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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 54 Records
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1956 (2) TMI 82 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ons or entries in the schedule would be changed, and that only such regulations should be considered as were applicable at the date of the confiscation. Mr. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the respondents sees no objection to this. The assessment must be made according to law. If subsequent regulations have changed the assessment, the question to be considered would be whether such changes are retrospective and can relate back to the time when the confiscation was made. This is of course without prejudice to the rights of the respondents to take fresh action under any new regulation which might have been passed. Mr. Sanyal states that the goods which include batteries, have been lying unused for over a year and the matter should be expeditiously decided. Mr. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the Customs Authorities assures me that the matter will be expedited. There will be no order as to costs. Let a plain copy of my judgment be supplied to the solicitor for the respondents.
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1956 (2) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ost price was 5 per cent., expressly stated to be for services to be rendered. All the elements of delivery, price and so on were made in this country, and I cannot doubt that the answer to the first question, "Does Akron exercise a trade within the United Kingdom ?" must be given quite clearly and firmly as "Yes". 50. With regard to the second question, I really have nothing to add because Lord Evershed M. R. has pointed out that if that answer is right, that Akron is carrying on a trade within the United Kingdom, it must be trading through Brentford. It is not suggested that there would be anybody but Brentford, and I should hold myself that in those circumstances it follows that Brentford here was the regular authorized agent for that purpose of Akron. I feel this question should be answered in that way. 51. I think the judgment of Harman J. was right, and that this appeal should be dismissed. 52. Appeal dismissed. 53. Leave to appeal to House of Lords.
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1956 (2) TMI 80 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tribunal. An ascertained liability is still there. It is still legally enforceable against the assessee. That the assessee avowed his intention in the proceedings before the Tribunal not to discharge that ascertained liability will not alter his legal liability to the Travancore State nor affect his legal rights under the Income-tax Act and the Excess Profits Tax Act. It is section 10(2A) of the Income-tax Act that would apply, when the required conditions are satisfied. Our answer to the first question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of that answer to question 1, question 2 does not call for an answer. Should, However, an answer to question 2 be necessary, we would be of the view, the independently of our answer to question 1, the answer to question 2 should be in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Since the assessee has succeeded, he will be entitled to the costs of this reference, counsels fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (2) TMI 79 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssessee who satisfies the terms of that provision is entitled, and that benefit can be afforded to him in the assessment. if in an appeal against an assessment order, the proper interpretation or effect of Section 25 (4) comes up for consideration, the assessee can certainly in his appeal have the decision of the Income-Tax Officer on that point adjudicated in the appellate Court and so on up to this Court. But the petition filed by Rarnaswami Chettiav in the present case is certainly not one of those enumerated in the Act, and no appeal therefore lies from the order passed adversely to the applicant in such an application as the same is not covered by Section 30 of the Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner was, therefore, right in the view, that no appeal lay to him. In this view we uphold the preliminary objection and decline to answer the question referred to this Court. As the applicant has failed in this reference he must pay the costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1956 (2) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appears to us to be that in computing the income for rate purposes the Income-tax Officer may have to take into account the profits made in an Indian State and may also have to deduct the losses sustained there, but in computing the income for tax purposes neither the profits made nor the loss incurred in an Indian State can be taken into account." He therefore saw no reason to differ from his earlier decision in Mishrimal Gulabchand of Beawar, In re 1950 18 ITR 75. With due respect to the learned Chief Justice we are unable to agree with this construction of section 10 or section 14(2)(c), and we are clearly of the, opinion that the construction adopted by the other High Courts is the correct one. In this view our answer to the question in R.C. 47 of 1951, R.C. 48 of 1952 and the second question in R.C. 1 of 1952 is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to answer the first question referred to us in R.C. 1 of 1952.
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1956 (2) TMI 77 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would not have arisen but for the Order issued in 1946 during the pendency of the proceedings under the prior Order and the Resident as the appellate authority no having disposed of the application finally under the prior Order or later ones and but for his leaving the claim for refund open. 11. Parties voluntarily entering into a con tract are wdltmrtiy bound by It and, when they have unreservedly acted up to It for a fairly long time they must be content with the result bene the ficial or otherwise. No case in which the doctrine of unjust enrichment has been applied tr.v "recovery of unconditional voluntary payment under no mistake of fact has been cited. 12. The claim is permissible, if at all, wider the provisions of the Rent Control Order anil since this has been found to be not possible, the decision of the lower Court has to be upheld. 13. The appeal is consequently dismissed with costs. K.N. Padmanabhiah, J. 14. I agree. B.S. Srinivasa Rao, J. 15. I also agree.
