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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 31 Records
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1955 (11) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the same. 17. For all these reasons I conclude that the Plaintiffs' claim for Rs. 34,000/- against the defendant firm must fail. 18. My answers to the issues are Issues Nos. 1 to 4 were conceded by the Defendants and will be answered in the affirmative. Issue No. 5 in the affirmative. Issue Nos. 6 and 7 in the negative. Issue No. 8 Defendants are liable to pay to the Plaintiffs Rs. 5,000/- with interest thereon at 6 p.c. from 19-6-1949 till judgment. There will therefore, be a decree for the Plaintiffs against the defendants for Rs. 5000/- with interest thereon at 6 per cent, per annum from 19-6-1949 till judgment. 19. Mr. Laud states that no order for costs should be made in favour of the Defendants or Plaintiffs. In my opinion the submission is reasonable. Mr. Banaji is content with the suggestion made by Mr. Laud. There will, therefore, be no order for costs and each party will bear its own costs. 20. Interest on judgment will be at 4 per cent. 21. Order accordingly.
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1955 (11) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he medical evidence, could have been used for causing the death. Thus viewing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence against the appellant, it is reasonably clear that he was chiefly instrumental in causing the death of the deceased Chhanga, although it may be true that he could not have perhaps done it single handed. He might have had the assistance of one or two more persons keeping in view the fact that the deceased was a much younger man in the prime of his youth and could not have been easily overpowered by the appellant who was in his declining years. It is not necessary for us to examine the case against those two accused who have been acquitted by the High Court and had been tried along with the appellant for the murder of Chhanga. But so far as the appellant is concerned, he seems to have acted in the way he did as a result of a premeditated plan to get rid of both his wife and her paramour. 10. For the aforesaid reasons both the appeals are dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d by fraud, a plea which has now been negatived. Even in this suit, they did not press the plea on which they have succeeded until they came to the High Court. Under the circumstances, we think it just that they should be deprived of all claims for mesne profits down to this date. 14. In the result, treating the plaint as an execution application, we direct that the properties mentioned in schedule A to the plaint be partitioned and the respondents put in possession of 126 acres 33 cents in Kalavacherla village and of 10 acres 12 cents in Nandarada village in proceedings to be taken in execution of this order. The respondents will be entitled to their share of the net income attributable to 136 acres 45 cents aforesaid from this date down to the date on which they are put in separate possession thereof. 15. Subject to the modification of the decree of the court below as stated above, this appeal will stand dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs throughout.
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1955 (11) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... under article 226, it was the validity of the notice., Exhibit C, with reference to these two matters that the appellants challenged. Tendolkar, J. stated in his judgment-and quite correctly-that these were the two points that &rose for determination. The question of -the rights of the appellants in so far as they related to the purchase by them of the mills and the factory was not raised in the petition, and no contentions were put forward in support thereof at any stage of the proceedings. It is for the first time in the argument before us that those rights are sought to be agitated. Under the circumstances, we must decline to consider them. It will be sufficient if we observe that the rights of the appellants, if any, other than those arising out of the lease, are left open to the determination of the appropriate authorities, and that nothing in our decision should be taken as a pronouncement on those rights. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titioner's case as put forward in his reply to the show cause notice and in the petition before us. At one time, it is pointed out, the petitioner contended that the lease was surrendered to him. At another time he contended that the lease was transferred by the partnership deed. In this case the facts are not in dispute, and if the petitioner drew one or the other inference as to his status, it cannot be said that he was guilty of mala fides which would disentitle him to any relief at the hands of this Court. In our opinion, the learned Judge has taken the right view as to the merits of the matter and it is a clear case for interference with the order passed by the Custodian. It may be pointed out again that the Custodian has made the order on an erroneous conception of the law and he has taken the view that the tenancy rights vested in the Custodian although in law there could be no such vesting. 16. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are then before it on appeal, and in our judgment it has no power under this section to pass an order or give directions with reference to the proceedings of an earlier year which are concluded. If the firm was dissatisfied with the assessment order in respect of that earlier year, 1941-42, and failed to obtain relief by way of an appeal, its remedy was to ask the Tribunal to state a case under section 66 of the Act. A writ of mandamus cannot in our opinion be issued by this Court to enforce the order of the Tribunal passed without jurisdiction during the hearing of the appeal relating to the assessment year 1942-43 in respect of assessment for the year 1941-42. In our opinion the petitioner has failed to establish a legal right to the relief which he seeks and this petition fails. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. December 2, 1955. This matter was placed in the list for a mention today at the request of the learned counsel for the Department on the question of costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 44 - THE CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... to exact from the purchasers of the shares by reason of the fact that the appellants' concurrence in the scheme was essential to its success in that 70,000 shares were not available without it. Apart from the holding of the shares, the secretaryship was worth little or nothing. It was only the appellants' special position that enabled them to obtain this money. It was in fact a sum earned in the course of the company's trade, namely, the sale of shares, and, even though not part of the purchase price, was only earned because of the holding of the shares and by way of inducement to part with them. On this analysis, as it seems to me, this was money earned by the company in the course of its trade and therefore a trading receipt and must be charged to tax accordingly. I am therefore of opinion that the commissioners came to a right conclusion and that this appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors Coward, Chance & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue
