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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 61 Records
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1966 (1) TMI 72
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... ... ..... according to the law pressed by the two parties nor whether such and such provisions of law make it not payable. If according to all the law applicable sales tax is not payable we cannot answer the question in the affirmative simply because the law which makes it not payable was not relied upon by the assessees before the Judge (Revisions) and consequently he had not discussed it. I have, therefore, considered the argument based on the notification dated 14th December, 1957, but found no merit in it. My answer to question No. 2 is in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment should be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 11(6) of the Sales Tax Act. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall get his costs in this reference which may be assessed at Rs. 50. Counsel s fee may be assessed at Rs. 50. MANCHANDA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (1) TMI 71
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... ... ..... orities in South Arcot was received by the authorities in Madras on 12th March, 1959, but the Madras property in this case belonging to Ranganatham Chetty had been sold by him long prior to that date. Therefore by virtue of none of these provisions of law can it be considered that the 1st petitioner, Kannamba and her legal representatives are defaulters for the sales tax arrears due by Ranganatham Chetty, and therefore their property cannot be proceeded against under the Revenue Recovery Act for the recovery of the arrears of sales tax due by Ranganatham Chetty. But whether that property can be proceeded against by other methods, for example, by a suit to enforce the charge mentioned in section 10 of the Act, it is not necessary to decide in the present proceedings, which deal with the limited question of the applicability of the procedure prescribed by Act 2 of 1864 (Act 6 of 1867). The writ petition is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 70
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... ... ..... the statute. The petitioners invited the jurisdiction of the authority under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act for redress of the petitioners grievances. The petitioners failed. The petitioners thereafter turned round and started these proceedings. In my opinion the petitioners are not entitled to do so because one of the principles of applications under Article 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioners must come in aid of redress of bona fide and legitimate grievances. In the present case it is apparent that the petitioners having lost in the several rounds of revisions of the various orders passed by the assessing authorities, tried to reopen some of the orders in a circuitous manner. That is not a bona fide application. For these reasons I am of opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to succeed. The application is dismissed. The Rule is discharged. The petitioners are to pay costs to the respondents being assessed at three gold mohurs. Application dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 69
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... ... ..... the opinion that the question should be answered as follows Question. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Commercial Tax Officer was justified in treating the matter as a case where no return was filed and to issue notice in Form VI on that footing and whether such notice is valid in law and if such notice is not valid in law, it has affected the assessment. Answer. The Commercial Tax Officer was justified in treating the matter as a case where no return was filed and to issue notice in Form VI on that footing. Such a notice is valid in law and, therefore, the last part of the question requires no answer. Even if it is held that the notice itself should have proceeded under clause (b) rather than clause (a), that does not make it invalid in law. The notice even in such an event is valid and the proceedings are in accordance with law. 15.. The assessee must pay the costs of the revenue. Certified for counsel. SEN, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (1) TMI 68
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... ... ..... assessment in the present case, which admittedly is one under section 11(3) of the Act, has been made on the basis of material and cannot be characterised either as arbitrary or without evidence. Therefore, we are clearly of the view that the Assessing Authority was justified in law in making the best judgment assessment against the applicants and the first question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The answer to the first question also disposes of the second question. It is not necessary to decide the third question because the learned counsel for the assessee conceded that if the best judgment assessment is one under section 11(3) of the Act, no question of limitation would arise. Question of limitation could only arise in the case of a best judgment assessment under section 11(4) of the Act. The reference is accordingly answered. The department will be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. FALSHAW, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (1) TMI 67
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... ... ..... lar to section 19 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act according to which upon publication of the rules they would have the same effect as if enacted in the Act. It is true that a statutory rule if validly promulgated has the same force as the provisions of the principal Act under which it has been made, but all that is being pointed out by me is that there are points of distinction between the Madras case and the present cases. I would, therefore, hold that even in exercise of rule-making power the Chief Commissioner in the present cases could not promulgate a rule which by having retrospective operation could have the effect of validating quasi-judicial orders which were altogether null and void when made. For these reasons, the petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are hereby quashed. It would be open to the respondents to initiate or take fresh proceedings for reassessment in accordance with law. In the circumstances I make no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 66
