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Showing 21 to 40 of 85 Records
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1972 (2) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y Land Improvement Schemes Act. Sub- section (2) of section 23 deals with anything done or intended to be done under the above mentioned Act by a public servant or a person duly authorized under the Act. It has no application where something is done not under the Act even though it has been done by a public servant who has been entrusted with duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the above mentioned Act. The impugned acts of the appellants in the present case were not in discharge of their duties under the above mentioned Act but in obvious breach and flagrant disregard of their duties. Not only they did no rectification work for the Bundh which was a part of the improvement scheme, they also misappropriated the amount which had been entrusted to them for the purpose of rectification. Prayer has also been made for the reduction of the sentence, but we see no cogent ground to interfere with the same. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... triction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction. That being the position, sec. 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot apply. The result is that sec. 70 of the Penal Code is no impediment by way of limitation in the way of the recovery of the fine. It is true that the deposit was made for a particular purpose, that is, to secure the presence of the appellant at the time of the hearing of the said contempt proceedings. But the High Court, as a court of record, being clothed with a special jurisdiction, has also all incidental and necessary powers to effectuate that jurisdiction. Consequently, it had the power to order satisfaction of fine imposed by it from out of an available fund deposited by or on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant. In our view, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant cannot, for the reasons aforesaid, be sustained. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ruction to an act but a compulsion to make them act. In this view, the conviction and sentence of-the appellant Shyam Lal Sharma under sec. 342 and 353 and of appellant Udho Prasad under section 353 and 342 read with sec. 34 are justified. In so far as their conviction under section 332 is concerned, the content-ton of the learned Advocate is that the appellants were not charged with this offence and, therefore, they are en-titled to an acquittal as they are prejudiced thereby. The learned advocate for the respondent does not insist on this conviction being upheld. In any case as we are confirming the conviction and sentence under the other two sections, it is not really necessary to go into the legality of the conviction under sec. 332. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction and sentence under sec. 332 and confirm the convictions and sentence of the appellants under sections 342 and 353, Cr. P.C. The appeal except to the extent indicated is dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
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1972 (2) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the market. The Manual for Nomenclature of Aluminium Mill Products clearly proves that these cans are extruded shapes as well as pipes and tubes. This shows that these cans are known in their market, as defined in entry 27. 26. In our opinion, these cans were rightly subjected to excise duty. In this view the points raised in the connected writ petition do not require any consideration. That petition has become infructuous. 27. In the result, special Appeal No. 307 of 1971 filed by the Union of India succeeds end is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by the Union Carbide India Ltd. is dismissed with costs in both courts. Writ Petition No. 3649 of 1971 is also dismissed but without any order as to costs. Special Appeal No. 429 of 1969 filed by Messrs Geep Flashlight Industries is technically allowed. The order of the learned single judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed with cots in both courts.
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1972 (2) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
Detention orders - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. On computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was February 5, 1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention thereunder had to be made, the date of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5, 1971, has to be excluded. So done, the order of confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, thus, cannot be sustained
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1972 (2) TMI 87 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t has become due by way of tax and that does not depend on assessment proceedings or quantification of the amount. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the observation that though the tax liability cannot be enforced till the quantification is effected, the liability for payment of tax is not dependent upon the assessment. The learned Judges were called upon to decide the ambit of the word arrears in section 78 of the States Reorganisation Act. They were not dealing with the question of refund of tax. The decision relied upon by the respondents is evidently not applicable to the case before me. In the result, as there is no assessment order against the petitioner, there is no amount of tax payable by him and he is therefore entitled to claim the whole of the advance tax paid by him by way of refund. The writ petition is therefore allowed with costs and the respondents are directed to refund the amount claimed by the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1972 (2) TMI 86 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would fall within the definition of electrical goods and would be taxable at the rate of seven per cent. as provided in this notification. This contention, in our opinion, is not correct. The notification of 1962 modifies the earlier notification only to the extent of its inconsistency or repugnancy. This notification does not prescribe any rate for motor vehicles or their component parts at all so that this notification cannot be said to be repugnant or inconsistent with any earlier notification dealing with motor vehicles and their component parts. In our opinion, the earlier notification of 10th May, 1956, which prescribes a rate of six pies per rupee still applies to the turnover of motor vehicles and their component parts including batteries. In the circumstances, the proper rate applicable to the turnover of batteries is six pies per rupee. We answer the question accordingly. