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Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 1058 Records
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1949 (4) TMI 22
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... ... ..... itioner, under the powers conferred on me in that behalf under the provisions of Section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, under which imprisonment is not to exceed one day for each rupee of the arrears." It is clear from these statements made by the Collector that he passed his order for the detention of the applicant under the bonafide belief that he had authority to make such an order under Section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act. Mr. Seervai also stated that in view of the Collector's affidavit he did not wish to press the allegations that the Collector had acted mala fide. In fact from the number of points raised and debated before us, it will be difficult to hold that he has acted mala fide or absurdly. The present application is consequently barred by Section 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935. We have, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in this case. Accordingly, we dismiss the application and discharge the rule. No order as to costs.
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1949 (4) TMI 19
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... ... ..... -owning companies. That being so, the decision in the earlier Bench case to which I have referred in no way compels this Bench to hold that the decision of the Tribunal is right. As held in the earlier decision, the section applies to property-owning companies and therefore to this case. But when the section is applied it is clear from the plain facts of the case that there was no evidence at all upon which it could be held by the Income-tax Officer that a declaration of a higher dividend was reasonable or even possible. That being so, the view of the Tribunal was in my judgment clearly erroneous and the question propounded must be answered in the negative. The section applies to property-owning companies but it was improperly applied on the facts of this case. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. The assessee is also entitled to the return of the deposit made by him. Certified for two counsel. CHATTERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (4) TMI 18
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... ... ..... therefore it would not be liable to assessment to excess profits tax. In my judgment no assistance can be obtained from the English cases and it is clear that the view of this Court is that merely holding property and deriving income therefrom by letting it cannot amount to a business. That being so, even apart from the proviso to Section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, we would be bound to hold that the activities of the syndicate do not amount to a business and that their receipts cannot be regarded as the profits of business. That being so, the dead rents and royalties could not be assessed under the Excess Profits Tax Act. That being so, the answer to the question which I have already set out must be in the negative. The assessees will have their costs of this reference--the hearing-fee being assessed at five gold mohurs. The assessees will be entitled to refund of the ₹ 100 deposited. CHATTERJEE, J.--I entirely agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1949 (4) TMI 17
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... ... ..... e profits of the company for income-tax purposes. We fail to see what bearing this judgment can possibly have on the facts of the present case. As observed by the Tribunal, the question whether the amount claimed by the assessee in the present case had been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business against the profits whereof it was sought to be set off was essentially one of fact, and, in the circumstances of the present case, we can find no reasonable ground for holding that the Tribunal could not find as a fact that this expenditure had not been so laid out or expended. We are of the opinion that the question of law formulated by the assessee or, for the matter of that, any other question of law does not arise out of the judgment of the Tribunal and we accordingly dismiss this petition. In the circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
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1949 (3) TMI 39
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... ... ..... has not been complied with and, therefore, I cannot accept the contention put forward by Sir Jamshedji that we must treat the agreement between the Phaltan State and the assessee as a notification under Section 60 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that we must take the view that both the orders complained of are valid and proper orders. I will now proceed to answer the questions raised. References Nos. 24, 25 and 26 raise the same questions with regard to three consecutive accounting years. Question No. 1 - in the affirmative Question No. 2 - In the affirmative. As regard Reference No. 27 in which one question is raised, the answer is that it is not competent to the Court to consider the agreement. But if it is competent, then the question must be answered in the negative. In Reference No. 28 which raises the same question as in Reference No. 27, the answer will be the same as in Reference No. 27. Assessee must pay the costs of all the references. TENDOLKAR, J. - I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 36
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... ... ..... an avoidance of payment of tax within the meaning of Section 10A of the Act. The motive of the assessee for opening the business is entirely immaterial and irrelevant. It is no concern of the Department how an assessee should conduct and carry on his business, and even if an assessee deliberately chose to start a business in a part of India where no excess profits tax is payable, he was perfectly entitled to do so and he was within the law in doing so. In my opinion, therefore, the order made by the Excess Profits Tax Officer was clearly wrong and in excess of the jurisdiction conferred by him by the statute. The question is not properly framed. We will reformulate the question and the question will read thus "Whether in view of the provisions of the third proviso to Section 5 of the Act, the Tribunal was justified in holding that Section 10A applies to the case ?" To that the answer is in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. S.R. Tendolkar, J. I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 35
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... ... ..... Section 9(1)(iv) the Legislature intended to make any exception in respect of an assessee who happens to be a Hindu undivided family. The deduction which is permitted under Section 9 is permitted to all assessees and the only condition that has to be satisfied is that there is an annual charge which is valid and legal and which can be enforced against the owner of the property. It is not disputed in this case that the assessee is the owner of the property on which the charge has been fixed. It is not disputed that it is an annual charge, nor is it disputed that it is a valid and legal charge, and I see no reason why any exception should be grafted on this section to the effect for which Mr. Joshi is contending. I am therefore of the opinion that the deduction has been properly claimed by the assessee under Section 9(1)(iv) of the Act. 5. We must, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. 6. Commissioner to pay the costs. S.R. Tendolkar, J. 7. I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 33
