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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 79 Records
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1964 (4) TMI 104
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... ... ..... y of the assessment orders made after the coming into force of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act. Question No. (iii)-The answer is in the negative. The petitioner is not entitled to refund as the tax was lawfully payable. Question No. (iv)-The assessment for the quarter ending 31st December, 1953, is not barred by limitation as it was made within thirty-six months from the relevant date. Question No. (v)-There is no finding by the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, that the tax was paid under threat or coercion. In any case as the tax has been found to be lawfully payable and was actually paid, the petitioner cannot claim refund in view of condition (3) of the third press note. The answer to this question is also in the negative. The references are answered accordingly. The petitioner shall pay one consolidated hearing fee, in respect of all these references, which we fix at Rs. 200 (Rupees two hundred only) to the opposite party. MISRA, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1964 (4) TMI 103
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... ... ..... ase as the final statement of the facts and to answer the question of law with reference to that statement. It is on this ground alone that the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the Orissa High Court in Collector of Commercial Taxes v. Bharat Sabai Grass Ltd. 1958 9 S.T.C. 289., where their Lordships observed Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the reference directed by the Orissa High Court was itself incompetent, because no such question of law as was formulated by that Court arose on the facts of the case, and it was quite unnecessary to answer such a question in the present case . We are satisfied that there is no statement of fact before us that the Tribunal used any materials extraneous to those already used by Sri Ramarao. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and the applications are dismissed with costs. Consolidated hearing-fee of Rs. 100 (rupees one hundred). NARASIMHAM, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (4) TMI 102
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... ... ..... on as laid down in the Limitation Act. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Burmah Construction Co. v. State of OrissaA.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1320 12 S.T.C. 816., the High Court s jurisdiction under Article 226, in cases of this type, would arise only for enforcing a statutory obligation on an officer of the State (here the Sales Tax Officer). But once it is clear that there is no order of assessment and there is no right to be enforced against the Sales Tax Officer, under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, this petition must fail and the petitioner must be left to pursue his normal remedies for the purpose of enforcing his right of refund, if any. For these reasons, without deciding other questions, we are of opinion that this is not a fit case for exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The application is therefore dismissed. with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100 (rupee one hundred only). MISRA, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 101
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... ... ..... ly making profit will bring the Society within the definition of a dealer. I do not think that the authorities relied on are of assistance to him. The first of them related to a certain deduction for purposes of income-tax, the Court of Exchequer being of opinion that the colportage was not a trade and the loss incurred in connection with it was not deductable for the purpose of income-tax. The other decision is that tanners who purchased raw hides for the purpose of tanning, were dealers liable to tax at the point of purchase. I can see nothing in common between that case and the present one. The tanners, as was held in that case, were clearly engaged on a commercial purpose and activity. I hold that the petitioner is not a dealer within the meaning of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The assessment made against it are quashed. The petitions are allowed. The petitioner is entitled to costs in one of the petitions and not in others. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 100
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... ... ..... States74 L. Ed. 1051. We are not persuaded by this argument. In the first place that decision turned on the language of the provision which the Court was called upon to interpret. That provision is not ad idem with Entry No. 72 or 73. Secondly, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a construction of a revenue statute which has been adhered to by the Internal Revenue Bureau for nearly 10 years ought not to be disturbed unless plainly wrong, which circumstances appears to have greatly influenced the decision of the Supreme Court. But we are not faced with any such consideration. 31.. For the reasons mentioned above, S.T.R.P. Nos. 57 and 58 of 1963 and S.T.A. Nos. 1 to 3 of 1964 are allowed and the orders of assessment impugned in these proceedings are quashed. The Revenue shall pay the costs of the assessees in S.T.R.P. Nos. 57 and 58 of 1963 and S.T.A. Nos. 1 to 3 of 1964. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (onehundred) in each case. G.K. GOVINDA BHAT, J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 99
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... ... ..... levy at 50 per cent. relying upon section 21-A of the Prohibition Act made by the department and confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal cannot therefore be supported. Section 8(2) itself was amended by Act XXXI of 1958 and came into force on the 1st October, 1958. Prior to the amendment, section 8(2) provided that sales not falling within sub-section (1) shall be taxable at the same rates and in the same manner as would have been done if the sale had in fact taken place inside the appropriate State. This amendment introduced a rate of 7 per cent. in section 8(2)(b). It would follow therefore that in so far as the sales up to the 1st October, 1958, are concerned, the tax leviable can only be at 2 per cent. In respect of sales on and from 1st October, 1958, the tax would be at 7 per cent. The petitions are accordingly allowed. The department will amend the assessments suitably. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 50 in each petition. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 98
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... ... ..... hat the disputed articles are not directly used in the manufacture of goods for sale . The reasons given by both the respondents are sufficient and relevant for purposes of refusing a registration certificate. It is true that after the original certificate was granted, these items were also added to it by means of a notification at the request of the petitioner. The respondents, however, seem to take the view that their notification was erroneous. In this view, they are correct. Consequently, we are of the opinion that under section 7(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act respondent No. 1 had the jurisdiction to modify or amend or partly cancel the certificate of registration with regard to the disputed articles. We, therefore, overrule the second submission of the learned counsel also. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that there are no merits in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed but there is no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. Here italicised.
