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1972 (1) TMI 60
Whether assessment or reassessment proceedings can be considered to be legal proceedings as contemplated by section 446 of the Act?
Held that:- The fact that after the amount of tax payable by an assessee has been determined or quantified its realisation from a company in liquidation is governed by the Act because the income-tax payable also being a debt has to rank pari passu with other debts due from the company does not mean that the assessment proceedings for computing the amount of tax must be held to be such other legal proceedings as can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court under section 446 of the Act.
The liquidation court, in our opinion, cannot perform the functions of Income-tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax payable by the assessees even if the assessee be the company which is being wound up by the court. The orders made by the Income-tax Officer in the course of assessment or reassessment proceedings are subject to appeal to the higher hierarchy under the Income-tax Act. There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Supreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commissioner of Income-tax. It would lead to anomalous consequences if the winding-up court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assess the company to income-tax. The argument on behalf of the appellant by Shri Desai is that the winding-up court is empowered in its discretion to decline to transfer the assessment proceedings in a given case but the power on the plain language of section 446 of the Act must be held to vest in that court to be exercised only if considered expedient. We are not impressed by this argument. The language of section 446 must be so construed as to eliminate such startling consequences as investing the winding-up court with the powers of an Income-tax Officer conferred on him by the Income-tax Act, because, in our view, the legislature could not have intended such a result. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (1) TMI 45
Whether the appellant is not guilty of any contravention of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act and cannot be subjected to the penal provisions of the said Act?
Because the firm is not a legal entity, it cannot be a person within the meaning of Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act or of Section 167(3), (8) and (37) of the Sea Customs Act, is equally untenable?
Held that:- The High Court thought that there is no definition of goods in the General Clauses Act and that contained in the Sale of Goods Act and which excludes money is inapplicable inasmuch as that Act was much later statute than the Sea Customs Act. It is, however, unnecessary to consider this aspect because even if the currency notes are not goods, the restrictions prescribed in Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Act cannot be nullified by Section 23A thereof which incorporates Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act.
The High Court was clearly right in holding that once it is found that there has been a contravention of any of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with Sea Customs Act by a firm, the partners of it who are in-charge of its business or are responsible for the conduct of the same, cannot escape liability, unless it is proved by them that the contravention took place without their knowledge or they exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention.
The charges and expenses incurred in connection with the despatch found in the entries in the books of account of the firm were the same as those relating to the offending package which was being despatched to Hongkong. The freight mentioned in the account slip is the exact amount which appears on the consignment note in respect of that offending package. The amount sought to be sent is half a lakh of rupees which can hardly be within the means of the Cashier, leading to the inescapable inference that the firm through its partners was concerned in the attempt to transgress the restrictions under Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and liable to penal action by virtue of Section 23A under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. On these facts as established and in our view rightly that it was not unreasonable to infer that it was the firm which was interested in sending the currency notes out of India in a clandestine manner.
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1972 (1) TMI 44
Notice Of Reassessment, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... gs for reassessment. But the Supreme Court observed that the words reason to believe in section 34(1A) of the said Act suggested that the belief should be of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and the Income-tax Officer might act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. But the facts of the instant case before us, in my view, are entirely different. In this case there is the positive evidence of one of the alleged creditors which makes the disclosure made by the assessee at the time of the original assessment untrue. If on that evidence the Income-tax Officer acts and forms the belief it cannot be said that the Income-tax Officer is acting unreasonably or on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. In the aforesaid view of the matter I would hold that the conditions precedent for the issue of the notice under section 148 of the Act have been made out and would dismiss this application without any order as to costs.
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1972 (1) TMI 43
Agricultural Income Tax, Income Tax Act, Retrospective Operation ... ... ... ... ..... that angle it is quite clear that Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. and Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. are intimately connected with the assessment of the year under appeal. The Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. filed the return and the matter was being proceeded with but in the subsequent stage the assessment was made on Turner Morrison. It further appears that Turner Morrison preferred appeals against the appellate order to the Tribunal as agent of the Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. which was subsequently withdrawn. In the premises I am of the opinion that the direction given by the Assistant Commissioner while setting aside the assessment against the Turner Morrison Company cannot be said to be a direction to any persons in its widest connotation. In the circumstances as aforesaid, the point raised by Dr. Pal must fail and the rule is hereby discharged. There will be no order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. Operation of the order is stayed for eight weeks.
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1972 (1) TMI 42
Income Tax, Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... e question, though raised before it, that the share of profits of the trust had been paid to it in accordance with the partnership deed. Without a decision on this question by the Tribunal it is not possible for us to answer the question referred. The only course, therefore, open to us is to send back the case to the Tribunal for a finding on this question. The course we have adopted is justified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gurbux Rai Harbux Rai 1971 81 ITR 476 (SC). We, therefore, ask the Tribunal to decide the question whether the division of profits, so far as the trust is concerned, was in accordance with the partnership deed and thereafter submit a better statement of the case to this court so that the question of law that has been referred to us can be properly answered. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 8th February, 1972. The Tribunal will then fix a date for the purpose. The costs will abide the event.
