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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 63 Records
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1970 (1) TMI 72
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... ... ..... s no agreement to sell the raw materials. It was stressed that since the assessee itself recorded the transaction as sale in its accounts the sales tax authorities were justified in treating the transaction as such. The manner of recording a transaction in the books would not make the transaction in law a sale. The assessing authority could prima facie treat that transaction as a sale on that basis, but when the facts have been determined the legal character of the transaction would depend upon them and not upon the label put upon it by the parties. We would answer the question as follows Under the circumstances of this case, the supply of materials by the assessee to its constituent units for the manufacture of shoes and boots was not sale, and hence was not liable to sales tax under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The assessee would be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 100 in each case. The counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (1) TMI 71
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... ... ..... requisites as used in the aforesaid notification. On the finding of fact ingoor and sindoor are not used for beautifying the face or the body. Their use is confined to married women, only for the purpose of indicating their married status. In view of such use, it can hardly be said that ingoor or sindoor would answer the connotation of the phrase toilet and cosmetics . The view of the Judge (Revisions) that these articles would not be within entry 10, namely, dyes, colours and compositions thereof has not been challenged before us. In our opinion, the Judge (Revisions) took a correct view of the law when he held that ingoor and sindoor would be taxable as unclassified items under section 3. We answer the referred question as follows Ingoor and sindoor are taxable under section 3, and not under section 3-A. The assessee would be entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100 one set of costs. The counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (1) TMI 70
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... ... ..... rule 10-A and section 8(4) of the Act are clear and unambiguous and are mandatory. Therefore, without complying with those provisions by furnishing the C form in original or its duplicate in the circumstances stated in the section and the Rules, an assessee cannot get the benefit of taxation at a lower rate. In the instant case before us, since the assessee has not produced and furnished the C form in respect of the sale in question, before the Commercial Tax Officer, the Tribunal erred in directing the taxation of the sale at a lower rate after taking an indemnity bond from the selling dealer. We, therefore, allow this revision petition, set aside the order of the tribunal and restore the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, upholding the order of the Commercial Tax Officer taxing the turnover at 7 per cent. The revision petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Assessee will pay the costs to the Government. Advocate s fee is Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1970 (1) TMI 69
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... ... ..... observation at page 350 that When he (Sales Tax Officer) is posted to a circle, he becomes automatically the assessing authority for that circle. We also approve of the observation of Manchanda, J., in the case of M/s. Agarwal Vastra Bhandar Misc. Case No. 51 of 1962 decided on 17-8-1966. that The provisions of section 2(a) read with rule 6 constitute the Sales Tax Officer the assessing authority for making any assessment under the Act. 10.. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Sri Merh acquired jurisdiction to make an assessment under the Act on his initial appointment as Sales Tax Officer, Kheri, under the notification of 21st March, 1953, and he retained that power when he was posted as Sales Tax Officer in Kanpur circle on his transfer from Deoria. 11.. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, and direct that the writ petitions shall now be laid before the Bench concerned with this opinion and answer. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (1) TMI 68
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... ... ..... r and directed the Sales Tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. The Judge (Revisions) obviously exercised his suo motu power in favour of the assessee and the assessee can have no grievance against it. As a result of the order passed by the Judge (Revisions) in the exercise of his suo motu power, the assessee got the relief to which he was entitled and at the same time the interest of the revenue was protected inasmuch as a fresh assessment could be made without the bar of limitation contained in section 21(2). On the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be held that the Revising Authority was not justified in exercising its suo motu power. The two questions raised by the assessee may be questions of law, but as the answer to these questions is obvious and admits of no doubt whatsoever, we do not think that it is a fit case in which we should call for a statement of the same. The application is dismissed with costs which we assess at Rs. 50. Application dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 67
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... ... ..... e himself would constitute the trade. It has been seen that neither of the authorities below applied their mind to the provisions of the Central Act. They have not recorded the requisite findings on the various factual aspects of the matter. It is apparent that the Central Act differs in the matter of allowable discount from the U.P. Act, but the effect of that difference cannot be adjudged at this stage because the material and relevant facts have not been found. The effect will have to be adjudged by the authorities below after they have found the facts. We answer the question as follows There is a material difference in the matter of allowable discount between the Central and the U.P. Sales Tax Acts. Its effect will depend on the findings on the various factual aspects of the matter. The assessee will be entitled to two sets of costs, which are assessed at Rs. 100 (rupees one hundred) each. The counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. References answered accordingly.
