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Showing 41 to 60 of 101 Records
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1973 (4) TMI 87
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... ... ..... ilway tea stall contractors, were not exempt, or, in other words, Indian food preparations and eatables were generally subject to payment of sales tax. It was urged that even a cooked meat and fish are sold in tins, bottles or cartons. That may be true. But then, as is generally known, they are sold as meat curry, mince meat, fish curry and vegetable curry. When uncooked vegetables are sold, otherwise than in tins, they would be exempt but when uncooked vegetables, like peas, cauliflower, etc., are sold in tins, they would be subject to payment of sales tax, because of the condition mentioned in column No. 2 of entries Nos. 16 and 18. In view of the above, therefore, we feel that the taxing authorities took the correct view of the matter and, consequently, the answer to the question referred must be given in the affirmative. The assessee would pay the costs to the department in these cases. We assess Rs. 100 as counsel fee in each case. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (4) TMI 86
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... ... ..... view of the abovesaid decision, the canteen sales that took place after 1st September, 1964, will be clearly taxable subject to the operation of G. 0. No. 2238, Revenue, dated 1st September, 1964. The Tribunal has, however, held that the entire turnover relating to the canteen sales is entitled to exemption. Now that we have held following the above decision of the Supreme Court that the canteen sales after 1st September, 1964, will become taxable, the actual turnover before and after 1st September, 1964, has to be worked out, and the petitioner s liability to sales tax in relation to the canteen sales after 1st September, 1964, has to be considered afresh in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court. For that purpose, we remit the matter to the Tribunal. The tax case is partly allowed. The Tribunal is directed to consider afresh item 2 relating to canteen sales in the light of what has been stated above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (4) TMI 85
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... ... ..... ted to sales tax in accordance with the notification dated 27th August, 1959. 4.. Learned standing counsel submitted that the freight, namely, the transport charge was paid by the assessee. It may be so. That cannot make the assessee an importer of the goods. It all depends upon the terms of contract of sale between the assessee and the Patna dealer as to who was to pay the freight. The primary findings of fact recorded by the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal in their respective revisional orders clearly show that the Dumka dealer was not an importer of the goods in question it was the Patna dealer who was the importer although the goods had been transported from Calcutta to Dumka directly to the assessee. It is, therefore, plain that the reframed question must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The reference is accordingly answered. The assessee will have the costs of the reference. Hearing fee Rs. 100 only. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (4) TMI 84
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... ... ..... nt. But to support such estimate materials must be found and indicated. It must be clearly kept in view that on account of escapement, reassessment is not intended to be penal, that is, arbitrariness cannot come into quantification of the escaped turnover and, in fact, for such conduct of the assessee penalty is separately provided. In view of what we have said above, it would follow that the conclusion of the Tribunal that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case more than the actual escaped turnover could not be added, cannot be found to be a (sic) valid conclusion. The answer to the second question, therefore, shall be that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessment in question had to be confined to the escaped turnover. 9.. Since both the assessee and the revenue have succeeded in part, we direct both parties to bear their own costs of this reference. B.K. Ray, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (4) TMI 83
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... ... ..... for the manufacture of khandsari and gur-sheera on the strength of the registration certificate ..... The learned counsel for the State vehemently urged that the certificate of registration was wrongly issued by the department, because gur could not be allowed to be purchased free of tax for manufacture of khandsari as the ultimate product, namely, khandsari, was itself free of tax. This argument is not available to the State. Having issued the certificate of registration, which clearly authorised the respondent-firm to purchase gur for the manufacture of khandsari and gur-sheera free of tax, the State Government cannot turn and say that the certificate issued by the department was wrong. It may also be stated here that this plea, that the certificate was wrongly issued and was not in proper form and could not have been issued, was nowhere taken before the learned Single judge in the return filed. Consequently, we find no force in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs.
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1973 (4) TMI 82
Best Judgment Assessment, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... have rightly taken the view that, by this order, the Tribunal did not hold that the assessee had shown sufficient cause for not filing his returns. No question of law arises as is posed by these three questions. Question No. 9 is essentially one of fact and does not raise any question of law. Question No. 10 is also academic in view of the fact that both Members of the Tribunal agreed that the assessee had committed default without sufficient cause by not filing his return, and as such it was not necessary for the Members to have referred the case to the President. So far as question No.11 is concerned, it is vague and does not set out the ground on which the order of the Tribunal can be said to be otherwise bad in law. The applications are accordingly dismissed. There shall be one set of costs which is assessed at Rs. 100. Income-tax Case No. 816 of 1971. For orders in this case, see our judgment of date in the connected Income Tax Case No. 800 of 1971, dated April 9, 1973.
