|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 76 Records
-
1965 (4) TMI 96
... ...
... ... ..... se the materials for assessment and satisfy himself, thoroughly uninfluenced by any direction of superior officers, and assess the tax payable on that basis. The assessing authority, in this case, has obviously failed to do his duty. We also note that when hundreds of figures relating to omissions are reported by the Intelligence Staff, they were placed before the petitioner s representative just on the day of the assessment order and asked to explain then and there. It is patent that such an opportunity is no opportunity at all. It is expected that the assessee ought to be given, both in law and in fairness, reasonable opportunities to look into all the necessary documents and other books so as to enable him to explain and show cause why the proposed turnover ought not be taken as the basis for assessment. We have no hesitation in finding that the assessment order was clearly vitiated by an apparent error. It is quashed. The petition is allowed with costs. Petition allowed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 95
... ...
... ... ..... diction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court s sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity . In the instant case the petitioner has made out a just case for interference. The petition is allowed. The assessment orders dated 18th of March, 1964, for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 under the U.P. Sales Tax Act as also under the Central Sales Tax Act are quashed. The notices of demand consequential to these assessment orders are also set aside. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 94
... ...
... ... ..... uage of the Central Act nor by its policy or scheme and, indeed no other convincing and reasonable hypothesis has been suggested for sustaining such a construction. I am, therefore, wholly unable to find any cogent or persuasive reason to agree with this submission, which I unhesitatingly repel. I have come to this conclusion independently, but, luckily, the matter is not res integra, for, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in S. Mariappa Nadar v. State of Madras 1962 13 S.T.C. 371 A.I.R. 1962 Mad. 290.has upheld a tax imposed on a sale held in the State of Madras in the course of inter-State trade when the goods sold were moved into the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where that movement terminated. For the foregoing reasons, all the four questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the petitioners in all the four references. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, however, I make no order as to costs. NARULA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1965 (4) TMI 93
Whether the sales with respect to which sales tax amounting to Rs. 54,375-5-0 was levied were outside the State and were therefore exempt under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution as it then was? - Held that:- Appeal allowed case remitted. The proper course for the disposal of this appeal is to call for a finding from the Sales Tax Officer on the question.
It is also necessary to call for a finding on the question whether the writ petition was within three years of the date on which the mistake first became known to the respondent so that a suit on that date for refund would not be barred under Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The papers will be sent to the Agricultural Income-tax and Rural Sales Tax Officer, Quilon, for findings on these two questions. The Sales Tax Officer should submit his findings within three months of the receipt of the order by him. It will be open to the respondent to give evidence to substantiate its case on both these points. After findings on these questions are received, the appeal will be listed before any Constitution Bench as early as possible for final disposal.
-
1965 (4) TMI 91
Whether under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941) the furnishing of the declaration forms issued by the purchasing dealers was a condition for claiming the exemption thereunder?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. This Court held that the said mandatory provision was inconsistent with section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act; and to avoid that conflict it reconciled both the provisions by holding that the rule was only directory and, therefore, it would be enough if it was substantially complied with. The said provisions may afford a guide for amending the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, but do not furnish any help for construing them.
-
1965 (4) TMI 78
Shares – Power to issue of at discount ... ... ... ... ..... to any clause in the agreement whereby such an authority could be exercised by the appellant. It was also faintly urged on behalf of the appellant that the shares were allotted to the Government of the erstwhile Kotah State and the respondent could not file the application under section 155 of the Companies Act. There is no force in this contention, because, according to article 295 of the Constitution of India, all the rights of that State had devolved upon the respondent. We have already pointed out above that in its resolution dated 24th November, 1951, the company had accepted the position that the title in the shares had devolved on the present Government of Rajasthan. This argument was thus raised only for the sake of adding one more contention. It is devoid of any force and is fit to be dismissed. The result is that none of the arguments advanced by the appellant has been found to be tenable. There is thus no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.
-
1965 (4) TMI 77
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
-
1965 (4) TMI 64
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... sale proceeds in the hands of the liquidator. As already noticed that, under section 230 of the Act, the Government can claim priority against the debenture-holders only in respect of revenues, taxes cesses and rates. The loan under the State Aid to Industries Act does not answer that description and we hold that the Government cannot claim any preferential payment under section 230(1)(a) of the Act. The Government must work out its rights only on the basis that the debenture-holders are the first mortgagees and the Government are the second mortgagees. That being so, the mortgage debenture-holders are entitled to the priority and be paid in full before the Government are entitled to claim any portion of the sale proceeds in the hands of the official liquidator. In the result, all the contentions fail and the appeal is dismissed with costs of the contesting respondents, one set. The costs shall be shared by the first respondent and the 3rd respondent in the proportion of 2 1.
