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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 71 Records
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1966 (2) TMI 63
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... ... ..... purchases in question are not exigible to tax as the goods purchased were sold out of this State on consignment basis. It does not appear that it was contended before the Commissioner that the last purchases of declared goods in the State are not exigible to tax, if those goods are sold outside the State on consignment basis. There is no support for this contention from the language of section 5(4). That section does not make any distinction between sales on consignment basis and other sales. It is not the case of the assessee that when it purchased those goods it intended to sell them in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Nor was it contended that the goods in question were sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. That being so, the purchases in question are exigible to tax. No other contention was urged before this Court. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 62
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... ... ..... that writ petition was dismissed as two opinions on the question whether agarbattis fell within the category of perfume were possible. No assistance therefore can be derived by the learned Junior Standing Counsel from that case for solving the problem which arises here. Giving the word perfume its meaning as is understood in the commercial world I would hold that dhoop and dhoop-batti, which do not emit any agreeable odour except when burnt, do not fall within the category of perfumes as found in item No. 37 of the said notification. For the reasons given above my answer to the question referred will be in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Let a copy of this judgment be sent under the seal of the Court and signature of the Registrar to the Revising Authority and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. The Commissioner of Sales Tax will pay the costs of the assessee which I assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (2) TMI 61
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... ... ..... eing sent by registered post, it does not prescribe a mandatory requirement but merely, as we have already observed, provides a rule for the benefit of the applicant. We cannot accede to the contention that in order that a revision application be entertainable it must be sent by registered post and not by ordinary post. When the Judge (Revisions) accepted the revision application, we cannot say that the revision application could not be acted upon. The acceptance of the revision application does not vitiate the proceedings taken thereon by the Revising Authority. Accordingly, we answer question (a) in the affirmative and question (b) in the negative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (2) TMI 60
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... ... ..... oal. It is now wellestablished that the word coal occurring in a fiscal statute has to be understood in its popular and commercial sense His Majesty the King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Limited(1951) C.L.R. (Ex. C.) 122 at p. 123., K.V. Varkey v. Agricultural Income-tax and Rural Sales Tax Officer 1954 5 S.T.C. 348. and Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants Association, Santra Market, Nagpur v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Sales Tax Department) 1956 7 S.T.C. 99. We derive further support for this view from the fact that sales of both coal and firewood have been taxed at 2 per cent. and there does not appear to us to be any good reason for treating charcoal differently. In our opinion, charcoal is covered by entry No. 1 of Part III of Schedule II of the Act and sales of charcoal are taxable at 2 per cent. 4.. We answer the reference in the manner indicated above and direct that the Revenue shall pay all costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 75. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (2) TMI 59
Penalty where no specific penalty is provided elsewhere in the act ... ... ... ... ..... es non est and non-existent, in the eye of law. In other words, it would be deemed that such a resolution had never been moved. If such a resolution, being void ab initio, does not at all exist in law, there is no question of its contravening any provision of the Act, entailing punishment It is noteworthy that if the resolution had not been proposed at a stretch, i.e., in a single breath as it were, and the names had been proposed, each in the form of a separate resolution, there would have been no contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 263. The contravention in question, if any, would be only of a technical nature. At any rate, the matter of the alleged breach or contravention of the provisions of the Act being highly controversial, its benefit must go to the accused. The view taken by the learned Sessions Judge does not appear to be unreasonable or illegal so as to call for interference in this appeal against acquittal, which is accordingly dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 58
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... contract or of the part performance thereof. rdquo In the present case, the plaintiffs-appellants are the pre-emptors. They are not the successors-in-interest of the Patel Mills Ltd. and are not bound buy any act of its liquidator, Sri Mehra. They also do not derive any title from Jugal Kishore nor can they be considered to be Jugal Kishore rsquo s transfere or successor. The right of a pre-emptor is independent of the right of the person whom he ousts by filing a suit for pre-emption. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the facts before us. The cases on which reliance has been placed by Bishambhar Dayal J. are clearly distinguishable, not being case of pre-emptors. The result, therefore, is that was allow this appeal with cists, set aside the judgment of Bishambhar Dayal J., as also those of the first appellate court and the trial court, and decree the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants with costs.
