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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 65 Records
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1961 (12) TMI 75
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... ... ..... ssee who was the last purchaser during the assessment year. was liable to pay tax on his purchase turnover even if he had subsequently sold the goods after the expiry of the assessment year. In my opinion, the assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer in this case is not open to the criticism that any part of the turnover in the hands of the petitioner was not part of the taxable turnover. Mr. Ullal prays that in respect of the turnover of Rs. 1,60,706-38 nP. the petitioner would be entitled to a refund, if sales tax on that part of the turnover had been collected from the dealer to whom the petitioner has subsequently sold the groundnuts. Whether the petitioner is entitled to such refund is a question, on which we should not, in my opinion, express any opinion in this case. It would be for the petitioner to work out his rights in that regard independently. This writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs. MIR IQBAL HUSSAIN, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (12) TMI 74
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... ... ..... ory provisions, but the forms as such cannot be condemned and put aside to defeat the seller s right and claim of taxation under section 8(1) of the Act. We are of opinion that in regard to S. Nos. 3 and 5 to 10, the aggregate turnover of Rs. 30,775 should be taxed under section 8(1) at the rate of one per cent. To this extent the decision of the Tribunal is correct. What remains is only S. No. 4 relating to a turnover of Rs. 350 which has been subjected to tax at the rate of 7 per cent. on the ground that the C Form does not mention the date of registration. The C Form is admittedly lacking in a material particular by reason of this omission. This should therefore attract tax only at the rate of 7 per cent. under section 8(2) of the Act. In the result, the decision of the Tribunal is confirmed in regard to S. Nos. 3 and 5 to 10 and set aside in regard to S. Nos. 1, 2 and 4. The revision petition is partly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1961 (12) TMI 73
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... ... ..... nted out, in the present case, the position is even stronger. It seems to us that, when once by reason of the very provisions of the Act a particular transaction is taken out of the scope of the operation of section 8(1), a subsequent compliance with the conditions will not serve to restore the transactions to taxability under section 8(1) of the Act. These provisions appear to me to have been stringently framed so as to prevent abuse of effecting sales to consumers in the guise of sales to registered dealers for purposes of resale or manufacture. It follows therefore that the transactions covered by the turnover of Rs. 19,000 and odd in dispute in the present revision petition were rightly brought to tax under section 8 (2) of the Act by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The order of the Tribunal which directed the taxation of these transactions under section 8(1) is clearly erroneous. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1961 (12) TMI 72
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... ... ..... o prevent future legislation except to the extent of the immediate appellate authority to which he can resort to for getting relief against the assessment not putting him in a position worse than that which he came to occupy by reason of the order of assessment. This vested right which he had in the present case was in no way affected and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which was passed after the commencement of the new Act, did not certainly clothe the assessee with any further vested right enabling him to resist enhancement by the Tribunal. The Tribunal went wrong in holding that the petition filed by the State Representative for enhancement of the assessment was not maintainable. The Tribunal has improperly declined to exercise their jurisdiction. The revision petition is allowed the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1961 (12) TMI 71
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... ... ..... the State. Yet another item is French coffee which is taxable in the same manner, subject to the condition that the coffee portion of the French coffee has not already suffered tax in this State under the earlier item. Prior to the passing of this Act, chicory was one of the general items taxable at the ordinary rate and for the first time the Legislature, considering the extensive use of chicory in its admixture with coffee powder, has brought it within the scheme of single point levy of tax at the same rate as coffee. To our minds, the Tribunal was justified in referring to this later enactment and it is entitled to rely upon the interpretation of the expression coffee as it appears in the 1959 Act. We see no reason to differ from the Tribunal in the view that it took that blended coffee powder is not the same as coffee that is mentioned in section 5(v) of the Act. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (12) TMI 70
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... ... ..... r the purpose of resale in the case of declared goods and other goods sold to registered dealers for resale or for use in manufacture, etc. The differentiation in the use of declared and other than declared goods in so far as any sales or purchases of such goods take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are dealt with differently and taxed differently. The very purpose of the Act being to treat declared and other than declared goods forming the subject-matter of inter-State sales differently, different modes of taxation of such sales are provided for by sections 8(1) and (2) of the Act. These provisions do accordingly carry out the policy of the Act and they cannot as far as we can see be attacked on the basis that the classification has no just relation to the purpose of the Act. This contention must fail. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.K. Mohamed Elias and Co. and Others Versus The State of Madras
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1961 (12) TMI 69
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... ... ..... cal law. We are unable to accept this argument. What is required by section 8(2) is only that the tax shall be calculated at the same rates and in the same manner as would have been done if the sale had in fact taken place inside the appropriate State and for the purpose of making any such calculation any such dealer shall be deemed to be a dealer liable to pay tax under the sales tax law of the appropriate State, notwithstanding that he in fact may not be so liable under that law. The expression at the same rates and in the same manner is accordingly qualified to a considerable extent, and even if the dealer and therefore the transaction in question may not attract the tax under the local sales tax law, for the purpose of section 8(2) the Central sales tax becomes leviable at the same rate as would otherwise be applicable under the local sales tax law. The result is that the contentions advanced fail and the petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee-one set-Rs. 150.
