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1974 (9) TMI 33
Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ditional information whatsoever with the Income-tax Officer so as to make him to treat the guest house expenses entirely as entertainment expenses. In that view of the matter, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that it was merely a change of opinion on the part of the Income-tax Officer and there was no information whatsoever either on the record of his file to which he did not apply his mind earlier or the implications of which he did not appreciate, inasmuch as he finalised the regular assessment for the assessment years under reference after comparing them with the assessments of the preceding years. Nor was there any information from the external source which justified him to initiate proceedings under section 147. In that view of the matter, therefore, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the revenue. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1974 (9) TMI 32
Firm Assessment, Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... 1971, not for the purpose of expressing any view of mine in that regard but only with the object of comparing the latter with the former law and to show that, as it stood at the relevant time governing the three tax cases in question, the decisions of the Supreme Court were applicable and once the option was exercised by the Income-tax Officer of taxing the share income in the hands of the partners, he had no jurisdiction to tax the total income of the unregistered partnership firm in its hands. For the reasons stated above, the common question of law in all the three cases is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. I accordingly hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of the Tribunal annulling the assessments for the three years in question was legal, valid and proper. The assessee must have the costs of all these references. A consolidated hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 150 only. S. K. JHA J.--I agree.
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1974 (9) TMI 31
Additional Evidence, Appellate Authority, Right To Receive ... ... ... ... ..... governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored and the case decided as if it is non-existent. Dealing with the scope of rule 29, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Babulal Nim, held that the admissibility of additional evidence under rule 29 depends on whether or not the Tribunal requires it to enable it to pass orders or for any other substantial cause. There is also nothing to suggest from the order of the Tribunal that it had not exercised its discretion properly in refusing to receive the additional evidence sought to be produced by the legal representative. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The costs will be paid by the legal representative of the deceased-assessee. Advocate s fee Rs.250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty only). Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (9) TMI 30
Machinery Installed In Hotel ... ... ... ... ..... ant are installed or any of the partners or servants of the petitioner are using any part of the premises in which the machinery and plant are installed as residential accommodation. Nor is it the case of the department that the petitioner has been using the place for the purpose of receiving and entertaining its guests gratuitously. It is, therefore, clear that sub-section (6) is not at all attracted to the case on hand. Hence, the claim for rebate has to be allowed. The orders of the Commissioner and the Income-tax Officer to the extent they disallow the development rebate in respect of the plant and machinery in question are set aside. The Income-tax Officer is directed to make the necessary modification in the order of assessment in the light of the above judgment. The other contention which relates to the claim for depreciation allowance under section 32 in respect of the lift installed by the petitioner is not pressed. The petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 29
Assessed Income, Commercial Profit, Distributable Surplus ... ... ... ... ..... s been issued on February 3, 1968, for initiation of rectification proceedings for assessment year 1961-62 was clearly time-barred and beyond the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer. The two subsequent notices for initiation of rectification proceedings for assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64 were consequential and, therefore, if the first notice pertaining to assessment year 1961-62 was beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the respondent herein, the remaining two consequential notices were also beyond the jurisdiction and authority of the Income-tax Officer. The result is that the notices are in excess of jurisdiction, bad in law, void and ineffective. The rectification orders which have been made in pursuance of these three notices would also, therefore, fail and, therefore, the aforesaid notices along with the said orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. The result is that this petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute with costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (9) TMI 28
1922 Act, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... is correct, there was no escapement of any income chargeable to tax. Only when a decision was given finally that section 44D was not applicable, the Income-tax Officer could consider that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. It is because of this position the Income-tax Officer did not take into account the earlier order of the Income-tax Tribunal and proceeded to make the original assessment on the basis that section 44D is applicable. The final decision of the High Court was definitely subsequent to the original assessment and that opinion led the Income-tax Officer to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, and that certainly clothes the Income-tax Officer with jurisdiction under section 147(b). For the foregoing reasons we hold that the assessment for 1960-61 was validly reopened under section 147(b) and answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to the costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1974 (9) TMI 27
From Other Sources, Income From Business ... ... ... ... ..... nciple could be laid down which would be applicable to all cases and that each case must be decided on its own circumstances according to ordinary commonsense principles. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court, the instant case decided on its own circumstances, according to ordinary commonsense principles, induces me to hold that the facts of the present case put it in a much stronger position than the case of the assessee either in Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills case or in the case of Ray Talkies. For the reasons stated above, I must answer the question referred in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and hold that, on the facts, and, in the circumstances of the case, the income of the assessee received from the managing contractor was income from business. The question is thus answered in the affirmative. The assessee must be entitled to have its costs--consolidated hearing fee assessed at Rs. 100 only. UNTWALIA C. J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (9) TMI 26
Business Receipt, Insurance Business, Investment Company ... ... ... ... ..... erred to before. Secondly, for this year, that by itself does not prove that the assessee was dealing systematically or in any organised manner in the business of holding investments. The alteration of the memorandum took place as mentioned before subsequent to the year in question. Furthermore, the clause to which our attention was drawn was only a permissive clause for a company of this nature to invest moneys which were not require immediately for the purpose of insurance business. Incidentally, there was a similar clause which the Gujarat High Court had to consider in the case referred to before. For the reasons mentioned we are of the opinion that in this year it could not be said that the assessee, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was an investment company in terms of the section. In the premises, the question referred to this court is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will get the costs of this reference. PYNE- J.-I agree.