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1972 (1) TMI 41
" (1) Whether the development rebate granted cannot be withdrawn under section 155(5) of the Income-tax Act of 1961 ? (2) Whether Tribunal was right in holding that the development rebate could not be withdrawn under section 35(11) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ? " - I, answer question No. 1 in favour of the assessee and against the department. I answer question No. 2 also in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department
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1972 (1) TMI 40
Levy Of Penalty u/s 271(1) - When concealment was discovered by Appellate Assistant Commissioner, whether Inspecting Assistant Commissioner can levy penalty in respect of such concealed income - Tribunal is right in the view that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to impose penalty in respect of the concealed income discovered by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
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1972 (1) TMI 39
" Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper construction of the wakf deed dated, March 24, 1950, it could be said that no life interest was created in favour of the mutawalli so as to make the value thereof liable to wealth-tax in the hands of the assessee ? "
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1972 (1) TMI 38
Quantum of penalty – Act of 1922 - Act of 1961 - Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... In arithmetic equal to a particular number means not less than that particular number as also not more than that particular number. It conveys the idea that it must be exactly the same. Thus, it cannot be said that section 271(1)(i) does not prescribe the lower limit for imposing the penalty. When this section says that the quantum of penalty imposed must be equal to 2 of the tax for every month during which the default continued it means that it cannot be less than 2 of the tax for every month during which the default continues because it cannot be more. There is also an upper limit which is that, irrespective of the months of default, it cannot exceed 50 of the tax. Therefore, the answer to the third question is that the rate of 2 per cent. per month under section 271(1)(a) is absolute and it cannot be reduced. The questions referred to us are, therefore, answered as indicated above. In the circumstances of the can, we make no order as to costs. PREM CHAND JAIN J.-I agree.
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1972 (1) TMI 37
Estate Duty Act, 1953 - " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in excluding the value of the property in question from the assessment holding that the deceased was not competent to dispose of the same and that it did not pass on her death ? All that section 6 says is that the property which the deceased at the time of his death was competent to dispose of shall be deemed to pass on his death. Irrespective of the fact that the husband was the true owner of the property, there was nothing to prevent the wife a minute before her death to transfer the property. The legal title against the entire world, expecting the true owner, vested in her and she had thus the right to dispose of that right, and once that right is conceded, the property shall be deemed to pass on her death and would, therefore,be liable to the levy of estate duty under section 5 of the Act
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1972 (1) TMI 36
Credits in assessee's accounts were treated as his undisclosed income - whether the penalty has been rightly imposed under section 271(1)(c) read with section 274(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1972 (1) TMI 35
Assessee's property was attached by the Tax Recovery Officer but it was already subject to mortgage and suit was pending on it - petition is accepted and the impugned order of the Tax Recovery Officer dated June 15, 1971, a copy of which is annexure "Z" to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. The Tax Recovery Officer should await the decision of the civil suit or sell the attached properties subject to the claim of the petitioner-bank as may be found due in the civil suit. In the proclamation of sale, it is necessary to mention the encumbrances to which the attached properties, which are sought to be sold, are subject in order to enable the prospective purchasers to assess the proper value of the interest that is being sold. If the property is brought to sale, the whole claim of the bank must be mentioned in the proclamation of sale
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1972 (1) TMI 34
Reassessment to include the amount shwoen in balance-sheet as "reserve for exchange" being exchange surplus on remittance from Pakistan - Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the reassessment proceedings under section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, were not validly initiated
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1972 (1) TMI 33
Definition of "Agricultural Income" – provisions of state Agricultural Income-tax Act were amended in 1964 to bring it on par with the definition in Income-tax Act - Whether the amendment with retrospective effect was valid - whether the proviso in the amending act validated assessments on the basis of original definition was valid
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1972 (1) TMI 32
Depreciation not claimed in the returns - If during the assessment proceedings, the Income-tax Officer comes to know of the relevant particulars for granting depreciation, the Income-tax Officer must give effect to it and allow depreciation
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1972 (1) TMI 31
Whether, “on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the order under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was null and void for the assessment year 1957-58 ? " - since the provisions of section 35 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and section 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 are substantially the same, the Income-tax Officer had the jurisdiction under Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 to pass the rectification order. The order cannot become null and void simply because it was made under section 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961
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1972 (1) TMI 30
Diversion of Income, by Overriding Title - assessee purchases business assets from Government with an agreement to pay ten per cent. of the net profits to the Government - hold that the amounts payable for the assessment years in question in pursuance to clause (7) of the agreement are on the basis of a paramount right created by the contract between the parties and they are liable to be deducted under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1972 (1) TMI 29
Expenses for legal proceedings to reduce tax liability - Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the expenses totalling Rs. 6,312 are an admissible charge against the income of the previous year – held that reasonable expenditure incurred honestly in connection with the proceedings would be an admissible charge against the income of the relevant year
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1972 (1) TMI 28
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directing the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after issuing a proper notice under section 23(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment year 1960-61 – held that Appellate Assistant Commissioner was correct in exercising the power under s. 31(3)(b) and the Tribunal was justified in upholding that order
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1972 (1) TMI 27
Business of the manufacture and sale of sugar - contributions to a scheme for raising average yield of sugarcane - direct benefit to the business carried on by the assessee - enduring advantage - Tribunal was not right in holding that the contribution of Rs. 24,000 made by the assessee to the Development Council was not an allowable deduction under the Income-tax Act
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