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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 74 Records
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1964 (9) TMI 75 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... most members of the community must be graded according to capacity to pay. The size of the house occupied has, it is true, a relation to income, but the amount by rates a house of a certain size will pay varies enormously with the situation, those in country areas paying less than those in towns." (125) For the above reasons, the basis of the tax under the impugned Act has no reasonable correlation to the value of the building to the assessee, and therefore, the impugned Act violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India, under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, and being inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, the impugned Act is void. (126) For the above reasons, the order I propose to make is that the Mysore Buildings Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 4 of 1963) be struck down as unconstitutional and therefore null and void. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. (127) Order accordingly
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1964 (9) TMI 74 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ractor from illegally extracting ore if he came to know of it, that by itself cannot be conclusive of his complicity in the illegal extraction when under, the lease granted to him no duty was thrown on him to see that during the subsistence of the lease no contractor employed by him or no person commits a breach of Section 228(7) of the 1954 Code. In our judgment, the imposition of penalty on the petitioner under Section 228(7) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, cannot be upheld on any view of the matter. For the above reasons, this petition is allowed and the decisions of the Additional Collector, Jabalpur; the Commissioner Jabalpur Division; and the Board of Revenue imposing on the applicant a penalty of ₹ 29,784/- under Section 228(7) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, are quashed. The petitioner shall have costs of this application. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 150/-. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1964 (9) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The trial court had allowed this interest but the High Court set aside the order allowing interest. The High Court first observed that interest on judgment had not been claimed in the plaint but in this the High Court was clearly in error. The High Court however also pointed out that soon after the judgment of the trial court the respondent deposited the amount of the decree in court. After the date of the deposit, of course, the appellant would not be entitled to any interest. There is also nothing to show that the deposit was made long after the decree of the trial court. It was however said that the deposit was of no use to the appellant because it could not withdraw the money without furnishing security. There is no material on record to show that that was so. In view of these circumstances, we do not think this to be a fit case for interfering with the High Court's order as to interest on judgment. 20. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1964 (9) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ill of exchange or a promissory note were founded on a good consideration. Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, however, enacts a special rule of evidence which operates between parties to the instrument or persons claiming under them in a suit or proceeding relating to the bill of exchange and does not affect the rule contained in s. 114 of the Evidence Act, in cases not falling within s. 11 8 the Negotiable Instruments Act. In our view the High Court was in error in holding that a statutory presumption of consideration arose in favour of the respondents in the proceedings under S. 33 for settlement of the schedule of creditors, and the Receiver exercising power under S. 80 of the Act was bound to admit the debts in the schedule if the insolvent or the other creditors failed to displace that presumption The appeal must therefore be allowed, the order of the High Court set aside, and the order of the District Court restored, with costs in this Court. Appeal allowed
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1964 (9) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would have deterred him from taking similar action in future. Then we art the defendant as to what he has to say about the punishment he stated that the matter is left in our hands. In the course of his argument the defendant told us that he was suffering from low blood pressure and he found it difficult to argue the matter beyond the first part of the day on the 14th. He therefore requested that the matter should be adjudged to the next day. The defendant also appears to be an old man. In view of his age and the condition of his health we feel averse to sending him to jail. In our view the end of justice would be met it we direct him to pay a fine of Rs thousands. We hope that the imposition of the said punishment which err on the fide of leniency, would have a sobering effect upon the defendant. We also direct that the defendant should pay the costs of these proceedings. We grant two months time from today to the defendant to pay the amount of fine. (20) Order accordingly.
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1964 (9) TMI 70 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed to transfer the lease to the Company cannot, therefore, be sustained. In the circumstances, stated above, the lessee's application for sanction must he regarded as still pending and the State Government must dispose it of according to law. ( 13. ) For the foregoing reasons our conclusion is that the orders, dated 7th April, 1964 and 20th February, 1964 of the State Government cannot be allowed to stand and must be quashed. ( 14. ) The result is that both the petitions are allowed. The two aforesaid orders are quashed by issue of writs of certiorari and the State Government is directed to determine according to law the lessee's Shanker Prasad Goenka's application for being allowed to transfer the lease to Messrs. T. C. Bajan and Co. of Katni. The petitioner Goenka shall have costs of the two applications. Counsel's fee in each case is fixed at ₹ 150. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners in both the cases.
