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1970 (12) TMI 79
... ... ... ... ..... me Court were suggested, in our view, against the background of these facts. Moreover, in the explanation to section 2(g) of the Madras Sales Tax Act of 1959, it is clearly stated A society (including a co-operative society), club or firm or an association which, whether or not in the course of business, buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods from or to its members for cash, or for deferred payment, or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration, shall be deemed to be a dealer for the purposes of this Act. This shows that the facts in the Madras case were widely different from the facts we are dealing with in this reference. In these premises, we are of opinion that the applicant was not a dealer in the relevant assessment year in respect of coke-breeze and stores and our answer to the reframed question is in the affirmative and in favour of the applicant. Each party will bear and pay its own costs. Roy, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (12) TMI 78
... ... ... ... ..... ation is not known, whether or not the applicant knew this cancellation, it had accepted from the purchasing dealer declaration forms which did not contain the purposes of purchase. In proper cases, as in the case of Durga Sree Stores 1964 15 S.T.C. 186., such declaration forms might not have been fatal. But when declaration forms of this nature are issued by a dealer whose registration admittedly has been cancelled, the omission to mention the purposes of purchase cannot be treated lightly or considered negligible, particularly in the context of the transactions prior to cancellation which have already been considered by us. In these premises the authorities, in our opinion, had justifiably refused to entertain the claim for deduction. Our answers to both the questions referred to us are, therefore, in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Roy, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (12) TMI 77
... ... ... ... ..... ion, if any, given in the statute or, in the case of a taxing statute where the word is not defined, from its use in popular parlance. In this context, it may also be borne in mind that when the Saurashtra High Court decided the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court judgment in Ramavatar s case 161 12 S.T.C. 286 (S.C.). was not delivered and the case does not appear to have been decided in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramavatar s case(1). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was in error in holding on the strength of that decision that Bengal light matches and paper caps are not fireworks within the meaning of entry 44E of Schedule C. Our answer to the question referred to this court for its opinion, therefore, is that Bengal light matches and paper caps are covered by entry 44E of Schedule C to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 15. The opponent-assessee to pay costs of the reference to the State of Gujarat. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (12) TMI 76
... ... ... ... ..... lso three years earlier, that is, during the year 1961-62. The learned counsel for the department appearing before me did not contest this proposition. This alone is sufficient for the disposal of this writ petition. Admittedly the burden was on the department to show that the assessee was a dealer. Again admittedly there was no material whatever collected by the department even during the ex parte private enquiries made by it that the assessee sold any of his manufactured goods or the material, that was imported by him during the course of his business, in the year 1961-62. That being the case, there was no jurisdiction with the Assessing Authority to assess the assessee to any sales tax under either of the two enactments, for that year. For the reasons given above, therefore, I agree with Narula, J., that this petition must be accepted and the impugned order of assessment quashed. I order accordingly. The assessee will have his costs from the respondents. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 75
... ... ... ... ..... e not separately of any use. When the bottle is opened, most of these articles are destroyed, and the value of the material which may remain undestroyed is so insignificant that it is not possible to assume any intention of sale between the petitioner and the retail dealer. 7.. We are, therefore, of opinion that no sales tax was chargeable upon the packing material used in the process of bottling. Accordingly, we allow both these petitions and set aside the orders of assessment passed by the Sales Tax Officer and the orders of the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax dismissing the petitioner s appeal against the orders of assessment. The assessment of sales tax having been set aside, the penalty also is set aside. The petitioner will get his costs of both these petitions from the respondents. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each case, if certified. The security for costs deposited by the petitioner in both these cases shall be refunded to him. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 74
... ... ... ... ..... re made compulsorily and at prices controlled without any option on the part of the assessee either with regard to the quantities or the prices at which they have to be supplied. That means there is no volition or choice on the part of the assessee with regard to the fundamentals of a sale transaction. If that is so, from the discussion of the Supreme Court decisions, particularly the decision in Chittar Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1970 26 S.T.C. 344 (S.C.)., it is clear that the transactions relating to the turnover in question did not become sales exigible to any sales tax. Accordingly we hold that the petitioner is not liable to pay sales tax on the turnover of Rs. 4,82,986.12. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the assessing authority as confirmed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to the extent indicated above is quashed. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner in this writ petition. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 73
... ... ... ... ..... ength of Punjab Registration Certificate and the balance goods worth Rs. 36,067.99 were imported goods. In the order of the Appellate Authority, it is stated that In the present case, the goods were sent on consignment basis to places outside the State of Punjab for sale. The despatch of goods on consignment basis does not constitute sale because there is no transfer of property in goods for a valuable consideration. It is, therefore, clear that all through the stand taken was that the despatch of goods on consignment basis for sale does not amount to sale. We have already held that the correct view is that sale of goods on consignment basis does amount to a sale and the view taken by me and Harbans Singh, J. (as he then was) is the correct view. For the reasons recorded above, we allow this petition and quash the orders, annexures A and B. In case the petitioner has deposited the amount of tax, it may be refunded to him. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 72
