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Showing 21 to 27 of 27 Records

• 1956 (7) TMI 35
  
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  ... ... ..... (a) defines block mica to mean any mica, other than chillas, splittings and waste mica, obtained from crude mica by any process of trimming. Section 2(b) defines chillas to mean thin laminations or cleanings of mica not more than 008 inch thick obtained from crude or block mica. Section 2(d) defines crude mica to mean mica in its rough state before it has been trimmed or subjected to any process. It is manifest that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the process of mining mica is tantamount to manufacture of goods within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended by Bihar Act VI of 1949. In my opinion the view taken by the Board of Revenue is not correct and the question of law as reframed must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. RAJ KISHORE PRASAD, J.-I entirely agree, and have nothing to add. Reference answered accordingly.

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• 1956 (7) TMI 34
  

  Admission of petition and directions as to advertisement

  
  
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  ... ... ..... m the order of Mr. Justice Desai and the absence of any indication in the judgment to the contrary that Mr. Justice Desai felt that he was bound by the mandatory provisions of rule 733 and that he had to give effect to those provisions. The result, therefore, is that we must set aside the order of Mr. Justice Desai, and send the matter back to him with a direction that he will pass the necessary order after considering the contentions of the petitioners as set out in their petition and the contentions of the appellants as set out in the affidavits on record. After considering these contentions it will be open to the learned Judge to make any of the orders which we have already suggested he can make on this petition. He will treat this matter as at the stage of notice for directions and treating it as a notice he will either give directions in terms of rule 733 or he will dismiss the petition or stay the petition as he thinks proper. Costs of the appeal, costs in the petition.

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• 1956 (7) TMI 26
  

  Employees’ Securities to be deposited in Post office Saving Banks or scheduled Bank

  
  
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  ... ... ..... nt of the society. It is undoubtedly true, that no such questions were put to any of the petitioners but that omission to my mind could not possibly have caused any prejudice to the petitioners and these were facts proved by the evidence and it was open to the learned Magistrate to draw any legitimate inference he could from them. The mere fact that the petitioners were members of the executive committee which for a number of years followed the policy of keeping deposits of employees not in any special account of a scheduled bank but in the society itself entitled one to infer from that alone that the petitioners must have known that the moneys were not being kept in a special account in a scheduled bank but were kept in the society in contravention of the provisions of section 282 B(1) of the Indian Companies Act of 1913. That being so, they were rightly convicted. The sentence is far from too severe. The result then is that the petition is dismissed and the rule discharged.

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• 1956 (7) TMI 25
  

  Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc.

  
  
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  ... ... ..... pect of the misapplication, retainer and misfeasance. This power is irrespective of any criminal liability for such acts of the persons concerned. On the facts, therefore, I order (i) Manindra Nath Ghose, (2) Kanai Lal Tarafdar and (3) Sudhangsu Kumar Basu to jointly and severally pay and restore Rs. 90,573-7-3 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum from 1st April, 1949, being a date after the order of liquidation made on 31st March, 1949, to the assets of the company, Indo-Burma Industries Ltd., by way of compensation both in respect of the misapplication of that sum and misfeasance in respect thereof. The respondents will pay the costs of and incidental to this application as between attorney and client to the liquidator applicant. In other words, there will be an order in terms of clauses (a), (b ), (c) and (g) with the direction upon the three respondents to pay the said sum of Rs. 90,573-7-3 with interest and costs as aforesaid. Certified for two counsel as of a hearing.

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• 1956 (7) TMI 24
  

  Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called

  
  
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  ... ... ..... Cas. 250 and the other being In re Malhati Tea Syndicate Limited 1951 21 Comp. Cas. 323 .The latter decision lays down the obvious principle that the word impracticable means impracticable from the reasonable point of view and the court should take a common sense view of the matter and must act as a prudent man of business. I respectfully agree with that principle. I should have thought that the word practicable or impracticable always means that. But a prudent person of business has not a sensitive, officious view of intervention in case of every rivalry between two groups of directors. I should have thought prudence demands that this court should ordinarily keep itself aloof from participating in such squabbles. In In re Malhati Tea Syndicate Limited2, there was doubt as to the existence of the board of directors validly appointed That case, therefore, on that ground is distinguishable from the present case. The application must, therefore, fail and is dismissed with costs.

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• 1956 (7) TMI 23
  

  Winding up – Application of insolvency rules and Preferential payments

  
  
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  ... ... ..... r section 49(i)(c ) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act the landlord is entitled to priority only in respect of one month s rent but by virtue of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 230 a landlord will be entitled to priority mdash though a qualified one mdash in respect of a longer period. Section 49 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act cannot therefore be applied to the present proceedings. As regards the argument that the landlord is entitled to priority because the premises was sealed by the order of court and thus came to be in custodia legis it is sufficient to say that the reduction into its custody by the law of any property does not affect the rights inter se of the competing claimants. The law holds the property impartially for the benefit of all who are entitled to it and landlords acquire no priority. No authority for supporting such a claim for priority appears to exist and certainly nothing has been shown to me. In the result, this application is dismissed.

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• 1956 (7) TMI 1
  

  Natural justice

  
  
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  ... ... ..... the order challenged by the Petitioner was made. This as I have already stated was the only argument advanced on behalf of the Respondent. To my mind there is no substance in this argument. Rules of natural justice require that an order of this kind should be made only after hearing the party concerned. The Deputy Collector cannot be stated to have given any hearing to the Petitioner and it seems redundant to elaborate on a point of this nature. The only conclusion possible is that the order challenged before me was passed without giving any hearing to the Petitioner and was contrary to the principles of natural justice. 3. In the view I take of the matter I do not think it is necessary for me to consider the other contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner. The petition succeeds and the Rule will be made absolute. A writ of certiorari will issue against the Respondent quashing the order made by him. The Respondent will pay the costs of the Petitioner fixed at Rs. 250/-.

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