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Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 1058 Records
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1949 (1) TMI 3
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... ... ..... shiva Vishwanath on the security of certain shares pledged by the debtor. These shares, which were assigned to Kunwar Ganesh Singh, were assigned by him to the assessee on the April 30, 1925. Some of the shares were sold for a sum of ₹ 254 during the year 1344F. The remaining shares could not be sold because they were of the company or companies which had gone into liquidation. The assessee thus suffered a loss of ₹ 13,232 which he wrote off as a bad debt in the year of assessment. Upon these facts it must be found that the loss was a business loss and not a capital loss." It will be noticed that the loss was allowed to be deducted because it occurred in the course of money- lending business of the assessee. For these reasons, I would answer both the question in the affirmative. The assessee having failed must pay costs to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa. Hearing fee, ₹ 250. MEREDITH, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1948 (12) TMI 10
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... ... ..... clear what the taxable income of a non-resident partner would be in the such a case, if the appellants' contentions were correct. These are some of the difficulties which would be encounter if it were held that the operation of Section 23 must be modified to meet the appellants' contention. This contentions would require much to be written into the section which is not there, would complicate its operation and would lead to practical difficulties. Their Lordships are satisfied that this section cannot be so modified it must be taken as it stands. Moreover there are other sections such as Section 16(1) the terms of which are almost equally difficult to reconcile with the appellants contention. Their Lordships therefore hold that this contention is not well founded and that the decision of the High Court at Nagpur was correct. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1948 (12) TMI 9
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... ... ..... arriving at a finding which there was no relevant evidence to support. In the circumstances, the question No. 2 must be answered in the negative. The Appellate Tribunal without having caused any further enquiry to be made and without having had any relevant evidence before them should have accepted the Income-tax Officer's profit rate to be the last word on the subject. They could, if they like, have called upon the Income-tax Officer to make further enquiries under stated directions. Their decisions in other cases, however similar, adopted as relevant evidence, must be held to have been so done on mistake of law. In the result, the application of the Income-tax Commissioner succeeds in part. The question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative. No. 2 in the negative and No. 3 in the affirmative. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties should bear their costs in this Court. RASIMHAM, J.--I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (12) TMI 8
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... ... ..... e dealing with question of law observed "In my opinion the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax that the loss (by theft) did not occur in the year of accounting (1932-33) is fatal to the contention of the assessee." This leads me firmly to the clearest possible inference that any further question of law did not arise for consideration in that case; secondly, if I may say so, with great respect, his Lordship has proceeded upon the assumption that the deduction claimed on account of theft or embezzlement can be claimed only as an allowance permitted in the specific provision of sub-section (2) of Section 10. It has always been held, and that unanimously, that claims for such deductions come within the general principles of law and rule in finding out what really represents the gains and profits of a business. It is for that reason that such deductions are claimed as losses incidental to the trade, otherwise known as trade losses. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (12) TMI 7
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... ... ..... y he is not correct. Secondly, there can be no sense in such a distinction that this enabling provision should apply to the case of a dissolved firm and not to a firm not dissolved. It may be that ordinarily on the death of any of the partners, the firm gets dissolved automatically but it does not so dissolve where the deceased partner's heir automatically, by virtue of the terms of the deed, become a partner without any fresh agreement. There can be, therefore, no reason why he should not sign in the place of the deceased partner whose status devolves upon him. In consideration of what I have said above, I would answer the question in the negative holding that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the application for renewal of the registration was not defective and should not have been rejected. The application is allowed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 100. NARASIMHAM, J.--I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered in the negative.
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1948 (11) TMI 11
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... ... ..... ested that some meaning ought to be given to the word "under-charged" in the section other than its natural meaning. That point does not seem to have been taken either before the Commissioners or before the learned judge, but, assuming it to be open to him, in my opinion, it has no foundation. The meaning which counsel invited us to adopt was that there should be read into the words "by accident or error, not being an error in the general law," I see no reason for reading in something which narrows the meaning of the expression. It seems to me that, if we were to accept this argument, we should not be fulfilling our duty of construing the language used. We should be guessing at the intention of Parliament, and in all probability guessing wrongly. For those reasons, and for the reasons given by my Lord, I am of the opinion that Atkinson, J., was quite right in the conclusion to which he came; and the appeal fails. ASQUITH, L.J. - I concur. Appeal dismissed.
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1948 (11) TMI 9
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... ... ..... l cases of buying and selling under all circumstances. What we say here is without prejudice to any other view that may be taken on the particular facts of a case. The questions put to us are limited by the words "in the circumstances of the case and on the findings of the Tribunal." As the contention had never been raised before the Income-tax Officer we do not know the nature and extent of the operations that were carried out in the State for the purpose of buying. According to the authorities cited by my learned brother, the mere act of buying may in certain cases as in the present one, be so negligible a part of the operation of the business as not to make any appreciable difference in apportionment of the amount that accrued or arose in British India. I believe in the truism that actual circumstances are of more weight in law cases, as in politics, than abstract theories, however conformable to the demands of reason these latter might be. In favour of revenue.