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1955 (11) TMI 43 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion. This in itself is sufficient to sustain the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer under sub-section (4) of section 23 of the Act. It is therefore, not necessary to consider the contention raised as to the validity of the notice issued under sub-section (4) of section 22. 21. It is urged on behalf of the assessee that the question of validity of the notice is a question of law and therefore the Tribunal should be called upon to state the case. Even assuming that any question of law does arise, it is not incumbent upon this Court to require the Tribunal to state the case when the answer is evident and there has been error on the part of the Tribunal in rejecting the application. We have taken a similar view Sagarmal Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Income-tax M.P. and Bhopal Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 89 of 1954 decided on 10th October, 1955. 22. In the result, this application is dismissed with costs Counsel's fee ₹ 75. Application dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The learned Sessions Judge himself assumed in his judgment that more than one person must have taken part in the offence. It might be that others committed the murder and robbery and the articles were given to him for hiding them. We, therefore, think that the accused cannot be convicted for murder or robbery. But the question is whether he can be convicted for a lesser offence. 24. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the accused hid the wristlets and the pot of money. This certainly resulted in screening the murderer. It has been held that an accused charged under Section 302, I. P. C., can be convicted under Section 201, I. P. C., though there is no specific charge, if the facts justify it. See Nagan v. Emperor, AIR1954Mad1088 . 25. We therefore, set aside the convictions and sentences passed on the accused tinder Sections 302 and 392, I. P. C., convict him under Section 201, I. P. C., and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years.
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1955 (11) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court with reference to the above remark. Moreover, the charge as laid in the complaint is that the declaration of the appellant in the nomination paper that he "was a member of the Balmiki caste" was false. There is accordingly no substance in this contention. 13. It must be emphasised that in the view that the order of the Magistrate dated 17-9-1952 was final, this appeal being really directed against that order there must be exceptional grounds before we can interfere with it in special appeal, and none such has been established. On the other hand, whether action should be taken under section 195 is a matter primarily for the Court which hears the application, and its discretion is not to be lightly interfered with in appeal, even when that is competent. But where, as here, the legislature does not provide for an appeal, it is preposterous on the part of the appellant to invite this Court to interfere in special appeal. 14. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... made by the petitioner in Pakistan under section 18A of the Income-tax Act. On the other hand, they always proceeded on the assumption that such payments had been made, but they thought that they were not liable to make any refund. Still I do not consider it safe to decide myself what excess payments had actually been made and I propose to leave it to the Income-tax authorities to decide that matter and to grant a set-off of the amount they find to have been paid in excess, under section 18A of the Act. For the reasons given above, this petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall issue to the respondent commanding the respondent to determine what excess payments had been made by the petitioner under section 18A of the Income-tax Act in Lahore in respect of the years 1946-47 and 1947-48, and to allow a set-off of those amounts in the assessments of the subsequent years, 1948-49 and 1949-50. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 39 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar the suit. o p /o p As regards the objection that the suit is barred by time, all that is necessary to say is that the assessment being void and the tax not having been paid no question of limitation arises. Obviously, the dispute has not been concluded because while the Federation insists on its right to tax, the Province denies any such power in the Federation, and one of the reliefs claimed in the suit, paragraph (b) of the relief clause, seeks a declaration that the plaintiff is not liable to be taxed under the Income-tax Act of 1922 or Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940 in respect of its future income. o p /o p For these reasons we decree the suit and declare that the Government of West Pakistan is not liable to income-tax or excess profits tax in respect of the profits earned by the Province of the Punjab from the Jollo Rosin and Turpentine Factory. Both Governments must bear their own costs. o p /o p Suit decreed. o p /o p
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1955 (11) TMI 38 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... one taxpayer and another, for it eliminates variations which are due to no other cause than any one taxpayer's decision as to what proportion of his total product he will supply to himself. A formula which achieves this makes for a more equitable distribution of the burden of tax, and is to be preferred on that account. Secondly, it seems to me better economics to credit the trading owner with the current realizable value of any stock which he has chosen to dispose of without commercial disposal that to credit him with an amount equivalent to the accumulated expenses in respect of that stock. In that sense, the trader's choice is itself the receipt, in that he appropriates value to himself or his donee direct instead of adopting the alternative method of a commercial sale and subsequent appropriation of the proceeds. Lord Tucker. My Lords, I would allow this appeal for the reasons which have been stated by my noble and learned friend, Lord Radcliffe. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . As has been pointed out in the counter-affidavit, the Raja was asked to pay up the amount but he said that only ₹ 5,000 was due and that amount also could have been realised by the assessee if he signed a voucher jointly. If the contention of the applicant be accepted that a sum of ₹ 5,000 deposited in Court was due to the assessee from the Raja of Tirwa, still if the amount was lying in Court, it belonged to the Raja Sahib and if it had been made available to the assessee towards the liquidation of his debt, the assessee should have signed the voucher so as to make the amount available to the Income-tax authorities to be realised and set off towards the income- tax liability of the petitioner. It cannot therefore be said that the authorities did not take proper and sufficient steps to realise the amount due to the assessee from the Raja of Tirwa. There is, therefore, no force in this petition and it is rejected. I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 36 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at State or its assignee, and no Jagirdar as such could have claimed such a right, and after the Integration of that State in the present State of Rajasthan, the same right became vested in the new State, and as the lessor Jagirdar himself possessed no right of ownership with respect to any salt deposits in his Jagir, the lease obtained by the present petitioner from the Jagirdar is of no avail whatsoever so far as the manufacture of salt is concerned. We are further of opinion that the concessions granted by the Government of India for stepping up the production of salt, referred to above, do not and cannot possess the effect of adversely affecting the rights of ownership in this connection vested in the former State of Marwar and now the successor State of Rajasthan so far as the territory of the former State of Marwar is concerned. 9. In view of the conclusions at which we have arrived above, this petition fails and is here by dismissed with one set of costs to the State.
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1955 (11) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of Pritam Singh Lohara is a further circumstance against them. No satisfactory explanation was at all rendered by either of them in regard to their absence from their normal place of residence and, they were not available to the police in spite of all their efforts to trace them. This absconding of the accused, therefore, along with the other incriminating circumstances goes a great way to point to their culpability. 28. Having devoted our anxious thoughts to all the arguments addressed to us by the learned counsel for the appellants, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was quite correct in the summary of the evidence against each of them and in holding that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused in regard to the offences with which they had been charged. 29. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and confirm the conviction and the sentence of death passed upon each of the accused. The sentences will be carried out according to law.
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1955 (11) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. Nor do we think it necessary to express any opinion as to whether the letter complained against constituted a contempt of Court. We may, however, note in passing that the circumstances under which the letter came to be addressed by the appellant to the Commissioner, the terms thereof and the order which was passed by the Commissioner on the application made by the respondent to proceed against the appellant in contempt on date the 2nd February 1953 lend support to the argument which was advanced on behalf of the appellant that the letter complained against did not constitute contempt of Court. The result, therefore, is that the appeal will be allowed, the order passed against the appellant by the Court below will be set aside and the original Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 1953 filed by the respondent in the High Court of Judicature at Patna will stand dismissed. The fine if paid will be refunded.
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1955 (11) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of this case this Court could have thought fit to grant special leave in terms of Article 136 (1) of the Constitution?
Held that:- That is again a matter for Courts of fact. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to make out any illegality or serious irregularity in procedure which can be said to have occasioned a failure of justice. No reasons have been adduced for interference with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... submit their returns and to permit the Sales Tax Officers to levy taxes on the petitioners and then direct the petitioners to file appeals against the assessment orders. The legal position is amply clear and the action of the Sales Tax Officers being in contravention of the Constitution the petitioners are entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The other two points argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not arise in view of my decision on the first point. In the result, this petition is allowed. A writ of mandamus shall be issued to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 directing the said respondents not to take any proceedings against the petitioners under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, either by demanding the returns or by imposing any sales tax, until the Parliament by law provides otherwise. In view of the change of law during the pendency of this petition, I think it is a fit case where parties should be ordered to beat their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ilar circumstances, the Privy Council, in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs. Khemchand Ramdas(1), has taken a similar view of the power of the Income-tax Officer to make an assessment after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in the statute. The relevant observation is to be found at page 180 of the report and is as follows In view of these express provisions of the Act, it is in their Lord- ships opinion quite impossible to suppose that the Income-tax Officer may in every kind of circumstance and after any lapse of time make fresh assessments or issue fresh notices of demands or that the Commissioner can direct him so to do. The result is that this petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall issue to the respondents not to proceed to assess the petitioner to sales tax in respect of its turnover for the year 1948-49, under section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs from the respondents. Petition allowed.
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