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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 78 Records
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1967 (9) TMI 137 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w under rule 6(c) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, such transport charges can be deducted from the total turnover of the dealer provided that such amounts are specified and charged for by the dealer separately without including them in the price of the goods sold. it is conceded that in the present case, no bills submitted by the supplier are available which would show the split up of the total charges of Rs. 41 per 1,000 into two distinct amounts, namely, Rs. 28 per 1,000 as the price at the kiln site and Rs. 13 being transport charges. The exclusion of the amount covered by the transport charges cannot be granted unless they are specified and charged for separately, which mode of dealing with such charges does not obtain in the present cases. It follows therefore that the plea for exemption was rightly rejected by the Appellate Tribunal. These two revision petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1967 (9) TMI 136 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d of twelve months immediately preceding the date of the winding up, they too were not entitled to any priority. The view taken by me above is however without prejudice to the Official Liquidator s right to approach, if he is so advised, the Sales Tax Authority whether by way of appeal or revision praying for the recall of the assessment orders in question and for a fresh consideration of the assessments in respect of those assessment years. Thus, for the reasons stated above, I allow this appeal in part, set aside the decision of the Official Liquidator in so far as it concerns the amount of sales tax under the assessment orders dated the 28th of March, 1964, and the 10th of August, 1964, for the assessment year 1959-60, and direct him to entertain the appellant s claim in regard thereto and to consider it in accordance with law. The appeal as regards priority fails. A copy of this judgment shall be supplied to the Official Liquidator free of charge. Appeal allowed in part.
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1967 (9) TMI 135 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cus standi to file this petition, as they are, in no way, adversely affected. He further urged that on the view expressed by this Court as to the validity of the order in question, there should not be any scope for any apprehension in the mind of the petitioners that the demand would be enforced against them. In this view of the matter, he urged that the petition is liable to be dismissed. We are of the view that this submission of the learned AdvocateGeneral is well-founded and must be accepted. On our finding that the impugned order is not binding on the petitioners and is a nullity, it is not necessary for us to quash the impugned order or to issue a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from giving effect to the order. 9.. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. We, however, direct that the respondents shall pay the costs of the petitioners. Hearing fee Rs. 150. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 11A of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 contravene Article 14 of the Constitution in so far as they affect proceedings under sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. From a plain reading of section 11(2) independently of section 11A(3). Neither section 11(2) nor section 11A(3) is violative of Article 14. A notice under section 11(2) is issued in a pending proceeding, whereas a notice under section 11A(1) initiates a new proceeding. There is a reasonable basis for classification and differential treatment of the notices under sections 11(2) and 11A(1) for the purposes of limitation.
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1967 (9) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 11(4)(a) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and consequently the notices impugned in the writ petitions from which these appeals arise are liable to be struck down and the respondents restrained from levying sales tax on the appellants for the period May 1, 1952 to October 31, 1955?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The notices issued on July 8, 1959, under section 11(4) are valid in respect of the entire period from Ist November, 1952 to 31st October, 1955. As regards the alternative contention of the respondent that the notices issued in 1955 validly initiated proceedings under section 11(4) for the period from 1st February, 1953 to 31st October, 1955, we are glad to find that the majority has accepted this contention. The irregularities, if any, in the notices do not invalidate them. However, for the reasons already mentioned, we are of opinion that the impugned notices issued on July 8, 1959, are valid.
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1967 (9) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the purchases by or on behalf of the petitioners from the cane growers in their respective factory zones were made under agreements of purchase and sale?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The establishment of new factories and the expansion of the existing factories need encouragement and incentives. The exemption in favour of new and expanding factories is based on legitimate legislative policy. The question whether the exemption should be granted to any factory, and if so, for what period and the question whether any factory has substantially expanded and if so, the extent of such expansion have to be decided with reference to the facts of each individual case. Obviously, it is not possible for the State Legislature to examine the merits of individual cases and the function was properly delegated to the State Government. The Legislature was not obliged to prescribe a more rigid standard for the guidance of the Government. We hold that section 21 does not violate Article 14.
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1967 (9) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of section 12A(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and a writ of mandamus will be issued to the respondents to comply with the refund orders set out in the petition filed before the High Court and to refrain from proceeding against the appellants under section 12A(4).
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1967 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
Whether having made the deposit even before the appeal was filed and well within the period of limitation, the assessee could be deprived of his right of appeal under section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. In the present case when the Assistant Commissioner took up the appeal for consideration, satisfactory proof was available in the shape of a certificate which even today is not denied. In our opinion the Assistant Commissioner was wrong in declining to consider the appeal in the presence of such uncontestable proof.
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1967 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the transactions with which are concerned herein this case are sales?
Whether there was any material to support the conclusion of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the final fact-finding authority, that the goods were delivered in the Madras State for consumption in that State?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The contentions of the appellant that the findings of the Tribunal about the quantum of the turnover were not based on any evidence, or that those findings were arrived at in violation of the principles of natural Justice or that the decision of the High Court is perverse, are wholly untenable contentions. At the time of the hearing no reasons were advanced in support of those contentions. Hence those contentions do not merit any detailed examination.
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1967 (9) TMI 94 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up - Appeals from orders and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc.
