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Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 1058 Records
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1948 (4) TMI 3 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... ssioners (see report of those two cases, ante, p. 1). It was stated in the judgment of Lord Porter that the two present appeals were concerned with similar facts and gave rise to the same considerations as were found in the Smith's Potato Cases. In those circumstances these appeals were also dismissed.
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1948 (4) TMI 2 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... ned to discuss that suggestion in this appeal and express no opinion, favourable or unfavourable, upon it. It is expedient, in view of the defects of the question, to answer it not by a simple affirmative, but by declaring that the Society is not exempt from liability to Assam agricultural income-tax in respect of profits from the sale to its members of tea cultivated or manufactured at its Deckiajuli Estate in the Province of Assam. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the judgment of the High Court should be varied by the substitution for an affirmative answer to the question of this following answer ― "The Society is not exempt from liability to Assam agricultural income-tax in respect of profits from the sale to its members of tea cultivated or manufactured at its Deckiajuli Estate in the Province of Assam" and that subject thereto the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1948 (3) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at profit as between the period prior to the moment of export from Gwalior and the moment subsequent to that export." Now, so far as the actual case was concerned, since the case fell within Section 4(1) of the Income-tax Act, undoubtedly all these profits were taxable in India and therefore I do not read this case as any authority for the proposition that no portion of the profits of this business accrued or arose in the Gwalior State. This case, therefore, in my opinion does not help the Advocate-General. The result, therefore, is that the profits of a part of the business of the assessee, viz., that of manufacturing oil in their mill at Raichur, accrued or arose to them at Raichur in the Hyderabad State ; and such part must be treated as a separate business within the meaning of the third proviso to Section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. I, therefore, agree that the question as re-framed by us should be answered in the manner indicated by my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1948 (3) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h adjoining the portion on which the assessee himself excavated gravel, were virgin soil on which the assessee had not carried on his business at all and what he let out was really land owned by him from which he derived profits. The ratio of all these cases to my mind is that if there is a commercial asset which is capable of being worked by the assessee himself for the purpose of earning profits and the assessee instead of doing so, either voluntarily allows someone else to use it on payment of a certain sum or is compelled by law to allow it to be used in such manner, then what he receives is income from business. But if the commercial asset has ceased to be a commercial asset in the hands of the assessee and thereafter he gets what he can out of it by letting it out to be used by others, then the rent he receives is not income from any business that he carries on. I therefore agree that the question should be answered in the manner indicated by my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1948 (3) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r under any of the heads mentioned in Section 6 he shall be entitled to have the amount of the loss set off against his income, profits or gains under any other head in that year. Now the sum of ₹ 2,01,000 falls within the fifth head in Section 6, viz., "any other sources" and the loss of business falls under a different head, viz., the fourth head of "profits or gains of business." So that section 24(1) applies. But the proviso to that section puts the assessee out of Court. That proviso provides that in so far as the loss sustained is a loss incurred in a Native State such loss shall not be set off against profits or gains in British India, but can only be set off against profits and gains in an Indian State. The result, therefore, is that even under Section 24 the assessee is not entitled to have the amount of ₹ 73,779 set off against the sum of ₹ 2,01,000. The second question referred to us must therefore be answered in the negative.
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1948 (3) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 48 (1) later on states that what shall be refunded to such an entity is the difference between the amount paid and the amount with which he is properly chargeable under the Act for that year, which clearly indicates, to my mind, that the entity which can apply for a refund under Section 48 is an entity which is assessable able to tax under the Act. Now it is the contention of the Baroda State that by virtue of the fact that the Ruler of that State is a sovereign prince they are exempted from tax under the Act. That position has been conceded at the Bar. If so, the Baroda State could never have been assessable under the Income Tax Act at all, and is not amongst the classes of entities enumerated in Section 48 (1). They have, therefore, no right to take advantage of the machinery provided by that section for refund in the case of an assessee assessed or liable to be assessed to tax in British India. The answer to both the questions will therefore be in the negative. o p /o p
