation - Abolition of State Administrative Tribunal - Interference with Judicial Functioning by the Executive - Role of Central Government in Abolishing the Tribunal - Mala Fide Action - HELD THAT:- The notification was issued by the Central Government in 1988 and the State Administrative Tribunal was established for the State of Madhya Pradesh. At that time, as per well-settled legal position, decisions rendered by the Administrative Tribunals constituted under the Act of 1985 were "final" subject to jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. No person aggrieved by a decision of State Administrative Tribunal could approach the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in view of Clause (d) of Article 323A (2) of the Constitution read with Section 28 of the Act of 1985 and the declaration of law in S.P. Sampath Kumar. If, in view of subsequent development of law in L. Chandra Kumar, the State of Madhya Pradesh felt that continuation of State Administrative Tribunal would be "one more tier" in the administration of justice inasmuch as after a decision is rendered by the State Administrative Tribunal, an aggrieved party could approach the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and, hence, it felt that such tribunal should not be continued further, in our opinion, it cannot be said that such a decision is arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable. From the correspondence between the State of Madhya Pradesh and Central Government as well as from the affidavit in reply, it is clear that the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar had been considered by the State of Madhya Pradesh in arriving at a decision to abolish State Administrative Tribunal. Such a consideration, in our opinion, was relevant, germane and valid. It, therefore cannot be said that the decision was illegal, invalid or improper.
It was also argued that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 is intra-vires and constitutional confirming the view taken by the High Court, the impugned action of abolishing State Administrative Tribunal is mala fide and malicious. For this, learned counsel referred to certain press reports wherein it had been alleged that a decision had been taken at the Cabinet Meeting of the State Government to abolish State Administrative Tribunal as the Chief Minister and all the Ministers were of the view that State Administrative Tribunal had granted stay in many transfer matters. The attempt on the part of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the action has been taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh because of adverse verdicts by the State Administrative Tribunal. In other words, according to the appellants, action of abolishing State Administrative Tribunal was taken because of "judicial orders" passed by the Tribunal which was not liked by the State Government. Such an action, submitted the learned counsel, cannot be sustained in law.
Thus, from the correspondence between the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Central Government and from various letters and communications and also from the decision which has been taken by the Cabinet, it is clear that the State Government took into account a vital consideration that after the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar, an aggrieved party could approach the High Court, the object for establishment of the Tribunal was defeated. In our opinion, in the light of the facts before the Court, it cannot be said that the decision to abolish State Administrative Tribunal taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh can be quashed and set aside as mala fide.
It was finally submitted that even on merits, the action of abolition of State Administrative Tribunal was unwarranted and uncalled for. For that, the counsel invited our attention to facts and figures and stated that it is not that all the cases decided by the State Administrative Tribunal reached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. In most of the cases dealt with by the State Administrative Tribunal, the parties accepted the orders of the Tribunal. It is only in few cases that the aggrieved party public servant or government approached the High Court. It was also stated that no survey has been made by the State. No reasons have been recorded why continuance of Tribunal was not necessary. There was non-application of mind to this very important aspect and on that ground also, the action deserves to be set aside at least with a limited direction to the State to reconsider the matter and take an appropriate decision afresh keeping in mind all relevant factors.
We are unable to uphold even this argument. In our judgment, if a decision is illegal, unconstitutional or ultra vires, it has to be set aside irrespective of laudable object behind it. But once we hold that it was within the power of the State Government to continue or not to continue State Administrative Tribunal and it was open to the State Government to take such a decision, it cannot be set aside merely on the ground that such a decision was not advisable in the facts of the case or that other decision could have been taken. While exercising power of judicial review, this Court cannot substitute its own decision for the decision of the Government. The Court, no doubt, can quash and set aside the decision, if it is illegal, ultra vires, unreasonable or otherwise objectionable. But that is not the situation here. To repeat, from the record of the case, it is amply clear that relevant, germane, valid and proper considerations weighed with the State Government and keeping in view development of law and the decision of the larger Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar, a policy decision has been taken by the State Government to abolish State Administrative Tribunal. Parliament also empowered the State Government to take an appropriate decision by enacting sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 and in exercise of such power, the State Government had taken a decision. The decision, in our opinion, cannot be regarded as illegal, unlawful or otherwise objectionable. The contention, therefore, has no force and has to be negatived.
The appeals were dismissed, and the decision to abolish the State Administrative Tribunal was upheld as legal and within the State Government's authority. No order as to costs was made in these matters.
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2004 (9) TMI 664 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... to the decree of ₹ 8,50,000 and remand the matter back to the learned Single Judge of the High Court for the purpose of redetermining the issue relating to the existence of the machinery, the value of the machinery and the de facto control and possession of the machinery subsequent to the arrangement. Needless to say if the evidence on record supports the Company's case, the Company will be entitled to a decree as has been directed by the earlier decision of the High Court which is set aside today. 10. WE make it clear that so far as the remaining directions of the Single Judge are concerned which have been affirmed by the Division Bench, namely, the reference of the amounts relating to the claims of the parties against each other to the determination of a Commissioner, we see no ground to interfere. Appeals are disposed of accordingly. It is requested that the learned Single Judge may dispose of this CP No. 35 of 1975 as expeditiously as is conveniently possible.