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1964 (9) TMI 69 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the facts and circumstances of the case read with the terms of the agreement. But if the terms of the agreement alone as reduced to writing de hors the facts and circumstances of the case, to which a reference has already been made, have to determine the nature of the transaction the agreement dated March 20, 1957, is a hire purchase agreement whereunder the so-called hirer automatically assumes the status of a fullfledged owner on payment of the amounts due plus a nominal sum of Re. 1. Even so, the so-called hire-purchase agreement will be an agreement of sale rather sale itself with facility of paying the purchase amount in instalments on the security of the bus. In either case, the assessee must be deemed to be the owner and he is entitled to the development rebate under section 10(2)(vib). The question referred to, therefore, is answered in the affirmative. The assessee shall get his costs. Advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (9) TMI 68 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mount of ₹ 1,400, the abandoning of his case for sources for ₹ 10,000 and odd and such other additional materials that may be found by the Tribunal. In our view, there was thus an error of law in the Tribunal's failure to consider this aspect of the case. In our view, the questions framed by the Tribunal do not bring out the true controversy between the parties and, therefore, we propose to reframe the questions. The questions so reframed would be "(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in setting aside the orders of penalty for the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54 by relying on the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gokuldas Harivallabhdas 1958 34 I.T.R. 98? (2) Whether the Tribunal erred in its application of the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision?" Our answers to both the questions are in the affirmative. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference.
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1964 (9) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e-company must be said to have exercised its option within the meaning of section 2(11) and, therefore, its previous year was the calendar year 1958. Mr. Kaji referred to two cases in Bisheshwar Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 27 I.T.R. 376 and Binodi Ram Balchand v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1962 44 I.T.R. 249, but in view of the fact that the assessee-company has exercised its option, neither of these two decisions can come to his assistance. That being so, we do not see any merit in the second contention urged by Mr. Kaji. But as we are with Mr. Kaji on the question of interpretation of sub- section (2A), our answer to the first question will have to be in the negative. In view of our answer to the first question, the second question would not actually arise. But in the event of our being not correct in our answer to the first question, we would answer the second question in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference.
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1964 (9) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... esentatives whom he has omitted to implead originally. The result of this would be that the appeal would have to be adjourned for the purpose of making the record complete by impleading these two legal representatives whom the appellant had omitted to bring on record in the first instance. This is the course which we would have followed but we had regard to the fact that the suit out of which this appeal arises was commenced in 1939 and was still pending quarter of a century later and having regard to this feature we considered that unless we were satisfied that the appellant had a case on the merits on which he could succeed, it would not be necessary to adjourn the hearing for the purpose of formally bringing on record the omitted legal representatives. We therefore proceeded to hear the appeal and as we were satisfied that it should fail on the merits we did not think it necessary to make the record complete. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e so as to defeat just claims arising under s. 9 of the Act. Indeed, s. 9 is so compulsive in its wording that s. 28 which is discretionary, at least so far as the Central Government is concerned, may be taken to be controlled by the former. The two sections must be read harmoniously and it could not have been intended that s. 28 was to be used to negative what s. 9 provided so explicitly. We think that on this harmonious construction we must hold that s. 28 does not put any bar in the way of the Corporation in the fulfilment of its obligations arising under s. 9. To this interpretation we readily incline because, as pointed out above, to hold otherwise would render s. 28 in its latter part ultra vires the Constitution as it would amount to taking away by, a side wind property of other persons. On the whole, therefore, we agree with the conclusions of the High Court though for very different reasons. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... portion of the judgment. We do not propose to pause to consider this objection which, in our opinion, is groundless, because if is admitted, and this is stated in the judgment itself, that after the judgment of the High Court, the parties were directed to file by con sent a joint memo working out the mesne pro fits for which a decree could be passed after making the allowances which were granted. Such a statement was filed and it is on that basis that the decree passed by the High Court proceeds. The parties carried out the decision of the High Court in the manner in which both of them understood it and we see, therefore, no reason to examine the question any further. 24. The result is that these appeals will be allowed only in regard to the rate of interest which was varied by the High Court. As the appellant has succeeded only partially we direct that the appeals be allowed with costs, but that in computing it, only one half of the hearing fee (one set), shall be allowed.