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1948 (3) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f 3? per cent. loan sufficient to produce the annuity and hold them. Such promissory notes were not purchased during the accounting year; but if and when such Government promissory notes are purchased and held by the executors for the purpose of giving the interest thereon by way of annuity to the widow, they may well become trustees for the widow in respect of such investments. The payment that was made was the very first payment made after the death of the testator under the provisions of clause 5 of the will; and in respect of this payment I am clear in my mind that the executors were not trustees and were not entitled to receive any amount on behalf of the widow. The Tribunal was therefore right in holding that Section 41(1) did not apply to this income and that this income was not taxable in the hands of the executors as trustees. I therefore agree that the questions should be answered in the manner indicated by my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the securities settled on this trust was not liable to tax. The other contention raised by the Advocate-General is whether this particular trust is a charitable trust at all. The argument advanced by the Advocate-General is that it is not open to a Parsi in India to make a revocable trust of personalty for a charitable purpose. Now it is well-established that a Parsi has no personal law which governs him in British India and he is either governed by the statutory law of this country or in the absence of statutory law he is governed by the Common Law of England and under the Common Law as stated both in Tudor on Charities (p. 551) and in Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 4, p. 200), it is open to a person to make a trust of personalty in favour of charity which is a revocable trust. Therefore in our opinion the answer to the question raised by the Tribunal must be in the affirmative. The Department must pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1948 (3) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of Section 9. Sir Jamshedji Kanga has attempted to argue before us the larger question as to whether under Section 41(1) a trustee can ever be charged in a larger amount than a beneficiary and Sir Jamshedji's contention is that even if the trustees were assessed as owners of the property under Section 9, they would be entitled to the same benefit under sub-section (2) as the beneficiary would be and Sir Jamshedji has also argued that the expression "owner" in Section 9(1) means not the legal owner but the beneficial owner. We do not think it necessary to decide either of these two questions raised by Sir Jamshedji and we confine our decision to the narrow point that as the beneficiary has been assessed to tax under Section 9(1) he is entitled to the benefit under sub-section (2) in the same capacity, viz., that of the owner of the property. We therefore answer the question in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1948 (3) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ath of Phiroz. If that is the correct interpretation of the trust deed, then it follows that upon the death of Phiroz, Freny and Feroza became absolutely entitled to the properties mentioned in schedule "E" in equal shares. That position having arisen, to my mind, the trust was extinguished in so far as it related to the properties in schedule "E". Any income, therefore, received by Freny from this portion of the properties ceased to be the income of a trust and was outside the scope of Section 16(1)(c). The result, therefore, is that with regard to the second question, Freny having become entitled absolutely under clause 4(d) of the trust deed to the income of the property which had been allocated to Phiroz during his lifetime, her income is not touched by the provisions of Section 16(1)(c) at all. I agree, therefore, that the answers to the two questions should be as indicated in the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939 (Assam Act IX of 1939). In ascertaining the agricultural income a deductions must be made by reason of Section 7(c) of the Act a sum equal to 15 per cent of the total amount rent which accrued due in the previous agricultural year in respect of the charges for collecting the same. It is to be observed that the deductions is 15 per cent. of the total amount of rent which accrued due, and not 15 per cent. of the total amount of rent collected. If in a particular year all the accrued rent is collected together with arrears due for past years, the deduction allowed is 15 per cent. of the rent which accrued due and not 15 per cent. of the total collected. That appears to be the view of the Board of Agricultural Income-tax and with that view I agree. The assessee will be entitled to the return of the deposit if any and the costs of this reference. Hearing fee assessed at 30 gold mohurs. MUKHERJEA J. - I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 18th of June, 1943, and I would therefore answer both the questions referred by the Tribunal in the negative. Assessees to pay the costs of the reference. I would like to say a word as to the paper book which has been submitted to us in this reference. Although it contains the statement of case, the judgment of the Tribunal is not printed. Now it is perfectly true that under Section 66 we are exercising an advisory jurisdiction but it has got to be remembered that the questions of law that come up before us are questions of law arising out of the order made by the Tribunal and in order to fully understand the order and the points of law that arise it is absolutely necessary that we should have the judgment of the Tribunal before us. We therefore hope that in future paper books submitted to us will contain not only the statement of the case but also the judgment of the Tribunal and all necessary papers and documents connected with the judgment. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , it would have been fully covered by Section 10(2)(xv) and the enactment of Section 4(3)(vi) would be entirely redundant in the case of any income derived from business. Similarly, if it was the income of a salaried servant, expenses actually incurred would in all cases have been covered by the first proviso to Section 7 and there would again have been no occasion to enact Section 4(3)(vi) at all. The true interpretation to my mind, therefore, of Section 4(3)(vi) is that where the object or purpose for which the grant is made is to meet expenses wholly and necessarily incurred in the performance of the duties of an office or employment of profit, the whole of that grant must be excluded from the total income of the assessee, and the Income-tax authorities cannot concern themselves with whether any part of such grant was in fact utilised for the purpose for which the grant was made. The answer to the question will be in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1948 (3) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lls within its express terms. To my mind the scheme of the Act is perfectly clear. When you turn to Section 10 which deals with business it is a self-contained head. Different businesses do not constitute different heads under the Income-tax Act. All businesses wherever carried on constitute one head which falls under Section 10 of the Act and in order to determine what are the profits and gains of a business under Section 10, an assessee