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2004 (9) TMI 653 - SUPREME COURT
Termination of services - contravention of Section 25F - Whether the Appellant is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act - Applicability of the Apprentices Act, 1961 - HELD THAT:- The expression 'Apprentice' has been included in the definition of 'workman' contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but by reason of a subsequent Parliamentary legislation, namely, Apprentices Act, 1961 (the 1961 Act), the term 'apprentice' has been defined in Section 2(aa) to mean "a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship. Section 18 of the 1961 Act provides that apprentices are trainees and not workers save as otherwise provided in the Act.
'Apprentice', as noticed, is defined to mean a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training pursuant to a contract of apprenticeship. How a contract of apprenticeship would be entered into is to be found in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the 1961 Act. The embargos placed in this regard are: (i) entering into a contract of apprenticeship with a minor in which event the contract must be executed by his guardian; and (ii) on such terms or conditions which shall not be inconsistent with any provision of the Act or any rule framed thereunder.
A 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must not only establish that he is not covered by the provisions of the Apprenticeship Act but must further establish that he is employed in the establishment for the purpose of doing any work contemplated in the definition. Even in a case where a period of apprenticeship is extended, a further written contract carrying out such intention need not be executed. But in a case where a person is allowed to continue without extending the period of apprenticeship either expressly or by necessary implication and regular work is taken from him, he may become a workman. A person who claims himself to be an apprentice has certain rights and obligations under the statute.
In case any person raises a contention that his status has been changed from apprentice to a workman, he must plead and prove the requisite facts. In absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought about, an apprentice cannot be held to be workman.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's judgment that the Appellant was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that his termination did not contravene Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court also confirmed the applicability of the Apprentices Act, 1961, to the Appellant's case, emphasizing that he remained an apprentice throughout his tenure.
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2004 (9) TMI 652 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nder section 32A was to be allowed on the machinery used in the business of the assessee?" Heard Sri A.N. Mahajan, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue. 2. The present reference relates to assessment year 1982-83. The respondent-assessee is carrying on contract business for construction of tubular trusses, beams, girders and other structural, rolling shutters and other civil works. The activities undertaken by the respondent-assessee do not amount to manufacture of articles or things as held by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. N.C. Budharaja & Co. 1993 204 ITR 412 wherein the Apex Court has held that construction activities are not exigible for investment allowance under section 32A of the Act or section 80-I of the Act. 3. Respectfully following the view taken in the aforesaid case we answer the questions of law referred to us in the negative i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (9) TMI 651 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ... ... ... ..... 8 to 41 and sections 43 and 43A but the provisions of section 5, which is the charging section would remain intact and these by no maxim of interpretation, would be superseded by the provisions of section 44BB. 17. It is in respectful consonance with the aforesaid ratio laid down by the said Third Member decision of the Tribunal, that we hold that since the income in question cannot even be construed to be deemed income of the assessee, there is no taxable income to be computed and so section 44BB is inapplicable. 18. In the above circumstances, the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) is not sustainable in the eye of law. It is hereby cancelled. Only a part of mobilization/demobilization work, which is attributable to the operations carried out by the assessee in India, is taxable in India. The services rendered by the assessee are not covered by the Notification, bearing No. G.S.R. 304(E), dated March 31, 1983. 19. Resultantly, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2004 (9) TMI 650 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... ee no reason to interfere with the order under appeal. The civil appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 649 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the alleged confession made by the appellant before the Executive Magistrate and other witnesses namely PWs 25, 26 & 28 in the course of recreating the crime scenario could be given any weight?
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2004 (9) TMI 648 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ... ... ... ..... l has held that combined penalty under Section 11 AC and Under Rule 173Q is not legally sustainable. He therefore prays that the penalty of ₹ 40,000 imposed may be set aside. Also heard Ld. SDR Sri B.L. Meena who has perused the judgments. 3. I have examined the records and considered the rival submissions. I find that the issue is no longer res integra and it is now well settled that no penalty under Section 11 AC of the Act ibid or under various Rules of the Central Excise Rules can be imposed when the duty has been paid before the issuance of Show-cause Notice. In the instant case Show-cause Notice was issued on 14th March, 1997, whereas the duty of ₹ 1,42,088 was paid on 8th October, 1996. Respectfully following the above judgments cited by Ld. Consultant. I set aside the impugned order imposing the penalty of ₹ 40,000 under Section 11 AC and under Rules 9(2), 52A, 173Q and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and allow the appeal. Ordered accordingly.