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1967 (9) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases and Power of Supreme Court to make rules ... ... ... ... ..... he costs of the appeal, and if such security be not furnished within such time as the court orders, the court shall reject the appeal. There was no section corresponding to section 148, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. The Privy Council held that the court had power to make fresh orders with regard to time within which the security should be furnished and thus alter the time once fixed by the court. In my opinion, that decision applies equally to the construction of section 633. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. If the default is not redeemed within the time allowed by the court, there would be a fresh default of compliance with the provisions of the Act and the court has ample power under section 633 of the said Act to grant relief against that default. In the result, this application succeeds and is allowed. The time is extended by another three months from 6th January, 1967. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1967 (9) TMI 85 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Application for ... ... ... ... ..... the board of management. Further, the petitioner has a right to seek for a rectification of the register, if her claim to be registered as a member is unlawfully and unreasonably refused by the board. In this case, articles 15 and 19 give a right of veto to the board to reject applications for transfer of shares to legal representatives and demand a sale of the same for a fair price to the existing shareholders. It is unnecessary to speculate as to what is likely to happen and how the board is likely to treat and dispose of an application for transfer, as no such application has been made so for by the petitioner. I accept the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that this petition is not maintainable. This company is practically held by members of a family and near relatives. There appears to be internal dissensions as between family members and close relations. I do not think this is a fit case for grant of costs. The application is dismissed, but without costs.
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1967 (9) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT.OF MADRAS
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... sferor company, it is obligatory that a scheme or arrangement should be proposed by that company and the shareholders put on notice of such intendment and objects and they being informed of the benefits, facilities and privileges attendant upon such an obligation. Thus, amalgamation being within the scope of the decision of the body of the shareholders, such a decision if made by the body unanimously ought not to be lightly interfered with by court. This does not necessarily mean that the consideration of public interest which always figures as a halo ought to be totally ignored. Though the Act of 1956 was silent about notice to Central Government in cases relating to such amalgamation, yet by the amending Act of 1965, a new provision, section 394A, has been introduced envisaging such a notice to Central Government. The representation which the Central Government might make obviously therefore can only be at the stage when the court considers an application under section 394.
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1967 (9) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1967 (9) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Disclaimer of onerous property, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... Company Law, second edition, at page 592, Disclaimer is.......a method whereby the members and the creditors as a whole benefit by ridding the company of something which, on balance, is a liability rather than an asset, thereby greatly facilitating the conclusion of the winding up. As it is the duty of the official liquidator, as also of this court, to see that the interests of the body of creditors and the shareholders of the company have to be safeguarded in full and as this is the primary sine qua non for the court to accept the request of the official liquidator for a disclaimer of an onerous contract, I am satisfied that, on the evidence placed before me, the contract in question is certainly onerous and burdensome and to refuse to allow the disclaimer would clearly hamper the course of the liquidation and therefore leave should be granted to the applicant to disclaim the same. Accordingly, prayer 1 is ordered and leave granted to disclaim the same by September 30,1967.
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1967 (9) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof and Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... e nor payable within the period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of the winding-up, they too were not entitled to any priority. The view taken by me above is however without prejudice to the official liquidator s right to approach, if he is so advised, the sales tax authority whether by way of appeal or revision praying for the recall of the assessment orders in question and for a fresh consideration of the assessments in respect of those assessment years. Thus for the reasons stated above I allow this appeal in part, set aside the decision of the official liquidator in so far as it concerns the amount of sales taxes under the assessment orders dated the 28th of March, 1964, and the 10th of August, 1964, for the assessment year 1959-60, and direct him to entertain the appellants claim in regard thereto and to consider it in accordance with law. The appeal as regards priority fails. A copy of this judgment shall be supplied to the official liquidator free of charge.
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1967 (9) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... in Hadley v. McDougall 1872 LR 7Ch. App. 312. C mdash 98 where Sir W. M. James L. J. observed We cannot make an order for production of documents on a person who is not a party to the suit. The plaintiff may, if so advised, amend the bill, so as to make the defendant set out all the entries himself, and he can then get the production of the originals at the hearing by means of a subpoena duces tecum. The modus operandi adopted by the petitioner to call for the documents in question to cross-examine the witness in the box is misconceived. This having been overlooked by the lower court, the learned judge exceeded his jurisdiction in calling for the records in exercise of powers under Order XI, rule 14, Civil Procedure Code. The order is vitiated by a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. I am, therefore, constrained to interfere under section 115. The order of the lower court is, therefore, set aside. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1967 (9) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up – Application for ... ... ... ... ..... terpretation of that section as urged by Sri Gupta. Sri Gupta also contended that as at the time when the order under section 18E of the Act was passed, the petitioner has acquired a vested right to pursue his petition in this court without the leave of the Central Government, unless section 18E(c) expressly or by necessary implication deprived him of that right the consent of the Central Government was not necessary in this case. The correctness of this contention can hardly be questioned but, as held above, section 18E(c) on its own terms is clearly retrospective in its effect. The second contention also therefore fails. Thus, for these reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that this petition could not be maintained without the consent of the Central Government after it passed the order under section 18E of the Act on the 22nd December, 1965, and as the petitioner has not obtained the requisite consent, his petition is liable to be, and, is hereby, dismisssd with costs.
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1967 (9) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... in the course of the winding-up proceedings also, as section 446(2)(c) clearly shows. In the result, I make the petition absolute in terms of prayers (a ) and (b). The liquidator should, if it is possible for him to prosecute the pending Supreme Court appeal on suitable arrangements being made by the creditors to put him in funds, make all possible efforts to do so. As far as costs are concerned, the costs of the petitioner as well as of the company will come out of the assets of the company in two separate sets. The shareholders who have appeared on this petition will also be entitled to their costs out of the assets of the company in a separate set. The other creditors who have appeared on this petition will, amongst themselves, be entitled to one set of costs out of the assets of the company. The winding-up order passed by me to-day should be advertised in the same newspapers in which the petition itself was advertised, and should also be published in the official Gazette.
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1967 (9) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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