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Showing 21 to 40 of 45 Records
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1962 (7) TMI 47 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s held that the assessees had three sources of income, namely, (1) subscription realised from the members; (2) subscriptions levied for the introduction of assistants; and (3) fees levied for agreeing to put the names of certain companies on the quotation list. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the income realised from all these sources was realised during the course of the trading activities of the assessee. In our judgment, that decision does not support the contention advanced on behalf of the revenue. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion, that the receipt with which we are concerned in this case is a capital receipt. At any rate, it is a casual receipt as contemplated in section 4(3)(vii). Hence, our answer to the points submitted to us is that the sum of ₹ 10,000 referred to above is not income assessable under any of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The revenue shall pay the costs of this reference. Advocate's fee ₹ 200.
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1962 (7) TMI 46 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the income, but it was on the basis of information that this court had declared the income to be assessable. He could proceed even if he did not change his own opinion in the matter and did not agree with the decision of this court; since he felt that he was bound by it he could form the belief that the income had escaped assessment. Even if the Income-tax Officer when passing the original order of assessment had seen and even tick-marked the entry in the assessee's accounts about the receipt of the bonds, if he did not include the amount of the bonds in the assessable income because he thought at the time that it was not assessable, he could, when later he read Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maheshwari Saran Singh 1951 19 I.T.R. 83 or was told about it and thus learnt that the income was assessable, issue a notice for reassessment under section 34(1)(b). I, therefore, agree that both the questions be answered in the affirmative. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (7) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elf determinative of the question. Apart from this as already shown above under the leases with which we are concerned the assessee acquired a substantial interest in land and not merely the right to dig earth even though that right was limited by specification of the depth. The mere description of the premium as price of the earth can make no difference to the real position which arises under the leases. It appears to me that the description of the premium or nazrana as price was a mere device to disguise the real nature of the transaction for purposes of claiming an allowance under section 10. The result is that for the reasons stated above the questions referred to this court in these references should all be answered in the negative and against the assessee. The references be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, with the above answer. The department should be entitled to its costs fixed at ₹ 100 in each case. Questions answered in the negative.
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1962 (7) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... including the vaults, which were used by the vaultholders under their licences, could be said to have been in the possession of the company in the course of its business. On the facts of the present case, it is possible to hold that the company was in occupation of the premises for the purpose of its business which consisted of safe storage of films by permitting use of the vaults and affording facilities for the safe storage of films and the income, which the company derived therefrom, was income received by the company from and in the course of its business. In our opinion, therefore, the income in the present case was income, which properly fell under section 10 and was not income from property falling under section 9 of the Act. Our answer, therefore, to the first question is in the affirmative. In view of our answer to the first question, the second question does not survive. The assessee will get its cost from the department. First question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (7) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e assessee should get its costs, assessed at ₹ 200, from the Commissioner of Income-tax. BRIJ LAL GUPTA J.--I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice. I agree with the answer proposed. On the facts of this case there was no material to hold that the sum of ₹ 20,000 was the income of the assessee from some source other than the source, the income from which was included in the assessed income after the rejection of account books of the assessee. I also agree with the order about costs. For myself, I was inclined to take the view that for the reasons given in our judgment in Income-tax Miscellaneous Case No. 197 of 1958 the question referred to us did not arise out of the appellate order of the Tribunal and should not be answered by us, but as the plea was not raised by Sri Gopal Behari, learned counsel for the department, and the matter was allowed to be argued on the merits, I need not say anything more about the same.
