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1953 (11) TMI 31
... ... ... ... ..... him to various voters asking them to vote for Congress candidates. We may observe that we are always reluctant to interfere with the decision of an Election Tribunal. We are conscious of the fact that the Constitution has given finality to its decision. But the point urged before us is not by way of appeal or disputing any finding of the Tribunal. But what has been urged before us, and the view which we have accepted, is that the Tribunal has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under section 99, under which it is obligatory upon the Tribunal to make an order with regard to a corrupt practice or an illegal practice; and, as in our opinion, the Tribunal has not considered the various aspects of the matter and thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, we are sending the matter back to them asking them to exercise the jurisdiction which in law is vested in it under section 99 and to give the necessary findings under that section. No order as to costs.
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1953 (11) TMI 30
... ... ... ... ..... carry on the same occupation and an element of competition is introduced in the business, that does not, in the absence of any bad faith on the part of the authorities, amount to a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Under the Motor Vehicles Act it is in the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to issue permits at different rates of tariff to different classes of vehicles plying in the streets of Calcutta and if that power is exercised in a bona fide manner by the Regional Transport Authority for the benefit of the citizens of Calcutta, then the mere circumstance that by grant of licence at different tariff rates to holders of different taxis and different classes of vehicles some of the existing licence holders are affected cannot bring the case under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. 1 2 . For the reasons given above this appeal has no merits and we accordingly dismiss it with costs. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 29
... ... ... ... ..... e such as distribution of revenue, the obligation to grant financial assistance by the Union to any State or the obligation of a State to make contributions and the like. It is, however, not necessary or desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of the expression "financial obligations." The court will have to consider in each case whether a particular obligation which may be the subject-matter of discussion falls within the expression "financial obligations" within the meaning of article 9. Whatever liabilities may or may not come within that expression we are clearly of opinion, in agreement with the High Court, that the liability to pay rent under a lease certainly does not come within that expression. 8. The result, therefore, is that we affirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. 9. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant P. K. Bose. Agent for the respondent A. N. Mitter. Agent for the intervener G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
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1953 (11) TMI 28
... ... ... ... ..... aid ₹ 58,000 out of the ₹ 62,000 now lying in deposit in court as compensation for the loss they had suffered, without prejudice to any further rights they may have against the Nawab or his estate. (4) After this has been done, the Custodian, U.P., will be at liberty to withdraw the balance of the ₹ 62,000. 33. Except for these modifications, the decree stands and the rest of the appeal is dismissed. 34. The modifications we have made here do not affect the plaintiff's rights under the decree except to his advantage. As against him, the appellants have failed. We accordingly direct that the appellants pay the plaintiff the costs of this appeal. 35. There is an application for amendment of the High Court's decree. This will be disposed of by the High Court. 36. Decree of High Court modified. Agent for the appellant B.P. Maheshwari. Agent for the respondent No. 1 N.C. Jain Agent for the Custodian of Evacuee Property, U.P. C.P. Lal 37. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 27
... ... ... ... ..... ff had not established his relationship but it will be too much to conclude therefrom that the plaintiff had put forward a false case. The utmost that could be said against him is that he failed to convince the Subordinate Judge of the truth of his case. We are unable on these materials to hold that the case of the plaintiff is demonstrably false. We think that the ground put forward by the respondent is too uncertain and elusive to deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of his decree by invoking the power under Order 41, Rule 33, C. P. C. 15. In the result this appeal will be dismissed with proportionate costs as against defendants 4, 8 to 12, 15, 20 to 22, and in so far as it relates to 62 cents in item No. 1, items 2, 3 two-third share in item No. 4 and item No. 8. It will be allowed as against the other defendants and in respect of items other than those mentioned above and the decree of the District Munsif will to that extent be restored with proportionate costs throughout.
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1953 (11) TMI 26
... ... ... ... ..... ature intended for the statute or Act to be effective In its entirety unless something in the Act indicates to the contrary. In order to ascertain the intention of the legislature, the court may examine the entire statute, including the invalid as well as the valid portions, and resort to the usual principles of statutory construction. But where it is impossible to determine what part of a statute was intended by the legislature to be operative when certain of its provisions have been held invalid, the whole statute will fall. and applying these considerations we have no doubt that the whole of Section 3 has to go and that no portion of it can be sustained. It follows that we cannot but endorse the conclusion reached in - AIR 1954 Trav C 34 (A) The result is that Section 3 of the Public Safety Measures Act 1950 (Act V of 1950) has to be declared illegal and void. and discharge accused Nos. 1 to 6 under Section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Order accordingly.
