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Showing 61 to 80 of 159 Records
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1971 (8) TMI 99
Appeal - Investigation - Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... hat the adjudication itself suffers a gross irregularity affecting the merits in so far there was clear breach of principles of natural justice. 22.So far as the third point raised by Mr. Dutt is concerned when on my findings made hereinbefore, the onus itself was not lawfully, imposed on the petitioner, it would be unnecessary for me to consider whether on the materials produced by the petitioner, the tribunals below were still right in holding that such onus had not been discharged. 23. On the conclusions as above this application succeeds and the impugned order of the Collector and the appellate and revisional orders therefrom are hereby set aside. The Rule is accordingly made absolute. Let a writ in the nature of Certiorari do issue quashing the aforesaid order. The respondents, however, would be at liberty if they so decide, to readjudicate the matter in accordance with law. Let the operation of the order remain stayed for a period until one week after the long vacation.
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1971 (8) TMI 98
Show Cause Notice showing one ground for confiscation and penalty but confiscation and penalty imposed on different grounds illegal
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1971 (8) TMI 97
Valuation - Trade discount ... ... ... ... ..... , the short levy cannot be recovered under Rule 10. The learned Central Government Counsel, however, contended that the short levy is recoverable under Rule 10A and any deficiency in duty in the event of short levy can be recovered without limitation of time but only in those cases where the Central Excise Rules do not make any specific provision for the collection of the deficiency in duty. The power under Rule 10A is a residuary power which has to be exercised in cases not falling within Rule 10. If any short levy is due to circumstances mentioned in Rule 10, the deficiency has to be recovered under Rule 10 and not under Rule 10A. As the recovery of the short levy under Rule 10 has to be made within three months of the payment of the duty, the demand notice made years after the payment of duty is clearly illegal and deserves to be quashed. 4. Accordingly, the demand notice directed against the petitioner. Annexure B to the petition, is hereby quashed. No order as to costs.
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1971 (8) TMI 96
"Excisable goods" become "non-excisable" after exemption. - Taxable event for payment of excise duty - Scope of. - Penalty and confiscation
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1971 (8) TMI 95
Assessment Year, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... test. But, that allegation was denied by the department in their counter-affidavit. The appellants have not adduced any evidence to show that the return in question was submitted under protest. We have gone through the return submitted by the appellants. There is no mention in that return that it was made under the protest. There is no other evidence to show that the return in question was made under protest. The contention that the return was made under protest does not appear to have been taken before the appellate authority. Therefore, there appears to be no merit in the plea taken by the appellants. If the said return was not made under protest, then it is a return submitted in response to the general notice under section 19(1) of the Act. That being so, the assessment made is a valid assessment as held by this court in Deva Prasad Barua s case, referred to earlier. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 94
Agricultural Income Tax Act, Appeal To Supreme Court, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... n was affirmed by the Board of Revenue. The decision of the Board of Revenue was challenged before a single judge of the High Court in a Writ Petition under article 226 of the Constitution. The learned single judge allowed that application and quashed the impugned orders holding that it was open to the assessee to change the option as regards the method of assessment. But in appeal the Division Bench set aside the order of the learned single judge and dismissed the writ petition. Against that order, this appeal has been brought. Quite clearly the order appealed against does not come within the scope of section 133(1)(a). The issue before the High Court was incapable of valuation. That being so, the High Court was not justified in granting a certificate under article 133(1)(a). Hence we revoke that certificate and send back the case to the High Court for a fresh consideration as mentioned earlier. We make no order as to costs in this appeal. Certificate revoked. Case remanded.
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1971 (8) TMI 93
Whether on the admitted and undisputed facts any tax could be levied under section 121 of the Adhiniyam on the company whose factory for manufacturing sugar was situate outside the jurisdiction of the Zila Parishad?
Held that:- The High Court was of the view (which appears to be unexceptionable) that the word "operation" covered the purchase of wool as raw material for use in manufacturing carpets and that such a purchase was an operation carried out in the course of its business by a person or firm which manufactured the carpets. We are unable to see how any assistance can be derived from the above case for the purpose of deciding the meaning of the word "carrying on business" used in section 121(a) of the Adhiniyam.
The contention of the Zila Parishad, if accepted, would lead to the astounding and extraordinary result that if a manufacturing concern continuously acquires raw material not only from different parts of India but also from other parts of the world it could be said that it was carrying on business in all those places from where the raw materials were acquired or purchased. We are unable to give any such wide connotation to the words "carrying on business", employed in section 121(a) of the Adhiniyam. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 92
Whether the notification dated November 3, 1942, imposing octroi within the limits of the Sonepat Municipality became applicable by reason of the provisions contained in section 5(4) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 ?
Held that:- The High Court was wrong in holding that the municipality was competent to levy and collect octroi from the appellants by reason of the provisions contained in section 5(4) of the Act. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeals are allowed. The applications of the appellants are allowed and writs of mandamus will go to the respondent municipality restraining the municipality from levying against and collecting from the appellants any octroi in respect of raw materials, components and parts imported by the appellants into the factory of the appellants. Appeals allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 91
Accepting Partition, Accounting Year, Agricultural Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... tion has been expressed with sufficient clarity in order to make it enforceable. The only contention advanced in this appeal on behalf of the appellant was that, as the Agricultural Income-tax Officer had not passed any order under section 29 of the Act, recording that the family in question is a divided family, that family must be deemed to be an undivided family. This contention has no basis. As seen earlier, the Appellate Tribunal has recorded a decision that the respondent family was divided even before the commencement of the accounting year 1956-57. The Appellate Tribunal has all the powers of the assessing authority. Hence, its order should be considered as an order under section 29. For the reasons mentioned above we dismiss this appeal. The respondent is not represented in this court. At our request Mr. S. T. Desai assisted us as amicus curiae. We are thankful to him for the assistance given to us. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 90
Whether the family must be deemed to be an undivided family?