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2004 (9) TMI 663 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... urnover." The aforesaid view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been followed by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Commercial Taxes Officer Vs. Kelvinator India, reported in 90 STC, 336, and in the case of Commercial Taxes Officer Vs. Weston Electroniks Ltd., reported in 87 STC, 522. In the case of CST Vs. S/S Kelvinator of India Ltd., reported in 2004 (40) STR, 680. Learned Single Judge of this Court following the decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Commercial Taxes Officer Vs. Kelvinator India, reported in 90 STC, 336, and in the case of Commercial Taxes Officer Vs. Weston Electroniks Ltd., reported in 87 STC, 522 held that if the dealer is charging the amount other than the warrant charges for the subsequent period and if it is optional, it can not be a part of the sale price. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal and same is accordingly, upheld. In the result, all the revisions fails and are dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 662 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ... ... ... ..... respect of those statements was afforded to assessee. The statement recorded during assessment proceedings of present assessee Smt. Sampat Devi Daga is one dt. 25th Oct., 2000 wherein VDT has supported the assessee's case by admitting purchase, making payment by account payee cheques and issuing purchase bill. VDT also furnished his affidavit dt. 25th Oct., 2000 corroborating the transaction as pleaded by assessee, when he appeared before AO in response to the summons issued to him by AO. The earlier statements dt. 30th and 31st March, 2000 have been retracted by assessee. As such, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case as also the situation that the facts of this case are identical with those of Mohanlal Daga's case, we follow our decision rendered above on similar issue in the case of Mohanlal Daga in ITA No. 7963/Mum/2003 and hold accordingly and, in turn, delete the addition. 20. In the result, assessee's Appeal No. 7845/Mum/2003 is allowed.
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2004 (9) TMI 661 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Secondly, the State Government had enough powers to relax the provisions of the Rules "in the interest of mineral development in deserving cases in such manner as they deem proper". True, that the order of the State Government quotes a wrong rule for relaxation, but, that, in our view hardly matters. As long as the State Government had the power of relaxation, then irrespective of any recitation, it must construed that the State Government has in its discretion made the order by exercising its power of relaxation. Looked at from this point of view, we find no substance in the contention. In the result, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in quashing the order No.5507/IV(E)(DS)SM 4/2003 dated 22nd May 2003, by which the quarry lease had been renewed in favour of the appellant company. Hence, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the State Government's order dated 22.5.2003 is restored. No order as to costs.
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2004 (9) TMI 660 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e of the considered opinion that if the Appellant files Review Application before the Appellate Tribunal within fortnight from today with an Application for condonation of delay then we are sure that having regards to the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Tribunal, after condoning the delay, will entertain the Review Application and try to decide the same on merit as early as possible, preferably by November 30, 2004. Accordingly, permission is granted to withdraw this Appeal. Learned Standing Counsel Shri Malkan, appearing on Caveat, on behalf of the respondents, left it to the Court for passing appropriate order, on the oral request made by the learned Counsel Shri Dharmadhikari for passing interim order against the respondents for recovery by adopting coercive measures. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the respondents are restrained from taking coercive measures against the Appellant till 30.11.2004. Direct Service permitted.
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2004 (9) TMI 659 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... a, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed
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2004 (9) TMI 658 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the Orissa Medical Education Service (Appointment of Junior Teachers Validation) Act, 1993 - Applicability of the 1973 Rules versus the 1979 Rules - Regularization of illegal appointments -Legislative competence and the scope of validating statutes - HELD THAT:- This Court observed that "the Validating Act provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 to 7 of 1959 Act or in any judgment, decree, order or direction of any court, the villages of Raipura and Ummedganj should be deemed always to have continued to exist and they continue to exist within the limits of the Kota Municipality, to all intents and for all purposes. This provision requires the deeming of the legal position that the villages of Raipura and Ummedganj fall within the limits of the Kota Municipality, not the deeming of facts from which this legal consequence would flow. A legal consequence cannot be deemed nor, therefrom, can the events that should have preceded it. Facts may be deemed and, therefrom, the legal consequences that follow." (Emphasis supplied). For the reasons and on the ground that the Validating Act did not cure the defect leading to the invalidity of the inclusion of the said villages in Kota Municipality, the validating Act was held to be invalid.
The deeming clause in the present case is to the same effect as that of the above mentioned case. The legal consequences of appointments being regular has been deemed without deeming facts either of repealing 1979 Rules and making 1973 Rules operative or changing the basis, namely, definition of Selection of Board. In this view, we have no hesitation in holding that Section 3(1) has to meet the same fate as was met by Validating statute in Delhi Cloth Mills case [1996 (1) TMI 431 - SUPREME COURT]. The validity of the Validating Act is further assailed on the ground that it by mere declaration validates the invalid appointments without removing the basis of invalidity of the appointments made. Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition, Page no.1421) defines Validation Acts as "a law that is amended either to remove errors or to add provisions to confirm to constitutional requirements".