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1973 (4) TMI 81
Assessee is a tea company - assessee has to pay 100 % agricultural income-tax on the market value of thatch, bamboo and fuel grown in the tea estate - for income-tax purposes he can adopt the market value of these produce
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1973 (4) TMI 80
Whether appellants when they sold the rice produced out of the paddy purchased, they were entitled to exclude the turnover relating to the paddy purchased?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is a misnomer to call rice as paddy. They are two different things in ordinary parlance. Hence quite clearly when paddy is dehusked and rice produced, there has been a change in the identity of the goods. Rice and paddy are treated differently. It is true that the entries in question were brought on the statutes by notifications issued by the respective Governments, as authorised under the respective Acts. But the Acts authorised the Governments in question to either include or delete items in Schedules C and D of those Acts and it further provided that once an inclusion or deletion was made, it became a part of the law. The fact that these Acts make distinction between rice and paddy is a circumstance of great significance. Those Acts proceed on the basis that paddy is something different from rice for the purpose of sales tax.
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1973 (4) TMI 79
Whether the sales effected by the respondent in these cases occasioned import of Egyptian cotton?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. This court came to the conclusion that the purchases in question were purchases for the purpose of export and the same did not occasion export. This court did not differ from the view taken in Khosla's case [1966 (1) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. On the other hand, it distinguished that decision. Hence the rule laid down in the Coffee Board's case [1969 (10) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] is inapplicable to the present case.
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1973 (4) TMI 78
Whether, in order to recover interest under section 8(1-A) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, it is necessary for the Sales Tax Officer to make an assessment order in respect of the interest and to issue a notice of demand in respect of such interest?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is nothing in the language of section 8(1-A) of the Act which prevents the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order. Indeed, the liability to pay interest is created by the statute and the Sales Tax Officer has no discretion to grant any exemption from the payment of interest.
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1973 (4) TMI 77
Whether a State Legislature has the legislative competence to pass a law for the deposit of that amount in the Government treasury?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and arises out of confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner (see section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882). It is plain that a law compelling deposit of money wrongly realised as sales tax cannot in pith and sub- stance be considered to be a law relating to trusts. The mere use of the word "trust" in sub-section (2) of section 29-A would not make the impugned law to be one relating to trusts.
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1973 (4) TMI 51
SSI Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... articular law should come into operation. A Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 64/72 dated 27-10-1972 has construed the notification in question and observed that the notification clearly draws a line between a manufacturer who exceeds production of 100 million matches per gross of boxes of 50 matches each and those who produce below that quantity and upheld the impugned notification. I am bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. 8.It is sought to be contended by Mr. Jogayya Sarma that at the time when the petitioner purchased the factory, the department had agreed to levy duty at the rate of Rs. 3.75 ps. Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that there was no such agreement. When there is a statutory rule, there cannot be any agreement in violation of the statutory provisions. The statutory rule prevails. 9.I, therefore, find no merits in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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1973 (4) TMI 50
Warehouses - Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... f general import. The Collector could have tested the integrity of the petitioner by directing the petitioner to comply with the condition internally prescribed by the Rule itself to ensure good behaviour on the part of the licensee. No such attempt has been made. The respondent rejected the application on capricious considerations and, I do not think that the application made by the petitioner was considered in a manner known to law. Whilst, therefore, removing the order as prayed for, I direct the respondent to restore the application made by the petitioner to file and deal with it in accordance with law and in the light of the judgment as above, and particularly, bearing in mind the various limbs of Rule 140, which by themselves, ensure good behaviour on the part of licensees. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. The Collector of Central Excise shall dispose of the application within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order.
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1973 (4) TMI 49
Whether there is a reasonable nexus between the basis adopted by the assessing authority and the estimate of escaped turnover made?
