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Showing 21 to 40 of 81 Records
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1971 (12) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
words 'considers it necessary' - meaning of the word 'consider' is 'to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch), to look attentively, to contemplate mentally, to think over, meditate on, give heed to, take note of, to think deliberately, be think oneself. to reflect'
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1971 (12) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pellant in the High Court under s. 5 of the Limitation Act and to condone the delay in filing the three appeals. In the result, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated August 18, 1966 and allow the appeals. The applications filed by the appellant under S. 5 of the Limitation Act are allowed. The High Court will take up the three appeals on its file and dispose them of according to law. The appellant will pay the taxed costs separately of the first respondent and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in all these three appeals in this Court. The appellant will also pay the separate costs of respondent No. 1 and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 as taxed by the High Court in all the proceedings filed by the appellant under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. It is needless to state that the High Court will consider the question of giving a very early disposal to the appeals. It is open to the High Court to give appropriate directions regarding the land acquisition amount. Appeals allowed.
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1971 (12) TMI 105 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Mr. M.C. Chagla on behalf of the assessees. (pages 652-653) The situation so far as the M.P. General Sales Tax Act is concerned is, in no way, different. Clause (iv) of section 2(r) makes it clear that as soon as a registered dealer sells the goods to a consumer or an unregistered dealer, the tax becomes exigible, and it cannot be recovered on subsequent transactions as the State loses its authority to impose such a tax. 10.. Having considered carefully all the provisions of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and the decisions cited above, we do not find any lacuna in the provisions of the State Act and, in our opinion, the contention of Shri Chaphekar that the tax cannot be recovered because no stage has been prescribed under the Act cannot be sustained. 11.. For the abovesaid reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100. The balance, if any, of the security deposit, after deducting costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 104 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent as made in the trade name is invalid. It is also before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, as pointed out by them, at the fag end of the arguments, that this contention was raised. This is not, however, an incurable irregularity. Under section 38A of the Act, no assessment made or order passed by any officer or authority under the Act, shall be set aside merely on account of any defect or irregularity in the procedure relating thereto, unless it appears that such defect or irregularity has in fact occasioned material hardship or failure of justice. As already stated, the petitioner-assessee has been submitting himself to the assessment as the sole proprietor of Hameedi Confectioners and has been taking necessary steps and the irregularity in issuing the assessment order in the name of his firm had not caused any material hardship or failure of justice to the petitioner. On the above grounds, the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 103 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t required to include in its turnover the purchase of cotton when it was not the last purchaser thereof irrespective of the fact that cotton seeds remained with it. This is the basis on which the decisions in all these cases proceed. These observations, if I may say so with respect, are in accord with the dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases noticed above. I, thus, see no infirmity in the judgments under appeal before us to warrant interference. I would, accordingly, dismiss all the Letters Patent appeals (detailed in the opening part of this judgment) and allow Civil Writ No. 96 of 1971. The impugned orders in the latter case are quashed. The assessing authority will, however, be at liberty to make fresh assessments in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in the light of the observations made above. I would, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs in all these cases. HARBANS SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Appeals dismissed. Petition allowed.
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1971 (12) TMI 102 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tioners, therefore, will not be completely exempted from assessment. The assessment order must, however, be quashed as it is an integrated order comprising not only the transactions for this period in between the petitioners and the Hirakud Motors, but also other transactions. We accordingly quash the impugned assessment order annexure-B dated 8th February, 1963, and direct the opposite party No. 1, the Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela Circle, to re-assess and recompute the tax by excluding the aforesaid transactions between the Hirakud Motors and the petitioners. Assessed tax relating to these transactions, if paid, be refunded to the petitioners. 4.. In the result, the writ application is allowed as indicated above. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the impugned order and a writ of mandamus be issued directing the opposite party No. 1 to make reassessment and recomputation. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1971 (12) TMI 101 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Assessing Authority purports to have acted clearly provides that before imposing the penalty the Assessing Authority has to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the dealer. Admittedly, in the instant case no notice was issued to the petitioner against the action proposed to be taken under this provision of law, nor was he heard on that matter. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the imposition of penalty on the petitioner is not valid and the demand notice so far as it relates to the amount of penalty cannot be enforced against the petitioner-firm. The petition is, accordingly, accepted to this extent. Thus, in our opinion, the order of imposition of penalty under section 16(1)(c) was passed without a reasonable opportunity having been given to the dealer. We will, therefore, answer this part of the question in the negative. The reference is answered as indicated above. The department will pay costs to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (12) TMI 100 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wanted to levy a higher rate of tax on bricks under section 3-A. This court held that the State Government was not competent to do so. The Legislature came to the aid of the State and made repeated attempts to justify its action. This by itself cannot be said to be an act of bad faith. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P.(1) has observed that it is for the Legislature to decide on what objects to levy what rate of tax. In V. Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India(2), the Supreme Court, no doubt, observed that the classification with regard to the tax. ability and the rate of tax made by the Legislature must be reasonable. But it went on to add that it is for the Legislature to determine the objects on which the tax should be levied and the rates thereof . In the circumstances I would uphold the validity of section 3-AB even though I am doing so reluctantly. By the Court The petitions are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the delivery by the respondent-Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.-hereinafter referred to as the assessee-to the Railway Board of railway coaches models 407, 408 and 411 is liable to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The difference between the price of a coach and the cost of material can only be the cost of services rendered by the assessee. The only difference as far as coach model No. 411 is concerned is that in that case the wheelsets and underframes are not supplied free of cost but otherwise there is no essential difference in the terms. This does not make any difference to the result.
