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Showing 21 to 40 of 112 Records
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1969 (2) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 7. On these facts, we are unable to hold that the Labour Court committed any error in arriving at the decision that Gupta was employed on clerical work and not in supervisory capacity. The principal work that Gupta was doing was that of maintaining and writing the cash-book and of preparing various returns. Being the senior-most clerk, he was put in-charge of the Provident Fund Section and was given a small amount of control over the other clerks working in his section. The only powers he could exercise over them was to allocate work between them, to permit them to leave during office hours and to recommend their leave applications. These few minor duties of a supervisory nature cannot, in our opinion, convert his office of senior clerk in-charge into that of a supervisor. The Labour Court was, therefore, right in holding that Gupta was a workman on the date of his retirement and that an industrial dispute did, in fact, exist. 8. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (2) TMI 174 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se and Mr. Mehta has not pointed out any provision which would make the report of the Mint Master the evidence of this fact. The evidence of the Goldsmith can hardly help this prosecution. In fact, Mr. Dixit himself admitted that even after the prohibition was issued for import of gold of the type seized, on permit of Reserve Bank, Government or any private party could imprint gold with such marks. Therefore, there is no iota of evidence in the present case to prove that the gold in question was smuggled gold. The mere fact that the accused was in possession of this gold and such possession was a conscious possession because of the various circumstances mentioned by the learned Magistrate would not prove the essential ingredient of the offence that the gold in question was smuggled gold. The learned Sessions Judge was right in acquitting the accused on that ground as the charge was not brought home to the accused No. 1. , 5. In the result this appeals fails and is dismissed.
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1969 (2) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... shall reserve for later consideration the meaning of the expression "so adjust his rates".' But one thing is clear and that is that the adjustment is unilateral and that the licensee has a statutory right to adjust his rates provided he conforms to the requirements of that paragraph viz., the rate charged does not yield a profit exceeding the amount of reasonable return. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the maxima prescribed by the State Government which bound the licensee under the Electricity Act of 1910 no longer limited the amount which a licensee could, charge after the Supply Act, 1948 came into force since the "clear profit" and "reasonable return" which determined the rate to be charged was to be computed on the basis of very different criteria and factors than what obtained under the Electricity Act." , For the reasons above, these appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (2) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nk that he means that enjoyment at least for any period short of that which gives rise to prescription, if founded on a mistaken construction of a statute, binds the court so as to prevent it from giving the true construction. If he did, I should not agree with him, for whom I know of no authority, and am not aware of any principle, for so saying. In our opinion, the principle of contemporanea exposito applies to the present case. The Act was passed in the year 1888 and there appears to be a practice followed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation for a very long time of treating the land and the building constructed upon it as single unit and charging the property tax upon the owner of the land in a case where the land is let for a period of less than one year to a tenant who has constructed a building thereon See Ramji Keshavji's case, 56 Bom. L.R. 1132 . 6. For the reasons expressed, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1969 (2) TMI 171 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... whitening brought about by Tinopal is a chemical process is of no consequence because that is not the criterion upon which entries in the notifications under the U.P. Sales Tax Act are to be interpreted. With effect from 1st April, 1960, washing materials were separately listed in another notification under section 3-A of the Act but until then Tinopal can very well be regarded as a chemical. If an article falls in a specific classification of washing materials it would cease to belong to the general category of chemicals. In the assessment years in question, which are 1958-59 and 1959-60, there was no separate classification of washing material and, therefore, Tinopal would be covered by the entry chemicals of all kinds . By the Court For the reasons contained in our respective judgments, we are of opinion that in respect of the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60, Tinopal would be a chemical liable to tax at the rate of one anna per rupee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (2) TMI 170 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essee supplies dynamo, suspension, gear, etc., because the contract separately refers to a payment of Rs. 800 for dynamo, suspension, gear, etc., per coach, but the revenue has made no attempt at any stage to disassociate this clause in the contract from the remaining part of it, and has pressed its case on the basis that the entire contract is one for the sale of whole coaches. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter into that question here. The assessee is entitled to its costs which I would assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. By the Court We answer the question referred to this court as follows The sum of Rs. 5,87,265 does not represent the turnover of sale of railway coaches by the assessee to the railway authorities but is an amount received by the assessee under a works contract and is not taxable. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (2) TMI 169 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 10th April, 1961, it appears that the assessee admitted before him that it manufactures sodium silicate by chemical process. According to one of the definitions of the word chemical any substance which is produced by a chemical process is regarded as a chemical. As already stated above, the assessee manufactures sodium silicate by chemical process and sells it as a chemical. The mere fact that sodium silicate does not take part in a chemical reaction in the manufacture of soap does not make it any the less chemical. I would, therefore, reframe the question to read Whether sodium silicate is included in chemicals of all kinds appearing at item No. 7 of Notification No. ST-905/X dated 31st March, 1956 and would answer it in the affirmative. By the Court Our answer to the question, as reframed by us, is in the affirmative. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall get costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (2) TMI 168 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble, but that is not taking a meal it is making a meal of the eatable or eatables. No one who goes to the restaurant run by the assessee and asks for being served a meal will accept singly or collectively any of the snacks or preparations enumerated earlier sold by the assessee. In our judgment, the sale of any of the articles sold by the assessee did not constitute sale of any meal . The sales were of cooked food , which is exempt from tax under item No. 9 of Schedule I. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the first question is that the word meal as used in Schedule I, item No. 9(b), means the food which one takes at regular times of the day at a breakfast, dinner, supper, etc., that the articles sold by the assessee taken singly or collectively do not constitute a meal and that sale is not a sale of a meal. The second question is answered in the affirmative. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (2) TMI 167 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee does not appear and produce its account books action under section 21 may be taken against it. The memorandum dated March 13, 1962, similary informs the assessee that if it does not produce its account books on the date mentioned therein the assessment for the year 1957-58 would be reopened under section 21. Those notices were never intended to be notices under section 21. In fact, it was subsequently on March 24, 1962, that a notice in the usual terms was issued under section 21. The two preliminary notices, not being notices under section 21, cannot be taken into consideration while computing the period of limitation for assessing the escaped turnover. The second question is answered in the negative. Accordingly, we answer the two questions as follows Question No. (1) In the negative. Question No. (2) In the negative. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Questions answered in the negative.
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1969 (2) TMI 166 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as a part of the price but in addition to such controlled price. Therefore, a specific notification was made that the buyer would pay sales tax apart from the controlled price. So the considerations which applied to the case of a free buyer and a free seller, do not apply to a case where the transaction is controlled by law. We have therefore to take into account the facts and circumstances and the law relating to each matter we shall then be able correctly to decide the character of a receipt whether it is a trading receipt or not this is not a pure point of law but a mixed question of fact and law. We are of opinion, on the facts and circumstances of this case and on the law applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case that the receipt in question is income under the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, and we answer the question in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (2) TMI 165 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... laneous petitions by the State also deserve to be dismissed. Apart from the question of delay there is no substance in these applications. A long drawn process of reasoning on which there may be two views, is sought to be placed before us, to prompt us to review our earlier judgment dated 30th January, 1968. In that judgment we settled the formula for refund of local tax in so far as the transactions therein covered the period prior to 1st October, 1958. We have however made it clear in our judgment in these proceedings, as to when and how refund of local tax has to be ordered. The principles set out by us and the indications given are sufficiently exhaustive. It is no longer necessary for us to review our judgment dated 30th January, 1968. In the absence of any allegation about discovery of new or important matter, nor about a mistake apparent on record, the applications for review are not even maintainable. They are dismissed with costs Rs. 35 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (2) TMI 164 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eedings under this Act, shall be treated as confidential. The only exception is when such a statement etc. is sought to be used for the purposes of a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code, that the bar of section 26(1) becomes inapplicable. So far as the present proceedings are concerned, they are not those as covered by section 26(3). Therefore, in view of the clear language of the statute, the lower appellate court could not require the department to produce the original statement of Chandu Lal. The decision in Ram Murti s case(1), on which the lower appellate court has relied, has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a case, where the application for cancellation of licence was held not to fall within the ambit of section 26. For the reasons recorded above, I allow this petition, set aside the order of the lower appellate court permitting the original to be summoned from the department. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1969 (2) TMI 163 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... law merely adds the obligation to enter into such a tie between the parties indicated there. It may even specify the terms, such as price, on which the agreement will take place. Regulation is still found to be subsidiary in such cases when the character of the transactions is examined. The transactions may take place within the limits set by, or even as a consequence of, a regulatory order. They are, however, sales in ultimate analysis. The case before us is governed by the ratio decidendi of the latter type of cases. The dividing line between the two types of cases may appear to be very thin sometimes, but it is there. I, therefore, answer the questions before us in the affirmative. By the Court Upon the reasons contained in our respective judgments, we answer the questions referred in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is also assessed in the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (2) TMI 162 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assessments in view of the wide disparity in electricity consumption from mill to mill for the required quantity of oil yield. Be that what it may, it is plain knowing it for certain, that the turnover depends on various factors and circumstances peculiar to the rotaries concerned, the taxing authority rested their conclusions on the tests carried in other rotaries. The basis furnished by tests conducted in other undertakings cannot be of much relevance for the purpose of these mills about which it cannot be said that they are similarly circumstanced in all respects. As the data relied upon by the assessing authorities, which is made the basis of best judgment assessment, thus smacks of arbitrariness, the best judgment assessment is liable to be set aside. The orders are therefore quashed. It is, however, open to the authorities to proceed afresh in accordance with law. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1969 (2) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, cloth given by the syndicate to its members on payment was a sale within the meaning of the U.P. Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The contention which has been pressed before us is that the syndicate and its members or shareholders happened to be one entity. Thus there could be no sale by one entity to itself. This point does not appear to have been agitated before the departmental authorities. Moreover the facts as they appear in the various orders are altogether meagre about the constitution of the syndicate. It is not even clear whether it got itself registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. In the absence of proper facts which could be established before the departmental authorities by the assessee the contention that the syndicate and its members constituted one entity cannot be entertained at this stage. On the findings on which the High Court based its conclusion it is not possible to hold that any other answer could have been returned to the question referred.
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1969 (2) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a registered dealer, who had his head office at Nagpur, under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, continued to be a registered dealer in Madhya Pradesh, formed on November 1, 1956, after the reorganisation of the States if his business was partly carried on in the area which went to Maharashtra State and partly in the area which formed part of the new Madhya Pradesh?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Conclusion in the present case is that the respondent cannot be treated as a registered dealer in the new State of Madhya Pradesh on the strength of the registration certificate issued to the respondent before coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act as no place of business in that area was specified in the registration certificate.
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1969 (2) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese ore by the non-applicant were in the course of inter-State trade and therefore exempt from tax under the old Act or were intrastate sales in this State and therefore liable to tax under the old Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. On the facts and circumstances of this case the sales of manganese ore by the appellant were in the course of inter-State trade and, therefore, exempted from tax under the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and the question of law referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the appellant and against the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh.
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1969 (2) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent is entitled to the exemption under section 5(2)(a)(vi) of the Act in the context and setting of the language of sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The appellants are right in their contention that the ginning process is a manufacturing process. It is true that cotton in its unginned state contains cotton seeds. But it is by a manufacturing process that the cotton and the seeds are separated and it is not correct to say that the seeds so separated is cotton itself or part of the cotton. They are two distinct commercial goods though before the manufacturing process the seeds might have been a part of the cotton itself. There is hence no warrant for the contention that cotton seed is not different from cotton. It follows that the respondent is not entitled to deduct the sale price of the cotton seeds from the purchase turnover under section 5(2)(a)(vi) of the Act. In our opinion, the assessing authority was right in holding that the respondent was not entitled to deduction in respect of cotton seeds sold by it to registered dealers. It is conceded that the assessing authority had already granted deduction under section 5(2)(a)(vi) so far as ginned cotton is concerned.
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1969 (2) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
If the escapement of turnover was a special matter such action should be taken within the period provided by the rule. It may be that the case before the learned Judge involved a question of escapement of turnover but there can be no manner of doubt that in the present appeals before us the previous decision of this court in State of Kerala v. M. Appukutty [1962 (10) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] would be fully applicable - Appeal allowed.
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1969 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
GOODS SUPPLIED TO OUTSTATION CUSTOMERS BY RAIL FREIGHT TO PAY — FREIGHT PAYABLE DEDUCTED FROM CATALOGUE PRICE — FREIGHT WHETHER PART OF SALE PRICE — WHETHER TO BE INCLUDED IN TURNOVER
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