|
Advanced Search Options
Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 1058 Records
-
1949 (9) TMI 28
... ...
... ... ..... certain amounts for depreciation. It is difficult to understand what the grievance of Mr. Kolah is He paid no income-tax prior to 1940-41 and therefore he got no deduction for depreciation. Mr. Kolah without paying any tax wants the benefit of the depreciation allowance. He cannot eat his cake and have it too. Apart from the clear language of the section the construction that we are giving to it does not result in any inequitable assessment of the assessee. The result is that we must answer the question in the negative. We frankly confess that it is difficult to understand the second question. We do hope that the Tribunal whose jurisdiction it is to raise questions and submit them to us for our opinion will raise the questions in a manner which makes them clear as to what the contention between the parties is. As neither Mr. Kolah nor Mr. Joshi is in a position to throw any light as to what is intended to be referred by the second question, we refuse to answer the question.
-
1949 (9) TMI 27
... ...
... ... ..... income, i.e., whether their shares were defined and known. In my opinion it is not open to Dr. Gupta at this stage to urge the new point which he now seeks to make. Inasmuch as the assessment has been made on the whole of the income of the Thakurs it is immaterial that the deities through the shebaits have to make payments to other persons and the amount which may be available to the deities is variable or indeterminate. It is equally immaterial that the shebaits as managers of the deities receive the income but have to make payments to or to provide for a large and somewhat indefinite group of persons and charities. Therefore, the question set out in the referring order should be answered in the negative. The income received under the deed of dedication is not chargeable at the maximum rate under Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this Reference. Certified for two Counsel. HARRIES, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1949 (9) TMI 26
... ...
... ... ..... ble. Only in exceptional cases, for legal necessity or for the benefit or preservation of the property, the shebait can alienate the same. But in my view that does not affect the nature of ownership of the property or the share to which deities are entitled. In my view it is only right and proper that the two deities should be entitled equally to the income derived from the properties bequeathed or settled under the will and the deed of settlement. To attempt to make any other apportionment or to define some other shares as between the two deities would be to make out a new settlement or a new will and that may be quite contrary to the intention of the settlor or testatrix. In the absence of any indication of intention to the contrary it is only just and proper that there should be equal division of the income of the properties concerned as between the two deities. I agree with the order proposed to be made by my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1949 (9) TMI 25
... ...
... ... ..... ayments received by them in connection with these leases as ordinary payments in the course of business and actually included the payment of ₹ 9,000 to them as part of their receipts. The fact, of course, that the assessees were taxed on this sum of ₹ 9,000 does not conclude the matter as they may have been wrongly assessed on that sum. However, it does show what was the true nature of these payments. The payment, as I have said, appears to have been made not as a premium but as an advance payment of rent made to assist the Madras Publishing House Ltd. to erect and complete the cinema. If it was such a payment, it is conceded that the amount would have to be allowed as a deduction in computing the assessees' income. For the reasons which I have given the question submitted must be answered in the affirmative. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two counsel. CHATTERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1949 (9) TMI 23
... ...
... ... ..... ed in applying Section 42 (3) in assessing the profits of the assessee in this case where part of its operations was carried on outside British India. 38. In my opinion Section 42 (1) and Section 42 (3) apply to both residents and non-residents. Any other construction would lead to the anomalous results. It is to be observed that Section 4, Income Tax Act, is expressly made "subject to the provisions of this Act" which include Section 42. It is to be noted, however, that the marginal note to Section 42 has been changed by Act, XXII 22 of 1947. By Section 12 of that Act for the marginal heading "Non-residents" the following has been substituted--"Income deemed to accrue or arise within British India". It was obviously done to alter the marginal note which was somewhat misleading. 39. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the question should be answered in the affirmative and that the respondent should be awarded the costs of this reference.
-
1949 (9) TMI 22
... ...
... ... ..... d the exercise of the discretion by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was considered to be perverse. In the case before us, however, both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Appellate Tribunal considered the case on the merits and both were of the opinion that there were no sufficient grounds for the condonation of the delay. There could be the only decision in view of the fact that the Special Manager had tried to get the delay condoned on a ground which was obviously false. In the circumstances of the case there is no point in having the question further considered by a larger Bench. As we are bound by the decision of this Court in the case of Shivnath Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces 1935 3 I.T.R. 200, mentioned above, we must answer this question in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of these proceedings. We fix the fee at ₹ 500 of the learned counsel for the department. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1949 (9) TMI 21
... ...
... ... ..... we have to determine is whether the company has been pursuing that object and carrying on that business or not, and it is impossible to hold on the facts of this case that by a solitary transaction of an advance of ₹ 5,00,000 to Agrawal & Co., it could be said the in doing so it was pursuing one of its objects and carrying out that business. Therefore, in my opinion, even if we assume that the question referred to us is a question of law, on the facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the moneys lent by the company to Agrawal & Co. were not in the ordinary course of business, that that transaction did not constitute part of the businees of the company and therfore the company was not entitled to reply on rule 1 (1) (b) of Schedule II to the Excess Profits Tax Act. The answer therefore to the question submitted to us will be in the negative. the assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismisses with costs.
