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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 73 Records
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1974 (12) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . It is Indokem Private Limited which had purchased these goods and had paid sales tax on it to its own vendors. Instead of keeping these goods in Bombay, Indokem Private Limited kept them in stock in Ahmedabad and they were in stock in Ahmedabad on the appointed day , namely, 1st January, 1960. Thereafter within a period of three months they were sold by Indokem Private Limited and the sales were effected in Ahmedabad and the goods, being situate in Ahmedabad, delivery thereof was given from Ahmedabad. This did not, however, make these sales the sales of a separate registered dealer. They continued to be the goods held in stock by Indokem Private Limited and the sales which were effected at Ahmedabad were the sales of Indokem Private Limited and Indokem Private Limited was entitled to claim a set-off in respect thereof, and we answer the question in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (12) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... p site, and only after this was done could the respondent remove the said felled timber from the coupe. In these circumstances, in our opinion, the marked trees, being goods agreed to be sold under the said agreement, could not be said to be in a deliverable state till they were felled and the hammer-mark was put at the stump site by the officers of the forest department. The property passed to the respondent only at that stage and it was then that the sale took place. It is an admitted position that the only manufacturing activity, which the respondent is alleged to have carried on, is the felling of the timber. This activity necessarily took place before the hammer-mark was put at the stump site on the felled timber, and hence before the sale took place. In our opinion, the questions framed by us must be answered as follows No. (1) in the affirmative. No. (2) in the negative. As the respondents are absent, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (12) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... affidavit. But a perusal of the description of the machines shows that they cannot be just removed. One of the machines is of 40 H.P., the other of 15 H.P. and the third is of 5 H.P. These machines cannot be treated as ordinarily movable articles, but the fact whether the machines are easily removable or not is hardly material. So long as the petitioner has his leasehold rights intact in the machines they cannot be sold outright and their possession cannot be given to the purchaser. The order passed by the recovering authority directing the Supurdar to produce the machines at the appointed time and date for auction is clearly wrong and deserves to be quashed. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and the respondents are directed not to disturb the petitioner s possession over the machines which are affixed in the factory so long as the petitioner s lease rights continue. The petitioner would be entitled to costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (12) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o Bharucha under the said agreement. As Bharucha never became the owner of the business of Regal Parsi Hotel, there could be no question of the retransfer of the ownership of that business to the owners. Even assuming that certain rights of ownership were transferred to Bharucha under this agreement, which, according to us, is not correct, there is no provision in the agreement for retransfer of the same. In fact, the agreement only creates certain rights which fall far short of the ownership in Bharucha for a limited duration. On the expiry of the agreement there is no question of any retransfer of any rights at all, but there is a mere cessation of the limited rights, which were given to Bharucha. Hence, in our view, the provisions of section 26(1) of the said Act did not come into play at all. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The applicant must pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (12) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act. Previously this entry read 52. Machinery and spare parts of machinery, not being such machinery or spare parts thereof as are taxable under any other item in this schedule. After amendment entry No. 52 reads Machinery and spare parts of machinery, including water pumps, not being such machinery or spare parts thereof as are taxable under any other item in this schedule. The amendment made by section 9 of this Act is as if the amended entry will always be in operation in substitution of the original entry. The amended entry hence governs the present case which is for the turnover of the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67. In view of the amended entry it cannot be doubted that the water pumping sets in which the assessee deals were liable to tax at 6 per cent. In this view, our answer to the question referred to us is that the turnover of the pumping sets in question was liable to tax at 6 per cent. We, however, make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (12) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r referring to that decision, the Division Bench has stated that it expresses no opinion as to whether the view taken there was correct or not. This observation of the Division Bench clearly shows that it took the view that that decision was not material to the point raised before it. In the result, in our view, the objection of Mr. Patel must be upheld, and the references are not competent. In our opinion, we have no jurisdiction to entertain the references and we reject the same. As far as the question of costs is concerned, it is important to note that no objection was taken by the respondent to the making of these references or the framing of the statements of the case before the Tribunal. It is only in this court that Mr. Patel has raised the preliminary objection on which he has succeeded. In these circumstances, it appears to us proper that the parties should bear and pay their own costs of these references, and there will be an order accordingly. References rejected.