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1961 (12) TMI 68
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... ... ..... the quantity of gold purchased from other dealers is part of the total quantity of bullion sold by this dealer, there is no reason to hold that that quantity would not be covered by the non-liability to tax granted on account of a second sale. As has been urged by the learned counsel for the assessee, under circumstances such as the above, the natural presumption arises that a person engaged in a transaction will presumably follow that course which takes him out of the taxable category rather than otherwise. We are of the opinion that the officers and the Tribunal below have set an artificial and unnatural standard in the facts and circumstances of the case. We are of opinion that the turnover in question can under the law be deemed to relate to the quantity of gold which the assessee had purchased from other dealers and was consequently the turnover relating to second sales of bullion. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1961 (12) TMI 67
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... ... ..... section 8(1) of the Act. If in the working of an Act, an anomaly in its incidence not consciously intended by the Legislature is noticed, it may be permissible to so interpret the Act as to avoid that anomaly. But where it is obvious that by not extending the Act to an area, the Legislature did deliberately create a distinction between transactions in which such area was or was not involved, it is not an anomaly with judicial interpretation is called upon to investigate. The dealers of this State were fully aware that when they sold goods to dealers in Jammu and Kashmir, the sales would attract tax under section 8(2) of the Act. In these circumstances, it is not correct to say that the levy of tax under section 8(2) is penal in its nature. The contention that these sales are outside the scope of the Central Sales Tax Act has therefore to be rejected. In the result, all petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 50 in each petition and appeal. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (12) TMI 66
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... ... ..... addressed before us by Mr. Srinivasan that the enactment of the rules contained in schedule II to the Act in accordance with which the turnover of a dealer had to be determined, constitutes to any extent or in any sense a matter involving an essential legislative function. Those rules, to my mind, in so far as they are relevant for the purpose of this case, amounted to no more than the details relating to the law made by the legislature imposing a sales tax on the turnover of a dealer. If the legislature had not made such rules but had left it to the State Government to formulate rules for the determination of the turnover, it could not have been successfully contended that the power conferred on the Government to make those rules was not delegatable. In my opinion, the manner in which the determination of the turnover of a dealer has to be made is a were matter of detail in regard to which it was not necessary for the legislature itself to make a law, and that being so, it
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1961 (12) TMI 65
Whether the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, can be said to have been extended for the first time by the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature in 1952 when it passed the Vindhya Pradesh Laws (Validating) Act, 1952, to the exclusion of the order contained in the Notification No. S.R.O. 6, or whether the Act continued to be in force in Vindhya Pradesh even before, and all that the Vindhya Pradesh Act did was to remove any doubts about its validity?
Held that:- Petitions dismissed. The laws in different portions of the new State of Madhya Pradesh were enacted by different Legislatures, and under section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, all laws in force are to continue until repealed or altered by the appropriate Legislature. We have already held that the sales tax law in Vindhya Pradesh was validly enacted, and it brought its validity with it under section 119 of the State Reorganisation Act, when it became a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, the different laws in different parts of Madhya Pradesh can be sustained on the ground that the differentiation arises from historical reasons, and a geographical classification based on historical reasons.
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1961 (12) TMI 63
Whether the exemption is effective from the commencement of the financial year or from the date of the notification?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The divisions of the year and the taxable turnover into different parts are to make easy the collection of tax, and form part of the machinery sections. If the tax is yearly and is to be paid on the taxable turnover of a dealer, then the exemption, whenever it comes in, in the year for which the tax is payable, would exempt sales of those goods throughout the year, unless the Act said that the Notification was not to have this effect, or the Notification fixed the date for the commencement of the exemption. In the present case, the Notification did not fix the date from which the exemption was to operate, probably because the Act omitted to make such provision, enabling the State to do so, and the exemption must, therefore, operate for the whole year, during which it was granted.
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1961 (12) TMI 51
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc.
