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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 87 Records
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1965 (12) TMI 136
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... ... ..... of the Munsif would not have been ousted. Although it was not pending before the Munsif it was pending before the appellate Court when the 1956 amendment Act was passed. It follows, therefore, that to such a suit the provisions of Schedule 11 read with s. 200 of the Abolition Act cannot be applied because the Legislature has in 1956 said expressly what was implicit before, namely, that pending actions would be governed by the old law as if the new law had not been passed. In our judgment, therefore, the proceedings before the Munsif were with jurisdiction because they were not affected by the passing of the Abolition Act or the amending Act, 1953, regard being had to the provisions of s. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act in the first instance and more so in view of the provisions of s. 23 of the amending Act, 1956 which came before the proceedings between the parties had finally terminated. The appeal must, therefore, fail. It will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 135
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... ... ..... e scrutinised that their relevance or utility can be determined. To require, therefore, a specification or description of the documents in advance is to misapprehend the purpose for which the power is granted for effecting a search under s. 105 of the Customs Act. We are, therefore, of opinion that the power of search granted under S. 105 of the Customs Act is a power of general search. But it is essential. that before this power is exercised, the preliminary conditions required by the section must be strictly satisfied-that is, officer concerned must have reason to believe that any documents or things, which in his opinion are relevant for any proceeding under the Act, are secreted in the place searched. We have already mentioned the reasons for holding that this condition has been satisfied in the present case. For the reasons expressed, we hold that the appellant has made out no case for the grant of a writ and this appeal must be ,dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 134
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... ... ..... e of clearer language for couching such command. We have no doubt that the High Court Was in error in construing this section in the manner it has done. the logical result of this would be to pass a sentence of imprisonment the respondent for a period not less than one year in respect of the offence under S. 3(1) of the Act. However, when special leave was granted this Court made the following order "Special leave granted. It may be recorded that counsel for the State states that the State, will not insist on this accused person’s going to jail. It win be open to consideration of the Court hearing the appeal to keep this in mind in deciding the matter.......... Mr. Bindra who appeared for the State did not insist that we should send the respondent to jail-which would be the result if we pass a sentence of imprisonment made obligatory by the law. In the circumstances we leave the matter where it is and merely pronounce our interpretation of the law. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 133
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... ... ..... preferring an appeal had not elapsed, the revision having been taken within two months from the date of communication of the appellate order. And the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, exhibit P-3, was promptly challenged before this Court. The petitioner, if he is so mined, must seek his remedy before the Appellate Tribunal by preferring an appeal from the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We are sure that if such an appeal is taken and if an application for excusing the delay stating the circumstances under which the delay was caused is moved before the Tribunal, they will consider the pendency of this application as well as the circumstances under which exhibit P-3 order came to be passed and the peculiar circumstances created by the provisions of the new statute in deciding the question as to whether the appeal should be entertained. Subject to the above observation, we dismiss this petition but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 132
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... ... ..... ax Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 34 without serving a requisite notice. Such a case could not fall under the second reservation. The case would clearly fall under the first reservation and the error being of a fundamental nature, the assessment would clearly be a nullity and such an assessment could not bar a civil suit. The appellate court was, therefore, right in holding that there was no bar to the suit under section 67 of the Act. Mr. Kaji wanted to urge certain other points but as the plaintiff succeeds on this ground, it is not necessary to consider any other question in this appeal. In the result, this appeal must fail. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs. The learned Assistant Government Pleader made an oral request for certificate being granted under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. I consider this case as a fit one for the grant of the certificate and the certificate is accordingly ordered to be issued. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 131
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... ... ..... s of the Supreme Court in their judgment dated 1st November, 1965, in the aforesaid case that unless there is an express statutory provision to that effect, no assessment can be made on a firm which has lost its character as an assessable entity before the actual order of assessment is made. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the solitary question involved in this case read with the abovesaid judgment of Sharma, J., this writ petition must succeed. I accordingly quash and set aside the impugned notices, annexures G and H, and the impugned assessment orders dated 25th September, 1964 (copies annexures I and J) and hold that the petitioner-firm is not liable to assessment under the Act in respect of any period prior to its dissolution on 10th April, 1962, in respect of which no subsisting assessment order had been made before the date of dissolution. In the peculiar circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 130
