|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 70 Records
-
1962 (1) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... applicable would be Article 74. Such an instance would be where the suit is brought for the recovery of the installment that has fallen due and before there is such a default as makes the whole amount become due. In such a case, although the bond is a bond payable by installments and there is a default clause, Article 74 would nevertheless be applicable. But I am clearly of opinion that where Col. 1 of Article 75 is in terms applicable, then Article 74 cannot be relied upon." 10. As stated earlier, it is a case which is clearly covered by the provisions of Article 75 of the Limitation Act because the right to recover the whole amount accrued to the creditor only upon the default of payment of all the installments and as the present suit had been instituted within three years of the date of default of the last installment payable under the bond, it was rightly held to be within time. 11. We, therefore, find no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1962 (1) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he appointment would be merely incidental to the main purpose of the enquiry. It would be difficult to conclude therefrom that the Special Committee were holding a parallel enquiry on matters pending decision by a court of law and that thereby their action tended to interfere with the course of justice." The same, with greater emphasis, can be said in the present case. The Departmental enquiry against Gurbaksh Singh did not tend to interfere with the course of justice. Bachan Singh, appellant, was conducting the enquiry under the orders of Pratap Singh. Pratap Singh directed the enquiry under orders from Government. Neither of them would commit contempt of Court in discharging his duty. I am therefore of opinion that the facts of the case do not make out that the appellants, by their alleged conduct, committed contempt of Court. I would therefore allow their appeals. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, these appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 72 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ture comes to an end". The view taken by us is also supported by the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lalit Ram Mangilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1950 18 I.T.R. 286; A.I.R. 1950 All. 390, 396. The decisions of the Bombay High Court and the Rangoon High Court are distinguished by the learned judges as being restricted to the particular facts of those cases. Seth J. lays considerable emphasis on the expression "normally" used by Kania J. in K.H. Mody, In re 1940 8 I.T.R. 179. The passage is as follows "....Kania J. only says that the profits can be ascertained normally when the adventure comes to an end, which presupposes that cases may exist where profits may be ascertained even before the entire property purchased had been disposed of." We respectfully follow this decision and answer the second question against the department. The assessee will be entitled to his costs and the advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 250. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (1) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tee, on which the conclusion of the High Court was supported. In any event, a case cannot be an authority on a point of fact, and each case will have to be examined in the light of the circumstances existing in it. In the present case, the two Tribunals specially appointed to consider these matters, went thoroughly into the question, and discussed it from a correct angle. If they had examined they facts after instructing themselves correctly about the law, a Court of revision should be slow to interfere with the decision thus reached, unless it demonstrates by its own decision, the impropriety of the order, which it seeks to revise. No attempt of this kind has been made in this case, and in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in reversing the clear finding. In the result, this appeal must be allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside, and that of the appellate authority is restored. The landlord shall pay the costs here and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion to the others and the business structure relating to one of a particular class of goods is entirely separate and distinct from that in respect of the others, but there is no evidence on the record before us to justify such a conclusion in this case. In the result the answers to the questions are as follows Question 1 The assessee's agency of the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. was not a separate business by itself and the closure of this business did not result in the destruction of a capital asset of the assessee. Question 2 The amounts of compensation received by the assessee from the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. were income chargeable in the hands of the assessee. Question 3 No part of the compensation money was received by the assessee on condition not to carry on a competitive business in explosives and consequently no part thereof was exempt from Indian income-tax levy. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Ray, J.-I agree.
-
1962 (1) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 71; L.R. 61 I.A. 10 that if there is a pending proceeding there is no escapement until there has been an assessment. The provisions of section 34 attract the provisions of section 22 and other provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act with the result that if there is a pending proceeding there is no escapement of income-tax and secondly, if there is a return, there is no escapement until there has been an assessment on that return. To sum up. In the present case the notice dated February 23, 1950, is valid and the revenue authorities cannot extend the period of limitation by assessing after the expiry of eight years by issuing a second notice on the eve of the expiry of eight years to obtain a period of one additional year from the date of the service of the second notice. The assessment is therefore barred by limitation because the assessment should have been completed by March 31, 1956. The assessee is entitled to costs. Certificate for two counsel. G.K. MITTER J.--I agree.
