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1972 (9) TMI 144
Octroi demand - whether the Rules did not authorise the municipality to impose octroi as the Rules only conferred that power upon the Government? - Held that:- The High Court, after having found that the petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant has suppressed a material fact, nevertheless, chose to pass upon the contentions of the appellant on merits instead of disposing of the petition on its finding on the preliminary objection. The High Court, having entered into the merits of the case and disposed it of on that basis, we do not think it necessary to consider at length the merit of the preliminary objection. Suffice it to say that it does not appear to us that omission to refer to the agreement dated September 26, 1960, can be characterized as suppression of a material fact in view of the nature of the relief claimed in the writ petition.
The appellant can take just exception only to the extent of one-third of. The amount shown in the demand notice as that alone represents the 50 per cent increase. In the result, we quash the demand notice to the extent of the 50 per cent increase.
The question whether the rest of the tax can be realised under the provisions of the Rules by issue of distress warrant does not arise for consideration in this proceeding. The appellant will be free to question the legality of any distress warrant if and when it is issued. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and it is dismissed in other respects.
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1972 (9) TMI 143
... ... ... ... ..... , Ahmedabad. The respondents are further restrained from taking any steps or proceedings against the petitioners either under the Act or under the rules made there" under in respect of the petitioners said product of gummed paper and textile wrappers. 18. We wish to make it clear that though in paragraph 13 of the petition some reference is made to the item of paper gummed tapes which are sought to be converted under Item No. 60 by reasons of the Finance Bill No. II of 1971 which came into force somewhere in 1971, we are not concerned with the paper gummed tapes which may be falling in the category of Adhesive tapes all sorts. The sole question before us is, whether the intermediate product of gummed paper was being manufactured n the petitioners’ factory at the relevant time and that is why we have confined our discussion to that item only. 19. The respondents will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioners. The rule is made absolute accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 142
Whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Deliberate and malafide conduct of not following the binding precedent of the High Court is contumacious does not unduly enlarge the domain of contempt. It would not stifle a bonafide act of distinguishing the binding precedent, even though it may take out to be mistaken. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the High Court has rightly found the appellant guilty of contempt.
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1972 (9) TMI 141
... ... ... ... ..... the department should be more alert in working out the figures and refunding the amount, if any, to the assessee. Now it is not in doubt that the amount which is provisionally paid is to be appropriated towards the tax due in pursuance of the final assessment order made. In this case, to the extent of the two amounts referred to above for which the cases were remanded, no final assessment order was passed. The provisional payments therefore made by the assessee would have to be thus worked out. If after working out, it is found that some amount has to be refunded to the petitioners, the department will see that it is refunded within two months from today. The department will naturally pay interest upon the amount found due from the date or dates on which the amounts become refundable at the rate mentioned in the relevant rule. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and a direction on the above lines will issue. The petitioners will get their costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1972 (9) TMI 140
... ... ... ... ..... ear of land revenue. I am of the view that as soon as the notice is issued to the court under section 26 in form B-6, it is the duty of the court to comply with the notice issued by the officer having jurisdiction. If the court fails to comply with the notice, it will be for the authorities concerned to invoke the provisions of section 26, such as having a charge on the properties of the court and recovering the amount unpaid as if it were an arrear of land revenue. In the result, the reference by the District Magistrate is answered in the affirmative. The respondent, Chandrasekaran will certainly have his remedies before the appropriate authority that the tax levied by the authorities was not due by him. If there are any infirmities in the assessment, it is for him to agitate the matter before the appropriate authority. In view of the orders passed in this reference, no orders are necessary on Crl. M.P. No. 2874 of 1970. Hence this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 139
... ... ... ... ..... an ordinary man regards it as a luxury or not. Dhoop and agarbatti as stated in the petition are mainly used by those who go to temples and other places of religious worship for offering prayers. These two items are within the reach of all and sundry. Their use does not give any added status to a person. In my considered opinion, none of them answers the description of the luxury goods. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Jullundur, vide his judgment dated 12th January, 1971, in another case came to the conclusion that dhoop and agarbatti could not be regarded as luxury goods. The reasons advanced by the said authority appear to be quite sound. Once it is held that dhoop and agarbatti cannot be regarded as luxury goods, then the assessment framed by the Assessing Authority cannot stand. In view of what has been stated above, these petitions are allowed and the orders, annexures A, to the two petitions passed by the Assessing Authority are quashed. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 138
... ... ... ... ..... such inter-State sales and is sought to be recovered from it under the Central Act. The difficulty of the petitioner, if at all, can be only in regard to the period between 10th November, 1964, and 9th June, 1969, but so far as that is concerned, the petitioner is amply protected by section 10 of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1969. But apart altogether from this answer on merits, it is difficult to see how the petitioner which is a limited company and hence a non-citizen can challenge the constitutionality of any statutory provision on the ground of infraction of article 19(1)(f). Vide the decisions of the Supreme Court in Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit SinghA.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1140. and British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit SinghA.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1451. These were all the contentions urged before us in support of the petition and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 137