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2004 (9) TMI 647 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ... ... ... ..... d, the assessee also came forward with a new plea that there was a narration on the back side of page 16 which indicated that the stock shown in the seized sheets was mere estimates of goods to be purchased for 1996-97. After giving careful consideration to all the relevant aspects of the case, we are of the view that the somersault taken by the assessee several months after search was, as held by the Assessing Officer, an afterthought and the events following thereafter were simply a device to frustrate the efforts of the Department to sniff off the unaccounted income of the assessee which it had unambiguously and voluntarily declared, and offered for taxation at the time of search. 44. We have given our careful consideration to all the judicial authorities cited and submissions made by the parties before us. However, we have not discussed some of them individually in the order to avoid adding bulk to the order. 45. Resultantly, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 646 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 107, lease can only be made by a registered instrument and if not so made, is void altogether. Therefore, the Official Liquidator cannot place reliance on the stipulation contained in an unregistered agreement to lease contemplating the lease period to be of 60 years. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in RAM KUMAR DAS v. JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO, DHABAL DEV reported in AIR 1952 SC 23 as followed by a Division Bench of this Court in BABULAL SOMALAL reported in 20 GLR 36, for rejecting the contention of the Official Liquidator that the lease was for a period of 60 years, and treating it as a monthly tenancy. The appeal is, therefore, devoid of any substance and, therefore, summarily rejected. The Civil Application stands rejected in view of this order. 4. At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for the Official Liquidator submits that the order may not operate for four weeks. There is no justification for such a request.
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2004 (9) TMI 645 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... a) of awarding compensation to a wife, who has failed to establish the second marriage, has no effect of binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India as the same has been exercised by the Apex Court exercising special power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and same holds good to the decision in the case of Smt. TARAMANI; and 2) The High Courts or the Sub-ordinate Courts have no such power to award compensation, even by applying pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in LAXMIDEVI's case as binding precedent. 20. As such, on going through the impugned judgment as we find that the learned Magistrate has not all considered this aspect, his applying the decision of this Court in TARAMANI's case blindly is illegal and that portion of the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 21. In the result and for the reasons stated above, the petition is allowed. The order of the learned Magistrate awarding compensation is hereby set aside.
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2004 (9) TMI 644 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ty to approach the learned Tribunal by way of Review as the petitioner is now in a position to deposit ₹ 6 lacs, as ordered earlier by the Tribunal, which he could not deposit in time and, therefore, his appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal by its impugned order at Annexure A. Permission granted. Disposed of as withdrawn.
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2004 (9) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the tenant permitted to occupy the premises till the end of 2005 subject to filing the usual undertaking before the Trial Court with a clear stipulation that the rent fixed shall be paid within the stipulated time, and arrears, if any, shall be paid within two months?
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2004 (9) TMI 642 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ded interest on interest and has accepted the principle laid down in the decision of the Gujarat High Court in D.J. Works v. Dy. CIT 1992 195 ITR 2272 which was subsequently followed by the Gujarat High Court in Chimanlal S. Patel v. CIT 1994 210 ITR 419 3. The latter decision of the Gujarat High Court has considered the very provisions which are in question in the present writ petition. 3. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, we feel that the petitioner is entitled to succeed on this aspect and accordingly we direct that interest on interest be also paid by the respondents to the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
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2004 (9) TMI 641 - CESTAT BANGALORE
... ... ... ... ..... d Advocate contended that the appellant did not render any service of consulting engineers and royalty charges cannot be taxed during the relevant period as amount received for consulting engineering services. He also brought to our attention the Order-in-Original No. 89/04, dated 14-9-2004 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs Muvattupuzha Division in the case of the appellant holding that royalty received is not liable for service tax. He requested the bench to remand the matter to the original authority in view of this decision. 4. On a careful consideration, we remand the matter to the original authority in view of his findings in the above mentioned case and also in view of the fact that service tax on intellectual property services (royalty etc.) has come under the service tax for the first time in the budget of 2004 only. Ordered accordingly. (Operative portion of the order already pronounced in open Court on conclusion of the hearing)
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2004 (9) TMI 640 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... he case of Commissioner of Customs Kolkata v. M/s. Rupa & Co. Ltd. 2004 (170) E.L.T. 129 (S.C.) this appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 639 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Respondent no.2 would surrender to custody as required in law so that his application under Section 439 of the Code can be taken for disposal?
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2004 (9) TMI 638 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... special leave petition is dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 637 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Limitation for completing the assessment for the block period in terms of Section 158BE -authorisation of search - mandatory approval of the CIT for special audit u/s 142(2A) - Power of CIT to extend time u/s 142(2C) - HELD THAT:- A comparison of two provisions shows that under Expln. 1 to Section 158BE originally the period to be excluded from computing the period of limitation under its Clause (i) and (ii) were the same as were to be excluded so under Clause (II) and (III) of Explanation to Section 153. No other provisions of Expln. 1 to Section 153 was included in Expln. 1 to Section 158BE. This was a legislative policy manifested by making specific and independent provisions for assessment under Chapter XIV-B. If any provisions of Expln. 1 to Section 153 were to apply as it were, in terms of Section 158BH, to proceedings under Chapter XIV-B, there was hardly any reason which could have led to enactment of Expln. 1 to Section 158BE independently and differently from existing other provisions of the same enactment. Legislature is not presumed to indulge in any academic exercise and that too in truncated manner.