-
1962 (1) TMI 68 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he judgment of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Company's case 1959 37 I.T.R. 1; 1960 1 S.C.R. 185 the liability must accrue or arise in order that a sum of money may be deductible in respect therefor. It may be that in a particular case an assessee's denial of a contract may not avail him and judged in the light of all the circumstances of the case it may be said that less had accrued some time before the assessee was prepared to acknowledge it but unless the assessee acts mala fide I can see no reason why he should not be allowed to contest the claim raised against him and make provision therefor in his accounts only when he finds himself in a position not to dispute the liability any further. In the result I hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss of ₹ 1,20,000 was admissible in the assessment year 1950-51 as claimed by the assessee. The assessee will have the costs of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1962 (1) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ity together as a unit. The power of excommunication is vested in him for the purpose of enforcing discipline and keep the denomination together as an entity. The purity of the fellowship is secured by the removal of persons who had rendered themselves unfit and unsuitable for membership of the sect. The power of excommunication for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of the community, has therefore a prime significance in the religious life of every member of the group. A legislation which penalises this power even when exercised for the purpose above-indicated cannot be sustained as a measure of social welfare or social reform without eviscerating the guarantee under Art. 25(1) and rendering the protection illusory. In my view the petitioner is entitled to the relief that he seeks and the petition will accordingly be allowed. BY COURT In accordance with the majority view of this Court, the petition is allowed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 65 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... apart 1/4th of the income for charitable purposes. Nevertheless, the income was theirs. As the property remained the property of the settlers the income was chargeable in their hands. Questions Nos. 2 and 3 must be answered in the affirmative. A further point was argued by Mr. Meyer that it is not enough that the trust deed should provide for a part of the income being allocated or distributed to a charity account in the ledger but that what was intended to be set apart for charity must be clearly and distinctly set apart and should not be the subject of a mere book entry, that is to say, it should not be in the power of anybody to use what was given to the charity in the business. Mr. Meyer drew our attention to several authorities on this point but I do not think it is necessary to go into the question in view of the answers given. As the revenue has succeeded on the most vital question the assessee must pay the costs of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (1) TMI 64 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ncertain times. In this sense payment under section 34 is not casual. Once payment of the compensation under section 23 is withheld after the taking of possession of the land acquired, the payment of interest at 4 per cent. per annum becomes not casually but regularly and recurrently payable. I cannot, therefore, persuade myself to treat the receipt as exempt from tax on the ground that it is "of a casual and non-recurring nature". For reasons stated above I would answer the question of law referred to this court in the negative. In other words, the answer is that on a true interpretation of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act and the award given by the Collector of Pepsu on the 30th of September, 1955, the sum of ₹ 48,660 was not a capital but a revenue receipt and as such was liable to tax under the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall be entitled to the costs of this reference which are assessed at ₹ 250. INDER DEV DUA J.--I agree.
-
1962 (1) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... gly hold that when a person transfers property representing that he has a present interest therein, whereas he has, in fact, only a spes successionis, the transferee is entitled to the benefit of s. 43, if he has taken the transfer on the faith of that representation and for consideration. In the present case, Santhappa, the vendor in Ex. III, represented that he was entitled to the property in praesenti, and it has been found that the purchaser entered into the transaction acting on that representation. He therefore acquired title to the properties under s. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, when Santhappa became in titulo on the death of Gangamma on February 17, 1933, and the subsequent dealing with them by Santhappa by way of release under Ex. A did not operate to vest any title in the appellant. The Courts below were right in upholding the title of the respondents, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs of the third respondent, who alone appears. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 62 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... also receive a share of what the business earns. That is not interest; it is simply a share of the profits." In Walker's case 1920 3 K.B. 648 the contract gave the lender a share of the profits without any rights or liabilities of the partners and therefore it was held to be a mere distribution of profits. In the present case the substance of the transaction is to be looked at. The assessee was obliged to pay interest at the rate of 4? per cent. for loans. The stipulation to pay 50 per cent. of the share of the profits was not for the purpose of fostering the business but appears to be for the oblique purpose of distribution or bifurcation of profits so that the profits received by the assessee from H. Manory Ltd. were reduced for the purpose of obtaining the advantage of avoidance of tax liability on the same. The question is therefore answered against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to the costs. G.K. MITTER J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (1) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... les but on persons. It has not been shown how the imposition of this tax is an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the petitioner to carry on trade, but it was submitted that by this means the petitioner will not be able to compete with the manufacturers outside the State of Assam. Assuming that this is so, it is clear that goods which are purchased are put to different uses and if the legislature thinks that certain classes of goods should pay the tax and not others that is a question of policy into which the courts cannot enter. We can only say that in such circumstances, per se there is no discrimination. There is no force in the second contention either. In view of our decision on these two points the third point, that is, the refusal of the Sales Tax Officer to amend the registration certificate will have no force. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed and the rule is discharged. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondent. Petition dismissed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ld not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the right of freedom of speech and expression. It is clear, therefore, that cl. (2) of Art. 19 clearly save the section from the vice of unconstitutionality. It has not been contended before us on behalf of the appellant in C.A. 169 of 1957 or on behalf of the respondents in the other appeals (No. 124- 126 of 1958) that the words used by them did not come within the purview of the definition of sedition as interpreted by us. No arguments were advanced before us to show that even on the interpretation given by us their cases did not come within the mischief of the one or the other section, as the case may be. It follows, therefore, that the Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957 has to be dismissed. Criminal Appeals 124-126 of 1958 will be remanded to the High Court to pass such order as it thinks fit and proper in the light of the interpretation given by us. Appeal No. 169 of 1957 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958 allowed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 59 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... om the carrying on of the business and be incidental to it. The loss should be inseparable from the business." Applying the above test to the facts of that case, it was held that the loss was not incidental to or one arising out of the business. In the circumstances, we have not considered it necessary to examine the other aspect of the case whether loss resultant on theft in the circumstances of this case is on the same footing as loss resulting from embezzlement by an assessee's employee. This reference can be disposed of on the ground that the assessee had failed to prove that the sum of ₹ 9,300, which was snatched away from its employee, Prabhu Dayal, on 3rd November, 1955, was connected with or incidental to the assessee's business. For reasons stated above, I would answer the question under reference in the negative. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall be entitled to ₹ 100 as costs. INDER DEV DUA J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (1) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedom of personal liberty, recognised the right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certain safeguards in favour of the detained person, as laid down in cls. (4) and (5) of Art. 22. One of those safeguards is that the detained person has the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make his representation against the order of dentention. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, it has not been shown that the appellant had the opportunity, which the law contemplates in his favour, making an effective representation against his detention. On this ground alone we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the Order of the High Court and the Order of Detention passed against him. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (1) TMI 57 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the orders of the District Collector. This is hardly a matter which can be considered at this stage and particularly in revision. If the suit is not maintainable on any such ground, it would be open to the defendant-petitioner herein to raise it at the trial and leave it to the consideration and determination by the Collector, Markapur. 17. On the merits, I am not satisfied that the 'judgment of the District Collector, Kurnool, in the order proposed by him is vitiated by one or other of the defects mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115, C.P.C. The District Collector felt satisfied that the plaintiff respondent herein had sufficient cause for his absence to the date of hearing before the Collector, Markapur and I fail to see how the conclusion reached by him could be said to be illegal or vitiated by any material irregularity. On the merits, the revision petition tails and is dismissed. In the entire circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.
-
1962 (1) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the new Rules purporting to be framed either under the cochin Act or under the Travancore Act in August 1960?
Held that:- It appears that these new Rules have been abrogated as from January 1958. So it Was urged on behalf of the State that this Court should not grant a mere declaration as to the invalidity of the Rules when they are no longer in existence. This argument in our opinion has no force because we must look to the situation as it was when the petitions were presented. The Cochin petitions were presented in 1956 and the Travancore petitions were presented in 1955 and at that time the Rules were in force and they continued in force till December 1957. Therefore the petitioners would be entitled to a declaration that the Rules were invalid because at any rate that would give them relief so far as the period after their petitions is concerned while the Rules remained in force.
We therefore allow the appeals and set aside the order of the High Court. The petitions are allowed and it is hereby declared that the new Rules purporting to be framed either under the cochin Act or under the Travancore Act in August 1960 and thereafter in January 1951 were invalid ab initio and have no force and effect. The appellants will get their costs from the State-one set of hearing costs.
-
1962 (1) TMI 55 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ished altogether by the flat of the executive Government for which there is no prima facie justification and of which the petitioner was not even given a notice of. The action of the executive cannot be defended on the vague formula of administrative grounds as observed by Basi Reddi, J., in Kakku Venkataramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh . 8. Mr. Jindra Lal has very strongly contended that the pension given to the petitioner was a matter of grace and bounty not founded on any legal right. No reference has been made in support of this proposition to any law or statutory rules and considering that the petitioner had enjoyed this pension for a span of many years feel bound to hold that there has been a very serious interference with and grave violation of a right which must in the context be regarded as property right. In this view of the matter the petition must succeed and the order of conciliation of pension set aside. The petitioner would get the costs of these proceedings.
-
1962 (1) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... l the objections available to him, both of law and of fact, excepting those that have been concluded by this judgment. In such proceedings, if the petitioner is not able to satisfy the assessing authority regarding the propriety of adopting the figures for the year 1958-59 in the assessment for the year 1959-60, it is open to the authority to consider those figures for making the assessment for 1959-60 also. 45.. In the result, O.P. Nos. 214 and 215 of 1960 will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. In O.P. No. 1585 of 1960 the contention of the petitioner on the legal aspects, namely, the validity of the surcharge under Kerala Act No. XI of 1957 is held against the petitioner. In other respects the order of assessment is set aside, to be taken up afresh in the light of the directions and observations contained in this judgment. Therefore, the petition O.P. No. 1585 of 1960 is allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
|
