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1965 (4) TMI 117
... ... ... ... ..... fter the enactment of the Finance Act of 1955, dividends became chargeable under section 12(1A) under the head 'income derived from other sources'. Could it have been the intention of the legislature that dividend income of a business in respect of which tax was charged under the head 'income from shares' under Act 7 of 1918 would not, after March 31, 1955, be entitled to the benefit of the exemption under section 25(3) merely because the head under which it was charged prior to the Finance Act of 1959 is now the head 'other sources'?" Similar considerations, we think, ought to apply to the language employed in section 24(2). For all these reasons, we are of opinion that the dividend income of ₹ 23,302 arising in the assessment year 1956-57 can be set off against the business of the earlier assessment years which had been carried forward. The department will bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the assessee. Hearing fee ₹ 100.
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1965 (4) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... squo; consequently that the transaction was valid under the principles laid down by the board in Rangasami Gounden v Nachiappa Gounden (L. R. 46 I.A. 72)". We may further point out that this decision does not refer to their decisions in Mst. Hiran Bibi v Mst. Sohan Bibi(2) and Khunni Lal v. Govind Krishna Narain(3) and it cannot be assumed that they intended to depart from their earlier view. Apart from that it may be pointed out that the two suits which were then pending were compromised with the full knowledge of the Court of Wards which was also a party to both the suits and the Court of Wards in fact released the estate by accepting from Gopinath monies which were due to it. In these circumstances we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to press in aid the provisions of s. 37(a) of the U.P. Court of Wards Act. For all these reasons we uphold the decree of the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (4) TMI 115
... ... ... ... ..... gh Court. I do not see why it cannot do so when it had remanded the case. It has been held in In re Trikamlal Maneklal 1958 33 I.T.R. 725 that a reference is permissible even against a remand order passed by the Tribunal. The reference that was disallowed in Munna Lal & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1965 55 I.T.R. 508 was not a reference from a final remand order but from an interlocutory order calling for a report from the Income-tax Officer on certain points. The order calling for a report was not an order remanding the case to the Income-tax Officer for fresh assessment or reassessment as in the instant case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall get his costs of the reference, which I assess at ₹ 200 from the assessee. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200. S.C. MANCHANDA J.--I agree.
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1965 (4) TMI 114
... ... ... ... ..... es by the tribunal about the commencement of the award should not be interfered with. Nothing was shown to us why the award should be made to commence earlier. Both sides were to blame in regard to the time taken up and the tribunal perhaps found if difficult to reach a conclusion earlier in view of the number of the references before it. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the selection of 1 January 1962, when the inquiry in the present reference was completed except the preparation of the award, was bad. In any event, this was a matter of discretion and it cannot be said that the discretion has not been exercised on judicial principles. We decline to interfere. In the result the appeal fails and it will be dismissed. it may however, be said that the appeal would have partly succeeded that for the creation of new scales of pay for class II employees and acceptance of some the minor points by the Reserve Bank. In this view of the matter we make no order about costs.
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1965 (4) TMI 113
... ... ... ... ..... gue and fanciful but legal and regular (see Chettiar P.K.N.P.R. Firm v. Commissioner of Income-tax AIR 1930 Rang. 33). Similarly, it has been held in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sen 1949 17 ITR 355 that where two methods are available to the Income-tax Officer for the purpose of assessment the one which is more just to the assessee and which involves a much less margin of chance of uncertainty should be taken as the basis, Further the Income-tax Officer having found that there was difference of ₹ 68,899 rounded it to ₹ 50,000, saying that he could not have made more than that amount as profit. This is clearly speculative. It has been held in K.S. Rashid & Sons, In re 1950 18 ITR 539 that no amount could be added merely to have a nice round figure. In the result, we answer the question in the negative and against the department. The result is that the assessment will have to be recomputed in the light of the observations made by us in the judgment. No costs.
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1965 (4) TMI 112
... ... ... ... ..... fect of cl. 7 is that the assignee of the lease enjoys the benefits and is subject to the burden of the covenants in the lease, but the clause does not amount to a consent by the landlord to an assignment either expressly or by necessary implication. The assignment to the appellant was without the consent in writing of the respondents. The Controller rightly passed the order for possession of the premises. Counsel for the appellant contended that the contractual term of the lease not having expired on October 6, 1959. the proceeding before the Controller was not maintainable. We indicated in the course of the argument that this contention not having been raised in the Courts below, we are not inclined to allow the appellant to raise it here for the first time. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellant will have a month's time from today to vacate the premises.