-
1949 (9) TMI 20
... ...
... ... ..... 065 accrued and arose to the assessee in Bombay and not in a Native State. The assessee has taken out a notice of motion for the purpose of raising a question as to his liability to pay excess profits tax on the commission earned and which is the subject-matter of this reference. We do not think it necessary that a separate and further question should be raised in order to meet the application of the assessee. What we propose to do is to amend the question which has been framed by the Tribunal, so as to read as follows - "Whether in the circumstances of the case the commission viz. ₹ 88,065 received by the assessee company from the United Salt Works & Industries Ltd., accrued in the State of Kutch or in British India, both for the purpose of income-tax and excess profits tax?" And we answer the question, in British India. There will be no order as to costs of the notice of motion. Assessee to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1949 (9) TMI 19
... ...
... ... ..... depositors who deposited their moneys with the Bank were at all concerned with what the Bank did with that money. They were only concerned with earning interest on their deposits. It was entirely irrelevant, as far as they were concerned, how the Bank carried on its business with their deposits. Therefore, it is clear that in this case it has not been established that there was any knowledge on the part of the lender that his deposit would be transferred to India for the purposes of earning income on it. If that be so, then the interest earned by the depositors was not chargeable under the Indian Income-tax Act and there was no obligation upon the Bank to deduct tax under Section 18(3A). The result therefore is that the Bank is entitled to the deduction under Section 10(2)(iii) in respect of interest paid by it to its depositors. We therefore answer the question in the affirmative to the extent of ₹ 32,469. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1949 (9) TMI 18
... ...
... ... ..... view of the law, we would, after answering the question of law, ask the Tribunal to determine the necessary facts on the evidence before it and come to the conclusion whether the two businesses carried on by the partners in this case constituted two different firms or one firm for the purpose of the Indian Income- tax Act. We will reformulate the first question submitted to us in the following terms "Whether in law common partners can constitute two separate firms in respect of different businesses carried on by these partners for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act." Having reformulated that question we answer the question in the affirmative. With regard to the second question, we agree with the Tribunal that it is a question of fact, and we answer it in the affirmative. We therefore direct that the case of the assessee should be dealt with in accordance with the opinion expressed in our judgment. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1949 (8) TMI 23
... ...
... ... ..... ition decree was passed, the Rai Bahadur would be liable to render account in respect of the twelve annas share on a different basis. But still he would continue to be a member of that firm and the partnership would not be in any way affected by the passing of that decree in the partition suit. 19. In my opinion the Tribunal was right when it took the view that the partnership continued and Section 26A was applicable. 20. Vis-a-vis the members of the family of the Rai Bahadur might be liable to account, as I said before, on a different footing. But he did not cease to be a partner of the firm and as such the application was rightly made under Section 26-A on behalf of the firm which was constituted under a proper instrument of partition which specified the individual shares of the partners. 21. The answer to the question put to us must therefore be in the affirmative. The assessees are entitled to their costs of this Reference. Certified for two counsel. Harries C.J. I agree.
-
1949 (8) TMI 20
... ...
... ... ..... i). Section 4(3) provides that--"Any income, profits or gains falling within the following classes shall not be included in the total income of the person receiving them." Clause (i) is--"Any income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes, and in the case of property so held in part only for such purposes, the income applied, or finally set apart for application, thereto." It is quite obvious that fees received by the Bar Council for enrolling advocates or for registering apprentices is not income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation. The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. The Bar Council, Madras(1). The answer to the question referred to us, therefore, must be in the negative. The Income-tax Department is entitled to the costs of the reference which we assess at ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1949 (8) TMI 17
... ...
... ... ..... nsion of the profession. A person may be compelled to discontinue his profession owing to his illness or owing to his appointment to some office which complete him to give up his profession. Such cessation of professional activities, even if involuntary, would constitute discontinuance within Section 25(3). Reference may be made to the case of Mr. Justice Iqbal Ahmad 1942 10 I.T.R. 152. The nature of the detention and the impossibility of making any reasonable forecast as to the length of such detention might lead the assessee to think at that time that it was all over with him so far as his profession was concerned. There were other facts which had been found by the Tribunal. Mr. Bose had dismissed his clerk and given up his chambers and on the material before them they were justified in holding that there was discontinuance by Mr. Bose of his profession. I agree with the answer proposed by the learned Chief Justice to the question put to us. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1949 (7) TMI 5
... ...
