|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 118 Records
-
1975 (8) TMI 38
Income Tax Act, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... ioner (and not of anyone below him) as the sine qua non for the issue of the warrant and (ii) the requirement of the search being conducted in conformity with the principles laid down in section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as far as may be. The most serious content of the warrant of authorisation is the name of the person whose premises, etc., are sought to be searched. The warrant in this case was admittedly blank in that regard when it was issued under the signature of the Commissioner. The Commissioner has in the instant case acted in my opinion in a more high-handed manner than did the Secretary of State in the case John Wilkes v. Wood. I am unable to congratulate the Commissioner for his betraying the confidence reposed in him by the drastic provision of section 132 and throwing all sense of propriety and responsibility to the winds on mere suspicion or pretence. With these words I agree that the petition should be allowed with costs and we order accordingly.
-
1975 (8) TMI 37
Authorisation For Search, Income Tax Act, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... s the search of the premises of the petitioner is declared to be illegal. The note appearing in annexure P-2 quoted above shows that the Authorised Officer did not apply his own mind at the time of making the seizure inasmuch as he returned the jewellery under telephonic instructions of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. Such a seizure must, therefore, be declared to be illegal as was done in the case of Shri Sibal. We order accordingly. Since there is no valid seizure of assets from the premises of the petitioner in the eyes of law, no order against him could have been passed under section 132(5) of the Act. Consequently, we quash the order dated January 13, 1975, annexure P-3 , passed by respondent No. 5 under section 132(5) of the Act. The articles seized as a result of the search of the premises of the petitioner would be returned to him forthwith. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. R. S. NARULA C. J.-I agree.
-
1975 (8) TMI 36
Income Tax Act, Interest Income ... ... ... ... ..... Officer to reduce or waive the interest. Section 217 also deals with interest payable by assessees under certain circumstances and no appeal is provided in section 246 against an order under section 217 but sub-section (2) of section 217 provides as follows The provisions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 215 shall apply to interest payable under this section as they apply to interest payable under that section. On a comparative study of the above provisions of the Act it is quite clear that section 246(c) does not provide for any appeal against the levy of interest in accordance with the provisions of section 139. That being the position, we hold that no appeal lies to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the charging of interest under section 139 of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. We, however, make no order as to costs. B. N. SARMA J.--I agree.
-
1975 (8) TMI 35
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Authorities ... ... ... ... ..... or failure on the part of the agency firm, to sell the goods. Further, if and when any such loss occurs, it would be open to the assessee to terminate the agreement as it is one at will. The circumstances that the partners of the selling agents are relations of the partners of the assessee-firm cannot cloud the issue here. The appointment as the selling agent was made at a time when Narayana Chettiar was the financing partner and Ramanlal was only a working partner. It is not as if Ramanlal was free to appoint selling agents of his choice without reference to other partners. In our view, the conclusion of the Tribunal that a part of the remuneration was not wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business is devoid of any material to support it. We consider that the disallowance as made by the Tribunal is not proper. In the result, we answer the question referred in the negative and against the revenue. The assessee will have its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
-
1975 (8) TMI 34
Equitable Construction, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... claim by considering as to what was the substance of the matter and cannot grant exemption on mere inference or analogy. The terms marketing and processing used in relation to co-operative societies in sub-clauses (c) and (e) of section 81 (i) of the Income-tax Act clearly indicate that the exemption covers only such income which arises out of the activity of processing or marketing of the agricultural produce of the members and not the income arising out of the business of purchase of paddy and sale of rice by the Society on its own account. This is clearly ruled out by the words agricultural produce of its members. Under these circumstances, we record the answer to the, reference as below On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that a portion of the assessee s income from the sale of rice, in so far as it related to paddy purchased from the members of the Society, is exempt under section 81(i)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
-
1975 (8) TMI 33
Inaccurate Particulars, Interest Payments ... ... ... ... ..... nalty. The disclosure made some time during the period from August 19, 1965, to April 1, 1966, by some of the partners in the instant case regarding the interest amounts shown in the return as interest paid to the respective parties, which was filed in October, 1963, may amount to, knowledge of those particular partners regarding the inaccurate particulars, but that disclosure cannot prove knowledge of the assessee-firm about inaccurate particulars of income at the time of filing the return, inasmuch as the firm is distinct entity as distinguished from the individual partners for the purposes of the Income-tax Act. From the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee-firm had furnished inaccurate particulars of income deliberately, bringing the case within the four corners of section 271(1)(c) of the Act. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. D. M. SEN J.--I agree.