-
1965 (4) TMI 63
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... circumstances, the proper order to be made in my view is to direct the directors of the company to transfer the shares held by M.R. Patny in terms of his will, which in fact has been given effect to by them by crediting the dividends in accordance therewith. With respect to the other prayers, I do not think there is any justification for their being granted in these proceedings. The petitioners did not lay claim to the shares transferred in the name of Harsha Karmarkar and Padmabai Patny. At any rate, this prayer involves rectification of register. It should be done only in other proceedings. Except for the high-handedness in dealing with the payment of dividend and transfer of shares, there is no justification for appointment of a committee of shareholders to manage the affairs of the company. This petition is accordingly partly allowed. The parties will bear their own costs. Company Applications Nos. 82 and 126/64 allowed. Company Application 83/64 dismissed as not pressed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 54
Forming incorporated company – Mode of ... ... ... ... ..... s in Table A of Schedule I to the Act, the number of the directors and the names of the first directors shall be determined in writing by the subscribers of the memorandum or a majority of them. Apparently, this explains how the plaintiffs found a place in the articles as among the first directors. But this is subject to the condition that they should acquire the qualification requisite for a director. The plaintiffs do not appear to have applied for the requisite shares to acquire the qualifications and this is evident from the proceedings of the company s general body meeting on February 19, 1959. The plaintiffs have not stated that they applied at any subsequent date or remitted the required amount for fifty shares. The effect of the evidence on record is that the plaintiffs took or evinced no active interest in the 1st defendant-company right through until it succeeded in getting stage carriage permit. The appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout.
-
1965 (4) TMI 53
Whether the allotment of the 2,000 shares and the several loans in the names of Ramnath and Narayandas were not genuine transactions, and that the parties did not intend that the allottees would be the holders of the shares or that Narayandas and Ramnath would be liable to repay the loans?
Held that:- We are satisfied that the allotment of the 2,000 shares was intended to be operative and the allottees became the owners of the shares. We are also satisfied that the loans to Ramnath and Narayandas were intended to be operative, and the company did not give any assurance to them that they would not be called upon to repay the loans.
The allotment of the 2,000 shares to the nominees of Narayandas in the meeting of the directors of the company held on May 25, 1946, was not void. In view of the fact that Narayandas was not entitled to vote on the allotment and alter exclusion of his vote there was no quorum, the allotment was irregular, and the company was entitled to avoid the allotment. Instead of avoiding the allotment, the company has chosen to affirm it. The allotment is, therefore, valid and binding on the allottees. For all the reasons, we hold that the allotment is valid, and there is no failure of consideration. Appeal dismissed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 52
Whether section 49E is subject to the insolvency rules contained in the Companies Act?
Held that:- Section 49E can be reconciled with sections 228 and 229 by holding that section 49E applies when insolvency rules do not apply. Accordingly, agreeing with the High Court, we hold that the Income-tax Officer was in error in applying section 49E and setting off the refund due. The Commissioner was equally in error in affirming this order.
At any rate, there is an error apparent on the face of the orders and the High Court was quite right in exercising its jurisdiction under article 226. Appeal dismissed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 51
Winding up - Liability as contributories of present and post members ... ... ... ... ..... e order against the past members who have not paid in full or in part the amount directed by this court on September 4, 1959. Further it would be just and equitable in view of the principles outlined above to refund the sum of Rs. 3,431 93 (cash on hand) after retaining a small portion for incidental expenses, to the past members. Justice requires that this refund will have to be in the proportion of the amounts actually paid by the past members. Thus keeping a sum of Rs. 131 93 for costs and expenses, if we distribute the balance of Rs. 3,300 to the past members, the past members who paid sums amounting to Rs. 4,600 will get 4,600/9,005 84 out of Rs. 3,300. The past members who paid Rs. 1,000 will get 1,000/9,00584 X 3,300. The persons from whom an amount of Rs. 3,405 84 has been collected will get 3,405 84/9,005 84. It seems to me that this is the only order which can justly be passed in accordance with law and justice. Costs of this application will come out of the estate.
-
1965 (4) TMI 24
Whether the Bombay High Court was right in holding that the suit filed by the appellant, Kamala Mills Ltd., against the respondent, the State of Bombay, was incompetent?