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1953 (11) TMI 25
... ... ... ... ..... in -- 'Jagdish Narain Singh v. Mt. Ramsakal Kuer', AIB 1929 Pat 97 (G). In this case, it was held that insolvent's money deposited by him in Court as security for the costs of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, can be attached, but the order of attachment must be made subject to the result of the appeal. These cases fully support the principle propounded in an earlier paragraph of this Judgment that property in 'custodla legis' cannot be attached in the execution of a decree except after the fulfilment of the specific purpose for which property is held. 12. For these reasons, I would accept the petition, set aside the orders of the Courts below and direct that as the money which is alleged to have been withdrawn by the landlord was in 'custodia legis' and could not be withdrawn until the specific purpose for which it was deposited had been fulfilled, it should be restored to the Court. The 'appellant will be entitled to costs here and below.
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1953 (11) TMI 24
... ... ... ... ..... Madhya Bharat Gwalior', AIR 1954 MB 70 (A) that when a suit is actually (sic)ending against a Company and is being contested (sic) it at the time of the removal of its name from (sic) register it is proper to direct the restoration of the name of the Company particularly when (sic) Directors were aware of the fact of the con-(sic)ested litigation and were actually taking part in (sic) In this case it could not be said that the Directors were absolutely ignorant of the steps taken by (sic) Registrar particularly when after the removal (sic) was the opponent No. 1 himself who took care (sic) inform the petitioner's attorneys that the name (sic)the Company has been removed from the (sic)egister. 9. Under the circumstances I think it proper to (sic)lirect the restoration of the name of the Company (sic) the register of the companies Madhya Bharat. 10. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs (sic)rom opponents 1 to 9. Pleader's fee to be taxed (sic) ₹ 10/-.
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1953 (11) TMI 23
... ... ... ... ..... e prior to the winding up order and within the period mentioned in Section 230(1)(a), the decision is obviously right But if they were subsequent to the winding up order, then with great respect to the learned Judge, we must dissent from him. Under Section 230, the material date is the date of the winding up order and not any subsequent date. If on the date of the winding-up order there was a notice of demand of payment of the tax under Section 18A, any subsequent assessment after the winding up would not destroy the preferential right of the State under Section 230(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act. It may be that if the final assessment is less than the amount collected under Section 18A, the company may be entitled to a refund of the excess. But that does not have a bearing on the preferential right under Section 230(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The liquidators can have their costs from the assets of the company. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 22
... ... ... ... ..... Madras case which furnished the basin for the decision that a purchase of a share in a Court auction was not governed by the articles relating to a transfer of a share. The Madras decision turned on its own special facts and cannot be said to give rise to any "principle" of general application as understood in the Lahore case. Further, the decision in, the Lahore case also turned upon the fact that the directors accepted the transfer, agreed to register it and communicated such acceptance to the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the learned Judge was of the view that they had no power to change their decision. These circumstances are not present in the case before us. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the District Judge is reversed and instead the application of the Respondent for entering his name on the register of the shareholders of the Appellant company shall stand dismissed. The Respondent shall pay the costs of the Appellant throughout.
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1953 (11) TMI 21
... ... ... ... ..... he court is not incompetent to impose conditions on the reversioner's right of recovering possession of the property during the widow's lifetime on the grounds of equity, justice and good conscience in proper cases, it is clear that in the case before us no equitable considerations at all arise. The appellants are not alienees from the widow; they came upon the land as trespassers without any right and it is the law of limitation that has legalized what was originally a clear act of usurpation. They have enjoyed their property since 1925, and as the title which they have acquired is not available against the reversionary interest, we do not see any reason sanctioned by law or equity for not allowing the reversioners their full legal rights. The result is that in our opinion the decision of the High Court is right and this appeal must stand dismissed with costs. 26. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellants Ganpat Rai. Agent for respondents Nos. 1 & 2 A. C. Dave.
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1953 (11) TMI 20
... ... ... ... ..... en the attack is not directed against him personally. We do not lay down any general rule because there may be cases where that is impossible, as for example in a court where there is only one judge or two and both are attacked. Other cases may also arise where it is more convenient and proper for the judge to deal with the matter himself, as for example in a contempt in facie curioe. All we say is that this must be left to the good sense of the judges themselves who, we are confident, will comport, themselves with that dispassionate dignity and decorum which befits their high office and will bear in mind the oft quoted maxim that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done by all concerned and most particularly by an accused person' who should, always be given, as far as that is humanly possible,, A feeling of confidence that he will receive a fair, just and impartial trial by judges who have no personal interest or concern in his case. Petition dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 19
... ... ... ... ..... pable of being enforced by a criminal sanction made any difference in this respect. In any view this question was not raised in any of the courts below and has not been indicated even in the respondent's statement of the case. We do not think that it would be proper to allow this question to be raised for the first time before us, as it requires consideration of the different provisions of the Defence of India Act and also of the implication of illustration (d) appended to section 56 of the Contract Act. In our opinion, the events which have happened here cannot be said to have made the performance of the contract impossible and the contract has not been frustrated at all. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta are set aside and those of the courts below restored. The plaintiff will have his costs in all the courts. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant S. C. Banerjee. Agent for the respondent No. I R. R. Biswas.