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1962 (7) TMI 42 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s was a sufficient basis for the income-tax authorities to come to the conclusion that the assessee was carrying on some undisclosed business or to come to the conclusion that the amounts received at Calcutta were income of the assessee from an undisclosed source. But there is no material from which the Tribunal could come to the conclusion that the assessee was carrying on some undisclosed business with a turnover of ₹ 4 lakhs, nor is there any material to support the finding that the income from the said turnover of ₹ 4 lakhs will be five per cent. of the said turnover. The question has thus to be answered in the negative and thus on the facts and the circumstances of the case there is no material before the Tribunal to hold that the sum of ₹ 20,000 represented the undisclosed income of the assessee firm. The assessee will be entitled to its costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 100. S.K. DUTTA J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (7) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nforceable claim against the said amount in favour of Government. In support of his submission that the claim set up by Government against the amount due to the assessee from Government is an enforceable claim, Mr. Mehta has invited our attention to certain clauses of the agreement between the assessee and Government under which the decision of the Government is made final and binding on the assessee; the claim asserted, however, is not referable to any of those clauses. The position according to us, therefore, is that the income has accrued to the assessee; payment, however, has not been made because as against the said payment there is an assertion of a claim by government. This mere assertion on the part of Government is not sufficient to affect the accrual of the income to the assessee. In the view that we are taking, therefore, our answer to the first question is in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (7) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ulted in capital gain. From the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also, it does not appear that at any time it was the case of the Income-tax Officer that the transaction of sale of shares had resulted in capital gains. These being the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the Tribunal was neither competent nor justified in interfering with the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as regards the transaction of sale and holding that the transaction of sale of shares had resulted in capital gains. The assessee's contention that the managing agency had value as on January 1, 1939, has been accepted by the Tribunal, and in view of this finding of the Tribunal, and in the light of the observations herein made, the amount of capital gains will have to be computed afresh. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the third question as framed is in the negative. The assessee shall pay half the costs of the department. Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (7) TMI 39 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e decision in Hotz Trust of Simla v. Commissioner of Income-tax is of any assistance. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the assessee that in the instant case the income which is the subject-matter of tax is "an income from property", and, therefore, under section 9 only the owner of that income as distinguished from the owner of the property yielding that income should be taxed. That contention is not germane for our present purpose. On the terms of the trust deed, there can be no doubt that the trustees appointed are not only the owners of the house properties detailed in the schedule thereto, but also are the owners of the income of those properties. For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the questions referred to us is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the first proviso to section 41(1) of the "Act" had been rightly applied. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (7) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... und of the incident, the nature and extent of the threat held out by the crowd of villagers. the excitement which must have been caused at the time of the incident, and. so, though we have felt no difficulty in agreeing with the decision of the High Court that at the time when the two appellants fired shots from their rifles the threat had ceased to exist, it would not be unreasonable to take into account the fact that, the excitement in their minds may have continued, and that, in the special circumstances of this case, may be regarded as an extenuating circumstance. We, therefore, think that the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of death imposed on the two appellants is set aside and instead, an order is passed directing that they should suffer impri- sonment for life. Accordingly, we confirm the conviction of the appellants under s. 302 and convert the sentence of death. imposed on them into one of imprisonment, for life. Conviction confirmed. Sentence reduced.
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1962 (7) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... serves "The claim relates to the 1955-56 assessment. But in the intervening two years, 1953-54 and 1954-55, there were profits against which a portion of these losses now sought to be set off could have been set off. This the assessee failed to claim at the relevant time. This contention was not taken before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and does not arise out of his order. The appeal is liable to be rejected on this ground." In our opinion, the assessee is clearly disentitled to have the losses of 1950-51 and 1951-52 set off against the income of the assessment year 1955-56 for the above reason set out by the Tribunal. Question No. 3 is therefore answered in favour of the assessee only in respect of the assessment year 1952-53 and against the assessee in respect of the other year 1955-56. As both the department and the assessee have partly succeeded and failed, there will be no order as to costs in this reference application. Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (7) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on the ground that the assessment should not proceed as though the family was undivided. If such a claim had been made to the income-tax authorities, it was their duty to investigate the claim and record an order embodying their conclusion. Failing that, the appellants could have at least asked for a prayer in the partition suit, O. S. No. 92 of 1948, on this question impleading the tax authorities as parties to the suit. Not having done this, the mere fact a partition is effected in pursuance of the preliminary decree in the suit would not affect the question of the liability of the properties now in suit for the tax arrears. We agree with the learned judge in the court below that section 67 of the Income-Tax Act is a bar to the maintainability of the suit, even though the declaration asked for did not in terms refer to cancellation of the assessment made by the authorities. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (7) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt., but in either event the restriction imposed by section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act in this behalf shall have been complied with and the levy up to two per cent. even in the absence of a specifically fixed rate within the limit of two per cent. will be a valid levy. By the impugned assessment orders, a sales tax in disregard of the restriction imposed by section 15 having been levied, the assessment orders must be struck down. For the reasons stated above the writ petitions must be allowed, and the impugned assessment orders quashed. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the impugned assessment orders, and the notices of demand in the three writ petitions. The assessment proceedings shall be deemed to be pending, and a fresh assessment shall be made according to law in the light of the observations made above. As the points urged by Sri Hari Swarup were not raised before the Sales Tax Officer. I make no order as to the costs of these petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (7) TMI 34 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and not otherwise. In understanding the scope of this rule, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that if an assessee underestimates his turnover, no penalty can be levied on him till the final assessment is made. The assessee is only required to pay the admitted tax. Under rule 18 a notice in Form 6 is mandatory and not directory. If that rule is read as a whole, in our judgment, it is clear that the assessee becomes a defaulter only if he does not comply with the terms of that notice. For the reasons mentioned above, we are in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee that the penalty demanded from him (which was calculated only upto November, 1960) is opposed to law. Therefore the order demanding penalty has to be quashed and the same is hereby quashed. The respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. If the petitioner had already paid the penalty demanded from him, the same shall be refunded to him. Petition allowed.