Held that:- If the jurisdiction conferred on the appropriate authority falls under the first category, then its finding that a particular transaction is taxable under the relevant provisions of the Act would be a finding on a collateral question of fact, and it may be permissible to a party aggrieved by the said finding to contend that the tax levied on the basis of an erroneous decision about the nature of the transaction is without jurisdiction. If, however, the appropriate authority has been given jurisdiction to determine the nature of the transaction and proceed to levy a tax in accordance with its decision on the first issue, then the decision on the first issue cannot be said to be a decision on a collateral issue, and even if the said issue is erroneously determined by the appropriate authority, the tax levied by it in accordance with its decision cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 23
Whether the High Court acted improperly in refusing to investigate a plea raised by the company that in issuing a notice under section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act the Income-tax Officer acted without jurisdiction and for a colourable purpose?
Held that:- As in the present case, the claim made is that the Income-tax Officer had no power to issue the notice under section 34, and that the power is exercised not for any legitimate purpose for which it may be used, but for the purpose of making a fishing enquiry and to review a previous order passed in favour of the company, a rule upon the Income-tax Officer to show cause why the order should not be set aside and an opportunity to the authority whose action was challenged either to accept or deny the facts alleged and to set out such other material facts as have a bearing on the question, was at least called for.
The order of the High Court ought to be set aside and the proceeding remanded with the direction that rule be issued to the Income-tax Officer and the petition be tried
-
1965 (4) TMI 22
Whether the assessee, Messrs. Shah Jethaji Phulchand, can be granted registration under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act on the basis of the deed made on November 20, 1950, for the assessment year 1953-54 and/or 1954-55 ?
Held that:- As no fatal defect has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Accordingly we hold that the assessee-firm is entitled to be registered, and agreeing with the High Court, we answer the question in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 21
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case what the assessee received in the relevant years is assessable to tax and whether section 34 of the Income-tax Act could be invoked in regard to the years 1947-48, 1948-49 and 1950-51 ?
Held that:- What the assessee received in the relevant years of account was not assessable to tax. It is unnecessary to record, as already observed, a finding on the second branch of the question, viz., whether section 34 of the Income-tax Act could properly be invoked in regard to those receipts. Appeal allowed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 20
Whether the two sums of ₹ 42,148 in the assessment year 1953-54 and ₹ 77,138 in the assessment year 1954-55 were deductible in computing income, profits and gains from the assessee's business assessable to tax ?
Held that:- The appellant-company is a commercial undertaking. It does business of the supply of electricity subject to the provisions of the Act. As a business concern its real profit has to be ascertained on the principles of commercial accountancy. As a licensee governed by the statute its clear profit is ascertained in terms of the statute and the schedule annexed thereto. The two profits are for different purposes---one is for commercial and tax purposes and the other is for statutory purposes in order to maintain a reasonable level of rates. For the purposes of the Act, during the accounting years the assessee credited the said amounts to the " Consumers' Benefit Reserve Account ". They were a part of the excess amount paid to it and reserved to be returned to the consumers. They did not form part of the assessee's real profits. So, to arrive at the taxable income of the assessee from the business under section 10(1) of the Act, the said amounts have to be deducted from its total income. Appeal allowed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 19
Whether the amount described as premium in the lease deed is really rent and, therefore, a revenue receipt?
Held that:- There is no material placed before us, either direct or circumstantial, to displace the description given in the lease deed to the said amounts as premium and to hold that they are not in fact premium but only rent. Appeal dismissed.
-
1965 (4) TMI 18
Whether the assessee, Mohandas Sadhuram, can be granted registration under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, on the basis of the partnership deed made on April 1, 1952, for the assessment year 1953-54 and on the basis of the said deed read with the supplementary deed on April 1, 1953, for the assessment year 1954-55?
Held that:- The partnership deed, reasonably construed, only confers benefits of partnership on the two minors and does not make them full partners. The guardian has agreed to certain clauses in order to effectuate the decision of the major members to confer the benefits of the said partnership to the minors. Accordingly, we hold that the income-tax authorities should not have declined to register the firm. We may mention that the supplementary deed dated April 1, 1953, has not been included in the statement of the case, but it is common ground that nothing turns on any of the clauses in the supplementary deed.
Accordingly, agreeing with the High Court, we hold that the firm is entitled to be registered under section 26A of the Income-tax Act, and the answer to the question referred is in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
|