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1970 (1) TMI 66
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... ... ..... could do so. This is well accepted. Here is a case in which the petitioner applied on false data for a higher quota, but ultimately he could get only the normal allotment. Be that as it may, it is not denied that the assessee utilised only the actual quantum granted by the Director of Industries and Commerce in his business and such a quantum has been duly accounted for and reflected in his regular books of account maintained by him. That being the conclusion of the Tribunal, which is essentially a question of fact, we are unable to interfere merely on a suspicion on which only the argument rests that the petitioner ought to be penalised on the ground that the accounts are unacceptable and that there has been an escapement of assessment. This is not a case in which section 16(2), or the text of it, warrants a reopening of the concluded or closed assessments on the ground of escapement thereof. No other question of law arises.The tax cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 65
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... ... ..... r dated 1st April, 1969, passed by the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes as contained in annexure 5 must be quashed. C.W.J.C. 345 of 1969 is accordingly allowed and the said order is quashed. The case is remitted back to the Superintendent, Commercial Taxes, Purnea, for rehearing of the objection filed by the petitioner-company and for deciding it afresh in accordance with law in the light of this judgment. It will be open to the petitioner-company to file a new objection petition with reference to the last notice dated 1st April, 1969 (annexure 5/a). Respondent No. 1 is directed thereafter to pass a fresh order and take action under section 21(2) of the Act, if necessary, and to amend or revoke the notice dated 1st April, 1969 (annexure 5/a). Since the notice under challenge in C.W.J.C. 158 of 1969 (annexure 1) was withdrawn, this case has become infructuous it is dismissed as such. There will be no order as to costs in either. S.N.P. SINGH J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1970 (1) TMI 64
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... ... ..... ng Act has inserted a new provision, namely, section 8-A in the Central Sales Tax Act. Sub-section (2) of the said section states that save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1), in determining the turnover of a dealer for the purposes of this Act, no deduction shall be made from the aggregate of the sale prices. In other words, the only deduction that could be made from the turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act is the amount provided under sub-section (1) of section 8A and no other deductions. The deductions provided under rule 6(4) of the Mysore Sales Tax Rules are not applicable to the Central Sales Tax Act by reason of sub-section (2) of section 8A of the Central Sales Tax Act. The said section has been made expressly retrospective. Therefore, the cost of the packing materials is liable to sales tax and the petitioner is not entitled to the deduction thereof. For the above reasons, this revision petition fails and is dismissed but without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 63
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... ... ..... l Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. v. The Punjab State 1964 15 S.T.C. 624.. It would, thus, appear that the Financial Commissioners have fixed a period of 90 days within which their revisional jurisdiction may be invoked. The aforesaid period, in my opinion, is not so short as can be deemed to be unreasonable so as to render the right of approaching the Financial Commissioners in revision illusory. The language of sub-section (3) of section 21 of the Act, reproduced above, shows that though a power is vested in the Financial Commissioner to revise an order of the Commissioner on the ground that it contains an erroneous decision on an important question of law, there is no obligation imposed upon him to entertain a revision even if he considers the same to be belated as having been filed more than 90 days of the date of the decision or the order of the Commissioner. This reference is answered accordingly. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (1) TMI 62
Whether section 20A of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, is within the competence of the State Legislature?
Whether an order may be made under section 20A for depositing with the State Government an amount collected by a registered dealer from his constituent to recoup himself for payment of sales tax under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, which amount according to law then in force, the constituent was not liable to pay?
Held that:- Appeal must be allowed and the petition of the assessee must be granted. It is declared that sub-section (3), (4) and (5) of section 20A are ultra vires the State Legislature. As a corollary thereto sub-sections (6) and (8) shall be deemed invalid. The assessee will be entitled to its costs in this court and the High Court
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1970 (1) TMI 53
Removal of Director ... ... ... ... ..... elf and it was after being satisfied that he passed the impugned order of recall from the Corporation. In the matter of appointment of respondent No. 9 as Deputy Principal Secretary, respondent No. 3 had no hand except that in references to the Public Service Commission, the attention of the latter was drawn by the State Government to the confidential report given by this respondent. Mr. Kuldip Singh did not seriously press the argument about the applicability of article 311 of the Constitution and rightly so. Recall from foreign service was not a reversion within the meaning of the said article nor was the recall by way of any punishment. It was in the discretion of the State Government to allow the petitioner to continue on foreign service or not and the period of such service could be terminated at any time. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is partly allowed as indicated above. In view of the divided success of the parties, I leave them to bear their own costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 51
Payment for exported goods, Application of Customs Act ... ... ... ... ..... tion, which is in contravention of the Rules or the Forms prescribed under the Rules, may be" penalised under section 23 of the Act, but such contravention will not attract the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. Under section 23A of the Act, only a breach of restrictions imposed by section 12(1) of the Act is to be deemed to be contravention of restrictions imposed by section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. An incorrect declaration in contravention of the Rules made under section 27 of the Act is not to be deemed a contravention of any restriction imposed by section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. It is, therefore, quite clear that, in these cases, the imposition of the penalties under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act was totally unjustified. Consequently, these appeals are allowed with costs, and the orders of the Adjudicating Officer, and the Board imposing the penalties under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, are set aside. Penalties, if recovered, shall be refunded.
