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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 94 Records
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1967 (3) TMI 83
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... ... ..... eeds within the meaning of section 14(vi) of the Central Act. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to exemption in respect of the sale of gingerly seeds and mustard seeds if he is not the first seller of these goods in the State, and is liable to be taxed only at two per cent., if he is the first seller of these goods. 9.. In the light of my above findings, I direct the respondent to revise the order of assessment, exhibit P-5, by not including the sum of Rs. 5,41,541.80, which he fixed as the value of the stock-intrade transferred to the partnership business, as taxable turnover, and in the light of his decision on the question whether the petitioner is the first seller in the State of gingerly seeds and mustard seeds. Exhibits P-5 and P-7 will be revised on the basis of the final order of assessment to be made by the respondent in the light of the above directions. This original petition is disposed of in the manner stated above. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1967 (3) TMI 82
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... he court-fee payable in respect of it has necessarily to be calculated under the Mysore Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. The decision of the Supreme Court in Dhirendha Chandra Pal v. Associated Bank of Tripura Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 213. dealt exclusively with the position as under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act, now called the Banking Regulation Act, and held that the proceedings thereunder are not proceedings in the nature of a suit but summary proceedings specially provided for expeditious disposal of winding up proceedings in the case of banking companies with liberty of power to the court to frame its own procedure for the disposal of such applications. I, therefore, hold that the present application as well as similar applications in the nature of suits which the liquidator may file in winding up have to be treated as regular suits for purposes of court-fee and the court-fee paid accordingly thereon under the Mysore Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958.
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1967 (3) TMI 75
Meetings and proceedings – Company Law Board’s power to call annual general meeting, Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
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1967 (3) TMI 74
Affidavit verifying petitions ... ... ... ... ..... s the case may be, for such limited purposes as may be specified in the notification. It is time that the Central Government of India issued a notification under section 14 of the Notaries Act recognising the existing reciprocity of notarial acts between India and U.S.A. in order that there may be no doubt or confusion in respect of the same and that individual cases need not come up to courts for admission. A copy of this judgment with the above observations shall be sent by the Registrar of this court to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, for taking necessary steps for issuing such notification and making relevant rules under section 15 of the Notaries Act on this point. There will, therefore, be an order admitting the petition signed by Mr. Michael Michaelson, President and Principal Officer of Franklin Square Agency Inc., the petitioner company, and verified by the two affidavits sworn before Elizabeth Levy, a Notary Public of the United States of America.
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1967 (3) TMI 73
Memorandum of association – Alteration to be registered within three months ... ... ... ... ..... iberate but unintentional. In this view, the order under section 17 is automatically revived, if once time is extended for filing the documents under section 18(4) of the Act. The petitioner in this case has applied within a month from December 24, 1966, for extension of time to file the documents and also for revival of the order within the meaning of the proviso to section 19(2) of the Companies Act. I am satisfied on a reading of the affidavit and the circumstances of the case that there is sufficient cause to excuse the delay in the filing of documents before the Registrar and to extend the time as also for revival of the order which according to the Registrar has lapsed. While therefore reviving the order made by this court on September 1, 1966, the applicant is given finally three weeks time from this date to file the certified copy of the same as also the necessary annexures with the Registrar of Companies. Thus prayer (1) in the judge s summons is accordingly ordered.
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1967 (3) TMI 72
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... he can not approbate and reprobate and ask for an equitable discretionary remedy from the court to rectify the register. In this case the member knew that his name was in the register he also knew that a balance order was passed against him as early as March 10, 1965. The delay in filing this application has not been explained. The decision in C.C.C.A. No. 95 of 1952 cannot help the applicant in any manner whatsoever. He cannot, therefore, at this belated stage set at naught the rights which have become vested and crystallised in the creditors. The balance order passed against him on April 22, 1960, is final, conclusive and binding on him. No substantial ground has been made out before me to set aside the decree dated April 22, 1960, and much less there is any substance in the contentions raised at this stage for the rectification of the register. Both the applications are therefore dismissed. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1967 (3) TMI 48
Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... admittedly not one of the passengers in the car at the time of the seizure. The mere fact that the car had been registered in the name would not be sufficient to hold that he either aided or abetted in the carrying of the smuggled gold in the car. His statement which has been marked on behalf of the prosecution, discloses that the car really belonged to Kabir and that Kabir had reached the car, and that he had only got it registered in the name of respondent 6. 13.We may also point out that this is an appeal against the acquittal. The mere fact, on the evidence, another view could be taken is no ground for setting aside the acquittal. It is not possible for us to say that the view taken by the learned Magistrate is either erroneous or unreasonable. There are no compelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal of the respondents passed by the learned Magistrate. In the result, for the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
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1967 (3) TMI 47
Whether the goods are to bear the old duty or the new?