In the case of Hari Singh & Ors. v. The Military Estate Officer & Anr. [1972 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court held that "The meaning of a Validating Act is to remove the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidating of actions or proceedings, which are validated by a legislative measure". The Supreme Court in the case of ITW Signode India Limited vs. Collector of Central Excise [2003 (11) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT] observed that "A Validation Act removes actual or possible voidness, disability or other defect by confirming the validity of anything, which is or may be invalid." The purpose of a Validating Act is to remove the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity. A Validating Act presupposes a positive act, on the part of the legislature, of removing the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity. In the present case nothing has been done.
The Supreme Court upheld the judgment and order of the Orissa High Court, dismissing the appeals and leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The contempt petition and Special Leave Petitions were also disposed of in terms of this judgment. The Court did not express any opinion on the promotions of certain individuals, leaving it to be decided by the High Court.
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2004 (9) TMI 657 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... only piped music was being played and the entrants were using the dance floor. In East India Hotels case (supra) Bombay High Court was of the view that payment for admission into discotheque is what is payment for admission to entertainment since a dance in a sense of a couple executing a ballroom dance, entertains and divers both those who are dancing and those who are looking on and to that extent is an entertainment. It is this element of fixed charge which is sought to be subjected to entertainment tax. 25.The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent and the petitioner is directed to deposit ₹ 1,60,169.50 and ₹ 36,106/- respectively within one month from today towards the satisfaction of the claim towards entertainment tax. On this amount being deposited, the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner shall be discharged by the Registrar of this Court. 26. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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2004 (9) TMI 656 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... r is conditional, the order under the latter is absolute. See State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd. and Ors. (2003 (7) SCC 389) . In the background of legal principles set out above, the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity. The residual question, however, is whether learned SDM could consider the suggestions, if any, given by the appellants, as to the manner in which goods can be stored or connected activities by passing order of a regulatory nature. This is permissible by the provisions itself which provide that SDM can regulate such activities. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on that matter for which material can be placed by the appellants before the learned SDM for appropriate orders in the matter, we direct that if any suggestion or alternative arrangement is brought to the notice of learned SDM it shall be considered in its proper perspective in accordance with law. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 655 - SUPREME COURT
Transfer of investigation to an impartial agency - expeditious trial and disposal of Sessions Case - Disciplinary action against judicial and police officers - Discharge of accused and commitment of other respondents for trial - HELD THAT:- There is no provision in the Code to file a protest petition by the informant who lodged the first information report. But this has been the practice. Absence of a provision in the Code relating to filing of a protest petition has been considered. This Court was Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Another [1985 (4) TMI 327 - SUPREME COURT], stressed on the desirability of intimation being given to the information when a report under Section 173(2) is under consideration.
There is no shadow of doubt that the informant is entitled to a notice and an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. This Court further hold that the position is different so far as an injured person or a relative of the deceased, who is not an informant, is concerned. They are not entitled to any notice. This Court felt that the question relating to issue of notice and grant of opportunity as afore- described was of general importance and directed that copies of the judgment be sent to the High Courts in all the States so that the High Courts in their rum may circulate the same among the Magistrates within their respective jurisdictions.
When the information is laid with the Police, but no action in that behalf is taken, the complainant is given power under Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code to lay the complaint before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and the Magistrate is required to enquire into the complaint as provided in Chapter XV of the Code. In case the Magistrate after recording evidence finds a prima facie case, instead of issuing process to the accused, he is empowered to direct the police concerned to investigate into offence under Chapter XII of the Code and to submit a report. If he finds that the complaint does not disclose any offence to take further action, he is empowered to dismiss the complaint u/s 203 of the Code. In case he finds that the complaint/evidence recorded prima facie discloses an offence, he is empowered to take cognizance of the offence and would issue process to the accused. It was specifically observed that a writ petition in such cases is not to be entertained.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order, stating that the writ application was not the proper remedy. The appellant should have availed the remedies available under the Code of Criminal Procedure before approaching the High Court. The appeal was dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 654 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... prove the guilt of the accused. The prosecution could not lay its hands on any item of evidence that may come under Section 10 of the Evidence Act, i.e. anything having been said, done or written by any of the appellants in reference to their common intention to kill Dr. Megh Raj Goyal. Though voluminous evidence was adduced by the prosecution, there is none which would come within the parameters of admissible item of evidence. This is an unfortunate case where a young doctor was killed. As Balwinder Singh could not be jointly tried with the appellants, the entire evidence of confession recorded under Section 15 and the extra-judicial confessions have become inadmissible and in the absence of any other reliable evidence the appellants are only to be acquitted of the charges framed against them. In the result, these appeals are allowed. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges framed against them and directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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