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1974 (12) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion (3) of section 9 to include that part of the assessment order which is not the subject-matter of the appeal, that is that part of the assessment order against which no relief is prayed for in the memorandum of appeal of the dealer. The appellate authority, in our opinion, is confined to the subject-matter of the appeal preferred by the dealer. It cannot go outside it. It may decide the points raised in appeal on grounds set forth in the memorandum of appeal or on other grounds, as contemplated by sub-rule (3) of rule 66. In this view the notice issued by the appellate authority requiring the petitioner to show cause why the turnover of photographs be not brought to tax was without jurisdiction. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned notice issued by the appellate authority for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73 is quashed. In view of the divided success the parties may, however, bear their own costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1974 (12) TMI 56 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ufacturing dealer making the payment. In our view, mere making of debit entries in the regularly kept account books of the dealer s vendors could not be said to result in the amounts of these debit entries being considered to be recovered from the dealer. As far as the question of costs is concerned, we would normally have awarded the costs of these references to the respondent on the principle that costs must follow the event. In the present case, however, after stating the facts and advancing some arguments, Mr. Surte stated that he desired to withdraw these references. It was Mr. Dada, the learned counsel for the respondent, who persuaded us to dispose of these references on merits as the sales tax department was anxious to have a pronouncement of this court on the question raised. In these circumstances, we think that it is fair that the parties should bear and pay their own costs of these references and there will be an order accordingly. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (12) TMI 55 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... such transaction out of the definition of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act as laid down by the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court. It is only when the transaction amounts to compulsory acquisition of property by an order of a statutory authority under any Act, that the transaction would not be a sale . From any view of the matter the transactions which are involved in this appeal are undoubtedly sales within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act as has been already held by us hereinbefore. In view of the above, we cannot but hold that the transactions In question are sales within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act and the assessment orders imposing sales tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, on the transactions are valid, legal and within the jurisdiction of the sales tax authorities. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The rule is discharged and all Interim orders vacated. No order as to costs. S.P. MITRA, C.J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (12) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... eedings lasted for several years, the Central Government should be paid fees as required by rule 291 of the Companies Court Rules. It is more appropriate according to Mr. Patel because winding-up order will have to be cancelled for the working and implementation of the scheme. A token amount of Rs. 1,000 would be more than sufficient as fees for the Central Government and the sponsor is ordered to pay the same. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the State of Gujarat shall bear their own costs. Rs. 1,000 shall be paid as and by way of costs of the textile labour association. There shall be no order as to costs as far as the Sales Tax Commissioner is concerned. No order as to costs in favour of M/s. Ambica Development Corporation. As far as the liquidator is concerned, Mr. V. B. Patel shall prepare bill and send it to Mr. I. M. Nanavati who shall pay the bill as proposed by Shri V. B. Patel. The sponsor s entire costs of the proceedings should come out of the company.(iv).
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1974 (12) TMI 45 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... rders and also contesting the levy of interest u/s. 139, we direct the Income-tax Officer top go into the question regarding the chargeability in of interest u/s.139. The levy of interest u/s.139(1) can be sustained only when the appellant has made an application for extension of time in the prescribed manner and while extending time interest has been levied as provided under the proviso to s.139(1). Under R. 117-A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 the Income - tax Officer can reduce or waive the interest payable u/s. 139(1) if the appellant produces evidence to the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer that it was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time. The Income-tax Officer is directed to examine these aspects while disposing of the additional grounds filed before the Tribunal regarding the levy of interest u/s. 139. 25. In the result, all the appeal are allowed in part to the extent indicated above and the assessee should be revised accordingly.
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1974 (12) TMI 44 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... thority. The provisions of s. 80C(1) and (2), in so far as they are relevant, read as under mdash Deduction in respect of life insurance premia, contributions to be provident funds, etc. (1) In computing the total income of an assessee there shall be deducted, in accordance with and subject to the provision of this section, an amount equal to sixty percent of the first five thousand rupees of the aggregate of the sums specified in sub-s. (2) and fifty percent of the balance, if any, or such aggregate. (2) The sums referred to in sub-s. (1) shall be the following, namely, (a) Where the assessee an individual, any sums paid in the previous year by the assessee out of his income chargeable to tax (i) to effect or to keep in force an insurance on the life of the assessee or on the life of the wife or husband of the assessee or (Corresponding provisions of s. 80A for the asst. yr. 1967-68 are identical) The provisions of s. 64, in so far as they are relevant, reads as under mdash
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1974 (12) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... to its ordinary dictionary meaning, is not merely any part of the tobacco plant like its leaves but the plant itself. Therefore, the expression tobacco , without any exceptions, would include the entire tobacco plant. But (by) the definition in question the expression was intended to be given both some restricted and enlarged meaning. By its enlarged scope both cured and manufactured tobacco are brought into it and not merely its natural state. By its restricted scope tobacco plant or any parts of it while the plant is attached to the earth were taken out of its purview. By giving an inclusive definition, it does not appear that the definition was intended to be restricted only to those parts of the tobacco plant mentioned therein. 11.Under these circumstances, I hold that tobacco seeds must be taken as part of the definition in question and therefore they are exempted from the tax. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1974 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was no evidence whatsoever to hold that the gold seized from the person to the appellant was "liable to confiscation" as contemplated by Section 11 of the Act?
Whether the High Court had wrongly used Section 123 of the Act so as to wrongly place the burden of proof on the appellant when this provision did not apply?
