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1958 (8) TMI 43
... ... ... ... ..... ere is a finding included therein which the Commercial Tax Officer never intended to arrive at. In any event, there is a patent inconsistency. That being so, this Rule must be made absolute to this extent that the assessment order dated the 10th of April, 1957, being Exhibit C to the petition must be set aside and quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari and the matter sent back to the Commercial Tax Officer, who must reconsider the matter under clause (2) of the heading exemption . He must come to a clear finding as to whether the exemption that he has disallowed relates to goods which are amenable to sales tax, in view of the observations made above, that is to say whether the goods have been delivered in West Bengal or outside West Bengal. So far as the rest of the assessment order is concerned, the correctness thereof has not been challenged. The assessment order will now be made in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Assessment order set aside.
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1958 (8) TMI 42
... ... ... ... ..... ur opinion, therefore, under section 22-B, the Commissioner would be entitled to revise orders passed prior to 1st December, 1953, when that section came into force. At the same time, under sub-section (2) of section 22-B, the revisional order itself cannot be passed after the expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be revised. As the questions framed by the Sales Tax Tribunal appear to us to be unnecessarily wider in scope, we propose to answer those questions as follows (1) The revisional powers under section 22-B can be exercised by the Commissioner even in respect of orders of subordinate authorities passed prior to 1st December, 1953, provided the revisional order is passed by him before the expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be revised and (2) The order of remand was justified in view of our answer to the first question. The applicant-assessee will pay the costs of the State in both the references. References answered accordingly.
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1958 (8) TMI 41
... ... ... ... ..... Officer to assess the petitioner a second time. This is a question of pure interpretation of a provision of law and the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court does not apply to this case. If we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the position will be that in every case of an argument under the Sales Tax Act, where a question of law is raised, the assessee will be held to have a right to approach this Court with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that his fundamental right has been infringed. He will thus be in a position to pass by at lest two Courts, namely, the Judge Appeals and the judge Revisions and come direct to this Court with a petition under Article 226. We do not think that this Court is bound to entertain a petition under Article 226 praying for the quashing of an assessment order merely on the ground that a question of law arises. We accordingly reject this petition. Petition rejected.
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1958 (8) TMI 40
... ... ... ... ..... bligation or liability on the part of the consumer to pay it as sales tax. It is any-the-less a tax on goods. It could not be said that the intention of the legislature in passing either the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act or the Essential Commodities Act was to prevent the State Governments from levying taxes on the sales of goods, a subject which is entirely within their sphere. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the impact of the two pieces of central legislation on the Regulation in question has not produced any adverse results. They have left the operation of the Regulation unaffected. It has survived in spite of these statutes and still holds the field and the imposition of taxes by virtue of that Regulation is legal. Hence, no exception can be taken to it on any of the grounds urged in support of these petitions. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee in each of them is fixed at Rs. 75. Petitions dismissed.
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1958 (8) TMI 39
... ... ... ... ..... ower conferred on the State Government. In the circumstances, this argument also has no force. In some of the petitions, some other detailed points have been raised on behalf of the petitioners to challenge orders which have been passed by the Sales Tax Officers. After hearing learned counsel, we find that those are points on which the petitioners can seek appropriate remedy by way of appeal, revision or reference in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and it is not at all necessary to entertain the writ petitions. Errors may have been committed by the Sales Tax Officers but no writ petitions are to be entertained unless those errors are manifest errors apparent on the face of the record and, after hearing learned counsel, we are not prepared to hold that any such manifest errors apparent on the face of the record have been committed which would justify our issuing a writ of certiorari. The petitions are all, consequently, dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1958 (8) TMI 38
... ... ... ... ..... ontention that any exports made through Cochin Harbour are exempt from sales tax etc. In their further reply dated 23rd March, 1955, apart from other matters, the applicants have taken the point that apart from the question of sales, these are export shipments and cannot be liable to sales tax, in view of the provisions of Article 286(1)(a) and (2) of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, the appellate authority will consider all the contentions including that based on Article 286 of the Constitution. 67.. It is not also possible for us to grant prayer (b) in O.P. 133/55 regarding the levy of sales tax on similar exports made by the applicants in 1953-54. We do not know the nature of those transactions and we are sure that the Sales Tax Authorities will consider all the objections of the assessees and pass appropriate orders. 68.. With these observations, O.P. 133/55 is dismissed. All parties will bear their own costs in the two O.Ps. and in the reference. Ordered accordingly.
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1958 (8) TMI 37
... ... ... ... ..... he expiry of three calendar years from the relevant period, namely 22nd October, 1949, to 9th November, 1950. 12.. The two orders of the Commissioner dated 15th December, 1954, are illegal and so are the proceedings for fresh assessment initiated in pursuance of those orders. Accordingly, the Commissioner s two revisional orders dated 15th December, 1954, the proceedings for fresh assessment started on the basis thereof and the fresh assessment order dated 20th August, 1957, passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Chhindwara, are quashed. This will not, however, affect the validity of the proceedings under section II B of the Act, if any, already taken to tax the turnovers for the periods 22nd October, 1949, to 9th November, 1950, and 10th November, 1950, to 30th October, 1951, which escaped assessment. 13.. Since the petitioner has succeeded in part, there will be no order about costs. The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition Partly allowed.