-
1975 (8) TMI 32
Income Tax Act, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... f this house property as exclusively belonging to them. The learned counsel for the assessees may be well founded in his contention if the words belonging to the assessee in section 5(1)(iv) would take in not only the right as a full owner, but also the interest of a life interest holder or any other partial interest as held in Controller of Estate Duty v. Estate of Late Sanka Simhachalam . But that question does not arise for consideration in this case as the property is an asset of the partnership firm and was not owned by a group of individuals in their own right. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the assessees in each of these cases were not entitled to claim exemption under section 5(1)(iv) in respect of house No. 8, Nowroji Road, Madras. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the affirmative and against the assessees. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1975 (8) TMI 31
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, General Public Utility, Not Involving The Carrying On Of Any Activity For Profit
-
1975 (8) TMI 30
Appellate Authority, Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Income Tax Act, Reassessment Proceedings, Recovery Proceedings
-
1975 (8) TMI 29
A Partner, One Partner ... ... ... ... ..... ourt may be made must be an order finally disposing of the assessment of the assessee. The order that the Apellate Tribunal passes under section 33(4) on appeal from an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may be one confirming the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or setting aside his order or remanding the proceedings to him and against any such order, which so far as the Tribunal is concerned decides questions about the rights or obligations of the assessee, an application for making a reference under section 66(1) may lie. We are, therefore, of the opinion that merely because the matter was remanded back to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the Tribunal, a reference under section 256(1) of the Act has not become inadmissible as contended by the learned standing counsel for the revenue. In the result, both the questions are answered in favour of the revenue as stated earlier. The reference is disposed of accordingly. M. C. PATHAK C.J.---I agree.
-
1975 (8) TMI 28
A Partner, One Partner ... ... ... ... ..... ld to be divisible. It also appears to us that the Supreme Court approved of the Madras decision on that basis. The law has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Parakh s case referred to earlier. The facts in that case seem to match the facts of the case before us and there is no reason why the propositions of law laid down by the Supreme Court in that case will not apply here. Following such law we return our answer to the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. It has been brought to our notice that in the instant case the revenue had allowed the deductions claimed only as against the income accruing from the branch of the assessee at Darsana on the basis of the allocation in the assessee s accounts. We make it clear that the deduction claimed will be available as against the entire income of the assessee including income arising within the Union of India. In the facts and circumstances there will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
-
1975 (8) TMI 27
Delay In Filing Return, Levy Of Penalty, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... but that does not mean that we should read in the Rules of 1922 in rule 8 under the remarks column that the seasonal factories were not to be included in the general mode of calculation laid down in the remarks column. In our opinion, therefore, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the mode of calculating double shift allowance cannot be supported on a pure interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Rules. Under these circumstances we hold that question No. (1) referred to us by the Tribunal should be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. We have already observed that question No. (2), in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax should be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The questions will be answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs as each side has lost partly and succeeded partly.
-
1975 (8) TMI 26
Carrying On Business, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... This is not also a case of a mere members club which comes into existence for the purpose of providing certain amenities to the members without any business element as such as in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Merchant Navy Club . Therefore, the claim for exemption cannot be said to have been established either on the principle of mutuality or on the principle of the absence of trade or profit motive. The cases of chambers of commerce or trade associations cited before us stand on a different footing and cannot be applied herein. We may make it clear that if proper facts are placed in any other year, the matter may have to be considered afresh, in the light of those facts. The result of the discussion is that the question in T.C. No. 253 of 1969 has to be answered in the negative and against the assessee and questions Nos. 1 and 2 in T.C. No. 5 of 1972 are also answered in the negative and against the assessee. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
-
1975 (8) TMI 25
Assessment Notice, Original Assessment, Reassessment Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ce, there must be further facts to justify the conclusion or belief that there has been an escapement of income. In this case I find no basis for that conclusion. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the Income-tax Officer had formed the belief that income had escaped assessment. What he has stated in fact was that had the books of accounts been disclosed, a larger income would have been found out. That is not, in my opinion, holding a belief in terms of clause (a) to section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the premises, I am of opinion that the condition precedent for the issuance of the notice is not fulfilled in the instant case. The notice is, therefore, quashed and set aside. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. If any assessment has been made in pursuance of the said notice, the same is also set aside. There will be no order as to costs in this rule. On the prayer of the respondents, the operation of this order is stayed for six weeks from date.