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1971 (12) TMI 89 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts,Adjournment of winding up petition, Advertisement of petition
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1971 (12) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order, Winding up – Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation, Winding up – Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc.
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1971 (12) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Meeting and Proceedings – Length of notice for calling meeting ... ... ... ... ..... The adoption of this language in section 171 is significant and shows the intention of the legislature to exclude the day on which the service was deemed to be effected and the day of the meeting. Reference to section 53(2) while interpreting section 171 as urged by Mr. Chopra, has, therefore, no justification. Length of notice of general meeting of companies is an important subject and the courts have been interpreting the relevant words in the provisions dealing with it, with a remarkable unanimity, and, now when as we have held above, the 1956 Act has not introduced any change, we would better adhere to the settled rules, which we must say with respect have been properly settled. The question posed accordingly must be answered in the affirmative. The day of service of the notice of the general meeting and the day of the meeting have to be excluded, while counting twenty one days the period of notice prescribed under section 171 of the 1956 Act. Costs shall abide the event.
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1971 (12) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... No. 1 is decided in favour of the official liquidator, whether a concluded agreement of sale came into existence with Nagar Mal Jaipuria ? (3)Whether the offer of the applicant stood revoked and the sum of Rs. 10,000 became refundable to him on the expiry of one month from January 18, 1971 ? Issue No. 1 I do not see how the question of jurisdiction arises. The petitioner is now seeking from this court a direction that the sum of Rs. 10,000 should be directed to be refunded to the petitioner. In fact it is he who wants the assistance of this court to direct the official liquidator to repay the said sum. Issue No. 2 This has not been argued. Issue No. 3 In view of my above finding, since the sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid as earnest money by the petitioner and the petitioner had not paid the balance as agreed but defaulted to complete the contract, the said amount is not refundable to him as claimed. In the circumstances, the petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150.
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1971 (12) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... redeemable bonds which they are entitled to receive under the scheme of amalgamation with this further direction that it should be so done after carrying out the prescribed procedure, if any, under the Companies Act. (e)The transferee company do within thirty days after the date of the order cause a certified copy of the order to be delivered to the Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, for registration. (f)Direction with regard to the dissolution of the transferor- company must be obtained from the Bombay High Court. (g)Liberty is reserved to the parties to the scheme of arrangement embodied in the scheme of amalgamation to apply to this court for any direction that may be necessary in regard to the carrying out of the scheme of arrangement and amalgamation sanctioned to-day. The petitioner to bear its own costs and pay one set of hearing fee to the Government of India, as they were entitled to the statutory notice. Other parties to bear their respective costs. Order accordingly.