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1961 (12) TMI 45
Court – Jurisdiction of, Meeting and Proceedings – Representation of corporation at meetings of companies & creditors, Compromise and arrangement
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1961 (12) TMI 44
Meeting and proceedings – Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc., Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served
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1961 (12) TMI 43
Validity of an order made under section 36 of the Insurance Act, 1938 sanctioning the transfer of its life insurance business by one insurance company to another questioned
Held that:- The transfer in this case is an exercise of this power and hence within the objects of the company. An exercise by a company of a power given by its memorandum cannot amount to an alteration of the memorandum at all.
In the present case the thing has been done under express statutory power. No question here arises of a corporate power. Further, there is not here a distribution of the assets of the transferor company after its undertaking had been transferred. Hence we have here no winding up really.
It was after such approval that the transfer had been sanctioned under section 36 of the Insurance Act and may be, though we do not have this on the record, the transfer was effected by proper documents executed between the companies. An agreement only to transfer the undertaking by the directors clearly does not violate section 86H for it is merely tentative, subject to final approval by the company in general meeting. In the present case, the defect, if any, arose from a statutory provision itself of which the shareholders must be deemed to have had knowledge.
It is not possible to take the view that a transfer cannot be sanctioned under section 36 if the result of that is to denude the transferor company of all its assets out of which an agent can be paid his commission. In the present case, he actually heard the policy-holders. Therefore, it does not seem to us that it can be contended with substance that sections 35 and 36 of the Insurance Act are not pari materia with the sections of the Companies Acts to which we have earlier referred. The last point of Mr. Sinha must also fail. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (12) TMI 41
Transfer to shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal ... ... ... ... ..... able. It remains to dispose of the other contention of the counsel for the appellants that Chhote Lal Sanwal Das was a necessary party to the suit. If it were a contest between the transferor and the transferee, there could be no manner of doubt that Chhote Lal Sanwal Das was a necessary party. The name of the first respondent, however having been registered as a member at the instance of Chhote Lal Sanwal Das, I do not see any reason why it was necessary for the plaintiff in this suit to have impleaded this firm as a party. This was a contest simpliciter between the company and the first respondent, the directors having taken upon themselves the task of rectifying the register without giving notice. Chhote Lal Sanwal Das had ceased to be a member of the company after the shares had been transferred in the name of the first respondent and there is no reason why it was necessary to implead the firm. In this view of the matter, this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.
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1961 (12) TMI 40
Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet, Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
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1961 (12) TMI 39
Winding up – Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc. and Inherent powers of Court
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1961 (12) TMI 6
Whether the general or special orders mentioned in the section subject to which it has the power to impose tax, are orders which were in existence before the rule prescribing the tax was framed and once a rule has been framed by it and the Government has accorded its sanction to that rule, the Government has no power to control the imposition of tax under it by any order made under section 59?
Held that:- It is the imposition after the making of the rule authorising the tax, that is subject to the Government's orders and not the making of the rule itself which authorises the tax. It is plain from section 59 that the control over a municipality's power to tax imposed by the requirement of the Government's sanction of the rule prescribing the tax contained in section 61, is not the same thing as the control contemplated by the general or special orders mentioned in section 59, for both are mentioned in section 59. If it were not so, it would have been unnecessary to provide for the general or special orders controlling the imposition of the tax in section 59. This is the first reason why we think that the appellant municipality's contention is untenable.
The imposition contemplated by section 59 is clearly not the passing of the resolutions under section 60 selecting the tax and making the rule prescribing the tax to be levied in terms of section 46(1), for section 56(1)(a) expressly makes the imposition something happening after section 60 has been complied with. This seems to us to be another reason for not accepting the appellant municipality's contention.
" Impose " in section 59 means the actual levy of the tax after authority to levy it has been acquired by rules duly made and sanctioned, and it is such imposition that is made subject to the general or special orders of the Government. Therefore, the Government can at any time by any such order prohibit the imposition of the tax.
Apart from the very interesting question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the municipality, being a local authority, was a State, and was not therefore entitled to the benefit of article 14, as to which we think it unnecessary to express any opinion, we are on the facts satisfied that there is no discrimination. The Government has now, it is not disputed, prohibited all municipalities from levying any octroi tax on milk. Furthermore, it has not been shown to us that all municipalities stand on the same footing with regard to milk.
The last objection that the order had been mala fide made is completely without foundation as the Government had earlier requested the appellant municipality to drop the tax on the ground, among others, that milk was really being purchased for the Government and that the Government was not liable to be taxed by a municipality. Appeal dismissed.
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