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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 29 of 29 Records
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1954 (5) TMI 22
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... ... ..... simply because he committed an error of judgment or the order passed by him is in excess of authority vested in him. The error must be a wilful error proceeding from improper or corrupt motives in order that he may be punished for contempt of Court. On the facts found, the appellant can certainly be said to have acted without proper care and caution but there is nothing on the record to suggest any wilful culpability on his part and it has been expressly held by the learned Judges of the High Court that he was not actuated by any corrupt or dishonest motive. In these circumstances, we think that the order passed by the High Court cannot be supported. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the fine, if paid by the appellant, will be remitted. 2. We desire to state that we do not by any means approve of the conduct of the Magistrate but there is no justification, on the facts disclosed here, for a proceeding in contempt against him.
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1954 (5) TMI 21
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... ... ..... een dealt with in paragraph 29(d) of the Tribunal’s order and the entire evidence has been gone through. We are unable to say that the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent No. 1 had omitted to include in his return of election expenses the dinner and hotel charges is a finding unsupported by any evidence. Reference may be made in this connection to paragraph 29(f) of the Tribunal’s order which deals with the matter in detail. On the whole our opinion is that the so-called apparent errors pointed out by the High Court are neither errors of law nor do they appear on the face of the record. An appellate Court might have on a review of this evidence come to a different conclusion but these are not matters which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari. In our opinion the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported and this appeal must be allowed. The writ issued by the High Court will therefore be vacated. We make no order as to costs of this appeal.
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1954 (5) TMI 20
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... ... ..... may, it appears that sub-section (3) was added to the section by reason of the fact that some Courts construed section 18(1) in the manner in which it has been construed by the Full Bench in this case, and the Legislature by enacting clause (3) made it clear that agreements of the nature indicated in the subjection were never intended to be included therein. In our opinion, the language of that section is not of much assistance in construing the main provisions of section 18(1). The result therefore is that in our view the receipt of money by the appellants from the complainant at the time of the oral executory agreement of lease was not made punishable under section 18(1) of the Act and is outside its mischief, and the Presidency Magistrate was in error in convicting the appellants and the High Court was also in error in upholding their conviction. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellants and order that they be acquitted. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 19
Whether the appellant can complain by way of a writ? - the sale of a liquor contract by auction - grant -of the contract to Thimmappa was wrong as he was present at the auction but did not bid
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. He could have done so in an ordinary case. The appellant is interested in these contracts and has a right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and be given the same chance as anybody else. Here we have Thimmappa who was present at the auction and who did not did not that it would make any difference if he had, for the fact remains that he made no attempt to outbid the appellant. If he had done so it is evident that the appellant would have raised his own bid.
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1954 (5) TMI 18
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... ... ..... ich the plaintiff is entitled is a decree regarding deduction only and dismissal regarding the rest of the claim. The parties will take and give costs in the measure in which they have succeeded and failed. I certify for two counsel. 26.. In C.S. No. 112 of 1951 I find under issue I that the Com- mercial Tax Officer is not entitled to reopen and revise the assess- ment of the sales tax on the turnover of Rs. 18,29,578-4-1 of the plaintiff for the year 1945-46 under issue 2 that it does not arise under issue 3 that the sale of groundnut oil was not outside the Province as alleged by the plaintiff under issue 4 that the Commercial Tax Officer had jurisdiction to exercise revisional powers under section 12 of the Act and rule 14 of the General Sales Tax Rules and has not con- formed to rule 17(1) in treating the assessment as escaped assessment and under issue 5 that the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as asked for with costs. I certify for two counsel. Ordered accordingly.
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1954 (5) TMI 17
Whether the power to impose a tax on the sale of goods under Entry 48 includes a power to impose a tax on forward contracts?
Held that:- The power conferred under Entry 48 to impose a tax on the sale of goods can therefore be exercised only when there is a sale under which there is a transfer of property in the goods, and not when there is a mere agreement to sell. The State Legislature cannot, by enlarging the definition of "sale" as including forward contracts, arrogate to itself a power which is not conferred upon it by the Constitution Act, and the definition of "sale" in Section 2(h) of Act XV of 1948 must, to that extent, be declared ultra vires. For the same reason, Explanation III to Section 2(h) which provides that forward contracts "shall be deemed to have been completed on the date originally agreed upon delivery", and Section 3B which enacts that, "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, the turnover of any dealer in respect of transactions of forward contracts, in which goods are not actually delivered, shall be taxed at a rate not exceeding rupees two per unit as may be prescribed", must also be held to be ultra vires. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (5) TMI 9
Audit – Appointment and Remuneration of Auditors ... ... ... ... ..... pany had not contravened any provision of the law when its board of directors had offered the appointment to him after informing the retiring auditor, but even his honest belief is no answer to the charge, though his misapprehension may serve as an extenuating circumstance justifying lenient treatment that may be meted out to him. In these circumstances, although the charge (2) is proved, the transgression on his part is not such as to justify a finding that the respondent has been guilty of such conduct which renders him unfit to be a member of the Institute. We do not think that the punishment need take any serious form. A mere warning should be enough, in the circumstances of the case, as recommended by the Council. The respondent is warned. He should realise the very responsible duties of his office and avoid being guilty of similar contraventions of the law in future, which, if repeated, would attract severe penalties. We make no order as to costs. Deka J. mdash I agree.
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1954 (5) TMI 2
Whether in the circumstances of the case the managing agency commission was liable to be apportioned between the Sassoons and their respective transferees in the proportion of the services rendered as managing agents by each one of them?
Held that:- The whole difficulty has arisen because the High Court could not reconcile itself to the situation that the transferees had not worked for the whole calendar year and yet they would be held entitled to the whole income of the year of account ; whereas the transferors had worked for the broken periods and yet they would be held disentitled to any share in the income for the year. If the work done by the transferors as well as the transferees during the respective periods of the year were taken to be the criterion the result would certainly be anomalous. But the true test under Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act is not whether the transferors and the transferees had worked for any particular periods of the year but whether any income had accrued to the transferors and the transferees within the chargeable accounting period. It is not the work done or the services rendered by the person but the income received or the income which has accrued to the person within the chargeable accounting period that is the subject-matter of taxation. That is the proper method of approach while considering the taxability or otherwise of income and no considerations of the work done for broken periods or contribution made towards the ultimate income derived from the source of income nor any equitable considerations can make any difference to the position which rests entirely on a strict interpretation of the provisions of Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act.
The result therefore is that the question referred by the Tribunal to the High Court must be answered in the negative. All the appeals will accordingly be allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 1
Whether certain sections of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, i.e., Act XXX of 1947, have become void from the date of the commencement of the Constitution of India by reason of Art. 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- Sub-s. (4) of s. 5 and the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in so far as it affects the persons proceeded against under that sub-section being a piece of discriminatory legislation offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution and is thus void and unenforceable. In reaching this decision, we refrain from expressing any opinion, as above pointed out on the validity of s. 5(1) of the Act or on the question whether s. 6(5) of the impugned Act offends against the provisions of Art. 20, sub-cl. (3), of the Constitution. We accordingly direct that an appropriate writ be issued against the Investigation Commission prohibiting it from taking any proceedings under the provisions of the impugned Act against the petitioner.
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