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1948 (11) TMI 7
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... ... ..... ho had failed to pay the amounts advanced to them in the course of the money-lending business of the Durbar for the assessment year 1939-40 is not income arising in connection with the said business within the meaning of Section 2 of the Government Trading Taxation Act, and that the income arising from such property is not liable to assessment under the provisions of the Indian Incometax Act read with the Government Trading Taxation Act (III of 1926). The answer to this question should therefore be in the negative, and to that extent the appeal is allowed. On questions Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6, it is the opinion of the Court and, on question No. 1, of the majority of us, that the appeal fails. The appeal is accordingly dismissed on the said five questions. The case is remitted to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for effecting the necessary substitution in its judgment and decree. The appellant shall pay to the respondent three-fourths of the costs of the appeal to this court.
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1948 (10) TMI 14
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... ... ..... lved, then the Court would be justified in sending it back for reconsideration." 31. In their Lordships' view S. 21a of the statute has been misconstrued, to the extent already indicated, and for this reason any findings of fact based upon this misconstruction cannot be treated as being binding upon the appellants. 32. In the result, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, and that the three assessments in question, already set aside and referred back to the Commissioner for re-assessment, should be further reconsidered in the light of the opinions expressed herein. 33. The appellant has already been awarded two thirds of its costs of the appeals to the Court of appeal and to the Judge of the King's Bench Court and one half of its costs of the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The respondents must now pay to the appellant the balance of all these costs and also the whole of the appellant's costs of this appeal.
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1948 (10) TMI 12
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... ... ..... laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council. I have pointed out above that the word "agriculture" means something more than cultivation, and on the facts of the case before their Lordships no question either of cultivation or of expenditure of skill and labour arose. I would, therefore, respectfully agree with Bose, Ag. C.J., and answer the reference as proposed by him. By the Court.-We answer the first part of the question as follows - The amount of ₹ 14,208 derived from the sale of timber is not, in this case, agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Income-tax Act and is thus not exempt from taxation under Section 4 (3) (viii). We answer the second part of the question as follows in accordance with the opinion of Hidayatullah, J. The amount of ₹ 1,275 derived from the letting out of pasture meadows will be agricultural income to the extent that it is derived from agricultural animals pastured thereon and not as to the rest.
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1948 (10) TMI 11
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... ... ..... British Income Tax Act of 1918, which are not the same as the proviso to Section 4 of the Act now in question but the case does draw attention to the distinction between an assessment upon actual income and an assessment upon a notional income and in so far as an average derived from a triennial period is the basis for computation of the income of one year in this Act the case has an important bearing. But apart from authority, their Lordships are of opinion that the appellant's contention is correct and they find it impossible to apply the words of the third proviso to Section 4(1) to an assessment under rule 2(b) of the schedule and they will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed with the costs of this appeal, and that the assessment of the Income-tax Officer for Satara should be restored. Their Lordships made no order as to the costs in the Courts below as the question argued before them was not raised in those Courts. Appeal allowed.
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1948 (9) TMI 18
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... ... ..... ear showing any liability on the part of the assessees to pay this sum to the sub-brokers. One should have expected an havala entry crediting the various sub-brokers who were entitled to this amount and debiting the brokerage account. But no such entry appears. Therefore the Tribunal was quite right in rejecting the claim of the assessees with regard to the sum of ₹ 25,575. We fail to see what question of law can possibly arise out of this decision of the Tribunal. We, therefore, refuse to accede to the application of the assessees to call upon the Tribunal to raise an additional questions with regard to the sum of ₹ 25,575. 7. We would, therefore, answer the questions raised by the Tribunal as follows - Questions 1, 2 and 3 in the affirmative. Questions 4 and 6 do not arise. Questions 5 and 7 in the negative. Question 8 in the affirmative. Question 9 see judgment. The assesses will pay the costs of the reference. The notice of motion will be dismissed with costs.
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1948 (9) TMI 16
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... ... ..... f the family in each of which the total amount of tax assessed on the Hindu undivided family was demanded. The Tribunal has itself pointed out that this was an incorrect procedure. As the Tribunal has observed however, that can be put right. Clearly the Income-tax Officer should first apportion the liability and make a proportionate demand from each member. Only if realisation from any member for any reason fails should he resort to the proviso under which each member is jointly and severally liable for the whole. The question submitted to us has been somewhat unhappily worded as it asks whether the proceedings were validly initiated and completed against the Hindu undivided family. The proceedings are to be completed not against the Hindu undivided family, but against its ex-members. However the legal position and the procedure are, to my mind, quite clear under the Act, and the question must be answered in the sense indicated in the above discussion. Agarwala, CJ.-I agree.