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... ... ..... the amendment passed on the December 3, 1940. Mr. Joshi says that within the meaning of Section 28, even a registered firm could commit default by not complying with the requisition under Section 22, sub-section (4); but the default has no significance because no consequence was attracted to the commission of that default by a registered firm. It is only when a default carries a certain consequence with it, namely, the possibility of a penalty being imposed for the commission of that default, that the default can be considered to be an offence. Obviously there was a lacuna in the law which has been made good by the amendment of the December 3, 1940; but he assessee is entitled to the benefit of that lacuna, and in our opinion the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the penalty imposed was not valid under the law. We must, therefore, answer the question in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J. - I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1949 (3) TMI 29
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... ... ..... tion that these observations of the Privy Council are based. The Privy Council has laid down a general principle which is as much applicable to the British Columbia Taxation Act as to our own Income-tax Act, because the definition of "income " under our Act is a very vide one and it covers innumerable cases. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the amount received by the assessee from the insurance company is clearly a revenue receipt subject to tax. I would only like to add that the question framed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not in proper form and we would reformulate the question so as to read - "Whether in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 14,00,000 was the assessee company's income within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act and liable to pay income-tax under the Indian Income-tax Act ? " Having re-formulated that question, I would answer the question in the affirmative. Tendolkar, J.-I agree. Tendolkar, J.-I agree
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1949 (3) TMI 28
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... ... ..... ase to be stated. But I wish to make it clear that it is for the High Court alone to indicate to the Tribunal what are the questions of law, and the only function of the Tribunal is, once a requisition is made upon it under Section 66(2), to formulate proper questions which arise out of those questions of law and to state a case which is germane to the questions of law indicated by the High Court. It would then be open to the High Court either to answer the questions as formulated by the Tribunal or, if the High Court feels that the questions are not properly raised, to reframe the questions or modify the questions, and answer those questions as reformulated or modified. With regard to the questions raised, they do not seem to have been very happily worded. But we think that the only questions that really arise and which should be decided are questions Nos. 4 and 5. Question No. 4 we will answer in the negative, and question No. 5 also in the negative. Tendolkar, J.-I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 27
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... ... ..... s been functioning for a very short period, or any other factor, and therefore we would permit Mr. Kolah to raise that question in the form which I shall presently suggest. No additional statement of the case is necessary in order to answer that question, and therefore after formulating that question we will be in a position to answer it straightaway. The proper question I would suggest is "whether in applying the provisions of Section 23A of the said Act the smallness of the profits made is to be considered with reference to the possibility of it being unreasonable to pay a dividend or a larger dividend than that declared, or whether the smallness of the profits may be considered in relation to other factor or factors." Having formulated that question, the answer I would suggest to that question would be as indicated in the judgment. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. There will be no order as to costs on the Notice of Motion. Tendolkar, J.-I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 22
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... ... ..... surplus which the bank invests in Government securities is the surplus which is constituted only out of the deposits and not out of capital. The Tribunal has, therefore, applied a rule which it calls a rule of justice, equity and good conscience by suggesting that it should be deemed that the moneys were invested by the bank proportionately from its deposits and its capital. For want of any better rule or a more equitable rule we see no reason why we should differ from the view taken by the Tribunal. 5. We will re-formulate question 1 which will therefore, read as follows "Whether in the circumstances of the case the interest on borrowings, for the purpose of Section 8, Income-tax Act, should be computed on the basis that investments were made proportionately out of capital and deposits?" 6. We, will, therefore, answer question 1 in the affirmatives. 7. The answer to question 2 will also be in the affirmative. 8. Assessee to pay the costs. Tendolkar, J. 9. I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 21
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... ... ..... ion applies both to co-operative societies which are not doing insurance business and it also applies to co-operative societies which are doing insurance business. In the case of co-operative societies which are not doing insurance business, their profits are exempt from tax, but only those profits which do not fall within the ambit of the explanation, or, in other words, the Central Government in the case of co-operative societies not doing insurance business has given exemption only in the case of certain kinds of income which do not fall under the heads set out in the explanation. In the case of co-operative societies doing insurance business, the Central Government has given exemption to the whole of the income derived by such co-operative societies because the explanation has no application to the case of such societies. I would therefore answer the question raised in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (3) TMI 20
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... ... ..... ase to which sir Jamshedji has referred, namely, the decision in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. 36/49 Holdings Ltd. (In Liquidation), (1943) 25 Tax Cas. 173. There may be other decisions which may perhaps seem to have taken a different view; but as that is a very recent decision and as the facts there are practically identical with the facts we have to consider in this case, I think on the whole I would take the same view as the Court of Appeal took in that case and hold that as the payment made by the assessee is a payment made for an indefinite period, a payment made in relation to the turnover of the company and not in relation to its profits, and as this payment has no bearing to any specific sum fixed as part of the price for the purchase of the undertaking, this payment is in the nature of revenue payment and not capital payment. We would, therefore, answer both the questions submitted to us in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J.--I agree.