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... ... ..... ection 13 for inspection he shall also be authorised to seize the document. Sri Lamgora who was a Sales Tax Officer of the Special Investigation Branch was clearly authorised to make such an inspection and was, therefore, entitled to seize the account books. The account book, as found by both the Courts below, was actually snatched with a jerk (jhatke se chhin liya) out of the hands of Sri Lamgora by Ramesh Chandra when Sri Lamgora wanted to keep it in his possession. An offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code, has, therefore, been clearly made out against the applicant. He has been rightly convicted. A sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment will, however, serve the ends of justice. The result is that the application in revision against the conviction is dismissed but the sentence is reduced to a rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months only. The applicant is on bail. He shall surrender to his bail and serve out the reduced sentence. application dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 65
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... ... ..... ying him, the property in the goods passes to the customer and is appropriated to him. This is clearly sale. The customer can order for a particular dish at the restaurant and reject it when it is offered to him if it is not in accordance with his orders. I, therefore, hold that the restaurant sales to non-residents and sales of packed food by the petitioner-company to its customers are taxable under the Punjab Act. No other point has been argued before me in this case by either of the sides. This writ petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned orders of the assessing authority and the revisional authority are set aside and quashed. The taxing authorities would be free to assess the petitioners for their restaurant sales but are hereby restrained and prohibited from taxing the petitioners on the basis of any legal fiction qua the food served to the resident customers in the petitioners hotel who do not pay for the food separately. Petition allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 64
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... ... ..... of the coal out of the territory of India was an integral part of the transaction itself and such export could not be treated as a separate transaction. Finally the Sales Tax Authorities could not assume jurisdiction to impose tax on a transaction which was not a sale as defined in section 2(g) of the Act. These being the grounds on which the appellant challenged the order of assessment in the writ petition, the mere fact that it did not take recourse to the last of the three remedies provided by the statute, although it had taken recourse to two of such remedies, would not debar the appellant from getting relief in its writ petition. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of J. P. Mitter, J., dated 11th August, 1961, are set aside and the rule is made absolute. The appellant will be entitled to costs of this Court and also of the trial Court assessed at five and three gold mohurs respectively. BOSE, C. J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 63
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... ... ..... contention that the requirement, which, according to the petitioner, has not been complied with, is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under section 26(1). The section is among the group of sections relating to recovery proceedings, and that gives power to the department to serve a garnishee notice as it were on persons from whom moneys are due to the assessee, requiring that such moneys should be paid over to the department towards arrears of tax. This power of the assessing authority is to be exercised by a notice in writing served on the person who is required to pay over the moneys to the department. The section no doubt says that a copy of such notice should be forwarded to the dealer at his last address known to the assessing authority. But it is manifest from the frame of sub-section (1) that it is not designed to be a condition precedent to a valid exercise of the power of requisition under section 26(1). The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 62
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and the documents on record, pointing to the contrary, the order of the Tribunal can be maintained as valid in law?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 54
Whether on a proper interpretation of the terms of the contract, there was or was not involved therein any sale in the course of import?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. There was no possibility of these goods being diverted by the assessee for any other purpose. Consequently we hold that the sales took place in the course of import of goods within section 5(2) of the Act, and are, therefore, exempt from taxation.
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1966 (1) TMI 46
Applications under sections 391 and 394 – Notice to be given to central government for ... ... ... ... ..... erely gives to the court the historical background of a piece of legislation but the conclusion which I have arrived at, namely, that notice of an application under section 391(2) only has to be given to the Central Government, appears to be in conformity with this background. Parliament, it must be presumed, knew the provisions of the various rules the Supreme Court had framed under section 391 and, if the intention was that notices of applications under sections 391(1) and 391(6) should also be served on the Central Government, the right given to a petitioner to move these applications ex parte should have been expressly taken away. The fact that that has not been done shows that the words any order in section 394A must be construed to mean any final order Consequently, the words every application mean an application under section 391(2) or section 394. I hold, therefore, that at this initial stage of the present proceedings no notice to the Central Government is necessary.
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1966 (1) TMI 45
Winding up - Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. and Savings of pending proceedings for winding up
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1966 (1) TMI 44
Service of documents on company and Director – Interested, not to participate or vote in Board’s proceedings
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1966 (1) TMI 26
Whether the discretion of the Tribunal has been properly exercised in a given case in refusing to allow a question to be raised which has not been set forth in the memorandum of appeal, would normally not be a question of law?
Held that:- Unable to accept the argument of Mr. Pathak that the new plea sought to be raised did not necessitate enquiry into facts which had not been investigated. The new plea is based on a two-fold assumption of facts--that a Hindu undivided family existed in the relevant previous year and that the income which was sought to be assessed in proceedings under section 34(1)(a) was the income of that family. The first may only be founded on evidence, and the second is contrary to the admissions made by Manji Dana. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 25
Whether the Income-tax Officer is entitled to have the length of the 'previous year' as 21 months though the assessee itself applies for such a change?