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1948 (9) TMI 14
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... ... ..... of the sale proceeds of forest trees on the grounds that such proceeds constituted agricultural income their Lordships observed "It appears to their Lordships that, whether exemption is sought under Section 2(1)(a) or section 2(1)(b), the primary condition must be satisfied that the land in question is used for agricultural purposes......... His case fails if he does not prove that the land is used for agricultural purposes." In my opinion, therefore, it has not been established in the present case that malikana is rent or that it is income derived from land, or that that the land in respect of which the obligation to pay was originally undertaken is being used for agricultural purposes. I would, therefore, answer the question referred to us for decision in the negative. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 250 including the ₹ 100 deposited for the reference. MEREDITH, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (9) TMI 13
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... ... ..... give even the exact cubic contents of the earth sold in that way. But in the case of an acquisition of mining rights under an agreement like the agreements in question, it is impossible to say that there is a sale of so much mica. The winning of mica depends upon many uncertain factors. The mine may prove disappointing in that it may not; yield much mica. It will be opposed to common sense to say that an acquisition of rights to win mica is a sale pf mica as raw material. On the facts of this case, it is abundantly clear that there is no manufacturing business and there is no sale of any raw material. The assessee carries on the business of winning and selling mica and for the business acquires mining rights in various places. Money expended for the acquisition of such rights must be held to be capital expenditure. The answer to the question is in the negative. The respondent will pay to the applicant costs of this reference, ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1948 (9) TMI 12
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... ... ..... e company, which is an impossible position for a company. This argument is plausible but does not bear examination. If such a contingency occurs, the Income-tax Officer will not exercise his power under the section on account of the smallness of the profits. Moreover, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner may withhold his approval in such a case. The section speaks of any company without any qualification; we do not find anything in the Act which compels us to cut down the plain meaning of these words and to limit the same so to exclude companies whose only source of income is property. It is pertinent to observe that the proviso to Section 23A itself makes an exception in regard to certain categories of companies but does not exclude a company like the assessee. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The assessee will pay costs of this reference; hearing fee being assessed at 15 gold mohurs. MUKHERJEA, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1948 (9) TMI 11
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... ... ..... ,686 is in any way material or relevant when in fact, and as his share in the partnership, the assessee received ₹ 41,000. Mr. Kolah has tried to suggest that ₹ 41,000 may have been made up of his share as mentioned in the partnership deed, plus amounts for others consideration. But that was not the case of the assessee before the Tribunal, nor is there any finding to the effect that ₹ 41,000 represents anything less than the share of the assessee in the partnership. Under the circumstances, if the assessee is liable to pay super-tax--and, as I have pointed out, that is not disputed in the reference--then the super-tax that he has got to pay is not on ₹ 28,686 but on ₹ 41,000. I would, therefore, answer the question as follows - (i) In the negative. (ii) Does not arise. (iii) ₹ 41,000. There will be no orders as to costs in the reference. No order on the motion. No orders as to costs. TENDOLKAR, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (8) TMI 29
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... ... ..... t of the question, however, is that merely because the Income Tax Officer to prove that such receipts are of an income nature. But in that form, the only possible answer can be that the burden in those circumstances is not upon the Income Tax Officer. Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyangar referred us to Sankaralinga Nadar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, and contended that there was some sort of estoppel arising against the Income Tax Officer in such circumstances. But the question as framed is that the Income Tax Officer has failed to notice similar cash receipts and not that he went into the matter and came to any definite conclusion with regard to them. The other cases cited by him have no bearing whatever upon the matter consideration. We must, therefore, as indicated already answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. The applicant should pay the cost of the reference, ₹ 250, to the respondent Commissioner. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (8) TMI 28
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... ... ..... dents that all income which accrues or arises whether within or without British India is taxable. In the case of non-residents, income which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise in British India alone is taxable apart from cases covered by Section 4(1)( a) which apply to residents and non-residents alike and it is only to define in what cases income, profits and gains are deemed to accrue or arise that provision is made in Section 42 and in other sections. We may here refer to the observations of Sir Iqbal Ahmad, C.J., in Hira Mills Ltd. v Income-tax Officer, Cawnpore 1946 14 ITR 417 - "We think on construction alone that it is quite clear that the relief afforded by Section 42, sub-section (3), applies only to a case in which the profits and gains are deemed under Section 42 to accrue or arise in British India, and not to a case in which they actually so accrue or arise or are received in British India." The question is therefore answered accordingly.
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1948 (8) TMI 27
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... ... ..... nion, the answer to the second question must also be in the affirmative. On the facts already narrated, it is clear that the debt became irrecoverable in the accounting period. It is not as if subsequent to the entry on September 12, 1942, there was no attempt to make further realisations. As already mentioned, there were such further realisations. The fact that the mortgage lands had been sold away need not necessarily mean that the assessee had at the time of making the entry no hope of realising any further amounts towards the debt. The finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal that the debt became bad in the year of account is correct, and the assessee was, therefore, entitled to an allowance of the sum of ₹ 5,880 under Section 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act. The answers to both the questions will be in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this petition to the respondent, ₹ 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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