... ... ... ... ..... the petitioner purchases the wire is engaged in the production of iron and steel. Iron and steel, as is evident from section 3-AA itself, may be in various shapes such as plates, ingots, bars, rods, etc. It can be in the shape of wires and merely because iron wires are galvanised does not change their nature. Wires are rolled into coils to facilitate their transportation. It is clear that the commodity does not change its nature from what it was at the time of production. Section 3-AA authorises the levy of tax on iron and steel only if it is sold to the consumer. The assessee having filed certificates in form III-A was not a consumer and as such was not liable to pay tax on the turnover of galvanised wire. We, accordingly, answer question No. (1) in the negative and question No. (2) in the affirmative. As both the questions have been answered in favour of the assessee, he is entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 136
... ... ... ... ..... order of this court in W.P. Nos. 550 to 554 of 1967 and to render effective and valid the original assessment orders as if they have been made under or pursuant to sub-section (1-A) of section 6 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. (2) The said section 9 likewise renders ineffective any order made by an appellate or revisional authority under the Sales Tax Act following the decision in Yaddalam s case 1965 16 S.T.C. 231 (S.C.). and renders valid and effective the original assessment orders set aside by such authority for the said reason as if the same had been made under or pursuant to sub-section (1-A) of section 6 of the Central Sales Tax Act. (3) As the demand made pursuant to original assessment orders so rendered are also rendered valid and effective, recovery of tax pursuant to such demand does not stand in need of any machinery other than or in addition to the machinery provisions already contained in the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, read with the Central Sales Tax Act.
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1972 (9) TMI 135
... ... ... ... ..... ikhan and Abdul Ruheem and Co. 1971 27 S.T.C 167., in support of his contention that in a taxing statute the popular meaning or the commercial understanding of the words should prevail in spite of the technical meaning that the words might secure by the application of the principles of geology, physics and chemistry. But in this case, the popular and commercial meaning given to the word diamond will not, in our view, take in industrial diamond, for the word diamond is normally attributed in the commercial circles to that used as a gem stone in an ornament. Normally when we go to a jeweller and ask for a diamond he would not show an industrial diamond. Therefore, in the commercial world industrial diamond has got a separate connotation from the diamonds which are used as gem stones for ornaments. In our view, the Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion in these cases. The tax cases are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 (one set). Petitions dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 134
... ... ... ... ..... he negative. In view of our aforesaid answer, question No. (2) remains only of academic importance. If the Sales Tax Officer could not go into the question of correctness or otherwise of the quarterly returns on 28th March, 1960, the statement made by the assessee in regard to the escaped turnover, which is the basis of imposition of penalty, could also not be taken into consideration on the said date. An admission does not fall beyond the purview of evidence and the question of consideration of the evidence arises only at that stage where a finding is to be recorded on a fact sought to be proved by the said evidence. It, therefore, follows that the statement on the basis of which a penalty has been imposed could not be treated as material for imposing penalty on 28th March, 1960, and our answer to question No. (2) is, therefore, in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. The fee of the learned counsel is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 133
... ... ... ... ..... at the service having been effected by affixture, he is not aware of the nature of the assessment order nor is he able to file an appeal in the absence of personal service of the assessment order. It is also pointed out that even when a request was made for a copy of the assessment order, that was rejected by the assessing authority on the ground that the service had already been effected as per law. If the petitioner has not got a copy of the order, as he was not personally served with the same, he is entitled to have a certified copy of the order from the assessing authority, even though the same has been served by affixture. The assessing authority may not be justified in refusing to supply a certified copy of the order to the petitioner, when demanded. We, therefore, direct the assessing authority to supply to the petitioner a certified copy of the assessment order dated 11th April, 1972. Subject to the above direction, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 132
... ... ... ... ..... ation to pay tax under the Act cannot be disputed and the date of grant of certificate of registration cannot arrest or shift that liability. The considerations of equity seem to have weighed with the learned Judges of the Patna High Court in the case referred to by the Additional Tribunal. Equity has no place in administering a taxing statute. We would accordingly hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that liability to pay tax under the Act would accrue only from the date of grant of certificate of registration in the facts of the case. Our answer, therefore, shall be the liability to pay tax under section 4 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act accrues as and when the condition laid down in section 4 itself is satisfied and without reference to the date of application for obtaining the certificate of registration or the date when the certificate of registration is granted. We make no order as to costs of this reference. B. K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 131