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1965 (4) TMI 111
... ... ... ... ..... the result there will be an order directing respondents 1 to 6 and 8 to repay the company the sum of ₹ 16,52,295/- misapplied by them. They will be jointly and severally liable to make the repayment, but, while the several liability of respondents 1, 2 and 4 will extend to the entire sum of ₹ 16,52,295 the several liability of the 3rd respondent will be limited to the sum of ₹ 15,07,470/ that of the 5th respondent to ₹ 8,96,848/- of the 6th respondent to ₹ 12, 96,409 and that of the 8th respondent to ₹ 9,69,180/-. It seems to me only just that interest should be paid on the sums misapplied from the date of each misapplication but the liquidator has claimed interest only from 8-8-1960, the commencement of the winding up. Therefore I direct that the above sums will bear interest at six per cent per annum from 8-8-1960 until realisation. 114. Respondents 1 to 6 and 8 will pay the Liquidator his costs in respect of this claim, namely, claim B.
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1965 (4) TMI 110
a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation
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1965 (4) TMI 109
... ... ... ... ..... hose sale proceeds. We have carefully considered these several cases, and are unable to see how they are relevant to the question before us. In none of the cases was the court called upon to decide whether a payment received subsequent to a chargeable accounting period was liable to be treated as the profits of that period merely because the work, which occasioned the payment, was done during that period. We are of the view that the sum of ₹ 62,009 received by the assessee did not constitute profits liable to be considered in its hands in the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1944, for the purpose of determining the excess profits tax for that period. The question referred to this court is answered in the negative. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which we assess at ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (4) TMI 108
... ... ... ... ..... facts of this case, therefore, we are satisfied that no amount could be validly claimed by way of commission for the year 1959-60. The notice of demand (Annexure D) which has been issued in that behalf shows that the cane commission 3 NP per maund which has been demanded from the appellant by respondent No. 2 for the years 1959-60 and 1960-61, amounts to ₹ 1,26,152/86 nP. It is common ground that out of this amount, ₹ 54,037.57P represents the commission for the year 1959-60. We must accordingly hold that the demand made by respondent No. 2 for the payment of cess commission for the year 1959-60 amounting to ₹ 54,037.57P is invalid and the notice to that extent must be cancelled. In the result, the appeal substantially fails and the order passed by the High Court is confirmed, subject to the modification in regard to the demand for the payment of cane commission for the year 1959-60. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed and Order modified.
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1965 (4) TMI 107
Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the decision of the District Court that the decree in question extinguished the respondents' right to redeem the mortgage?
Held that:- On the facts of this case, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conclusion of the District Court that the decree in question had extinguished the respondents' equity of redemption. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (4) TMI 105
Whether the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the proceedings on the petition presented by the Corporation without the leave of the High Court in view of s. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, the company having been ordered to be wound-up by the High Court on November 9, 1959?
Whether in view of s. 44(a) of the LIC Act none of the provisions of the Act applied to the company and therefore the Tribunal could not proceed on the application of the Corporation subsequent to the company being wound-up?
Whether the transfer of ₹ 82,000/- from the Life Fund to the General Department of the company was for consideration and was necessary for the life insurance business?
Held that:- The Tribunal had jurisdiction to continue the proceedings after November 9, 1959 when the company was ordered to be wound-up and that the provisions of s. 446, Companies Act, or s. 44(a), LIC Act, do not in any way affect its jurisdiction to continue the proceedings.
The Tribunal took a correct view about the nature of the transfer of ₹ 1,10,000/- in 1948 and ₹ 32,000/- in 1952 to the Life Insurance Fund and rightly held that the transfer of ₹ 82,000/- to the General Department by' resolution dated January 6, 1956, was not in accordance with the provisions of the Insurance Act and that consequently that amount continued to form part of the assets of the life insurance business of the company upto September 1, 1956 and that as such vested in the Corporation which could recover it from the company and the directors responsible for the transfer of the amount to the General Department. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (4) TMI 104
... ... ... ... ..... d in entry No. 41 cannot be read in a wide sense so as to include everything made fit for eating by application of heat, as by boiling, baking, roasting, broiling etc. The term is confined to those cooked things which one generally takes at regular meal hours. It is no doubt true that the entry treats pastries as cooked food when it specifically provides for exclusion of pastries from its scope. But this artificial exclusion of pastries from cooked food cannot afford any justification for including in cooked food that which is not cooked food as understood in common parlance. 7.. For these reasons, our answer to the question stated for our opinon in each reference is that biscuits do not fall within the meaning of the term cooked food used in entry No. 41 of Schedule II to the Act, and are, therefore, not exempt from tax under the entry. 8.. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in all these six cases. References answered accordingly.