Held that:- It is not necessary for us in this case to decide whether that intention has been expressed with sufficient clarity so as to make it enforceable. Suffice it to say that, in this case, the family sought to be taxed was non-existing in the concerned previous years and, hence, cannot be considered as a Hindu undivided family " being assessed for the first time ". That being so there is no room for application of the " deeming " provision in section 29(3).Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 89
Whether the notices issued by the Expenditure-tax Officer under section 16(a) of the Act illelegal?
Held that:- It is no doubt true that the impression created by the notices which were issued and the correspondence which followed between the assessee and the Expenditure-tax Officer was that the notices had been issued under section 16(a) of the Act, but, in the writ petitions and the returns which were filed, both sides were quite clear that the matter was not confined only to clause (a) of section 16(1) and clause (b) figured prominently. We are unable to see that the notices which had been issued were confined only to the terms of section 16(a). It is not disputed on behalf of the assessee that if the matter was covered by section 16(b), they would be perfectly valid. The pleadings in the writ petitions covered both clauses of section 16 and, in any case, the Expenditure-tax Officer had made a positive averment that the information with regard to the expenditure incurred by the assessee's wife became available to him only on 5th May, 1962. Thus, the notices which were issued on that date relating to the assessment years 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 were within the period of four years which was the limit prescribed with regard to action under clause (b), the limit being more in respect of clause (a). In our judgment, this concludes the matter because it was nowhere controverted in the High Court that the requisite information came into the possession of the Expenditure-tax Officer only on 5th May, 1962. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 88
Whether the interim payment received by a former holder of an estate under section 50(2) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act 26 of 1948) whose estate vested in the Government under section 3 of the Act was of capital nature and not liable to tax ?
Held that:- Appeals allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside, the writ petitions are allowed and the concerned Income-tax Officers are prohibited from including the interim payments received by the petitioner under section 50(2) of the Act in his assessment.
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1971 (8) TMI 87
Assessment Year, Notice Of Reassessment, Original Assessment, Statutory Agent ... ... ... ... ..... se, nor the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate in which it was held that section 3 of the Act gives an option to assess the total income of either an association of persons or the members of the association individually. On the other hand, in S. Inder Singh Gill v. Commissioner of Income-tax the original assessment was on the agent and the reassessment proceedings were initiated against the principal, as in the present case. It is true, no objection was raised that such a procedure could not be adopted and no decision rendered. But it seems to have been assumed that reassessment proceedings could be taken against the principal even though the original assessment was made against the agent. For all the above reasons, we answer the second question by stating that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the reassessment proceedings could not be initiated against the assessee direct in this case. The parties will bear their own costs of the reference.
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1971 (8) TMI 86
Income From Other Sources – Whether the professional fees received after the assessee's death is taxable under the head income from other sources - it seems that preconditions for issuing the impugned notices as contemplated in section 147 of the Act were there - Application dismissed
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1971 (8) TMI 85
Firm carrying on business in bus transport was dissolved and the buses were allotted to two partners - the written down value is nil after allowing initial depreciation - whether the value at which the partners took over the vehicles amounts to profits - whether the allotment to the partners can be treated as a sale - Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of section 10(2)(vii) were applicable to the transaction in question
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1971 (8) TMI 84
Assessee has been assessed in the status of an association of persons - Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be held that the assessment made under section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income- tax Act, 1922, was valid - Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be held that the surplus on the sale of land arose out of an adventure in the nature of trade and as such was rightly brought to tax
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1971 (8) TMI 83
1. Whether, assessee is entitled to the deduction commission paid on borrowing shares for purposes of pledging them as security with the income-tax department - 2. Whether assessee is entitled to the deduction of legal expenses - 3. Whether AAC was competent to substitute the figure of Rs. 3,73,075 as the amount of loss carried forward - 4. Whether Tribunal was right in holding that the amount of Rs. 2,00,348 represented capital expenditure and was not a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 - questions Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are answered in favour of the department and against the assessee and question No. 2 is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department
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1971 (8) TMI 82
Whether the sum of Rs. 45,380 paid to L. Gurandittamal and L. Sahibdiyal, employees of the applicant firm, is permissible deduction in computing the business income of the applicant - commission paid to the two employees was not a permissible deduction. The question whether actually service was rendered is one of fact. Since there was concurrent finding of the department and the Tribunal that no service was rendered, the expenditure is not allowable
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1971 (8) TMI 81
Recovering the balance of tax from the partner - Income-tax Officer wrote to the partner that if he paid his share of the firm's dues, the balance would not be recovered from him - steps were initiated to realise tax from others but they were held " in abeyance under executive instructions ". In this state of affairs, in our view, the learned single judge was perfectly justified in holding that the decision of appellant No. 1 to realise the balance of tax from Khanjan Lal alone was tainted with capriciousness – revenue’s appeal dismissed
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1971 (8) TMI 80
Reassessment of a Hindu undivided family after its partition - it was not previously assessed to tax - Notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act to the disrupted Hindu undivided family was without jurisdiction and it was not properly served. The said notice for the assessment year 1955-56 is hereby quashed and consequently the notice under section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is also hereby quashed and set aside. Respondents are restrained from giving any further effect to the said notices
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