... ... ... ... ..... r as fixed by the assessing authority for the year 1965-66 was Rs. 1,15,000 and not Rs. 1,50,000. Thus the basis upon which the revising authority proceeded to confirm the assessment has turned out to be erroneous. Moreover, the assessment for the year 1965-66 was then pending in revision before the judge (Revisions). He has since set it aside and remanded the case to the Sales Tax Officer for a fresh assessment. Thus the very basis upon which the two assessments in question have been affirmed has disappeared. There is no other material upon which the assessments can be justified. We accordingly answer the three questions as below Question No. (1) in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. Question No. (2) in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. Question No. (3) in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 130
... ... ... ... ..... ction 10(d) of the Act, which rendered him liable to a penalty under section 10-A of the Act for contravention of section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. 11.. Under the circumstances and for the reasons mentioned above, we would answer the reference by stating that the dyes and colours imported on C form declaration could be held to have been used by the respondent in such a manner as to render the dealer liable for penalty for infringement of section 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. However, the authority imposing the penalty will, we hope, take into consideration our observations that the striking out of the relevant phrase by the respondent was probably an inadvertent and unintentional act for which a severe penalty need not be imposed. With these observations we return the reference to the Board of Revenue for taking the consequential action. We further direct that there shall be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 129
... ... ... ... ..... of the Act is unjustified and illegal. The facts are not in dispute and in one case the vires of the statute was challenged and in the other the point depended upon the interpretation of certain provisions of the Act and, therefore, we thought it proper to entertain the writ applications from the two assessment orders in question. 12. For the reasons stated above, C. W. J. C. 883 of 1972 is allowed and the addition of Rs. 2,39,06,588.65 in the taxable turnover of the petitioner as made in annexure 2 is struck down. C. W. J. C. 882 of IM is also allowed and the addition of the sum of Rs. 1,44,76,061.84 in the taxable turnover of the petitioner in annexure 3 is also struck down. The result of knocking down this figure is that the revised assessment order contained in annexure 3 becomes bad and the original assessment order contained in annexure 2 comes into force. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs in either. AKBAR HUSSAIN, J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 128
... ... ... ... ..... t appeal. It was for this reason that that authority directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 500 and, upon his failure so to do, rejected the first appeal summarily on 29th April, 1963. 6.. We are in agreement with the observations made by the learned Judges constituting the said Division Bench presided over by Dixit, C.J., and K. L. Pandey, J. 7.. In this view of the matter, we answer the reference by stating that under the proviso to section 38(3) of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, as it stood prior to 15th April, 1968, the part payment demanded by the appellate authority was relatable, not to the gross tax and penalty, but the net demand of tax and penalty remaining due after assessment. Let the reference be returned to the Board of Revenue for further action as may be necessary in view of the answer to the said question. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference as the respondent did not even care to appear in this court. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 127
... ... ... ... ..... he State, whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax. The view that an assessee should have a taxable turnover of Rs. 10,000 to make him liable for sales tax runs counter to the definition of total turnover in section 2(q). We, therefore, disagree with the Tribunal and hold that the respondent whose total turnover even according to the books of account is more than Rs. 10,000 for 1961-62 and 1962-63 is liable to pay tax on the turnover relating to tooth-powder. In respect of the assessment year 1959-60, it is conceded that the total turnover itself is less than Rs. 10,000 and, therefore, the Tribunal is right in setting aside the assessment. The result is that T. C. No. 288 of 1967 relating to the assessment year 1959-60 is dismissed but T. C. Nos. 286 and 287 of 1967 are allowed in part and the assessment orders so far as they relate to the turnovers in tooth-powder are held to be valid. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 126
... ... ... ... ..... under section 7(3). In the instant case, the assessment was made after initiating proceedings under section 21. The Judge (Revisions), however, relying upon the decision in Gopi Kishan s case(1), took the view that such an assessment was invalid under section 21, but was valid under section 7(3). He, therefore, tried to justify the assessment under the latter provision. In view, however, of the fact that the assessment under section 21 itself would be valid because of the decision of the Full Bench, the question whether such an assessment could be justified under section 7(3) becomes of academic importance only. It is, therefore, not necessary to answer question No. (3) either. We accordingly answer question No. (1) in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. We return no answer to questions Nos. (2) and (3). The assessee shall pay costs of this reference to the Commissioner of Sales Tax which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 125
... ... ... ... ..... ax. They may also show that the amounts so collected were utilised or spent for the purpose for which they were collected. Under sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Amendment Act, 1970, the burden of proving that no amount was collected by way of tax under the principal Act in respect of any sale of jaggery or in respect of any portion of the turnover relating to such sale effected by the assessee is cast on the assessee. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the assessments and remitting the cases to the assessing authorities for fresh disposal according to law after giving an opportunity to the assessees to adduce such evidence as they consider fit in support of their claim for exemption under section 9 of the Amendment Act of 1970. We are, therefore, satisfied that there are no grounds for interference in these revision petitions. In the result, the revision petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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