Held that:- Allow these appeals, vacate the answers given by the High Court to questions Nos. (1) and (3) and answer those questions in favour of the department, i. e., that the estimate of taxable turnover under the "State Act" and the "Central Act" made by the assessing authority for the period from November 1, 1959, to October 20, 1960, on the basis of ₹ 31,171.28 as the escaped turnover for a period of 19 days was legal and justified and, consequently, the penalty of ₹ 2,000 imposed on the assessee was in accordance with law
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1973 (4) TMI 48
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the whole of the trust estate was to be included in the assessment or only a portion thereof and, if so, what portion?
Held that:- The deceased Safiabai had only one-third share in the income of the trust property. That interest undoubtedly passed on her death. In the remaining two-thirds income, she had no interest and the same did not pass on her death. Her title to the property as a trustee was purely a personal right. It had no value in terms of money. It conferred no right on her. It only imposed some duties. Such a right cannot be considered as "property". Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (4) TMI 47
Whether the value of 25 acres of wet land is exempt from levy of estate duty under section 24 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?
Held that:- From the facts set out it is absolutely clear that under the partition deed Kotamma gave up her rights to the extent mentioned earlier and in lieu thereof the other members of the family allotted to her share 25 acres of wet land to be enjoyed by her during her lifetime. It was an adjustment of rights. The contention of Mr. Rama Rao that there was " disposition " under the partition deed---the contention which has appealed to the High Court---appears to us to be an erroneous one. A partition is not a transfer in a strict sense. It is an adjustment of the rights of the various members of the family. We see no reason why we should not place the same interpretation on the word " disposition " in section 24 of the Act.
Appeal is allowed. The answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it is vacated and in its place we answer that question in the negative and in favour of the revenue.
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1973 (4) TMI 46
Failure To File Return ... ... ... ... ..... (Income-tax Reference No. 50 of 1968 decided by Ansari and Kapur JJ. on December 21, 1972). After going through the entire case law, the learned judges were of the opinion that the Tribunal could not reduce the penalty to an amount which was below the minimum prescribed under section 271(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This opinion was expressed upon the question Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in law competent to reduce the penalty levied under section 271(1)(a) to a figure lower than the sum equal to 2 of the tax for every month during which the default continued but not exceeding in the aggregate 50 of the tax ? The question is almost identical to the question which has been referred to us. Therefore, following the opinion given by this court, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. Since there is no appearance before us on behalf of the assessee, we make no order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (4) TMI 45
Levy Of Penalty, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... April 1, 1968. It appears to us that the legal position has been correctly stated thereunder. Since, in the instant case, there was no concealment of income arising out of returns furnished on or after April 1, 1968, the amended provisions would not be attracted. Learned counsel for the department urged that this court may answer the question only with regard to the applicability of the amended provisions of section 271. He urged that the rest of the question, which is a simple one, may be left to be determined by the income-tax authorities in the light of our decision on the first part of the question. We, therefore, propose to answer only the first, part of the question. Our answer to the question referred to us is as under The Tribunal was justified in holding that in respect of the assessment years 1961-62 and 1962-63, the quantum of penalty would have to be regulated with reference to the provisions of section 271(1)(c) of the Act before the amendment on April 1, 1968.
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1973 (4) TMI 44
Family Property ... ... ... ... ..... sessment years. In the light of the observations of their Lordships, it does not appear to us to be necessary, as has been urged by the learned counsel for the revenue, that there should exist at least two male members of a joint Hindu family to bring into existence any joint family property or that some joint Hindu family property must be in existence before a member of that family impresses his self-acquired property with the character of joint family property by throwing it voluntarily and intentionally into the common stock of the family. The result of the above discussion is that the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, upheld by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, is held to be correct. Consequently, our answer to the question of law, referred in all these references, is in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The assessee will be paid his costs by the revenue which are assessed at Rs. 400 for all the four references.
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1973 (4) TMI 43
Burden Of Proof ... ... ... ... ..... nd that if there is no evidence on the record except that the explanation given by the assessee is false, it does not follow that the receipts were the taxable income of the assessee. It was also held that the findings given in the ment pro for determining or computing tax are not conclusive in penalty proceedings, although they may constitute evidence of concealment. The decision of the Tribunal is based entirely on the findings given in the quantum appeal and on the fact that the explanation given by the assessee was false. The approach of the Tribunal was justified so long as the case of Lalchand Gopal Das held the field, but cannot be sustained in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Anwar Ali s case. We, accordingly, answer the question referred in the negative and against the department, and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Question answered in the negative.
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