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (2) TMI 85 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t does not arise even under general law. But this is not a case of tax which was unascertained. The petitioner submitted his return and, even according to him, the amount payable was known to him. The authorities merely directed him to pay the said amount within a given time. There is, therefore, no uncertainty as regards the amount payable. There was a demand for payment of the amount and hence the provisions of section 16(3) are attracted. Even in the notice issued to the petitioner in B-1 form, it is specifically stated that interest is payable. This itself is a clear indication that the Legislature contemplated levy of interest even in the case of such an assessment. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to some decisions as to what is the meaning of notice of assessment. But I do not find any assistance from the said decisions. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. G.P. fees Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 84 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pursuance of a specific order and were delivered to the person ordering the goods. Of course, the position would be different if the goods had been ordered by A, had reached Delhi and were delivered to B. In that case, there would be no movement of goods occasioned by a contract of sale which may have come into being between A and the company. There is no finding by the Tribunal that when orders are placed by a customer, the company has the option to deliver the goods to the buyer as and when received at Delhi. Therefore, these observations of the Supreme Court do not at all help the learned counsel. After giving our careful thought to the matter, we are of the view that there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Bhagirath Dass. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (2) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ceeded to treat all the transactions alike. We have to, therefore, quash the assessments on this turnover with a direction that the assessing authority may determine the turnover of such transactions in respect of which the goods have been despatched by the assessee to destinations outside the State in pursuance of the orders placed by the buyer and charge them to tax under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The result is, the orders impugned herein are quashed, with a direction to the respondent to determine in respect of each of the years, the transactions wherein there is numerical similarity between the stock transfer and the ultimate delivery to the buyer outside the State, as also the transactions wherein the assessee has despatched the goods to places outside the State under the orders of Tyresoles Concessionaries (P.) Ltd., and assess them as inter-State sales under the Central Sales Tax Act. There will, however, be no orders as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1972 (2) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... documents relating thereto are endorsed by the assessees in favour of the customers in that State, it amounted to sale in the course of inter-State trade coming under section 3(b) and it is the State of Gujarat from where the movement of the goods commenced that has jurisdiction to assess the turnover and collect the tax under section 9(1) of the Act. We are in entire agreement with the view expressed in that case. We are, therefore, of the view that the transactions in question will have to be treated as interState sales coming under section 3(a) and not under section 3(b), and that, even if the sales are assumed to be inter-State sales coming under section 3(b), the State of Tamil Nadu has no jurisdiction to tax the same under the Central Sales Tax Act in view of section 9(1) of the Act. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the revision of the assessment made by the respondent is quashed. The petitioner will have its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1972 (2) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld not have exercised his mind as to whether there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time. What the Appellate Assistant Commissioner noted was that the appeal presented against the revised order was in time. It might be that in view of the notice of rectification issued on 29th December, 1961, itself, which was prior to the expiry of the period prescribed for appeal against the order dated 30th November, 1961, the petitioners had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal. But neither did they specifically seek to file an appeal against the original order of assessment nor did they ask for excusing the delay in filing the appeal against the original assessment order. The petitioners were, therefore, not entitled to dispute the turnover assessed in the original assessment order in the appeal filed by them against the revised assessment order. The revision petition, therefore, fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 80 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earned brother has emphasised that fact in the penultimate paragraph of his judgment. It has been held in Shankerjee Raut GopaIji Raut v. State of Bihar(2), that what is of importance to make the sale as one in the course of export (inter-State trade and commerce in the instant case) is that there must be an obligation to export (transport outside the State in this case)-obligation may be of the seller or of the buyer-and it may arise by reason of statute, contract between the parties or from mutual understanding or agreement between them or even from the nature of the transaction which links the sale to export. Such obligation to transport outside the State undoubtedly did arise in the transaction between the mine owners and the State Trading Corporation. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly held that the sales by the mine owners to the State Trading Corporation were in the course of iner-State trade and commerce and not intra-State sales. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (2) TMI 79 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l. It should, therefore, be considered as a non-volatile oil used for human consumption, satisfying the definition. As shown by their letters, copies of which are placed before us, the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, as well as the Board of Revenue, Government of Andhra Pradesh, have treated cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum) as an oil-seed falling under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. This shows that even the departments concerned with the taxation of these commodities have dealt with it as an oil-seed. We, therefore, find that cardamom is an oil-seed coming within section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act and as such is not general goods liable to tax at multi-sale-point in the State. The sale turnovers of the petitioners in this regard should therefore be deleted from the taxable turnover. The assessment in each case will be suitably revised. In the result, both the petitions are allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (2) TMI 78 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uch an event the assessing authority is expected to go deeper into the account books and to find out some positive and concrete material showing the understatement of the turnover. But in the absence of any positive material, the account books cannot be rejected merely on the ground that they do not disclose adequate turnover. Fall in the turnover may be due to several reasons and not necessarily due to suppression of sales. Accordingly, it is essential in such a case that some positive material should be brought on record justifying the rejection of the assessee s account books. In the instant case, no positive material has been placed on the record which can be said to be sufficient for rejecting the assessee s account books. We, accordingly, answer the first question in the negative. In view of our answer to question No. (1), it is not necessary to answer the second question. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (2) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a general result or effect of a chaff-cutter. Without them a chaff-cutter cannot work efficiently for a long time. We are thus satisfied that oil-cans and steel files are accessories of chaff-cutters and their turnover is exempt from tax under the aforesaid notification. Before parting with the case, we might observe that the revising authority has relied upon Notification No. 3615/X-950(i)-58 dated 14th December, 1961. By that notification spare parts of the agricultural implements were also added to item No. 1 of List II of the notification of 31st March, 1956, which exempted from tax the agricultural implements and their accessories. Therefore the appropriate notification, in our opinion, is the one dated the 31st March, 1956. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 100. There will be one set of costs only. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (2) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from unsplit or unprocessed foodgrains, and accordingly, nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to prevent the imposition, levy or collection of the tax in respect of the first purchases of split or processed foodgrains merely because tax had been imposed, levied or collected earlier in respect of the first purchases of those foodgrains in their unsplit or unprocessed form. The amendment is retrospective. In view of this amendment it has to be held that the split or processed dal purchased by the assessee is different from the whole dal purchased by the dal mills, so that the purchase tax can be levied on the first purchase of each of such commodity. Admittedly, the assessee was the first purchaser of the processed or split dal and was liable to pay purchase tax. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances, however, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (2) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ufacturing process is involved nor does milk in any way change. its composition. Commercially also, milk shake is not different from milk. In our opinion, milk retains its essential character even when it is sold in the shape of milk shake. Entry No. 10, which grants exemption to milk, is not limited to milk only but includes milk products. Milk shake, even if it is not milk, certainly would be a milk product. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the turnover of milk shake is exempt under the aforesaid notification. As milk is covered by the aforesaid notification, it cannot be said to be an unclassified article. We, accordingly, answer the question by saying that milk shake is not an unclassified article and the revising authority was right in holding it to be exempt from tax under Notification No. ST-3506/X dated 10th May, 1956. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. There shall be one set of costs only. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (2) TMI 74 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the effect of the above sub-section was to make rule 25C a part, of the Act itself. In our opinion, the sub-section cannot override the limits of delegated legislation, namely, that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. Section 2(s)(iv), as it stood at that time, did not contain a provision that only such sales would be allowed to be deducted from the taxable turnover as were covered by a declaration as might be prescribed in the Rules any such provision contained in the Rules could only be treated as directory, as was done by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Orissa case(1), referred to above. We accordingly hold that the provision of rule 25C with regard to the year 1961-62 was only directory and not mandatory and it was not necessary to obtain declaration form for goods which had been sold to registered dealers for the purpose of resale within the State. The question is thus answered in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (2) TMI 73 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tention of the department that fresh material had been found to show that the working expenses as computed in the original order of assessment was too low. It has to be noted that the assessee returned a turnover of Rs. 15,028.00. The assessing authority in the best of judgment assessment added nearly Rs. 11,000. If the assessee had supplied refreshments to the N.C.C. Cadets of the value of Rs. 7,210, the said turnover would come within the turnover determined on the basis of working expenses and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said turnover has escaped assessment. This view of ours is supported by the decision in Footer Mal Megh Raj v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh 1971 28 S.T.C. 361. For the reasons stated above, we allow this revision petition, set aside the order of reassessment made under section 12-A as affirmed by the appellate authorities and also the levy of penalty. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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