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Showing 61 to 74 of 74 Records
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1976 (5) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Legal Representative, Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... erefore, those assessments were rightly set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner inasmuch as they were not in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 159 of the Act does not provide for annulment of any assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147 of the Act. On the other hand, it expressly provides for continuance of the assessment, reassessment and recomputation from the stage at which they stood on the date of the death of the assessee against his legal representative who in terms of sub-section (3) of section 159 of the Act is deemed to be an assessee and he is liable to pay the tax which the deceased assessee would have been liable to pay if he was alive, as stated in section 159(1) of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in sustaining the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and we return our answer in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.--I agree.
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1976 (5) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... meant real as opposed to notional delivery. In the jugment of Gupta J., Explanation to section 24 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, has been considered. It is laid down that under Explanation 2 a transaction which is not otherwise speculative may still be speculative within the meaning of that Explanation if there was no actual delivery of the commodity or scrips. The type of transactions which were referred to in the above judgment appears to be the transactions as indicated in the section itself, that is, transactions under a contract of sale. What the position would be where there was a breach of contract was neither mooted nor considered by the Supreme Court and the observations of the Supreme Court are clearly in the background of an existing or a subsisting contract. It is also to be noted that the Supreme Court did not hold that all such transactions where there was no actual delivery of commodity or scrips are necessarily and always speculative but that they may be.
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1976 (5) TMI 12 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Capital Asset, Attributable To ... ... ... ... ..... hares and whether losses were to be apportioned pro rata or per capita. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mandyala Govindu s case 1976 102 ITR 1 (SC) we find there is no material for ascertaining in this case how the losses were to be apportioned. We may, however, make it clear that we refrain from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the decisions rendered in Hiralal Jagannath Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1967 66 ITR 293 (All) and Ganesh Lal Laxmi Narain v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1968 68 ITR 696 (All). The decision that we have reached is on the peculiar facts of the case which are more or less identical with the facts of the case of Mandyala Govindu 1976 102 ITR 1 (SC). In view of what we have stated above, we answer the question by saying that the assessee-firm was not entitled to the renewal of registration for the assessment years 1963-64 and 1964-65. As nobody has appeared for the assessee there shall be no order as to costs.
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1976 (5) TMI 11 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Delay In Filing Return, Penalty Proceedings, Reasonable Cause ... ... ... ... ..... cause failed to furnish the return within the time specified in section 271(1)(a) read with the relevant other section referred to in that section. Once this initial burden, which may be slight, has been discharged by the department, it is for the assessee to show as in a civil case on balance of probabilities that he had reasonable cause in failing to file the return within the time specified (4) Mere falsity of the explanation furnished by the assessee cannot help the department in establishing its case against the assessee at the time of imposition of penalty. In view of the above discussion and in view of our conclusion, we answer the question as reframed by us as follows Reasonable cause is an ingredient of the offence for which the penalty is provided and the taxing authority has prima facie to prove absence of reasonable cause in the sense that has been explained above. The matter will now go before the Division Bench for disposing of the case in accordance with law.
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1976 (5) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Jurisdiction Of Court, Powers Of Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... r section 263 of the Act. Therefore, the Commissioner by the order dated the 20th March, 1975, has given effect to the order passed under section 263 of the Act which he was restrained to do so. In any event this is not permissible. I, therefore, set aside the order dated the 20th March, 1975, and direct the Commissioner to consider the application under section 264 for the said assessment years. In the view I have taken the Commissioner must be restrained from giving effect to the notice under section 263 of the Act which is under challenge in this writ application for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore. In the aforesaid view of the matter if any order has been passed pursuant to the notice as it has been passed in the instant case, the same is also quashed and set aside. The respondents are restrained from giving effect to the same. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Operation of this order is stayed for eight weeks.