... ... ... ... ..... advancement of textile technology, it is now possible, without using the warp and the woof pattern to produce tape, by holding the threads together lengthwise by using gum. To a casual look, the product resembles a tape which has been woven in the normal sense on the loom. But it is not the appearance alone, but what is necessary for weaving is that threads are bound together in order to produce a pattern of fabric or tape. In State of Madras v. T.T. Gopalier and Another 1968 21 S.T.C. 451., this court expressed the view that the term weaving will include also weaving of threads into interlocking patterns. It went on to observe that it cannot necessarily be restricted to weaving on a loom, using the warp and woof pattern of thread, and that any form of using threads so as to evolve a pattern and make them into a product of utility will fall within the definition of weaving . We share this view. The tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (12) TMI 71
... ... ... ... ..... ich the purchase tax is sought to be levied are the purchases of three motor trucks. With regard to these purchases, we have already quoted the findings of the Tribunal as found in para. 34 of its judgment. These findings contain some findings of facts and it is evident from them that the trucks constitute capital assets and that there is nothing in the record of the case to show that they were purchased with the initial intention of making profit. Since the first question is confined only to these purchases, and since no other purchase of articles, such as building materials, are involved in the facts of this case, our answer to question No. (1) is in the negative. In view of this answer, question No. (2) does not arise to be considered. We, therefore, dispose of this reference accordingly. In view of the answer, which we have given to question No. (1), it is ordered that the applicant shall bear the costs of the respondent in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (12) TMI 70
... ... ... ... ..... be clearly entitled to the amount and the remedy of suit would obviously be a costly and a cumbrous remedy, we see no reason why a direction for the refund of the amount to the petitioner which has been realised from it without the authority of law, should not be made. This view finds full support from the decision of their Lordships reported in The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another v. Bhailal Bhai and Others(1) and The State of Kerala v. Aluminium Industries Ltd.(2) 14.. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The notice dated 1st September, 1969, issued by the Sales Tax Officer (annexure A) is quashed on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to issue the said notice. We also direct the respondents to refund the amount of Rs. 7,000 to the petitioner which was deposited by him in pursuance of the direction of the Commissioner dated 8th May, 1968. We leave the parties to bear their own costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 69
... ... ... ... ..... e Code of Criminal Procedure states that the court passing a sentence of fine may take action for the recovery of the fine in the manner prescribed therein. The power to recover the fine is, therefore, circumscribed by the limits of the power to impose a fine. 10.. We, therefore, hold that by resorting to the procedure under section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate designated under section 13(3)(b) of the Act, in the absence of any other provision, cannot recover any amount as if it were a fine, in excess of the limits prescribed under section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The warrants issued by the second respondent for the recovery of the amounts in the instant cases being in excess of his powers, must be held to be without jurisdiction. 11.. For the reasons stated above, these petitions are allowed. The recovery warrants issued by the second respondent are quashed. 12.. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 68
... ... ... ... ..... les them to recover this sale price as an arrear of land revenue. But, in the view we have taken of the third ground, no sales tax was payable in respect of those sales and, therefore, neither section 64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, nor section 82 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, can be called in aid to sustain the steps taken for recovery of Rs. 24,455.30 as part of the sale price for bamboos extracted during the years 1962-63 to 1966-67 and salai wood extracted during the years 1962-63 to 1967-68. 9.. The result is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. The communications dated 2nd September, 1968, and 9th September, 1968, and the notice of demand dated 19th September, 1968, are quashed and the respondents are directed to desist from recovering the aforesaid amount as sales tax from the petitioner. The respondents shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the petitioner to whom the security amount shall be refunded. Hearing fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 67
... ... ... ... ..... of refund of Rs. 8,965.23 by instituting a suit. We are clearly of the opinion that the said amount is being withheld from the petitioner without any authority of law. We are further of the view that as the writ petition was filed within three years of the date when the mistake became known to the petitioner, there is no ground for refusing relief to it. 18.. In the result, we quash that part of the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, made on 30th October, 1965, whereby he rejected the claim of the petitioner to concessional rate being charged for the sales of Rs. 96,959 and assessed the tax on these sales at the rate of 10 per cent. We also direct the respondents to refund that amount of tax to the petitioner which was deposited by it in pursuance of the aforesaid direction in excess of the concessional rate of 2 per cent. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 66
... ... ... ... ..... eal and revision under the Act which it did not avail of and this petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on that ground. The remedy by way of appeal and revision provided under the Act is an adequate opportunity and the petitioner should have followed the same but in the circumstances of this case I find that the impugned order was passed by the Assessing Authority without observing the principles of natural justice and is, therefore, without jurisdiction. I have no hesitation in quashing the same in this writ petition even if the petitioner did not avail of the remedies provided under the Act. For the reasons given above, this petition is allowed with costs and the impugned order of the Assessing Authority dated 30th January, 1968, is quashed. It will, however, be open to the Assessing Authority to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law and the rules on the subject bearing in mind the observations made above. Counsel s fee Rs.100. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 65