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1958 (8) TMI 36
... ... ... ... ..... 7,934-1-0 due to the sales tax department is not entitled to priority because it did not become due during the period of twelve months next before the relevant date. I am of opinion that this contention is without substance. Section 530(1)(a) of the new Act does not require that a claim must become due as well as payable within the period of twelve months. In my judgment its requirements are satisfied if the co-existence of both occurs for the first time within the period. Even if the amounts of sales tax for the three years in question were due from before the period of twelve months, they were not payable previously. As they first became payable within that period having already been due from before, I hold that the entire amount of Rs. 7,934-1-0 ought to be treated as preferential claim and to be paid in priority to ordinary debts. The official liquidator is directed to treat the claim of the sales tax department for the aforesaid amount accordingly. Ordered accordingly.
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1958 (8) TMI 35
... ... ... ... ..... ere can be no doubt that it is a tax on sale of goods which is an exclusively Provincial subject. 12.. As regards the quantum of the turnover for the purpose of assessment, the sum paid by the American firm namely Rs. 1,45,000 and odd should be taken to be the sale price. Messrs Chromite Corporation of India were only the selling agents and they accepted the price from the American firm on behalf of the petitioner. The lower price shown in the accounts as representing the value of the goods at the time of delivery to Messrs Chromite Corporation of India at Barbil in Keonjhar district, cannot be taken as the sale price because there could possibly be no sale between the petitioner and his selling agents. 13.. For the aforesaid reasons I am satisfied that the petitioner was rightly assessed to sales tax. 14.. Both the applications are dismissed with costs. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 200 (Rupees two hundred only). BARMAN, J.-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1958 (8) TMI 34
Winding up - Powers and duties of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... courts below rightly held that the present suit will not be maintainable since the unpaid call money is not a book debt. Then turning to the second aspect of the case, namely, that it is a book debt the lower courts have rightly pointed out that the debit entry giving rise to a cause of action is of the date 14th August, 1950, while the suit was laid on 28th November, 1953, for realisation of a contractual debt and, therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation. The final point is the set-off pleaded. It is no doubt true that in view of the decision on points 1 and 2 the plea of set-off is not of any importance but at the same time it is a comforting thought to us that the defendant has not swindled the institution. On the other hand, he has met his obligation as one of the promoters of the company. The net result of this analysis is that the decision of the court below is irreproachable. The second appeal has got to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed with costs. No leave.
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1958 (8) TMI 33
Political contributions – Prohibitions and restrictions regarding, Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc.
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1958 (8) TMI 32
Oppression and mismanagement –Power of Tribunal on application under sections 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... er shall not be bound to act according to any advice that may be sought from and tendered by the board of advisers or any one or more advisers as the case may be. The special officer will alone remain responsible to this court for the conduct, regulation and administration of the company notwithstanding the presence of the board of advisers or their advice. (6)I, therefore, make an order constituting an advisory board on the terms and conditions set out above. The other orders sought by the special officer on this summons are more or less administrative and there appears to be no objection to such orders. I, therefore, make an order in terms of clause (d) that the remuneration will be Rs. 1,500 per month and actual travelling expenses and hotel expenses not exceeding Rs. 50 per day, if incurred, from the 1st of August, 1958, and also clause (e) of the summons. The applicant and the company will get their costs out of the assets. The State Bank will add its costs to its claim.
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1958 (8) TMI 29
Directors, etc. not to hold place of profit ... ... ... ... ..... s before, but on the coming into force of the new Act it immediately became necessary for those companies in which offices of profit were held by directors or their relations to have this state of affairs ratified by the acceptance of a special resolution by a meeting of the company. I thus consider that the accused company in the present case was wrongly acquitted in the preliminary stages on the strength of the provisions of section 652 of the Act and, therefore, the appeal of the State must be accepted and the order of acquittal set aside. This is not, however, to be taken as expressing any opinion as to whether any offence has or has not been committed by the accused company in this case, in which the true facts still remain to be established by evidence, and the law applicable to the facts as found still remains to be determined. I would accordingly accept the appeal and order that the trial of the accused company should proceed according to law. Dulat, J. mdash I agree.
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1958 (8) TMI 28
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1958 (8) TMI 1
Transit of goods ... ... ... ... ..... is not an absolute bar to the exercise of the powers by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the present circumstances, where there was no justification in law for the issue of the notice, the order, if at all, was without jurisdiction and this court will not stay its hands from giving relief to the petitioners on the ground that they could have approached the higher authorities under Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act. 9.In the result, therefore, we allow these petitions in so far that we issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the notices of demand as there is no statutory provision under which the said notices could be issued. If the respondent has any right to claim the customs duty, he can always enforce that by means of a proper proceeding, but the notice of demand was without any authority of law and is liable to be quashed. C.R. 36/57 and C.R. 101/57 are accordingly made absolute but the parties will bear their own costs.
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