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... ... ..... stitute it an agent of the manufacturing company. On consideration of the relevant clauses of the agreements we hold that they created the relationship of buyer and seller and not of principal and agent and that the assessees became buyers of the foodgrains obtained by them from the Government. They were, therefore, dealers and when they transferred the property in them to their customers on payment of the price, they sold them and became liable to pay sales tax on the turnover of the sales. Question No. 1 as redrafted by us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, is entitled to his costs of the reference assessed at Rs. 50. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (12) TMI 129
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... ... ..... 1, 1 7,216.00 for the assessment year 1957-58 in M.P. No. 74 of 1965, (xvii) Rs. 49,725.89 P. for the assessment period from 1st April, 1959, to 31st December, 1959, in M.P. No. 111 of 1965, (xviii) Rs. 1,37,129-5-6 for the assessment period from 1st January, 1955, to 31st December, 1955, in M.P. No. 284 of 1965, (xix) Rs. 1,65,333.04 P. for the assessment period from 1st January, 1953, to 31st December, 1953, in M.P. No. 285 of 1965, and (xx) Rs. 1,95,053.37 P. for the period of assessment from 1st January, 1956, to 31st December, 1956, in M.P. No. 306 of 1965, are quashed. The demand notices to the assessee-companies for the payment of the aforesaid amounts are also quashed and the opponents are restrained from recovering those amounts from the petitioners. The petitioners shall have costs of their applications. Counsel s fee in each case is fixed at Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners in each case. Applications allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 128
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... ... ..... the Sales Tax Officer are circumstances from which he could infer that the assessee s turnover was Rs. 4,00,000. All that has to be seen is whether his determination is out of all proportion or not, whether it is an entirely wild guess or whether it is of a shocking amount. We cannot say that the determination in the instant case can be described as a wild guess, having no relation to the circumstances or is a shocking determination. It is supportable by the circumstances stated by the Sales Tax Officer. The question, therefore, is answered in the affirmative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Sales Tax Commissioner shall get his costs of the reference, which we assess at Rs. 50. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 50. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (12) TMI 127
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... ... ..... mplies that the recording of reasons is a condition precedent to the search. So also the wording of the section leaves no room for doubt that the receipt has to be given sometime before the removal of the books. A provision for the seizure being effected in the presence of independent witnesses is no doubt an additional safeguard, but as indicated earlier, in the nature of the power exercised and the other conditions and limitations by which it is hedged in, it cannot be said that the absence of such an additional safeguard will justify the power being characterised as arbitrary, naked or unrestricted. As the above discussion should make the position sufficiently clear we do not feel it necessary to go into the other decisions cited in the Madras case. We overrule the objection that section 17(2A) of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, offends Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. 13.. The Criminal Revision Petition No. 230 has only to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
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1965 (12) TMI 126
Business income - deduction u/s 10(2)(xi) - ... ... ... ... ..... onies are so advanced as incidental to and inthe course of its business, often the advances would constitute a debt which,when realised, would go to swell the profits of the business. Actually, inthis case the advances did go to swell the business profits of the assessee. On behalf of the revenue it was stated that the question whether thedebt, if realised, would have gone to swell the business profits of the assesseewas not specifically mooted before the Tribunal. But it is clear from the s order that this aspect was present to its mind and in fact it has given a finding that the interest charged in the past and the interest which the department had held to have accrued to the assessee have all gone toswell the profits of the assessee. Further, it is only one aspect of the ques-tion whether deduction of the amount in question could or could not beallowed under section 10(2)(xi). The question under reference is answered against the department withcosts. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1965 (12) TMI 125
Whether sales tax could be imposed on the respondent for the period from October, 1955, to May, 1959, in view of the prohibition contained in Article 286(2) of the Constitution as it stood before its amendment?
Whether sales tax could be validly levied on sales taking place between January 1, 1955, to September 6, 1955, in view of the provisions of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (Act 7 of 1956)?
Held that:- Allow this appeal in part and order that the respondent should be granted a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the appellants not to realise sales tax with regard to transactions of sale between the period from September 7, 1955, to May, 1959, but the respondent will not be entitled to any writ with regard to transactions of sale between January 1, 1955, to September 6, 1955. The appeal is accordingly allowed to this extent but the parties will bear their own costs.
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1965 (12) TMI 122
Whether the value of the materials consumed in carrying out the contracts for electric fittings is taxable under the Bombay Sales Tax Act (51 of 1959)?