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1970 (1) TMI 38
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... cessions. I accept that, and the criticism of Ian that it implies. But I also accept Ian as a witness of sincerity and if repentance is genuine, it is not nullified by being tardy. In my judgment, there is now no justifiable ground for Brian having such a lack of confidence in Ian as to support the making of a winding up order. Mr. Settle accepts that this is not a case of deadlock, nor of exclusion I have rejected the existence of the alleged agreement for sharing profits equally Mr. Settle accepts that the refusal to employ Brian is not enough per se, and in any case I have rejected it as having any weight Mr. Settle very properly says that he does not make too much of the bank episode and I do not accept that Ian is proposing to run the company for his own benefit. Even if one goes outside the four corners of the petition, in the end Brian is left with complaints which in my judgment are wholly insufficient to support the petition. The petition must therefore be dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 29
Whether the two bags had been thrown from the flat of Chokshi or from the flat of any of the other tenants of the building and who could have thrown them?
Held that:- It was obvious that whoever threw the bags had reasons to hide the gold at least temporarily while the search was going on. Chokshi naturally denied that he had thrown these bags, but he admitted that the other bag which was found in the balcony of Mody's flat was his. His explanation was that Chandchankar had probably thrown the gold since he was making enquiries about the price of gold from him. He admitted that the slips of papers on which the amount of gold was written were in his handwriting but he said that he had written them to find out the price of gold which presumably Chandchankar had for sale. All this clearly demonstrates that it must have been accused Chokshi who was responsible for throwing the bags. By throwing the bags he cannot get rid of the possession of gold which under the law makes him responsible under the Gold Control Act and the Customs Act.
The High Court and the Presidency Magistrate righlty believed the prosecution case and have deduced on circumstantial evidence that it must have been Chokshi who threw the bags from the window of his lavatory at the back of the flat since it was directly above the place where the bags had fallen and in the course of falling has killed a pigeon nesting there. They disbelieved the version of Chokshi that it was Chandchankar who could have thrown the gold. The reasons given by the High Court in support of accepting the prosecution version are very convincing and, in fact, they leave no room for doubt whatever. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 28
Customs - Animal feed or compound animal feed - Liability to export duty - Promissory estoppel - Connotation of
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1970 (1) TMI 27
Exemption notification - Mistake in wording - Effect - Held ... ... ... ... ..... authorities determined the rubber component in these articles and found that it was less than 40 per cent and granted exemption. Perhaps a mistake was committed in the notification in mentioning rubber component for rubber.compound . That is no reason for holding the petitioner liable. The removal from the factory by the petitioner was admittedly at a time when the notification Ext. P1 was applicable that is during the period 26-5-1967 to 30-6-1967. The second notification Ext. P2 which superseded Ext. P1 does not purport to act retrospectively nor does it state that it is a correction notification. On the other hand, it contains the preamble that it is in supersession of Ext. P1 notification. This can have effect only after the date of its publication. I therefore see no justification for the demand Ext. P3 and the orders Exts. P5 and P7 cannot be sustained. I set aside Exts. P3, P5 and P7 and allow this original petition. I direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 26
Claim of the income-tax department and of the sales tax department for priority in the collection of their dues
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1970 (1) TMI 25
Whether, on a proper construction of section 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the Income-tax Officer ceases to have the power to impose a penalty under that section, once an appeal has been filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, against the assessment which gave rise to the initiation of penalty proceedings
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1970 (1) TMI 24
Refusal of registration of the assessee-firm - admission of minor in partnership ... ... ... ... ..... any flaw nor any difficulty in interpreting clause 6 of the instrument of partnership. The words regardless of such losses can only mean that if one of the two businesses results in loss and the other in profit, the minor would be entitled to her share of the profits in the business which resulted in profit in accordance with the shares specified in the instrument of partnership, but not the losses suffered in the other business. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the income-tax authorities or the Tribunal that the manner in which the partners have actually divided the profits and the losses in this case is not in accordance with the shares specified in the instrument of partnership. In our opinion, registration has been wrongly refused to the assessee-firm for all the assessment years. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The department shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
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