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Showing 21 to 27 of 27 Records
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1964 (6) TMI 38 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... ys standing to the credit of the No. 2 account and that, therefore, the liquidator was right in limiting the bank s preferential claim to pound 78 19s 7d. The facts in that case were different from those here in an essential particular, and the question to be determined by the judge was a different one. I do not think there can be anything in that decision which compels me to treat the two accounts in the present case as representing a single amalgamated account. The financial result of doing so would not be greatly different and this point was not much discussed in argument. I propose, accordingly, to make an order, the effect of which will be that the bank ranks as a preferential creditor in respect of the amount transferred from the current account to the wages account, reduced as above-mentioned, together with the sum of (7,886 6s. 1d. on wages account. The effect of this order will be that the bank ranks as a preferential creditor in the total sum of pound 25,377 13s. 1d
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1964 (6) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... riminal prosecution. It was held that there was nothing in section 179 to indicate that, if the liquidator takes action without direction of the court, the action would be illegal or invalid or that it would invalidate the prosecution. These decisions have no bearing on the question whether a shareholder can sue in the name of the company without the sanction of the court after the appointment of a liquidator. Thus our conclusions are that the reliefs sought for in appeal are those which the company alone is entitled to ask, that there is no appeal by or on behalf of the company and that the appeal is therefore incompetent. The preliminary objection is accordingly upheld. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. As the appeal fails on a preliminary point we direct the appellant to pay one half of the costs of the contesting respondents, one set only, and to bear his costs. The memorandum of cross objections which relates only to findings is dismissed in the circumstances.
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1964 (6) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... nd she claims to be entitled to the shares on which this court cannot go in an application for rectification of the share register of the company under section 155. In my view, such questions can be resolved either by amicable partition among the parties and transfer of the shares to the petitioner by agreement among the heirs of Gour Gopal, or by a suit for partition of the estate of Gour Gopal and allotment to the petitioner of the shares to which she claims to be entitled. To hold otherwise and to go into the question of partition and separate allotment to the petitioner of the shares in respect of which she claims rectification, would amount to an unwarranted enlargement of the scope of section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956. For the reasons mentioned above this application is misconceived and is dismissed with costs. This order is made without prejudice to the petitioner s right to file a suit for appropriate relief, if she is advised to do so. Certified for two counsel.
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1964 (6) TMI 34 - THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Affidavit verifying petitions ... ... ... ... ..... The alternative, as Mr. Whitehead candidly accepts, will be that in conjunction with the affidavit, or as part of it, there will have to be sworn matter showing what the exact position of the deponent is or, alternatively, his authority from the directors to swear the affidavit. That sort of evidence will give rise to difficulties in many cases although as he truly said this is probably a case which is a long way one side of the line if there is a line. I need only add this as regards inconvenience, the affidavit in support of the petition is a relatively simple matter and it should not be difficult to time the presentation of the petition so that the affidavit can be sworn by the secretary or, if necessary, by a director within the permitted period of four days. In the circumstances, I will take what is the usual course in cases of this kind, that is to make a winding-up order subject to the production of an affidavit sworn by a director or secretary or a principal officer.
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1964 (6) TMI 29 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up - validity of floating charge ... ... ... ... ..... mpany kept four separate accounts with the bank, and there is no doubt room for argument as to the precise way in which the various debits and credits should be calculated in relation to each of the accounts. Such argument, however, is in my view of no more than academic interest, for when the payments in by the company have been set in the first instance against the debt outstanding at the date of the creation of the charge, it is clear upon any view that the amount of the subsequent advances by the bank not requited by payments in exceeds by many times the amount of cash available in the hands of the receiver. I have had the advantage of studying the analysis of the figures of the various accounts which Russell L.J. has set out in his judgment, and I am content to accept this as sufficiently accurate for all the purposes of this case. For these reasons I am satisfied that Plowman J. came to a correct conclusion, and I, accordingly, agree that the appeal should be dismissed.
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1964 (6) TMI 2 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Sale proceeds of dead and windfallen avenue trees cut and removed from the estate - taxability - Such receipts must be of a capital nature
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1964 (6) TMI 1 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Status - HUF - individual - notices issued under section 34(1)(a) - quashing of notices ... ... ... ... ..... s, some other Income-tax Officer has changed his opinion and thinks that the racing receipts should have been treated as income. This is certainly not within the scope of section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. There is no omission on the part of the petitioner to disclose any primary fact. Upon these primary facts, the Income-tax Officers for about 20 years drew the conclusion that they were casual receipts. The present Income-tax Officer is of a contrary view. This is not a ground upon which an assessment can be reopened under section 34(1)(a). The result is that for the reasons given above, this application should succeed. The rule is made absolute and the notices issued under section 34(1)(a) dated March 22, 1962, being annexure E to the petition are all quashed by an appropriate writ and there will be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the same. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed Rule made absolute.
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