... ... ... ... ..... orising such assessments. The State Legislature by enacting section 24 of the amending Act, has declared that those assessment orders, notwithstanding the declaration of any court, must be held to be valid. The Legislature has not removed the cause of its ineffectiveness or supplied power to assess the dissolved firm at the time when the said assessment orders were made. A court s decision must always bind the parties unless the basis of the decision is removed by the Legislature. No such thing has been done by the amending Act. Therefore, we hold that section 24 of the Mysore Sales Tax (Amendment) Act (9 of 1970) in so far as it purports to validate the invalid assessments made on dissolved firms prior to 1st April, 1964, is ineffective. 13.. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed. The impugned assessment orders dated 23rd January, 1969, are quashed. 14.. The petitioner will get the costs of these writ petitions. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one set). Petitions allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 64
... ... ... ... ..... er should straightaway, on behalf of the Federation, put the goods on board the ship. But that does not make the sale as between the Federation and the assessee an export sale or a sale that occasioned export. Counsel for the assessee invited our attention to Ben Gorm Nilgiri Plantations Co., Coonoor v. The Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ernakulam 1964 15 S.T.C. 753 (S.C.). and the Coffee Board v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, and Another 1970 25 S.T.C. 528 (S.C.). from which he read out observations as to what is meant by an export sale which occasioned export. The actual decision in either of those cases is not in favour of the assessee. Nor do we think that the observations help him in the light of the view we take of the facts in this case. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 50. Following this decision, the other writ petitions, which are of the same pattern, are also dismissed with costs counsel s fee in each Rs. 50. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (12) TMI 63
... ... ... ... ..... itigation. In this case the Tribunal clearly committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record as a result of which it did not exercise its jurisdiction to hear the appeals on merits. If the writ application is dismissed and we wait for the disposal of the reference applications still pending before the Tribunal, it would take a long time for disposal of the appeals on merits. As in our view the conclusion of the Tribunal is erroneous in law it is in the interest of all that the appeals pending before the Tribunal should be quickly disposed of. We accordingly overrule the preliminary objection. 10.. In the result, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 8th June, 1970, is quashed. All the fifteen second appeals shall be deemed to be pending before it. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of those appeals within three months from today. The writ application is allowed but in the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs. PATRA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 62
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ision is based on the fact that the suit is filed under Order 21, rule 63, by a decree-holder against a successful objector who has not interfered with the insolvency proceeding or hampered or affected prejudicially the administration of the insolvent s estate by the insolvency court. That decision cannot apply to the facts of this case where the company in liquidation is sought to be subjected to a decree for the suit amount. On a due consideration of the matter I am of the view that, having regard to the object underlying section 446 of the Companies Act, which is one to prevent all litigations against the company in liquidation except with the permission of the company court, leave of the company court is necessary for a proceeding initiated by a defendant under Order 8-A. In that view the order of the lower court rejecting the petitioners application under Order 8-A has to be upheld. The civil revision petition, is therefore, dismissed but, in the circumstances, no costs.
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1970 (12) TMI 61
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... ested to apply for winding-up orders which may be passed after hearing the parties interested specifically on this question in each of the two cases. In the result, I dismiss each of these two applications with one set of costs to the objecting creditors represented by Mr. R. Gulati in the case of the Premier Motors and one set of costs to the creditors represented by Mr. Bharatji Agarwal in the case of the Credit Motors as these creditors appear to have borne the main burden of opposition to the schemes. The interim orders are vacated. The payments made so far towards the liquidation of the debts during the pendency of these proceedings will, of course, be treated as a discharge of the liabilities to the extent of payments made. As regards the allotment of shares of Auto Hind Industries, it will be open to the Premier Motors to buy back these shares at par only after the remaining liabilities towards the depositors to whom the shares have been allotted, have been discharged.
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1970 (12) TMI 60
Whether the appellant was not entitled to file an appeal against the order of the company judge directing sale of leasehold rights of the Golcha Properties (P.) Ltd. (in liquidation) in the land belonging to the appellant?
Held that:- The exercise of the power under section 457(1)(c) of the Act to sell the immovable and movable property of the company by public auction or private contract would certainly fall within the ambit of the rule 103 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 which expressly provides for issuing of a notice of the summons to the petitioner on whose petition the order for winding up was made. It is implicit that if the directions which have to be given by the court would affect any person prejudicially he must be served with a notice of the summons under the general rule of natural justice and that no order should be made affecting the rights of a party without affording a proper opportunity to it to represent its case. The High Court was thus clearly in error in not entertaining and deciding the appeal preferred by the appellant who was the owner of the land in which leasehold rights said to have been created by her in favour of the company in liquidation were sought to be sold. Appeal allowed.
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