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1964 (4) TMI 97
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... ... ..... xtraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court when he has an alternative remedy by appeal to the departmental authorities. We would, therefore, in the exercise of our discretion refrain from quashing this order and the orders in the connected petitions. We also find that the contentions that have been advanced on behalf of the petitioners before us were not advanced by them before the Sales Tax Officers. The petitioners ought to have pleaded before the Sales Tax Officers that there was no rate of tax fixed for the turnover of cotton yarn and that consequently they could not be assessed at all. It was for the first time in these petitions that the petitioners have raised the contention that the notifications were invalid and that no rate of tax on the turnover of cotton yarn has been fixed under any provision of the Sales Tax Act. We, therefore, dismiss this petition and having regard to the circumstances we shall let the parties bear their costs themselves. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 95
Whether the assessment of the sales tax in question is void and ultra vires?
Whether the assessment of sales tax was properly and validly made on the 1st defendant firm?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Failure to see how the filing of a revision petition can constitute waiver of the illegality of the assessment order or proceedings to recover sums due on the basis of an assessment order passed not against the defendants but against another party. The subsequent revision petition to the Board of Revenue and its dismissal on July 23, 1949, stands on no better footing.
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1964 (4) TMI 93
Whether in view of Article 295(2) of the Constitution the exemption granted by the agreement of April 7, 1947, still continued and the assessments made against the respondent for the years 1950-51 to 1956-57 must therefore be quashed?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Considering the effect of this agreement after April 1, 1950, in view of the legislative provisions made thereafter, and we have held therein that though the agreement of April 7, 1947, might cast an obligation on the Government of India under Article 295(l)(b), the legislative provisions made from April 1, 1950, would supersede the agreement and thereafter the legislative provisions would prevail in spite of the obligation cast on the Government of India by Article 295(l)(b). The principle of that decision in our opinion applies to Article 295(2) also under which the obligation in the present case devolved on the Part B State of Madhya Bharat, and in that view the legislative provisions made by the M.B. Sales Tax Act, 1950, or the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, would prevail as against the agreement.
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1964 (4) TMI 90
Whether the contract and delivery to the common carrier are effected directly or through agents?
Whether the sale is one for export or is one in the course of export?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The transaction of sale in the present case did not occasion the export of the goods, even though the appellants knew that the buyers in offering the bids for chests of tea and the export quotas were acting on behalf of foreign principals, and that the buyers intended to export the goods. There was between the sale and the export no such bond as would justify the inference that the sale and the export formed parts of a single transaction or that the sale and export were integrally connected. The appellants were not concerned with the actual exportation of the goods, and the sales were intended to be complete without the export, and as such it cannot be said that the said sales occasioned export. The sales were therefore for export, and not in the course of export.
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1964 (4) TMI 75
It cannot be said in the present case that tanning bark was bought by the respondents for any purpose unconnected with the business carried on by them, viz., manufacture and sale of the dressed hides and skins. Consumption in the business and not sale of the commodity bought therefore does not exclude the respondents from the definition of dealer qua the tanning bark.
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1964 (4) TMI 73
Whether the assessing officer was not wrong in allowing deduction of ₹ 2,40,000 for the quarter ending on 30-6-51 and ₹ 15,677-1-3 for the quarter ending on 30-9-51 from the respective gross turnover of the applicant?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. High Court came to a correct conclusion. The High Court is correct in holding that the production of declaration under rule 27(2) is not always obligatory on the part of a selling dealer when claiming the exemption. It is open to him to claim exemption by adducing other evidence so as to bring the transaction within the scope of section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. In this case, the Sales Tax Officer was satisfied by a mere statement of the dealer and it has not been shown that in fact the registration certificate of the buying dealer, M/s. S. Lal and Co., did not contain the statement that the goods were intended for resale by him in Orissa.