Held that:- In the present case the payment of duty was synchronous with the clearance of the goods because the gate pass can only be issued when the goods have actually been cleared for removal. The above construction of the Rules agree with the construction placed by the Board of Revenue in its ruling of 1957 where the effect of the sealing of the wagons by the Railway after loading and the issuance of railway receipts was considered. The Board ruled that such goods would not be considered as lying in the stock in the factory premises. When we add to it the fact in this case that duty was paid on the goods and gate pass was also issued, there remains little to argue except to say that the wagons being in the new siding must be treated as still in the factory. Here the difficulty in the way of the Union of India is that the Excise authorities themselves refused to recognise this portion as part of the factory. If the goods were put in the wagons after payment of duty, and the wagons were sealed and shunted out of the factory on a proper gate pass, not only under the ruling of the Board but also on the application of the Rules as explained here these goods became free of the enhanced duty. The recovery was accordingly erroneous. The duty collected must, therefore, be refunded and we order accordingly.
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1967 (3) TMI 46
Firm - default in payment of the penalty - further imposition of penalty - validity ... ... ... ... ..... nt has submitted that as the appellant had the alternative remedy of an appeal against the imposition of a penalty upon penalty, we should decline to interfere at his instance. This plea was not raised before the single judge at the hearing of the petition. The learned judge decided the petition on merits. Again, we are taking the view that the imposition of the impugned penalty is invalid. In these circumstances we think that it would not be proper to decline to interfere. In the end, it may be mentioned that the view which we are taking was also taken by the Kerala High Court in M. M. Mathew v. Second Additional Income-tax Officer, Kottayam and Padmanabha Menon Krishna Menon v. Commissioner of Income-tax. We allow the appeal with costs and quash the order of the Income-tax Officer, C-Ward, Allahabad, imposing the penalty of Rs. 600. We also issue a direction to the Collector, Kanpur, that he should refrain from collecting the said amount from the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (3) TMI 45
Assessee, HUF - income from the business could be not be treated as the income of the HUF - no justification for making a joint assessment of the share incomes of C and his sons. R & O, along with the income from the property received by the HUF
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1967 (3) TMI 44
Order of the assessment was set aside - demand of advance tax was not valid - If the assessment of that total income has been set aside, it is not open to the ITO to consider that total income for the purpose of computing the amount of advance tax
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1967 (3) TMI 43
Carry Forward - order of the Income-tax Officer on the return filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1956-57 need not be regarded as an assessment completed under sub-section (1) of section 23, but should be read as amounting to computation of loss for the said year
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1967 (3) TMI 42
Madras Agricultural Income Tax Act - Lands purchased in name of wife and minor children and consideration was provided by assessee - U/S 9(1)income from land was could be assessed in the hand of the assessee
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1967 (3) TMI 41
Shares held by karta and coparceners of HUF using family funds loan to joint family by company - loan given could not be assessed as dividend income of family
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1967 (3) TMI 40
Loss - admissible deduction - assessable income ... ... ... ... ..... om the conclusion that the sum of Rs. 13,000 was given to Sri Prem Narain to honour a hundi which had been received by the assessee in connection with his business dealings. Inasmuch as Rs. 12,000 was lost, it must be held that it was a loss incurred by the assessee in the conduct of his business. Mr. Tewari claims deduction under section 10(1) of the Act. The submission is that the provision requires that assessment of tax shall be made on profits or gains of any business. Profits or gains are the residue left after deducting the losses and the business expenditure. Therefore, the deduction of any loss is implicit in section 10(1) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The department shall pay to the assessee a sum of Rs. 200 as costs of these proceedings. We fix the amount of fee of the learned counsel for the department at the same figure. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1967 (3) TMI 39
Deposits made by assessee with K Ltd. - purpose was to earn the income from that amount - necessary condition for the grant of the allowance contemplated in s. 12(2) was fulfilled and the assessee would be entitled to set off the interest paid to the firm, K & Co., against the interest earned from K Ltd.
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1967 (3) TMI 38
Whether petitioner was entitled to be assessed as a HUF - held, yes - fact that the assessees were being assessed as individuals up to the asst. yr. 1963-64, would not make any difference in so far as their present claim to be assessed as a HUF is concerned
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1967 (3) TMI 37
Under trust deed, trustees were given absolute discretion to accumulate income or use it for benefit of any one or more of beneficiaries to the exclusion of others - in such case, trustees were assessable at maximum rate under proviso to section 41 of IT Act, 1922
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1967 (3) TMI 36
Search and seizure - petitioner presented an application u/s 132(11) to the Central Board of Direct Taxes at New Delhi against the order u/s 132(5). Pending the application u/s 132(11), the petitioner filed, in the Delhi High Court, a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India - held that Delhi HC has no jurisdiction to entertain petition
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1967 (3) TMI 35
Mysore Agricultural Income Tax Act - Appeal To Tribunal - Tribunal dismissed the appeal in limine taking the view that the appeal which was not maintainable before the Commissioner did not become maintainable by reason of the amendment nor could the Tribunal treat the same as an appeal filed before it - held taht order of Tribunal was liable to be set aside
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