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1974 (9) TMI 25
Computation Of Capital, Income Tax Act, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... tention of the revenue is accepted in the case of the provisions appearing in Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, then necessarily even the deductions which are permitted under Chapter IV have to be held as coming within the meaning of the expression income, profits and gains not includible in its total income as computed under the Income-tax Act . I do not think that Parliament ever intended that such a result should follow. I am, therefore, of the view that the claim of the respondents in these cases that there has been an under-assessment under the Act by reason of not treating the deductions allowed under sections 80-I and 80J of the Income-tax Act as amounts not includible in the total income of the petitioners cannot be sustained. The notices issued to the petitioners either under section 8 or under section 16 of the Act are, therefore, patently contrary to law. In the result these petitions succeed. The impugned notices are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 24
Search And Seizure, Summary Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... e petitioner stated that some of the documents seized are promissory notes and mortgage deeds and in order to enable the petitioner to realise the moneys before they get barred by limitation, it should be necessary that the department should be directed to return those documents to the petitioner. The learned counsel for the revenue could not seriously dispute this contention. We, therefore, direct the respondents herein to return such of those seized documents which are promissory notes and mortgage deeds to the petitioner after taking copies of the same, attested by the petitioner. Subject to the direction relating to the return of the promissory notes and mortgage deeds, the writ petition is dismissed and the rule nisi is discharged. No order as to costs. It is needless to point out that every one of the contentions raised by the petitioner in this writ petition, he can raise before the Income-tax Officer in the regular assessment proceedings in the computation of income.
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1974 (9) TMI 23
Fair Market Value, Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... s found by the Tribunal, since the difference between Rs. 1,20,000 which has been found to be the fair market value of the buildings transferred by the assessee and the sum of Rs. 80,000 which is the consideration declared by the assessee in the sale deed as the value of those buildings is in excess of 15 of the sum of Rs. 80,000, section 52(2) is attracted and the difference between Rs. 1,20,000 and Rs. 80,000, namely, Rs. 40,000, is capital gains for the purpose of determining the income and should be computed as such under section 48 of the Act. In the light of the above, our answer to the question which we have reframed must be in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We answer the question accordingly. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this reference. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1974 (9) TMI 22
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Delay In Filing, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ad a right to reagitate the matter of condonation of delay at the hearing of the appeal. These questions do not directly relate to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in disposing of the appeal. He undoubtedly had jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal one way or the other. The question whether the Income-tax Officer was heard or otherwise is a question of fact upon which the parties are not agreed. In view of this special feature it would not, in our opinion, be appropriate to interfere with this order at this stage when the petitioner has already filed an appeal before the Tribunal and the same is pending. It cannot be gainsaid that in that appeal the petitioner is entitled to raise all questions and challenge the various findings recorded by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The order dated 8th August, 1973, is quashed. In view of the divided success the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 21
1961 Act, Association Of Persons, Income Tax Act, Service Of Notice ... ... ... ... ..... , there is no substance even in the last contention which was raised on behalf of the petitioner. Having considered all the points raised on behalf of the petitioner, I am of the view that there is no valid ground to quash the notices in respect of the assessment years 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65, 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70. The notices in respect of the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 must, however, be held to be invalid for the reasons already stated. In the result, C.W.J.C. No. 1647 of 1971, which relates to the assessment year 1960-61, and C.W.J.C. No. 1643 of 1971, which relates to the assessment year 1961-62, are allowed and the impugned notices (annexure 3 to the two writ applications) are quashed. The other writ applications, namely, C.W.J.Cs. Nos. 1644, 1645, 1646, 1648 and 1649 of 1971 and C.W.J.Cs. Nos. 1222, 1223 and 1224 of 1972 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in any of the applications. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH J.--I agree.