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1965 (4) TMI 103
... ... ... ... ..... the work done by the 10 karigars in the petitioner s workshop forming the manufactory owned or run by the petitioners is mixed up with the account in respect of the remaining other karigars working in their respective residences, the work of the particular 10 karigars has to be separated from the others for determining the actual figure on which exemption has to be granted and the assessment has to be revised accordingly. 16.. In the result, therefore, the assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer in respect of the 7 quarters from the one ending on 30th September, 1954, to the one ending on 31st March, 1956, must be quashed. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed, and all these assessment cases are remanded to the Sales Tax Officer with a direction to him to revise the assessment of sales tax in respect of the said quarters on the basis of the aforesaid observations. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs. AHMAD, C.J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1965 (4) TMI 102
... ... ... ... ..... eptember, 1964. It is not argued before us that the officers who were responsible in taking or recording the two statements of the dealer, acted in excess of their jurisdiction with reference to those two statements. Nor is it stated that the respondent has no jurisdiction to proceed and examine whether in the previous years there had been a suppression of turnovers. In the circumstances, all that we can do is to observe that the assessing Officer should give every opportunity to the petitioner, who is the dealer, to place such evidence as he can to prove that the two statements were not voluntary but were taken under duress or undue influence. It is expected that the assessing Officer will bring to bear upon the question his objective mind which should be demonstrable in his order so that the appellate authority may be in a position to judge of its propriety and fairness. Subject to these observations, we dismiss W.P. No. 1578 of 1964 but with no costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1965 (4) TMI 101
... ... ... ... ..... t true that where there is an alternative remedy, this Court may not in its descretion interfere. The existence of an alternative remedy does not touch the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere. In the instant case, regard being had to the exceedingly unsatisfactory nature of the assessment order, I have decided to exercise my discretion in favour of the petitioner. 7.. In the result, I quash the best judgment assessment made by the respondent and remit the case to the Commercial Tax Officer for him now to make another assessment according to law. This Rule succeeds to the limited extent indicated above. Let a writ of certiorari accordingly issue. There will be no order as to costs. Civil Revision No. 542(W) of 1962. The point involved in this Rule is the same point as involved in Civil Revision No. 541(W) of 1962. For the reasons given by me in Civil Revision No. 541(W) of 1962, I make this Rule also absolute to the extent indicated in the other Rule. Rules made absolute.
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1965 (4) TMI 100
... ... ... ... ..... ices in our set-up, and a lamentable misunderstanding of his constitutional obligation to the State and the people. It must be pointed out that it is on the impartial objectivity and aloofness of the administrator from personal power-politics, that the success of our constitutional setup, and consequently of our national progress, largely depends. Infirmity like the above displayed by the services is thus likely to have far-reaching reaction on the entire set-up affecting even the citizens confidence in the integrity of the administration, and patriotism of the administrator. An infirm conduct of a responsible and experienced administrator can, however, constitute little justification by itself for the law not taking its course, if otherwise the dictates of impartial justice so warrant, of course, subject to considerations of resultant prejudice caused thereby to an innocent citizen. In the final result, these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1965 (4) TMI 99
... ... ... ... ..... ungabhadra Industries Limited. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1960 11 S.T.C. 827., vanaspati is used for all purposes for which groundnut oil is used. It is in fact identified both by the consumer and the trade with groundnut oil, and in such a state of things, to claim that the explanation requires a different kind of identity to be established, seems to us to be unacceptable. We are accordingly satisfied that the expression identifiable constituent must necessarily be given a broad meaning, for the nature of the identity must alter, having regard to the process of manufacture to which the article used is subjected. If the identity is not necessarily required to be visual, this contention of the State that the groundnut oil is not identifiable as a constituent in vanaspati has necessarily to be rejected. It follows that the petitioners are entitled to the lower rate of taxation. The petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200 (one set). Petitions allowed.
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1965 (4) TMI 98
... ... ... ... ..... be considered as of special importance in inter-State trade and commerce, and it follows, therefore, that cinder, which is the product of coke, is not coke or a form of coke. Perhaps there is force in this contention. It is further argued that having regard to the fact that ashes left off after complete burning of coke or coal are of practically no economic value or material use, cinder, therefore, would not have been regarded by the Legislature as of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. But that is a matter on which one cannot speculate, and, in the absence of further material, I cannot express my opinion on this aspect of the question. On the whole, as I indicated, I am inclined to the view that cinder is not coke or is not a form of coke and is not within entry I of Schedule II of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitions are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, I ought to say the petitioners cannot be mulcted with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1965 (4) TMI 97
... ... ... ... ..... e order of penalty passed by the Additional Assistant Commissioner is patently in violation of the provisions of section 43(1) of the Act and cannot be sustained. 7.. The impugned order of penalty is so manifestly arbitrary and capricious that the applicant cannot be denied the relief of the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing that order merely because under section 38 of the Act the assessee could have appealed against that order. 8.. For these reasons, the order passed on 16th March, 1964, by the Additional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 43(1) of the Act imposing a penalty on the petitioner is quashed. As the appeal filed by the petitioner against the assessment order is still pending, it would but be proper for the Additional Assistant Commissioner to stay further proceedings under section 43(1) of the Act till the disposal of that appeal. The petitioner shall have costs of this application. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 150. Application allowed.
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