Held that:- If the previous year at any given time applicable to the assessee ends on June 30 and he wants to vary it so as to make it end on March 31 next, the Income-tax Officer has power to accord sanction to the change on the condition that the previous year would consist of the entire period of 21 months commencing on June 30 of the year up to which his accounts were last made up to March 31 of the year up to which his accounts are newly made up. The condition properly safeguards the interest of the revenue. Had he sanctioned the change on the footing that the previous year of the assessee in relation to the current assessment year would be the period of 12 months from April 1 to March 31, the income of the preceding 9 months from July 1 to March 31 would have escaped taxation altogether.
Once the length of the previous year is fixed and the income of the previous year is determined, that income must be charged at the rate specified in the Finance Act and at no other rate. The order of the Income-tax Officer, in substance, permitted the change of the previous year on condition that the previous year in relation to the assessment year 1952-53 would consist of the period of 21 months commencing from July 1, 1950, and ending on March 31, 1952. The Income-tax Officer had power to impose this condition. The further condition that the income of the previous year of 21 months would be assessed at the rate applicable to the income for 21 months is redundant. Once the length of the previous year is found to be a period of 21 months, the income of the entire period of 21 months must be considered to be the income of the previous year relevant for the assessment year 1952-53, and the entire income must be assessed at the rate specified in the relevant Finance Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 24
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the surplus or difference arising as a result of devaluation in the process of converting dollar currency in regard to the sum of $36,123.02 repatriated to India was profit which was taxable in the hands of the assessee ?
Whether the said sum of $36,123.02 having been taxed in the relevant earlier years, the surplus or difference in dollar exchange account arising by reason of the repatriation thereof as a result of devaluation was rightly taken as profit taxable ?
Held that:- In our view it was not a trading transaction in the business of manufacture of locomotive boilers and locomotives; it was clearly a transaction of accumulating dollars to pay for capital goods, the first step to the acquisition of capital goods. If the assessee had repatriated $36,123.02 and then after obtaining the sanction of the Reserve Bank remitted $36,123.02 to the U.S.A., Mr. Sastri does not contest that any profit made on devaluation would have been a capital profit. But, in our opinion, the fact that the assessee kept the money there does not make any difference especially, as we have pointed out, that it was a new transaction which the assessee entered into, the transaction being the first step to acquisition of capital goods.
In our view the High Court was right in answering the questions in the negative. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 23
Whether notice can be issued at any time for reassessment under section 34(1)(a), as amended by the Finance Act, 1956, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in respect of a concealed income to which section 34 (1A) thereof applied?
Held that:- In this case, both during the period between the amendments of 1954 and 1956 and thereafter, they occupied different fields. By July 17, 1954, when sub-section (1A) was introduced in section 34, no proceedings under section 34(1)(a) could be initiated except for the assessment year 1946-47 in respect of the previous years that fell within the period beginning on September 1, 1939, and ending on March 31, 1946, for they were barred under the unamended section. Sub-section (1A), therefore, practically governed a situation that was not governed by the provisions of section 34(1)(a). It was intended to catch escaped incomes of the war years which were out of the reach of section 34(1)(a). It is not, therefore, appropriate to describe sub-section (1A) as one carved out of sub-section (1)(a) or to call it a species of which sub-section (1)(a) is the genus. Sub-section (1A) operated where sub-section (1)(a) practically ceased to function.
Sub-section (1A) does not really prescribe any period of limitation. It enables the Income-tax Officer to take proceedings within a particular time, though the period of limitation had expired. In this view, no question of carving out a species out of a genus arises. It conferred a special power on the Income-tax Officer and the said power expired on April 1, 1956. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 22
Whether the family property can properly be described as 'joint property' of the undivided family."?
Held that:- Property of a joint family, therefore, does not cease to belong to the family merely because the family is represented by a single coparcener who possesses rights which an owner of property may possess. In the case in hand the property which yielded the income originally belonged to a Hindu undivided family. On the death of Buddappa, the family which included a widow and females born in the family was represented by Buddanna alone, but the property still continued to belong to that undivided family and income received therefrom was taxable as income of the Hindu undivided family. The High Court was therefore right in recording their answers referred for opinion.
In this case we express no opinion on the question whether a Hindu undivided family may for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act be treated, as a taxable entity when it consists of a single member---male or female. Appeal dismissed.
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