... ... ..... the award which, it must be remembered, was framed and published as an interim award. The facts with which the arbitrator was faced were themselves complicated and the conception upon which is founded his interpretation of the respective legal rights of the parties in the assets of the partnership or partnerships is a subtle one. But there is neither indefiniteness nor ambiguity in his holding as to the interests of the parties in the firm of Hurdutroy Chamria and Co., which is set out in para. 8, and this is, after all, the essence of the matter. Neither of the Courts below has felt itself faced with any difficulty in interpreting the effect of the award and their Lordships do not think that it would be right for them to entertain an appeal to set aside or remit it on this ground. 15. In the result their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of those of the respondents who have appeared in the appeal.
-
1949 (7) TMI 3
... ...
... ... ..... profits earned by the assessee was the rate of gross profit a wool merchant in India would normally make if he supplied goods to the assessee instead of the assessee himself purchasing the wool here.. The contention of the assessee was that there should have been definite material on the record to prove what the margin of the assessee's profits on his purchase was, and that in the absence of any such material there was no material at all. In the circumstances I consider that in calculating the profits, as he has done, the Income-tax Officer has acted well within the powers given to him under rule 33, and that the purchase figures of the assessee company did amount to material on which the proportion of the profits could be reasonably attributable to the acts of purchase of the assessee in British India. I would accordingly also return an answer in the affirmative to the third question, and allow the costs of these proceedings to the respondent. Harnam Singh, J.-I agree.
-
1949 (7) TMI 1
... ...
... ... ..... he additional growths became ipso jure the property of the company." In the present case the trees were not acquired nor were the leaves acquired until the appellants had reduced them into their own possession and ownership by picking them. The two cases can, in their Lordships' opinion, in no sense be regarded as comparable. If the tendu leaves had been stored in a merchant's godown and the appellants had bought the right to go and fetch them and so reduce them into their possession and ownership it could scarcely have been suggested that the purchase price was capital expenditure. Their Lordships see no ground in principle or reason for differentiating the present case from that supposed. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and that the respondent should be ordered to pay the costs of the appellants of and relating to the reference to the High Court. The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
-
1949 (6) TMI 2
... ...
... ... ..... o one Chintayya who "gifted his share to his son-in-law M. Ramayya," and this Ramayya executed a kath S-13 in favour of a member of the Tangirala family (plaintiff's predecessor). This would show that there was even a transfer to an outsider, though a relation, recognized by the inamdar. The neutralizing effect of all these factors has not been given any weight in the consideration of the evidence by Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J. On the evidence that has been placed before them, which is not conclusive, their Lordships are not satisfied that the plaintiff on whom the burden lies to prove that he has a title to evict the defendants, has discharged his burden. 51. For the above reasons, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside, with costs, the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam restored and the plaintiff's suit dismissed. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal.
-
1949 (6) TMI 1
... ...
... ... ..... me-tax, Madras v. Zamindar of Singampatti 1922 ILR 45 Mad. 518, on which he relied strongly has not been referred to in the judgment of the Board, though as will appear from the arguments reference had been made to it. Their Lordships have no doubt that though the case is not mentioned by name it must have been considered by the Board. In view of the decision in Probhat Chandra Barua v. The King Emperor 1930 LR 57 IA 228, it must now be held that the decisions in Zamindar of Singampatti's case (supra)and Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1924 ILR 3 Pat. 470, are no longer good law. Following the decision in Probhat Chandra Barua's case (supra), their Lordships hold that the decision of the High Court on the question referred to it is right; and that the tax was rightly levied on the amount of ₹ 7,612 in the present case. For the above reasons, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
-
1949 (5) TMI 14
... ...
... ... ..... definition of "business" must be construed so as to avoid conflict. If by the definition a company holding property does not carry on a business unless the holding of such property is its whole or main function, then the rule cannot extend the definition so as to make a company which holds property as a minor function, carry on business with regard to such property. In my view, the income derived from the holding and letting of property by the assessee company was income derived from property and it could not be regarded as the profits and gains of a business as there is no finding that the holding and letting of such property was the sole or the main function of the company. For these reasons, the question stated by the Tribunal in the case submitted should be answered in the negative. The assessee company will be entitled to its costs and the return of the deposit of ₹ 100. Certified for two counsel. CHATTERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered in negative.
-
1949 (4) TMI 26
... ...
... ... ..... Tribunal. If the question referred to us could be held in the negative. In so far as the last contention of Mr. Sikri is concerned we are of the opinion that it is not covered by the question referred to us. The only question which we are asked to consider is whether the sum of ₹ 45,351 determined as profit of the assessee for the relevant accounting period in their Sambar Lake firm had been remitted to the assessee in the relevant accounting year and is consequent taxable. We think that on the case as stated and in view of the question as formulated we are not called upon to decide and indeed have no power to decide, if the sum of ₹ 7,162 being the excess of the remittances received by the assessee over the remittances made by him can be regarded as profits received during the account period and liable to tax. The respondents shall have his costs of this reference. We assessee counsels fee at ₹ 250. Harnam Singh, J. I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
........
|