There being a clear provision made to cover the field of computation of limitation provided under Chapter XIV-B and expressly provided taking into account the conditions which also were part of above-referred provision of Section 153, but were not completely in accordance with the Section 153. The part of Section 153 which was expressly not included in the provisions cannot by any stretch of imagination be said that the provision has been made applicable in regard to computing limitation u/s 158BH. The fact that different periods had been provided for cases depending on the date search warrant is executed, a legal fiction defining the term is also enacted under Expln. 2.
Thus, on the interpretation of provisions of Section 158BE, if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is to be accepted, then insertion of original Expln. 1 firstly by inserting it retrospectively vide Finance Act, 1996 providing for exclusion of period only in two events and then again amending it by substituting Expln. 1 with prospective effect specifically w.e.f. 1st June, 2002 extending the exclusion of period in some more contingencies, also commensurate with some of the provisions of Section 153, would have been wholly unnecessarily intended to be clarificatory in nature. Such intention cannot be attributed to the legislature.
In fact, Section 158BE provides a complete code prescribing limitation and mode for computing such period of limitation for assessment for block period. It provides for commencement of period of limitation, it provides specific circumstance or condition in which time is to be excluded. It also prescribes the maximum extent upto which time is to be excluded in computing period of prescribed limitation. Thus, Section 158BE, being a complete code in itself on the subject of prescribing and computing limitation for completing block assessment, which itself is a special provision, other provisions of the Act outside the provisions are necessarily excluded.
We may notice that by the amending provisions Clause (3) and (4) have been added for additional exclusion of period in computing limitation for completing block assessment u/s 158BE and proviso has also been added for computing limitation period in case time left after extension of time taken for the proceedings is less than 60 days, then the period for computing the assessment is extended upto 60 days. It does not make any provisions to indicate its operation to be retrospective in any sense like it was indicated while inserting Explanation later on renumbered as Expln. 1 for the first time vide Finance Act, 1996, or while Expln. 2 was inserted vide Finance Act, 1998, making it effective w.e.f. 1st July, 1995.
Thus, not making it specifically retrospective in operation and making it explicitly operative w.e.f. 1st June, 2002 only, the substituted Expln. 1 vide Finance Act, 2002 can have no application to the present case on its own force. Nor any provision has been made validating assessments made prior to substitution of new Expln. 1 w.e.f. 1st June, 2002, which otherwise might fall within the ambit of proviso, if it were then in operation. In the absence of such saving/validating provisions the assessment made on 8th March, 2001 was clearly barred by time when made as per extant provisions and were not validated by subsequent amendment of the Act through substitution of Expln, 1 to Section 158BE w.e.f. 1st June, 2002.
Since excluding the entire period of 180 days, the assessment order does not fall within the period of limitation and the assessment order in question fails on that ground alone, we do not deem it appropriate to consider the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that even otherwise the appellant is not entitled for any benefit of exclusion of period for having special audit u/s 142(2A) of the Act or at any rate beyond 120 days as has been found by the Tribunal.
The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 636 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notification issued by the State Government on 14.4.1969 prescribing the registration fee on a graduated form on the basis of value of subject matter of the instrument is in accordance with the spirit of section 78 of the Registration Act and is valid in law?
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2004 (9) TMI 635 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal on the grounds mentioned in its order. In such type of situation there is no other option for this Court but to allow the petitions and quash and set aside the impugned orders dated 13-11-2002 (Annexure-G in both petitions, as well as impugned order dated 4-12-2003 passed by the Appellate Tribunal in Modification Applications). 7. In view of the above discussion all these petitions are allowed and the impugned orders dated 13-11-2002 (Annexure-G in all the petitions) and the impugned common order dated 4-12-2003, passed by the Appellate Tribunal below Application No. C/M/2228/2002-Mum are hereby quashed and set aside and all the matters are remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for deciding the matters afresh in light of the orders dated 21-10-2002 and 31-10-2002 passed by other Benches of the Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai. Rule made absolute in all these petitions. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Interim relief, granted earlier, shall stands vacated.
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2004 (9) TMI 634 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the award is contrary to the terms of contract and, therefore, no arbitrable dispute arose between the parties?
Whether the award is in any way violative of the public policy?
Whether the award is contrary to the substantive law in India, viz., Sections 55 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act?
Whether the reasons are vitiated by perversity in evidence in contract?
Whether adjudication of a claim has been made in respect whereof there was no dispute or difference; or (vi) whether the award is vitiated by internal contradictions?
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