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1966 (2) TMI 43
Winding up – Power to order public examination of promoters directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... d to give evidence and evidence taken from him under compulsion ultimately leads to an accusation against him, that would not be a case which would attract the provisions of article 20(3). Public examination under the provisions of the Companies Act would not amount to accusation and is not prohibited under article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The submission that it may prejudice the first respondent in his criminal appeal will not entitle him to the prohibition under article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. In the result the application of the official liquidator is allowed so far as the first respondent is concerned, and dismissed as regards others. The official liquidator is authorised to engage a counsel, conduct the public examination of the first respondent and incur the necessary expenditure. The examination will be conducted by the master. Report within six months. This order will be suspended for three weeks to enable the first respondent to file an appeal.
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1966 (2) TMI 42
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... ccessful petitioner, but the judge does not appear to have decided the case on the basis of that particular argument. However that may be, the petitioner was, as I have said, content to leave the formation of the company to Kaufmann, and I have no reason to think that in framing the constitution of the company in the way in which it was in fact framed, a deliberate trap was being laid for the petitioner or that, Kaufmann, was doing anything other than producing a constitution which seemed to him best suited to the facts of the case with which he w-as dealing. Once it is accepted, as I consider it must be, that the constitution of the company is not one of which the petitioner is entitled to complain, then in the absence of any proof of what. Lord Shaw in the-well-known case Loch v. John Blackwood Ltd. 1924 AC 783, 788 40 TLR 732 PC a lack of probity in the conduct of the company s affairs, the petition must, in my judgment fail. I would, therefore, dismiss it on both grounds.
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1966 (2) TMI 28
Import Trade Control - Pet animal - Import licence ... ... ... ... ..... of a licence is clearly a condition for importation. In fact, it is a precondition. 20. emsp For the reasons aforesaid I am of the opinion that the second point raised has not been substantiated. In other words, in my opinion, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 read with the Import (Control) Order, 1955 and the schedule thereto, have laid down that the importation of horses into India could only be done subject to the obtaining of a valid licence or a customs clearance permit. This is a prohibition with a condition and where the condition has not been fulfilled the goods are ldquo prohibited goods rdquo and comes within the mischief of Section 125 of the said Act. That being so, the adjudging officer had a discretion to impose a fine or not and was not bound to give to the appellant an option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation. In the premises this appeal fails and should be dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1966 (2) TMI 22
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the dividend income from shares standing in the name of Kishanchand Lunidasingh Bajaj and acquired with the funds of the Hindu undivided family of which the said person was the karta was assessable in the hands of the assessee-family ?
Held that:- In so far as it deals with dividend which is " grossed up ", sub-section (5) of section 18 forms a corollary to section 16(2). Therefore, when tax is paid on behalf of a shareholder and deduction is made from dividend, credit is given to him for the tax paid in his final assessment. But the scheme of " grossing up " is not susceptible of the interpretation that the income from dividend is to be regarded as the income only of the registered shareholder and not of the real owner of the share.
Unable to accept the argument of counsel for the appellants that because the dividend income in respect of the shares cannot be " grossed up ", and credit for tax paid cannot be obtained by the appellants, the appellants are not liable to be taxed in respect of dividend received by them. There is no provision in the Act which supports this plea, and the scheme of the Act lends no countenance to an expedient which may lead to gross evasion of tax. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 21
Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit is excluded?
Held that:- In the absence of express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court, the action for refund of tax was maintainable.