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1956 (2) TMI 76 - TRAVANCORE & COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... occupation in the Travancore State except perhaps for an occasional tour outside the State and in view of this the income derived from disciples like Mr. Levy should be considered as having arisen in Travancore and not outside it. The learned counsel for the Department has not been able to point out any specific piece of evidence which should induce a contrary conclusion and as we see nothing in the materials before us which will support the view that the income from the vocation or occupation practiced by the assessee in Travancore arose anywhere than within that State we answer the second of the two questions referred to us in the negative. 10. The questions referred are answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this Court and the signature of Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as provided in sub-section (5) of section 113 of the Travancore Income-tax Act, 1121. We make no orders as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (2) TMI 75 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... rgh. We know there is that allegation and the further one that the taxpayer himself had by letter declined to go on with the agreement. These things have not been tried, but they are surely matters which must be taken into consideration when it is said by one side that this is for the loss of a capital asset, and on the other that this is a trade profit arising in the ordinary way from your profits under Schedule D. I do not think it is necessary to add anything further. Harman J., who gave consideration to this matter, came to the conclusion that the Commissioners were perfectly justified in their findings as they stated them, and he upheld them; and I need only add that in this court nothing that I have heard leads me to suppose that the Commissioners fell into error, and certainly nothing that for one moment makes me feel that Harman J. fell into error. For my own part, I would dismiss the appeal. ROXBURGH J. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (2) TMI 74 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut such payment is necessary if the assessee is to carry on business at all and this is not a case where the assessee having a discretion to lay out money for the purpose of earning profits in a business, spends an unnecessarily large amount during the chargeable accounting period. Neither the assessee nor the Excess Profits Tax Officer has a discretion in the matter of determining the amount payable by way of sales tax and rule 12 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act does not enable the Excess Profits Tax Officer to cut down payments made by the assessee by way of sales tax under provisional assessments. The levy is statutory and not a voluntary payment, which might or might not be made at the discretion of the assessee. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax will pay the assessee's costs inclusive of ₹ 250 as advocate's fee.
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1956 (2) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ving been an assessee himself within the meaning of section 29, should not have been penalised under section 46(1), even though the tax demanded in the notice issued under section 29 was not paid within the time allowed. The imposition of the penalties on the petitioner was wholly without jurisdiction. The petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. The orders of the Income-tax Officer imposing the penalties of ₹ 250 and ₹ 10,000 will stand cancelled. In the view we have taken of the invalidity of the orders of the Income-tax Officer, we refrain from considering whether the Commissioner of Income-tax exercised his revisional powers, which the petitioner invoked, consistently with the directions given by an order of this Court dated 21st January, 1954. We are not commenting on the propriety of the orders ultimately passed by the Commissioner. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Petition allowed.
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1956 (2) TMI 72 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... of his judgment 1955 1 W.L.R. 1314, 1322 "Apart from the holding of the shares, the secretaryship was worth little or nothing. It was only the appellants' special position that enabled them to obtain this money. It was in fact a sum earned in the course of the company's trade, namely, the sale of shares, and, even though not part of the purchase price, was only earned because of the holding of the shares and by way of inducement to part with them. On this analysis, as it seems to me, this was money earned by the company in the course of its trade and therefore a trading receipt and must be charged to tax accordingly." I agree with that conclusion, and I think that this appeal fails and must be dismissed. JENKINS L.J. I agree, and I have nothing I can usefully add. BIRKETT L.J. I also am of the same opinion, and also have nothing to add. Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Solicitors Coward, Chance & Co.;Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1956 (2) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fits of the company in any of the six previous years, the six accounting years of the company previous to the year ending 31st March, 1947, that would fall within the scope of sub-clause (c). That the dividend accrued to the assessee in his previous year, the accounting year ending with 12th April, 1947, is irrelevant. The view we have taken of the scope of the proviso to sub-clause (c ) of section 2 (6A) is in accord with the principle laid down by Chagla, C.J., and Tendolkar, J., in Sheth Haridas Achratlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 27 ITR 684. See the observations at pages 688 and 689. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court if we may say so with respect, the significance of the expression " six previous years of the company preceding the date of liquidation" in the proviso to sub-clause (c) of section 2 (6A) has been correctly denned. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee.
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1956 (2) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... We will, therefore, now do what the High Court should have done. We were asked not to allow the proceedings to pend any longer but we are not prepared to do that in this case. If the view taken by Mr. Pitam Singh and the High Court is right, then a serious offence of a kind that is unfortunately becoming increasingly common, and which is difficult to bring home to an offender, has been committed against the administration of justice, and if the District Court is satisfied, as were Mr. Pitam Singh and the High Court, that a prima facie case has been made out and that it is expedient in the interests of justice that a complaint should be filed, then it is but right that the matter should be tried in the criminal Courts. We will not say anything more lest it prejudice the appellant. The District Judge will of course be free to exercise his own discretion. The application for the making of a complaint will accordingly be remitted to the District Judge who will now deal with it.