is entitled to show all his profits and set off against those profits losses incurred by him in the same head. It is only when he proceeds to set off a loss under business against a profit under some other head that Section 24 comes into operation and various considerations will arise whether he is entitled to such a set-off or not. Therefore in my opinion the Tribunal was right in the conclusion it came to and we must therefore answer the question in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1948 (3) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Municipal Authorities within the jurisdiction of the Municipality, viz., within the limits of the City of Bombay. These obligatory and discretionary duties of the Corporation are not to be discharged outside the limits of the city. It is only under Section 288 which, as I have pointed out earlier, falls under Chapter X which specifically deals with water supply that the Commissioner is empowered to supply water to any local authority or person outside the city limits. But that power which is conferred under section 288 cannot be looked upon either as an obligatory or a discretionary duty case upon the corporation. Therefore, the activity carried on by the Municipality does not fall within the exemption mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of Section 4(3) and therefore the income derived by the Municipality is liable to tax. The answer to the question therefore will be in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J.―I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1948 (3) TMI 35 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... facts that no accounts at all had been conveniently kept regarding this home chest, and no explanation was furnished of the real source of these sums drawn from the home chest, and, instead, this home chest seems to have partaken of the nature of the widow's miraculous cruse of oil which was never exhausted, or the purse of Fortunatus which was always full. The Income-tax authorities were surely entitled to use this as material in connection with the other materials before them from which to draw a conclusion. As I have already stated, it is not for us to express any opinion whether the conclusion they did draw was, upon these materials, in fact justified. My answer to the question put to us would be that there was legal evidence to support the finding of the Tribunal,, and I would answer the reference accordingly. The Income-tax Commissioner is entitled to his costs which we assess in the sum of ₹ 250. AGARWALA, C.J.―I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , 1937, and that concession is that a suit could lie even in respect of these trade marks if they were not registered. But assuming that a special right does come into existence, which I very much doubt, what we held in the decided case was that such a right must be of an enduring character in order to make the expenditure a capital expenditure. It is not disputed that in this case, as in the other, the trade mark only endures for a period of seven years after which a fresh application for a trade mark has to be made. If the duration of the trade mark is only seven years it does not possess that permanency which is required in order to make the expenditure a capital expenditure and in order to bring into existence a benefit of an enduring character. In my opinion, the decision to which I have referred applies and the answer to the question must be given on that basis. The result, therefore, is that the answer to the question must be in the affirmative. Tendolkar, J.-I agree.
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1948 (3) TMI 33 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppellant had extensive speculative business, part of the gains of which he had suppressed in various benami accounts and that there were investments outside the books as in the case of Ballabux Gidwani." The explanation of the assessee with regard to this deposit being untrue, it was open to the Income-tax Officer to rely on circumstantial evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the sum entered in the books, and having found that there had been suppression of gains made in the speculative transactions of the assessee, it was not wrong for him to attribute this entry relating to ₹ 3,500 as gains from that source. It is clear, therefore, that there is no substance in the contention that this ₹ 3,500 has been doubly taxed, and the question which has been stated must be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department. The Department is entitled to the costs of this reference, ₹ 250. MEREDITH, J.―I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir mother ceased to be a voluntary payment as soon as they entered into the agreement which the law could enforce as being sufficiently supported by adequate consideration. It is not disputed by the Advocate-General that if the charge was supported by adequate consideration, undoubtedly the assessee would be entitled to the allowances under sub-section (4). If so, why is natural love and affection not an equally good consideration ? Law looks upon it as a good consideration, and if in this case it can be supported by that consideration, the payment of ₹ 6,000 stands on the same footing as if there was pecuniary consideration for the payment of this amount by the assessees. We, therefore, do not agree with the Tribunal when they take the view that the payment of ₹ 6,000 is not a permissible allowance, and we would, therefore, answer question submitted to us in the affirmative. The Commissioner must pay the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (3) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay 1934 61 I.A. 209; 2 I.T.R. 148 refers to trustees whose position again is not analogous to that of a receiver. In the matter of The Official Assignee for Bengal 1937 5 I.T.R. 233 relates to the official assignee in insolvency whose position again is not analogous to that of a receiver. In my opinion, the Tribunal was right in the view which it took. The owner under the terms of the section must be the mortgagor and cannot be either the mortgage or the receiver appointed by the Court. Before I conclude it is perhaps desirable to mention that it is not contested that the assessee will be entitled to the relevant proportionate allowances under the provision I have already referred to, Section 9 (1)(iv). I would answer the reference in the manner I have above indicated. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 250. AGARWALA, C.J.―I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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