-
1975 (8) TMI 24
Income Tax, Winding Up ... ... ... ... ..... there is absolutely no material on which he came to be satisfied, in the absence of a certificate. The third respondent as well as the second respondent were aware of the income-tax proceedings, as seen from the correspondence that passed between the parties. They pleaded inability to pay to the 4th respondent, in the absence of the certificate. But, how then this volte face? The present stand of the third respondent is only an attempt to bypass the statutory obligation imposed on him under section 555(7)(b). Thus, I have no other option but to set aside the order of the third respondent, dated November 30, 1973. Accordingly, Application No. 421 of 1974 will stand allowed. Consequently, the 4th respondent will be entitled only to the balance, after meeting the income-tax liability of the company, to the tune of Rs. 10,853.55. In the above terms, Applications Nos. 461 and 462 of 1973 are ordered. In the peculiar circumstances of these applications, I make no order as to costs.
-
1975 (8) TMI 23
Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... erve should be allowed or not, came up for consideration before this court and after considering the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, particularly Schedule VI, under which the said contingency reserve and the tariffs and dividends control reserve were required to be compulsorily made, this court allowed the deduction claimed in respect of such reserves that were created by the assessee in that case. We may point out that one of the reserves that was considered in that case was also required to be created by the assessee-company from out of the revenues of the assessee-company. The ratio of that case of Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1974 97 ITR 334 (Bom) would be clearly applicable to the question raised before us in this case. Having regard to the above discussion, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1975 (8) TMI 22
Income Tax Act, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... uary 10, 1975, annexure P-6, passed by the Income-tax Officer under section 132(5) of the Act. We further direct that the documents, money and jewellery illegally seized from the petitioner s premises should be returned to him forthwith. At this stage Mr. D.N. Awasthy, the learned counsel for the respondents, makes an oral request that in view of the absence of the Income-tax Commissioner from the circle and also the absence of the Income-tax Officer from Chandigarh at the moment and the fact that the key of the Government locker, in which the jewellery of the petitioner has been kept, is lying in a sealed packet, which may have to be opened in court, a fortnight s time may be allowed to the respondents to comply with the order for the return of the seized jewellery, cash and the documents. Mr. Kuldip Singh opposes this prayer. In the interests of justice, however, we allow the respondents two weeks time to comply with the order for the return of the above-mentioned articles.
-
1975 (8) TMI 21
Chargeable To Tax, Insurance Policies ... ... ... ... ..... the view I have taken, I am of the opinion that prior to amendment with effect from 1st of April, 1972, the interest could not be charged in the case of an assessee who had not filed the return prior to the assessment and to whom no extension of time had been granted by the Income-tax Officer on an application made. That was a lacuna in the legislation as it stood. The position seems to have been rectified by the subsequent amendment as indicated by me. That is also an indication that at the relevant time the Income-tax Officer had no power to charge interest. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this rule must succeed and the assessment order quashed to the extent it imposes interest for non-submission of returns. To that extent, let a writ in the nature of certiorari issue accordingly and respondent be restrained from realising any amount as interest. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus also issue accordingly. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1975 (8) TMI 20
Appeal To Tribunal, Appeal To Tribunal, Capital Loss, Capital Loss, High Court, High Court, Jurisdiction Of Tribunal, Jurisdiction Of Tribunal, Revenue Loss, Revenue Loss
-
1975 (8) TMI 19
Accounting Year, Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... not be overlooked that even the Income-tax Officer himself was not opposed to the cost of production of the picture being taken into account for the entire period in which the picture was produced, but he only raised an objection to the establishment expenses for the period June 1, 1951, to March 31, 1952, being taken into account. Such artificial differentiation between the two costs was not permissible especially when there is a single venture and the entire cost is incurred for the production of the picture. In the case of such a transaction the net profits or loss can only be ascertained upon completion of the picture and the release thereof. Thus, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the amount of Rs. 42,338 as expenses incurred by the assessee during the period June 1, 1951, to March 31, 1952, for the assessment year 1953-54. Thus, our answer to the question referred is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessee.
|