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1964 (9) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s annual value cannot be construed to mean that even though the previous year may be of a longer period, only 12 months' notional income shall be taken into account for taxation. We, therefore, answer questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the following manner (1) That the income of the period of 18 months from October 1, 1953, to March 31, 1955, being the total income determined for the assessment year was chargeable to tax at the rate applicable to such total income and not at the rate applicable to the proportionate income of the period of 12 months. (2) That, on the facts and in circumstances of the case, the income from property was liable to be assessed for 18 months from October 1, 1953, to March 31, 1955, that being the size of the previous year and not on the reasonably expected income of 12 months only. The reference is answered accordingly. The costs of the reference will be paid by the petitioner. Advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 150. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (9) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing this Act is to indicate that the doctrine of immunity which has been borrowed in India in dealing with the question of the immunity of the State in regard to claims made against it for tortious acts committed by its servants, was really based on the Common Law principle which prevailed in England; and that principle has now been substantially modified by the Crown Proceedings Act. In dealing with the present appeal, we have ourselves been disturbed by the thought that a citizen whose property was seized by process of law, has to be told when he seeks a remedy in a court of law on the ground that his property has not been returned to him, that can make no claim against the State. That, we think, is not a very satisfactory position in law. The remedy to cure this position, however, lies in the bands of the Legislature. The result is, the appeal fails, but in the circumstances of this case, we direct that the parties should bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 61 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut 14th September, 1955, prior to the commencement of the year of account and the purchase price paid for the acquisition of those shares cannot, therefore, be claimed as an allowable expenditure while computing the income of the assessee in respect of the year of account. Secondly, the purchase price was clearly in the nature of capital expenditure and cannot, therefore, possibly be claimed as an allowable expenditure under section 12 which is the section under which income from dividend is liable to be taxed. The assessee was, therefore, not entitled to claim any deduction of the purchase price paid by her in computing the income from dividend and the claim for deduction made by her was rightly rejected. Our answer to the second question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. Since the assessee has failed in getting an answer in her favour in respect of both the question referred for our opinion, the assessee must pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner.
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1964 (9) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ciation that was given the facility of obtaining scrap at more favourable prices than dealers and it was that body which was subjected to control in the shape of having to sell what it had purchased from controlled sources at the prices specified in column II. Lastly, it was faintly urged by Mr. Agarwala that the appellant was merely the President of the Association and could not be held liable for the sales effected by its employees. There was no dispute that the sales were by the Association and at prices fixed by that body. It was also admitted that these prices were in excess of the prices specified for sales fixed for the Association. under s. 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, "Any person who abets the contravention of any order.... shall be deemed to have contravened that order." In the circumstances, we do not see bow this affords any defence to the appellant. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd submitted that should we allow the appeal on our construction of the proviso to s. 4(1 ), we should remand the case to the High Court for considering the other objections that were raised. Though the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that we might ourselves deal with the other points, we do not accede to this request. In our opinion the case has to be sent back to the High Court for all the other objections being considered on their merits as may arise on the pleadings and in law. We are not to be understood as having expressed any opinion as to whether any such point arises or their merits. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court allowing the Writ Petition is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for being disposed of in accordance with law and with this judgment. The costs of the parties in this Court will abide the result and will be provided for by the High Court in its final order. Appeal allowed and case remanded.
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1964 (9) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r applications. I may add before parting with these cases that counsel on behalf of the petitioners invited my attention to section 142(3) and stated that the principle above mentioned has now obtained statutory recognition as it is embodied in that section. On the other hand, counsel on behalf of the revenue has submitted that this is a case falling under section 145 of the Act and the accounts having been rejected, the assessment has to be made in the manner provided by section 144 and that therefore section 142(3) has no application. I do not express any opinion on this aspect in these cases as I think that, apart from the statutory provisions, this court will always insist on the principles of natural justice being followed. It will be open to the assessing authority to issue notice to the assessee and proceed to reassess after giving a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. These writ applications are disposed of on the above terms. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1964 (9) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ys were given by way of accommodation, they should be regarded as accepting the advances as loans. We are, however, unable to accept that contention. The word "accommodation" in the context can only mean that the moneys were given as a favour with a view to oblige the Bombay firm and not in the course of the regular business of the assessee or as a part of the financial arrangement between the two firms. That this must be so is plain from the order of the Income-tax Officer as well as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We are, therefore, of opinion that the assessee has not been able to show that the sum of ₹ 2,68,385 was either a bad or doubtful debt in its money-lending business or one representing a loss sustained in the course of its business. The question referred to us will, therefore, be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee, who will pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (9) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... finding the court can certainly set aside the finding on a reference under section 66. When we find that in considering the three tests laid down in the proviso to section 10(2)(x), the Tribunal has ignored various circumstances on record which were extremely relevant in considering whether from the point of view of commercial expediency, which is the only point of view from which the matter must be looked at, these three tests were satisfied, we are certainly entitled to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. We are of the view that on the facts and circumstances which were on record before the Tribunal, there was nothing to show that any part of the commission paid by the assessee-firm to Kevalchand was unreasonable so as to be disallowed as a permissible expenditure under section 10(2)(x). Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
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