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1953 (11) TMI 18
... ... ... ... ..... deliver on 5th January, 1953, was not a valid judgment because the other member of the Bench died before it could be delivered. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court which purports to be its judgment is set aside. As it is no longer possible for the Bench which heard the appeal and the confirmation proceedings to deliver a valid judgment we send the case back to the High Court for re-hearing and delivery of a proper judgment. 1953. November 23. BOSE J. The order for stay dated the 25th May, 1953, has now expended itself. The death sentence cannot be carried out as there is no valid decision of the appeal and no valid confirmation. The position regarding that is as it was when the appeal was, made to the High Court. The second and the third appellants will surrender to their bail as they are now relegated to the position which they occupied when the appeal was filed in the High Court. Appeal allowed. For the appellant Naunit Lal. For the respondent C. P. Lal.
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1953 (11) TMI 17
... ... ... ... ..... ech and expression is not denied to the appellants, nor are they prohibited from forming associations or unions. The Act makes no discrimination between textile workers as a class but lays down a reasonable’ classification to the effect that a certain percentage of membership possessed by a union will be allowed to represent the workers as a class to the exclusion of others, but there is nothing to prevent the other unions or other workers from forming a fresh union and enrolling a higher percent-age so as to acquire the sole right of representation. The appellants challenge the validity of the Act as infringing their fundamental rights and yet they base their case of discrimination on the provisions of the same Act. This position is not in accord with reason ,or principle. We hold, therefore, that the appellants have made ,out no case for interference with the orders of the courts below. We uphold the convictions and sentences and dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 16
... ... ... ... ..... deprived of the benefit of exemption from taxation twice over, (1) 1902 1 K.B. 388 at 396. (2) (1913) L.J.P.C. 139. for the simple reason that he did not comply with the directory provi- sions contained in rule 18. Mr. Veeraswami on behalf of the Govern- ment submitted that some value should be attached to the words subject to the conditions appearing in rule 5(1)(k). But, as already observed, the effect of these words subject to the conditions depends upon what is intended to be achieved by the rules and what exactly is the scope and purpose of the rules framed. In my view, the conditions that have to be satisfied under rule 18 are not absolute and it is sufficient if they are substantially complied with, which has been the case in this appeal. I am therefore of the view that the decision arrived at by the learned Second Additional City Civil Judge is correct and the decree of the lower Court has to be upheld. This appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 15
... ... ... ... ..... of this observation, it is clear that the learned Judge applied the principle of autre fois acquit in Ramautar Lal s case(2), only because he came to the conclusion for reasons, which need not be considered at present, that the Court which held the first trial was not incompetent to try the accused for the offence with which he was being charged at the second trial. It seems to be manifest that the present case comes within the four corners of sub-section (4) of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Proce- dure and the trial which is pending before Mr. D. Prasad cannot be held to be barred under the provisions of that section. The result is that I hold that the trial pending against the petitioners is neither illegal nor barred under any provision of law. No other point has been raised on behalf of the petitioners. I would, therefore, dismiss their application and discharge the rule. JAMUAR, J.-I agree. Application dismissed. (1) A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 290. (2) A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 32.
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1953 (11) TMI 14
Transfer of Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal and Powers of Court to rectify register of members
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1953 (11) TMI 13
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... order. If they were prior to the winding up order and within the period mentioned in section 230(1)(a), the decision is obviously right. But if they were subsequent to the winding up order, then with great respect to the learned Judge, we must dissent from him. Under section 230, the material date is the date of the winding up order and not any subsequent date. If on the date of the winding up order there was a notice of demand of payment of the tax under section 18A, any subsequent assessment after the winding up would not destroy the preferential right of the State under section 230(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act. It may be that if the final assessment is less than the amount collected under section 18A, the company may be entitled to a refund of the excess. But that does not have a bearing on the preferential right under section 230(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The liquidators can have their costs from the assets of the company.
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1953 (11) TMI 1
Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... r to fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or both and may confiscate the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed. 5.It is clear from a perusal of this section that the only jurisdiction and power which the Court has got under this section is to confiscate the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed upon conviction and not otherwise. If once the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the appellant the High Court has neither the jurisdiction nor the power to confirm the order of confiscation of the two blocks of gold which has been passed by the learned Magistrate. 6.We are of the opinion that the order made by the High Court in regard to the confiscation of the two blocks of gold was manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the State was unable to support the decision of the High Court on this point. The appeal will therefore be allowed and the order of confiscation of the two blocks of gold set aside.
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