Whether Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code had not been complied with inasmuch as only two very general questions were asked by the Trying Magistrate, followed by two others on one point?
Held that:- No presumption under Section 123 of the Act could be used against the appellant. We do not think that the High Court or the Magistrate had used this presumption. We find that they had relied upon circumstantial evidence in the case to infer the character of the gold recovered and the accused's guilty knowledge.
The appellant admitted in his statement under Section 108 of the Act, that transporting of these pieces of gold was an offence. If the gold had been legally imported before 1948 it could not be an offence to carry it. The appellant had not proved who Pannalal, the person who was alleged by him to have given him the gold to carry was. At least, the burden of proving an innocent receipt of gold lay upon the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The totality of facts proved was enough in our opinion to raise a presumption under Section 114, Evidence Act that the gold had been illegally imported into the country so as to be covered by Section 111(d) of the Act. The appellant had not offered any other reasonable explanation of the manner in which it was being carried
It is true that the general form of questions put does not strictly comply with the provisions of Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. But, we are unable to hold that the appellant suffered any injustice for this reason. Indeed, he had not even raised such a question in the trial Court or before the High Court. If he had done so, the alleged defect could have been easily cured. The objection seems to us to be most technical and flimsy. The defect could not have possibly vitiated the conviction of the appellant.
As the appellant and the fact that there is no previous conviction proved him, we consider it to be undesirable to send the appellant back to jail for a few days. We, therefore, reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. Subject to this modification, this appeal is dismissed
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1974 (12) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT, AHMEDABAD
Domestic grinders and domestic flour mills - Trade Notices - Effect ... ... ... ... ..... y separate part which was not manufactured by these manufacturers. It had to be fitted into the manufactured item of the petitioners. It is wholly immaterial that at the stage of sale, the petitioners at the request of the customers fit an electric motor or leave it to the customers to get electric motor remitted into this unit. That would not make the article in its original state excisable as manufactured by the petitioners. In that view of the matter the entire levy under article 33C was wholly illegal and ultra vires. In that view of the matter, all three petitioners must be allowed by quashing the impugned levy and declaring that the petitioners domestic grinders do not attract duty under the relevant entry 33C. Therefore, respondents authorities are restrained from levying any duty under the aforesaid entry 33C on these goods in question. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs in each case. The aforesaid order shall be stayed for a period of six weeks from today.
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1974 (12) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT AT GUJARAT, AHEMDABAD
Cotton fabrics impregnated or coated - Precedents - Appeal - Delay in disposal of appeal - Administration of Justice - Taxing statute
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1974 (12) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
A Partner, Estate Duty, In Part ... ... ... ... ..... f, however, the transfer was from the capital account or loan account or any other general account to which profits are credited, then section 10 cannot be applied. We would answer the question as indicated above. In passing the orders under section 64(6), the Tribunal would be free to go into all the facts and consider the matter as if it was hearing the appeal by itself. We have in T. C. No. 107 of 1969 (East India Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax) judgment in which was delivered on 20th November, 1974, indicated the scope of the powers of the Tribunal in a matter which goes back to it as a result of the reference. We have held that the powers of the Tribunal in such a matter are as ample as they were at the time when it dealt with an appeal for the first time. We are making these observations only to avoid any misapprehension about the scope of the enquiry which is to be conducted hereafter. As neither party has succeeded, there will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (12) TMI 36 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, High Court, Original Assessment, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... way denies discretion to the court. In Digamber Prasad v. S. L. Dhani, a Full Bench of this court refused to quash, at the instance of the tenant, the order of the competent authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, passed without jurisdiction because the tenant had not paid the rent due from him. This Court refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the tenant for this reason. Even if, therefore, this court has the option to grant or refuse relief to the petitioner, considerations of justice have to be taken into account in exercising the option. There is nothing surprising in this doctrine. As Lord Macmillan writes in almost every case, except the very plainest, it would be possible to decide the issue either way with reasonable legal justification and that, in such a case, ethical considerations operate and ought to operate (Law and other Things, page 48). For the above reasons, we dismiss the writ petition with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (12) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... f the Commissioner of Income-tax. To our mind, the right to ask for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is not taken away. The forum, which has power to postpone payment of refund, has been changed. It is only a matter of procedure and within the competence of the legislature. The right to ask for refund, as already adverted to, accrued to the petitioner only on the High Court upholding the claim of the petitioner for exemption from payment of tax under section 4(3)(i) of the old Act and section 11 of the new Act. Since it is purely a procedural matter, it is not necessary that section 241 should have been made retrospectively applicable. It is further to be noticed that the rights of the assessee are also protected as it is entitled to payment of interest on the amount ordered to be refunded in the event of the Supreme Court upholding the judgment of this court. For the reasons recorded, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (12) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Late Filing, Levy Of Penalty, Mens Rea, Penalty Proceedings, Reasonable Cause
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