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1974 (9) TMI 20
Dissolution Of Firm, Firm Assessment, Income Tax Act, Two Partners ... ... ... ... ..... or otherwise, would be governed by section 189. In view of the aforesaid discussion I am of opinion that the assessment order dated August 25, 1970, inasmuch as it clubs the income of the erstwhile and the reconstituted firm is vitiated and is liable to be set aside. The petition, therefore, succeeds though for reasons different from that mentioned in the judgment of Gulati J. and the assessment order dated August 25, 1970, and demand notices following it, are quashed. The petitioner is not entitled to a mandamus, directing the respondent No. 1 not to enforce a levy or assessment of tax in respect of the firm as it stood prior to its constitution. The relief is accordingly refused. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. By the Court In view of the majority judgment the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of assessment and the revisional order dated August 25, 1970, and May 25, 1972, respectively are quashed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 19
Additional Tax On Undistributed Profits ... ... ... ... ..... ook value of investments still held. The Special Commissioners, on appeal, upheld the Crown s contentions. It was held by Rowlatt J. that the surrender of the old stocks enabled the result of the company s holding of those investments to be definitely ascertained and was equivalent to a realisation. We are of the opinion that the facts of this case were entirely different and the observations of Rowlatt J. at page 28 of the reports upon which reliance was placed do not deal with the question as to what should be taken into consideration in judging the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the conduct of a businessman in declaring dividend or further dividend. In the aforesaid view of the matter we do not think that counsel for the revenue can have any assistance from the aforesaid decision. In the aforesaid view of the matter the question referred to this court is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. PYNE J.--I agree.
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1974 (9) TMI 18
Delay In Filing Return, Levy Of Penalty, Mens Rea, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... n appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (exhibit P-5). The petitioner seeks to quash exhibits P-4 and P-5 orders. A contention was raised that the provision authorising the imposition of penalty at a certain multiple of the total wealth and not of the tax assessed was unconstitutional and invalid. But the petitioner s counsel stated at the hearing that he was not pressing this point. The petitioner s counsel associated himself with the arguments of counsel for the assessee in I.T.Rs. Nos. 85 and 86 of 1972 that mens rea was an essential ingredient of penalty proceedings under the Wealth-tax Act also. We have held against this, in our judgment in I.T.Rs. Nos. 85 and 86 of 1972 heard along with this. As the relevant sections in the Wealth-tax Act are similar, if not identical, to the Income-tax Act, we hold that mens rea is not an essential ingredient before imposition of penalty under section 18 of the Wealth-tax Act. We dismiss this writ petition, but without costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 17
Female Member ... ... ... ... ..... sad Singh J., in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Pannalal Rastogi (Tax Case No. 19 of 1969 decided on the 22nd November, 1973). Yet I had followed the earlier Bench decision of this court, as I was bound to do, in the case of Panna Lal Rastogi . Following the aforesaid decisions, it has also to be held in this case that even without adoption the Hindu undivided family was there and the status of the assessee in the two assessment years was surely such on her adopting a child which was not only an adoption to her but also to her husband. For the reasons stated above, I would answer the question referred to this court in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee should be assessed to wealth-tax in the status of a Hindu undivided family and not as individual. The assessee must have the costs of this reference. A consolidated hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 only. S. K. JHA J.--I agree.
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1974 (9) TMI 16
Garnishee Order, Income Tax Act, Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... sued be a defaulter within the meaning of section 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the corresponding provision of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This question also is not res integra but it is covered by authority. In Third Income-tax Officer v. M. Damodar Bhat, before the time given for payment of the income-tax expired, the Income-tax Officer issued a garnishee order on a third party under section 226(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was contended that before a notice under section 226(3) was issued, a demand notice should have been issued on the assessee and the assessee had to be in default. Overruling this contention, the Supreme Court held that the notice issued to the third party under section 226(3) was legally and validly issued. In the circumstances, there are no merits in this petition and it is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed and the rule nisi is discharged. The respondents will be entitled to costs which we fix at Rs. 250.
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1974 (9) TMI 15
Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... nds of the two sons as an individual. If on these facts the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there had been a partition between the two sons in or about the year 1956, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the assessee that the finding of the Tribunal suffers from any error of law. The finding is based on relevant material. On this finding of fact there can be no manner of doubt that the share income pertaining to 19 p. share belonging to each of the two sons was their individual income. It cannot possibly be the income of any joint Hindu family. It being their individual income, it was liable to be added to the income of their mother under section 64(2) of the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal was justified in upholding this action of the Income-tax Officer. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1974 (9) TMI 14
Delay In Filing ... ... ... ... ..... the term full and true disclosure has been used with reference to a default covered by clause (c) which is not the case here. In the present case it has been found that the assessee had inflated his expenses to the tune of Rs. 2,000 on account of which an addition was made to his income. The question is whether this would be non-disclosure of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Since the Commissioner did not apply the correct test the impugned order dated 24th November 1973, cannot be sustained. The Commissioner should decide the case afresh after taking into consideration the correct tests required to be applied by the statute. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated November 24, 1973, and the order dated 29th November, 1973, are quashed. The matter is sent back to the Commissioner for decision of the application made by the assessee afresh and in accordance with law. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs.
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