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1949 (3) TMI 19
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... ... ..... the Tribunal to set aside an order of dismissal for default or an order passed on an appeal heard ex parte when it is satisfied that there was in fact no service of notice or that there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellant or the respondent from appearing on the date fixed." This argument on behalf of the respondents cannot, therefore, be accepted. In the view taken above respondent No. 2 had inherent jurisdiction to entertain and decide the first application dated February 13, 1950, of the assessee and its order of October 27, 1950, treating it as a review application is not a correct order. So the order of respondent No. 2 dated October 27, 1950, is, in the circumstances, quashed, and under article 227, respondent No. 2 is directed to dispose of the application, dated February 13, 1950, of the petitioners on merits and according to law. There is, in the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs in this petition. DUA, J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
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1949 (3) TMI 18
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... ... ..... as that if a part of the income is lost, and subsequently it comes back to the assessee, it is liable to be taxed. In the case before us it cannot be said that the sum of ₹ 16,544 which is remitted by the creditor has been received by the assessee as income which is liable to tax. Our attention has also been drawn by Mr. Pandit to a decision of the Nagpur High Court which was really decided before we decided the case reported in 16 Income Tax Reports page 183 (Mohsin Rehman Penkar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City) 1942 10 I.T.R. 21 but which was reported subsequently; and that case is reported in the same volume at page 430 (Agarchand Chunnilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. and Berar) and the Nagpur High Court has taken the same view of this question as we have done. The result, therefore, is that the answer to the question submitted to us must be in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1949 (3) TMI 17
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... ... ..... d High Court, and that is reported in Shivnath Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces . Although the case was under the old Act, it dealt with the very question with which we are dealing now and there also the Assistant Commissioner had refused to condone the delay and the Allahabad High Court held that the order made by the Assistant Commissioner was not under Section 31 but it was an order made under Section 30 and, therefore, no appeal lay to the Appellate Tribunal. We, with respect, entirely agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court and also the reasoning on which that decision is based. The result is that we must hold that there is no appeal from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to condone the delay under Section 30, sub-section (2), of the Income-tax Act. The answer to the question will, therefore, be in the negative. Assessee to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J. - I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1949 (2) TMI 10
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... ... ..... . and approved by the House of Lords may be referred to - "You cannot earn profits on a notional debt-it is not an asset. It is not an asset which would ever appear in a balance sheet. It must be in the balance sheet for the year as an existing assets, not something which is written back by a re-opening of the balance sheet in some subsequent year so as to let in something which in that year was not an asset at all…..It is quite impossible to treat a receipt, which is to be written back into a previous year for the purpose of ascertaining the profits, as being an asset in the shape of a debt within the meaning of these capital provisions." The question referred to this Court must accordingly be answered in the negative and the sums standing to the credit of the different insurance funds as reserve for exceptional losses cannot be deducted under Rule 2 of Schedule II read with the explanatory sub-paragraph of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. Das, J.-I agree.
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1949 (2) TMI 8
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... ... ..... such sale to a non-member, (sic) it was for the acquisition of a "valuable right" which is to be regarded as a capital expense but not as a trading expense. If the payment of the annuity to Mitchell Innes had not been made contingent upon the receipt of income from Messrs. Ralli Brothers, the observations of Lawrence, J., and Macnaghten, J., would have been of great force. On the special facts arising in this particular case and on the interpretation of the terms of contract as evidenced by the agreements, particularly Exhibit B, it must be held that the amount in question was not an item of capital expenditure but was a revenue expenditure allowable as an admissible deduction under Section 10(2)(xii) of the Income-tax Act as it stood before its amendment in 1946. The question raised must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. The assessee respondent is entitled to the cost of the hearing in this Court. DAS, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1949 (1) TMI 11
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... ... ..... hich has been received should in the present case be treated as income. 3. As to the salami or the rent paid being agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(1) and as such exempt from assessment under Section 4(3)(viii) of the Act, the matter seems to me to be set at rest by the admission of parties stated in the letter of reference as follows --"In this case it is admitted by both the parties that during the accounting period the land was not used for agricultural purpose." Under Section 2(1) of the Act it is the actual use of the land which is to be looked to as the decisive factor and not the purpose of the lease vide Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1948 16 ITR 330 (PC) and In re Maharajadhiraj Sir Bijay Chand Mahiab 1940 8 ITR 378. For the reasons given above I would answer the questions referred to us, viz., 1(a) and (b) and 2, in the negative, with the result that both items are to be treated as assessable. Amiruddin Ahmad, J. I agree.
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