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1962 (7) TMI 33 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nner as if the sale had taken place inside the appropriate State, the further part of the section lays down that the dealer shall be liable notwithstanding that he, in fact may not be so liable under that law that is to say, for the purpose of attaching the liability to Central sales tax, the fact that in respect of that transaction he may not be liable to tax under the local sales tax law is of no consequence. The above view had been unsuccessfully pressed before this Court by the learned Government Pleader in C.R.Ps. 964 and 1393 of 1961(3). This Court has given reasons for not accepting that view and therefore, we see no reason to prefer the casual observations found in the above Madras decision to the view expressed by this Court in the earlier decision. The earlier decision is binding on this Bench and no case is made out for referring this matter to a Full Bench. In the result, this petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal set aside. No costs. Petitionallowed.
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1962 (7) TMI 32 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ciples laid down in the judgment under appeal, because in the cited case, the property in the goods did not pass from the Mills to the assessee and there was no agreement of sale of goods to be obtained in future between the assessee and the third party. In a case in which the property in the goods did not pass to the assessee, it appears to us there can be no sale by the assessee of the concerned goods to a third party within the meaning of the definition of the term sale in the Sales Tax Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that when the documents are delivered to the ultimate purchaser there are notionally two transfers , is erroneous and is not supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bayyana Bhimayya v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 1961 12 S.T.C. 147. , relied on by the Tribunal. We hold that the impugned transactions are not taxable. In the circumstances of these cases, we make no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (7) TMI 31 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... irm is not subject of any of the three questions referred to this Court. In fact the first question starts with this that the Commissioner has the power to increase the taxable turnover and consequently the amount of the sales tax payable but that he can only do within the period prescribed by section 11-A of the Act. This is a new matter that is being raised in this reference and as it is outside the scope of the questions in the reference so it cannot be entertained. The consequence is that so far as the first question is concerned the powers of the Commissioner under section 21(1) of the Act are not at all controlled by section 11-A of the Act, which does not in terms apply to a Commissioner, and the other two questions with this answer to the first question are rendered meaningless and do not arise. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to their own costs. SHAMSHER BAHADUR, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (7) TMI 30 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pass on the burden to their customers, those on whom licence fee is levied cannot pass on their burden to their customers, and therefore there is discrimination between these two classes of dealers, does not appear to have any force in it. The two sets of dealers are not identically placed. The differentiation made is justified by the rule of classifications. The last contention of Sri B.V. Katageri, that the rules having come into force from 1st November, 1957, rule 25 should not have been applied to his turnover for the period commencing from 1st Octo- ber, 1957, and ending with 23rd October, 1957, is without force. If that rule is not made applicable then the assessees would have been liable to pay sales tax under section 5 which means that they would have had to pay more tax. The rule in question was given retrospec- tive effect. For the reasons mentioned above, these petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one set). Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (7) TMI 29 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tates Reorganisation Act includes notification also. In view of these provisions, the notification issued by the Collector of Bombay on 18th May, 1953, continues in force till the same is either modified or replaced by any further notification. it is not the case of Sri Katageri that that notification had at any time been replaced by any other notification or that the same had been repealed. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of Sri Katageri that the power delegated to the Sales Tax Officer had lapsed on the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act. There is also no substance in the contention of Sri Katageri that the Commercial Tax Officers who replaced the Sales Tax Officers (which is merely a change in the name) under the 1957 Act, did not get any jurisdiction to function under section 14 of the Act. There is no doubt that these petitions are wholly misconceived. They are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100, one set. Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (7) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by a rule, learned counsel cited before me several cases. There can be no quarrel with this provision but the point does not arise in the case, because as already observed, there was no curtailment of any power or right by the rule. Apart from this, it is wellsettled that a power under a particular proposition can be curtailed where there is a specific provision for the curtailment of such a power under another provision of the statute. In this connection, I may only mention the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Madurai Pillai v. Muthu ChettyA.I.R 1914 Mad. 257. It follows that even if a wider power had been conferred on a dealer under section 3-AA, if there was provision in section 24 for the curtailment of such power, as to my mind there is, the power could be validly curtailed. But as I have already observed above, the point does not arise in the case. For the reasons stated above this writ petition must fail and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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