Held that:- No answer should have been recorded by the High Court on the question framed, for the question whether in respect of a transaction sales tax is exigible may be determined only on the terms of the contract, and not from the invoice issued by the person entitled to receive money under the terms of the contract. The invoice did not represent any transaction, nor did it evidence a contract for work or for sale of goods. Without, therefore, expressing any opinion on the question whether the view taken by the Tribunal or by the High Court was correct, we discharge the answer recorded by the High Court on the ground that the question submitted for their opinion was not one which brought out the true question which was submitted to the Deputy Commissioner for opinion, and even if the question be amended, there is no evidence on which the question may be answer- ed
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1965 (12) TMI 110
Whether in law the revising authority was right in holding that the sales in dispute were not for delivery outside Uttar Pradesh and that the applicant was not entitled to a rebate under section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948?
Held that:- Appeal allowed.The assessee-mills is entitled to rebate under section 5. High Court erred in relating despatch instructions to the mode of performance of the contract. The revising authority was not right in holding that the sales in dispute were not for delivery outside Uttar Pradesh.
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1965 (12) TMI 108
Whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction or not in reviewing his own order?
Held that:- The errors, if any, arose because the Department did not raise those points before the Commissioner. They were also errors not apparent on the face of the record for the decision depends upon consideration of arguable questions of limitation and construction of documents. Indeed the Commissioner re-heard arguments and came to a conclusion different from that which he arrived on the earlier occasion. This is not permissible under rule 83 of the Rules.
The order of the Commissioner is set aside, except in regard to items (b) and (e) mentioned in paragraph 7 of his order.
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1965 (12) TMI 106
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the property in the rubber consignments passed to the applicant in Cochin i. e., outside the State of Bombay?
Whether the purchase tax under section 10(a) is leviable in respect of the purchases in dispute?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Mr. Donde is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case and the High Court has rightly answered this question of law also in favour of the State and against the assessee.
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1965 (12) TMI 105
Whether a certain amount is lawfully due or not, must be determined by the Assistant Commissioner in making the order of assessment or reassessment?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The Assistant Commissioner appointed under the Act is within the limits of his jurisdiction and authority competent to decide all the questions which arise before him: his orders, it is true, are liable to be set aside in appeal or modified in revision as provided by the Act. But under the Act the Assistant Commissioner-who exercises the powers of the Commissioner-has no power to review his decision, nor is he authorised to ignore his previous order, and to pass an order for refund inconsistent with his previous order which has not been set aside by appropriate proceedings.
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1965 (12) TMI 92
Whether the Tribunal is right in holding that the Central sales tax paid by the opposite party at its purchase point and charged on to its customers does not form a part of the sale price of the commodity sold so as to be taxable under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947?
Whether the allowance of the claim of the opposite party for deduction of Central sales tax collected from its customers is permissible under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and the Rules framed thereunder?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no force in the contention that the Central sales tax realised by the assessee falls within the expression "any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof". The assessee by paying the Central sales tax when he bought the goods did not do anything to the goods, and the tax was paid in respect of the transaction of purchase and not in respect of the goods.
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1965 (12) TMI 90
Construction of the provisions of rule 5(1)(i) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, questioned - Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The expression "in respect of the goods" in rule 5(1)(i) of the Rules means only "on the goods". Even if the word "attributable" is substituted for the words "in respect of", the result will not be different, for the duty paid shall be attributable to the goods. We cannot, therefore, agree with the construction of rule 5(1)(i) of the Rules accepted by the High Court.
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1965 (12) TMI 73
Appointment of sole selling agent ... ... ... ... ..... ation of the case, I do not think that the tike observations relied upon could be regarded as obiter. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion I am inclined to take the view that section 294(2) should be interpreted to mean that the conditions prescribed in the said section is a condition precedent, which attaches to the very making of the contract of appointment of sole selling agent and non-compliance thereof would render the contract of appointment bad ab inito. In this view of the matter the preliminary issue raised in this case is answered in favour of the defendants. Consequently, the petition will have to be dismissed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the fair order as to costs would be that each party will bear its own costs and I accordingly direct that each party should bear its own costs. The undertaking which has been given by the defendants as regards keeping separate accounts, will continue to operate for a period of 3weeks from to-day.
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