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1971 (12) TMI 47 - ITAT DELHI-A
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... ... ..... hese parties advanced amounts to the assessee. Hence we cannot uphold the addition of Rs. 25,000, we are to allow the payment of interest to these parties. 6. The next contention of the assessee was with regard to payment of bonus of Rs. 840. It was stated by the counsel for the assessee that this bonus was payable according to the trade practice and that the books of account had been produced to show that bonus had been credited in the personal accounts of the employees to whom the assessee was to pay the bonus and that ultimately the bonus had been paid in the next year. Besides the fact that the amount was small, we find that after debiting the amount to profit and loss account, the assessee credited the bonus in the accounts of the employees and there is evidence to indicate that the bonus had been paid. Thus the addition of Rs. 840 as had been disallowed by the AAC can not be said to be appropriate and hence we delete the addition. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1971 (12) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Export of coir yarn ... ... ... ... ..... efore when in the declaration rupee payment is shown it is not in the prescribed manner and therefore there is a violation. Apparently the scope of Section 12(1) is not properly appreciated in urging this contention. The requirement in that section is that the dealer should affirm in the said declaration that the full export value of the goods will, within the prescribed period be paid in the prescribed manner . There is no case that there is no affirmation in the declaration. The statement as to rupee payment is made to the customs authority and that is in pursuance of the contract Ext. P1. No contravention of Section 12(1) can be spelt out in these circumstances. Therefore there is no case for any action under Section 113 and 114 of the Customs Act, 1962. The penalty imposed on the petitioner and the fine imposed in lieu of confiscation are, therefore, unjustified. As a consequence, I quash Ex. P6 order of the first respondent. The Original Petition is disposed of as above.
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1971 (12) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Ship stores - Consumption on board the vessels ... ... ... ... ..... this argument cannot be sustained. Mr. Sen referred to the provision of Chapter XII which is, in my opinion, not applicable in respect of the stores on board of the foreign going vessel. We are concerned here whether the consumption of goods on board of a foreign going vessel is liable to pay duty. There is no doubt that Sections 91 to 99 are applicable in respect of all goods which are coastal goods as defined under section 2 (7) but the definition of coastal goods does not apply to stores which are on the board of a foreign going vessel to be consumed during the carriage of the coastal goods . 9. In the circumstances, therefore, in my opinion, Mr.. Deb s contention must succeed and the rule must be made absolute. The impugned order is set aside, and the respondents are restrained from giving effect of the circulars dated 5th May, 1966 and 23rd May, 1966 as against the petitioner. There will be no order as to costs. The operation of the order is stayed for the three months.
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1971 (12) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Value - `Value' under Exemption Notification - Meaning ... ... ... ... ..... entral Excise Rules, exemption is granted in respect of excisable goods from the whole or any part of duty leviable on such goods. That means that the goods should be both excisable goods and be leviable with the duty. Therefore, the value for purposes of exemption from duty is the real actual value after the duty has been paid and calculated and not the deemed value of Section 4 of the Act for the purposes-of duty . Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules is a part of the Act by virtue of Section 38 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 22. In that view of the matter, I dismiss this appeal. The order of the learned Judge is upheld in its entirety including his observations on matters covered by the cross-objection. 23. The cross-objection is dismissed. 24. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal and the cross-objection. 25. There will be stay of operation of this judgment and the interim order granted by the Appeal Court will continue until the 31st January, 1972.
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1971 (12) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether firm continued to employ the looms in the factories after December, 1956 when direct purchases of the manufactured cloth were suspended?
Held that:- From account books it was seen during the course of personal hearing that yarn was supplied on various dates between July, 1956 to April, 1957 (even after December 1956) of the total value of ₹ 54,776-2-9 to M/s. Chintamani Wvg. Mills. In addition cash advances were made on different occasions between these dates amounting to ₹ 12,875,00. The total payments made by the factory to your firm amount to ₹ 60,211-3-6. There are no accounts to indicate that the individual factory owners were charged for any expenditure on account of baling or for transport. It passes comprehension why a commercial concern engaged with profit taking motive should first advance large sum of monies to the individual factory owners, receive their entire production supply sized beams of yarn, get the cloth processed at Bombay, make sales and charge no forwarding commission, on baling expenses and no transport charges.
Under these circumstances, unable to agree with contention that you ceased to employ looms from the individual factories after December, 1956.
The conclusions of the Assistant Collector and of the Collector which are identical that one out of the 16 units of factories manufacturing cloth on behalf of the appellant was a licensed one are amply supported by evidence on the record and have not been shown to be vitiated by any legal error nor has any grave injustice been shown to have resulted thereby to the appellant. On these conclusions there can be no doubt that appellant is a manufacturer within the contemplation of the Act and the exemption under item (10) of the notification dated March 1, 1956 or under item (7) of the notification dated Januray 5, 1957 is not available to the appellant. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Activity For Profit, Advancement Of Object Of General Public Utility, Income Tax, Road Transport Corporation
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