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1964 (4) TMI 61
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up – Application for ... ... ... ... ..... order in terms of prayers (a) and (b). The official liquidator to take charge of all the properties and effects of the company. The official liquidator to cause a sealed copy of the order to be served on the company- The petitioner do advertise within 14 days from this date a notice in the prescribed form of the making of this order in one issue of the Times of India, the Sholapur Samachar, the Bombay Samachar and the Maharashtra Gazette. The petitioner do serve a certified copy of the order on the Registrar of Companies not later than one month from this date. Petitioner s costs of the petition to be paid out of the assets of the company, counsel being certified. Costs of the company to come out of the assets. Costs of the supporting creditors, i.e., the State Government (one set) and the other supporting creditors (another set), to come out of the assets of the company. The opposing creditors will bear and pay their own costs. The official liquidator to act on the minutes.
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1964 (4) TMI 60
Kinds of share capital - Two kinds of share capital, Winding up – Power of Tribunal to make calls and Delivery of property to liquidator
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1964 (4) TMI 45
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... lar form of remedy there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute, which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it .... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. Here the liquidators are creations of the Companies Act and their liability along with the officers of the company for damages for misfeasance or non-feasance is created by section 235 of the Act of 1913, and I consider that any shareholder who claims this remedy must go to the court under the Act in order to obtain it. I am therefore of the opinion that the lower court wrongly held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I accordingly accept the revision petition and direct that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1964 (4) TMI 44
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the receipt of ₹ 50,787 was a receipt of dividend and is taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- Agree with the High Court that the answer to the question referred to it is in the affirmative. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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1964 (4) TMI 43
Whether on a true interpretation of article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the dividend of ₹ 4,12,500 was liable to be included in the assessment year 1952-53?
Held that:- If the mere declaration of dividend in general meeting of the company is not to be regarded as payment within the meaning of section 16(2), much less can it be said that a resolution declaring interim dividend—-which is capable of being rescinded by directors—operates as payment before the company has actually parted with the amount of dividend or discharged its obligation by some other act. The High Court was, therefore, right in recording an affirmative answer to the question propounded for the consideration of the court. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 23
Whether effect of the provision contained in article 295(1)(b) of the Constitution and have held that in view of the position emerging on April 1, 1950, by the extension of the Income-tax Act to the territory of the Part B State of Madhya Bharat by the Finance Act of 1950 and in view of the Concessions Order, the concessions granted by the Government of the former State of Madhya Bharat, which became the obligation of the Government of India under article 295(1)(b), must be held to have been superseded by the legislative provisions made as from April 1, 1950, and that corporations or individuals who had any concessions before April 1, 1950, would thereafter, be entitled only to such concessions as would be permissible under the Concessions Order?
Held that:- In the circumstances the respondents cannot rely on the agreement with the former State of Madhya Bharat, which must be deemed to have been superseded by the legislative provisions which came into force from April 1, 950, and can only get such concessions as may be allowed to them under the Income-tax Act read with the Concessions Order. We have already pointed out that the Government of India allowed concessions for five years, which the respondents have already availed of. They are not entitled to any further concession by virtue of the agreement with the Government of Madhya Bharat. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition.
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1964 (4) TMI 22
Whether there was evidence to come to the conclusion that the computation of the income of the assessee at ₹ 1,80,000 and remittance at ₹ 30,000 in the assessment for the year 1947-48 was right?
Whether there was evidence for the conclusion that the sum of ₹ 1,07,461 was remitted into India and was assessable to tax in the assessment for the year 1948-49 ?
Held that:- With great repect, the High Court did not appreciate the findings of the Tribunal, recorded in the supplementary statement. The Tribunal had accepted the earlier findings of the court, recorded in the order dated July 31, 1958, but in spite of discarding the theory of benami on the material before it, it came to the conclusion that no other conclusion except that 87,500 dollars was the income of the assessee was possible.
Once it is held, as we do hold, that there was material for the finding of the Tribunal that 87,500 dollars represented the income of the assessee, no other issue survives.
In the result, the appeals are allowed and the question referred to the High Court answered in the affirmative. Appeal allowed.
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