There was in the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act at the material time no express provision which obliged the taxing authority to exclude from the computation of taxable turnover the amount of sales tax collected by the dealer. The argument of counsel for the respondents that the taxing authority has infringed a prohibition imposed upon him has therefore no substance. Appeal allowed
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1966 (2) TMI 20
Agent - Manager - Evasion of duty - Prosecution - Abettor ... ... ... ... ..... clear recital in the appellate judgment that the learned D.G.C., who appeared before him for the State, conceded that the prosecution case against the appellants, who included the present respondent, was confined to clauses (a) and (b) of the Act. In these circumstances, we do not consider it appropriate now to enter into the question whether the liability of the respondent as an abettor had been made out because, in doing so, we might be overlooking prejudice to the respondent in his defence. It is clear that if liability is sought to be fixad on the respondent, as an abettor, a fresh trial must take place. 9.The offence is alleged to have been committed early in 1959 and the respondent was convicted by the learned Magistrate in May, 1962. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent in Aug., 1963, and 2 years more have passed since then. We consider it wholly inappropriate, in such circumstances, to direct a re-trial. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 19
This petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed by the Lakshmi Narayan Public Charity Trust, through its sole trustee, for quashing the notices issued by Tax Recovery Officer - Whether recovery proceedings can be initiated against the trust in respect of the tax arrears of the settlor
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1966 (2) TMI 18
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1963 - sum which was refunded to the assessee by the Bombay sales tax authorities was assessable to tax as the income of the assessee
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1966 (2) TMI 17
Was the Tribunal justified in coming to the conclusion that, upon the facts admitted or found before them, the Income-tax Officer was entitled to proceed under the proviso to section 13 as regards the assessment of the engineering department of the assessee for the relevant ' assessment year ' - Held, yes - ITO was justified in applying the proviso to s. 13 and making an estimate of profits
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1966 (2) TMI 16
Bad debt - allowability u/s 10(2)(xi) of the IT Act ... ... ... ... ..... the amount of Rs. 10,000 was found to be realisable in 1956. Therefore, it cannot be said that this debt to the extent of Rs. 10,55,025 had already been discovered by the assessee to have lost any chance of recovery before the previous year. In that view, the Tribunal s opinion that the debt had not become bad before the previous year cannot be assailed. All the questions that we have referred to above were questions of fact, and the Tribunal came to its own findings on those facts. It was not, as it could not be, urged before us that those findings were not based upon materials or evidence on record. In that view of the matter, they must be conclusive and cannot be reopened. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question framed shall be in the affirmative. The reference is accordingly, disposed of. The assessee will be entitled to a sum of Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty) only as costs of this reference from the department. Question answered in the affirmative
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1966 (2) TMI 15
Rejction of accout books of assessee - addition as estimated profits from suppressed transactions is not justifiable in law
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1966 (2) TMI 14
Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding the status of the assessee as individual in respect of the income from the business 'C' - held that business " Chandmull Rajgarhia " was rightly taken to be of the assessee and not of the Hindu undivided family. The first question accordingly is answered in the affirmative
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1966 (2) TMI 13
Reassessment - firm - Tribunal was justified in holding that the proceedings under s. 34 were invalid
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1966 (2) TMI 12
Cancelling the registration of the firm - proceedings under s. 34 - validity ... ... ... ... ..... essee for reassessment of his income. In that view, the proceedings under section 34 cannot be said to be invalidly initiated. It is not contended by learned counsel that the case does not come under sub-section 34(1)(b) in other words, the cancellation of the registration information which could justify initiation under rule 6B did not amount to an initiation of proceedings under section 34 nor is it contended by him that the reassessment was initiated beyond the stipulated time of four years. Learned counsel, however, very strenuously attempted to bring the order passed under rule 6B for examination in this case before us but, as we have said, the forum for that is otherwise, and if advised, he may seek his redress in that forum subject to the question of limitation. For the reasons given above, we have to answer the question as reframed in the affirmative and dispose of these references accordingly. In view of the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs
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