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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 29 of 29 Records
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1958 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is anything in the words of Art. 312 which takes away the usual power of delegation, which ordinarily resides in the legislature?
Held that:- We cannot read Art. 312 as laying down a mandate prohibiting Parliament from delegating authority to the Central Government to frame rules for the recruitment and the conditions of service of all-India services. We, therefore, reject this contention.
Seeing that the rules would govern the all-India services common to the Central Government and the State Government provision was made by s. 3 that rules should be framed only after consulting the State Governments. At the same time Parliament took care to see that these rules were laid on the table of Parliament for fourteen days before they were to come into force and they were subject to modification, whether by way of repeal or amendment on a motion made by Parliament during the session in which they are so laid. This makes it perfectly clear that Parliament has in no way abdicated its authority, but is keeping strict vigilance and control over its delegate. Therefore, reading s. 4 along with s. 3(2) of the Act it cannot be said in the special circumstances of this case that there was excessive delegation to the Central Government by s. 3(1). We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation.
In this case the appellant was serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Punjab, and, therefore, the Punjab Government would have authority to institute the enquiry against him. The Central Government would only come into the picture after the enquiry is concluded and if it is decided to impose one of the three punishments mentioned in r. 4(1). This contention must also be rejected. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the State of Punjab.
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1958 (12) TMI 30 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ely founded. We are also impressed by the circumstance that the petitioner has not chosen to come to this Court in good time, but only long after the impugned orders had been passed. In view of the above circumstances, we would have normally declined to make any orders on this petition, but for the fact that the orders of assessment are clearly unsustainable and in view of the provisions of section 18-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act it is doubtful whether the petitioner could take any other proceedings to get the orders set aside. While refusing, therefore, to issue a writ of mandamus we think that it is necessary in the interest of justice to quash the assessment orders dated 29th June, 1954, and 6th June, 1955, passed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Hospet, against the petitioner in Assessment No. A. 2-4148. We accordingly quash the said orders, so that they shall not be used to the detriment of the petitioner. We make no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1958 (12) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vate defence 3.. that if, in the course of such exercise of the right of private defence, P.W. 1 came to be pushed, it amounted to no offence, as the force was used in exercise of right of private defence open to the accused in law. If P.Ws. 1 and 2 took the law into their own hands and exceeded their powers and encroached upon the lawful right of citizens they have only to thank themselves if they came to be assaulted in the illegal exercise of their official functions. This is a clear case where the action of P.Ws. 1 and 2 amounted to a seizure of private property within the meaning of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, as applied to the Andhra Pradesh State and also amounted to a seizure of the property under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which P.Ws. 1 and 2 had no power to do. The accused not having committed any offence, the conviction and sentence are illegal and consequently are quashed. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Conviction quashed.
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1958 (12) TMI 28 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rtunity for adducing necessary evidence. We do not think that the writ jurisdiction extends to giving such direction by remanding the case. When it is clear that the taxing authorities were not in breach of any duty cast on them, nor guilty of any contravention of law or form of procedure so that their order may be vitiated, we do not see any justification for quashing such an order. The learned counsel has failed to cite any compelling authority which would warrant the course that he proposes in the circumstances of the case. The petitioner had time and opportunity to resort to civil remedy. He has not even approached the Tribunal. The relief that he claims might have been effectively given in one of these forums. He failed to avail of these opportunities and has invoked the writ jurisdiction instead, but has not made out a case of defect or excess of jurisdiction. This petition must therefore fail, and it is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (12) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an error was not raised before the Sales Tax Officer. If it was the appellant s case that he was not liable to sales tax, because the sales were in the course of export out of India, it was his duty to raise that point. If he had raised that point and the Sales Tax Officer had decided it erroneously, there might be scope for an argument that in coming to the decision, he had made an error which is apparent on the face of the record. The question was not raised at all. If the question was not raised, how could there be a question of any error in the decision of that question. There is, therefore, in my opinion not even any scope for an argument of an error apparent on the face of the record. Quite apart from the reasons given by the learned Judge himself, I am of opinion that the appellant was not entitled to any of the reliefs under Article 226 of the Constitution which he asked for. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs. BACHAWAT, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (12) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company – Membership of and Winding up – Power of liquidator to accept shares, etc., as consideration for sale of property of company
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1958 (12) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Power of court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... d be followed where there is much complexity, or where other relief is required. The principles of law as enunciated in the English cases referred to above have been followed by courts in India, vide Ramesh Chandra Mitter v. Jogini Mohan Chatterji AIR 1920 Cal. 789, In the matter of Dhelakhat Tea Co. Ltd. 1958 28 Comp. Cas. 62 , T.A.K. Mohideen Pichai Taraganar v. Tinnevelly Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1928 Mad. 571, and Devakumar Mishra v. Rupak Ltd. AIR 1955 Pat. 486. Some evidence has been led in this case and the company has also produced some documents in support of its plea. I must not prejudice either party by expressing any views on the merits of the dispute. The petitioners in this case should, if so advised, get their cause adjudicated in a civil court by instituting a regular suit. This is not a fit case in which the discretionary powers of this court for rectification of the register can suitably be invoked. The petition is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (12) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Application for and Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... tributed assets of companies in liquidation there is provision for their going to the public account of India in the Reserve Bank under section 555 of the Companies Act. But there appears no comparable provision for assets of dissolved companies under section 560 of the Act. It is, however, unnecessary for me to decide this question of how far, if at all, the doctrine of bona vacantia would dapply to properties of a dissolved company in this case on the ground that the facts at any rate do not show satisfactorily here that there is any asset or property of this defunct company. It may also be that because of the express provision in article 296 of the Constitution the Companies Act, 1956, in India which copied in section 560 the major provisions of section 354 of the English Companies Act, 1948, did not introduce the further provisions of sections 355 and 356 of the English statute. For these reasons, the application must be and is dismissed with costs. Certified for counsel.
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1958 (12) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit was not maintainable by reason of the provisions of section 4 of the Rewa State Companies Act, 1935, and the appeal filed by the plaintiffs must, therefore, be dismissed?
Held that:- The first contention that respondent No. 1 should not be allowed to raise an objection of the kind which he has now raised at this late stage can be disposed of very easily. The objection taken rests on the provisions of a public statute which no court can exclude from its consideration. The question is a pure question of law and does not require the investigation of any facts. Admittedly, more than twenty persons formed the association in question and it is not disputed that it was formed in contravention of section 4(2) of the Rewa State Companies Act, 1935.
The appellants herein have not asked for a return or refund of their subscriptions; on the contrary, they have asked for a rendition of accounts in enforcement of an illegal contract of partnership. The reliefs they have asked for necessarily imply a recognition by the court that an association exists of which accounts ought to be taken. When the association is itself illegal, a court cannot assist the plaintiffs in getting accounts made so that they may have their full share of the profits made by the illegal association. The preliminary objection succeeds. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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