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1956 (2) TMI 69 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, and not until the whole or part of such income is in his hands is he in a position to discharge that obligation. It follows, accordingly that the sum so collected is income of the assessee in the first instance and is, therefore, attracted to tax. It has then to be examined if the provisos to section 16(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act are attracted to the facts of this case. In my view, they do not, for the simple reason that the assets from which the temple is to be maintained remain the property of the assessee and a part of the income from these assets is applied for an obligation created by the assessee himself. I find, therefore, that the income in the sum of ₹ 2,051 was not received under the deed of dedication to the deity and, therefore, it is assessable in the hands of the assessee. The question is accordingly answered against the assessee who will pay ₹ 32(sic) as costs to the Income-tax Department. CHOUDHARY, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (2) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be no doubt that under Section 20, Civil P. C., the suit could be filed in the Devakottai Sub-Court. 35. In the result, the decree and judgment of the lower Court are affirmed subject to the modification that the plaintiff will be entitled to recover one-third of the decree amount from defendant 1, another one-third from defendants 2 and 3, and the remaining one-third from defendant 4 and that only in the event of the one-third of the amount not being recovered, after all legitimate steps have been taken, from defendant 4, that that one-third will be recoverable from defendants 2 and 3 and from defendant 1 in moieties, as conceded by the learned advocate for the plaintiff Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. This appeal is dismissed with 1/2 costs. 36. On these findings it follows that the plaintiff was fully justified in attaching the decree and the amount in deposit in O. S. No. 22 of 1950. Therefore, there are no merits in the C. M. As. and they are also dismissed with 1/2 costs.
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1956 (2) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and in our opinion it was done with perfect propriety. The same view of the law was taken by the Punjab High Court in an earlier case reported in Padam Parshad Rattan Chand of Delhi v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi. For the reasons indicated by us, with very great respect, we are unable to accept the view of the law taken by those learned Judges. The result therefore is that we answer question (1) in the affirmative the instrument of partnership created a valid partnership between the three adult partners, Kantilal having been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The answer to question (2) is that the firm must be registered with effect from the date when it came into existence, not by reason of the date of the instrument but in point of fact. If it came into existence on 1st January, 1946, then it should be registered from that date. If it came into existence at a later date, then from such date. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (2) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the other cases discussed above when it could reasonably be inferred that the lessor parted with his capital interest in the leased property. Here, one lease was for 30 years and the other for 25 years. The lump sum royalty paid would represent a reasonable yearly rent for the occupation of the mines, viz., ₹ 766-10-8 for the Nagavaram mine and ₹ 480 for the Singanapalle mine. The assessee himself understood the payment as a taxable income for in his return of income for the relevant year 1947-48, he included the proportionate lease amounts for one year in respect of the two mines. We, therefore, agree with the Tribunal in holding that the amounts in question represented revenue receipts and were not proceeds of the capital interest parted with by the lessor. We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. The applicant will pay the costs of the respondent. Advocate's fee, ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (2) TMI 65 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... may charge the statutory agent under section 43 read with sections 40 and 4(1)(a). In the present case the assessee was in receipt of the income of the nonresident and would be chargeable to tax as an agent under section 40(2) of the Act. In Turner Morrison and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax the Supreme Court was of the opinion that "the language of section 43 will also attract the provisions of section 40, for that section also contemplates a person who is entitled to receive on behalf of the non-resident any income, profits and gains chargeable under this Act and may even attract the provisions of section 4(1)(a)." For this reason, it must be held that the assessee was rightly charged on the income of the non-resident as statutory agent under sections 40(2) and 43. Our answer to the question referred is in the affirmative and against the assessee. Advocate's fee ₹ 250 and other costs to be paid by the assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1956 (2) TMI 64 - RANGOON HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax authorities are able to point to some consideration other than the purpose of the business as accounting for any portion of the payment made. In such cases, of course, such portion of the amount claimed, which is either not held to have been paid or is held to have been paid for reasons other than business expediency, could and should be disallowed; but the reason for the disallowance is because either the portion disallowed is not paid, or because the expenditure is not solely and exclusively for the business, and not on the ground that in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer or other taxing authority the remuneration is 'unreasonably' high-either because the employee does not, in the authority's opinion, deserve so much, or because the assessee could have secured other employees on more favourable terms." I agree that the answer to the question proposed, as recast by the learned Chief Justice, should be in the negative. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (2) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come from the foreign sources was deferred, that was occasioned by factors beyond the control of both the assessee and the assessing authorities. It is not as if we can subscribe to the view, that if the Act did not specifically provide for the machinery to assess the income under such circumstances, the requirements of section 34 of the Act can be dispensed with. The requirements, in our opinion, have been satisfied in this case. There was definite information subsequent to the termination of the hostilities, and that information led to the discovery of the income which was not and which could not have been assessed in the original assessment proceedings. As we have pointed out, the bar of piecemeal assessment would not apply to the facts of this case. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the assessee. Since the assessee failed he will pay the costs of the reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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