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1976 (5) TMI 9 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Immovable Property, Movable Property, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... is also not conclusive of the matter, as the requirement of the notification is that he should hold a bachelor s degree in civil engineering which he does not. Counsel also urged that one Sri R. D. Agarwal, who had a degree in engineering from the Banaras Hindu University, had been registered as a valuer both in the category of valuers for plant and machinery and immovable property and the case of the petitioner is identical. This is denied in the counter-affidavit. It is also not clear that Sri R. D. Agarwal did not hold a degree in civil engineering. Thus, the stand of discrimination taken is also not established. In the result the petition is partly allowed. The respondent No. 1 is directed to register the petitioner as a valuer of immovable property under the Wealth-tax Act. The claim of the petitioner for being appointed as a valuer of immovable property under the Estate Duty Act is rejected. in view of the partial success of parties, there will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (5) TMI 8 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... feel that the question as framed envisages an inquiry as to whether the finding of the Tribunal that the Income-tax Officer could be ascribed with the belief that the transaction was one for avoidance of tax, is correct as the second part of the question is couched in the words and the assessee is liable to pay tax on the capital gains . This postulates an inquiry as to whether all the ingredients that are necessary for making the assessee liable to capital gains were present. We have already held that the Income-tax Officer had in fact not formed a reasonable belief, as is required under section 52(1) of the Act, and this being so the requirements of section 52(1) are not satisfied in the present case. We, therefore, answer the question by saying that the provisions of section 52 were not attracted, and the assessee is not liable to pay tax on the capital gains. The assessee is entitled to his costs which is assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1976 (5) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... n sought to be assessed in the particular assessment year, that is the year commencing on 1st April, 1947, but the assessment was dropped after it was commenced or if the assessment was completed and afterwards it was found that it did not have any assessable income, then in such a case what would be the status of such an association which would incidentally come to be determined in the proceedings ? This status cannot stand or fall on the result of the final assessment. It is possible also to visualise cases where in order to determine whether a particular association would have an assessable income or not would depend upon the prior determination of its status. In such a case further complications would arise. The Tribunal in its order made in Income-tax Appeals Nos. 12801 to 12804 of 1965 has noted some of the difficulties which have been indicated above. For the reasons as aforesaid, the answer to the question ought to be in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
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1976 (5) TMI 6 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Retrospective Amendment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... plying with the provisions of section 139(1) and not for filing the return within the time allowed. It has nothing to do with section 139(4). Once the assessee is in default, section 271(1)(a) applies. Similar view has been taken by a Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a decision in Poorna Biscuit Factory v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1975 99 ITR 41. Reliance has also been placed on the latest decision in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bihar Textiles 1975 100 ITR 253 (Pat). This case was concerned with the question whether the extension of time granted by the Income-tax Officer under the proviso to section 139(1) absolved an assessee of the penalty under section 271. In our opinion, this decision does not help the assessee. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the question referred to us should be answered in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The revenue is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1976 (5) TMI 5 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Arbitration Award ... ... ... ... ..... year. Though a part of the interest was debited in the earlier year for the purposes of book-keeping, it has been held by this court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Provincial Farmers (P.) Ltd. 1977 108 ITR 219 (Cal) by following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case, of Keshav Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1953 23 ITR 230, that a mere book entry is not conclusive for the purposes of income-tax, for the substance of the matter cannot be altered by a mere method of accounting. In the premises, the contentions of Mr. Sengupta must fail and we return our answer to both the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The parties shall pay and bear their own costs. The order of the Appellate Tribunal was wrongly printed in the paper book and a copy of the correct order was placed before us. Accordingly, we direct that this copy be kept on the record as desired by the learned counsel for both the parties. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.--I agree.
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1976 (5) TMI 4 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Retrospective Amendment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... mistake. In the case of Narayan Row 1965 57 ITR 149 (SC) the Amending Act with retrospective effect was also in existence at the time when the Income-tax Officer proceeded to rectify the order and could determine whether the records disclosed an apparent mistake in the background of the amended Act. In the instant case the Amending Act came into existence long after the order sought to be rectified and the order of rectification. Therefore, at the relevant time, the mistake, though deemed, could not be apparent from the records. We do not propose to include the expression deemed to be apparent in section 35 of the Act. We hold that though it could be deemed that there was a deemed mistake in the order at the relevant time yet there was no rectifiable mistake apparent on the face of the record. In this view, we answer the question No. 1 also in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. DEB J.---I agree.
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1976 (5) TMI 3 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Hedging Transaction, Income Tax Act, Raw Material, Speculative Transactions ... ... ... ... ..... erally the assessment year. (3) In order to be genuine and valid hedging contracts of sales, the total of such transactions should not exceed the total stocks of the raw materials or the merchandise on hand which would include existing stocks as well as the stocks acquired under the firm contracts of purchases. In that view of the matter, therefore, we answer the second question in, the negative and hold that the assessee is not entitled to set off Rs. 27,157, being the amount of loss against its other business income suffered on account of settlement of forward transactions of sale of oil tins, since the hedging transactions must be in respect of raw materials so far as the manufacturers are concerned. In view of our answer to question No. 2, we need not answer question No. 1 and leave it to the Tribunal to apply the circular and give benefits thereunder so far as may be consistent with the order made in this reference. There should be no order as to costs in this reference.
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1976 (5) TMI 2 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Delay In Filing Return, Penalty Proceedings, Reasonable Cause ... ... ... ... ..... any stage to show what was the precise nature of the business carried on by it and whether its activities in putting up the structures in the said land and letting them out formed part of its regular business. The assessee cannot raise and agitate this point in this reference particularly when the relevant facts relating thereto have not been investigated or found. For the above reasons, the revenue succeeds in this reference. Question No. 1 was not pressed by the learned standing counsel and we do not answer the same. We answer question No. 2 by stating that the incomes from the structures have been rightly assessed under s. 9 of the Act. Question No. 3 we answer by stating that the structures put up by the assessee are buildings within the meaning of s. 9 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and the incomes arising therefrom are liable to be assessed in the hands of the assessee under the said section. In the facts and circumstances, we make no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1976 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
In the present case, there was not a whisper of the application u/s 25A(1) of the Act by the appellant on March 15, 1957, when the penalty proceedings were initiated against it. Even on March 25, 1958, when the penalty was imposed, there was no order u/s 25A(1) of the Act. It was only on March 26, 1962, that the partition was recognised and order u/s 25A(1) of the Act was passed. There was thus no bar to the imposition of the impugned penalty - assessee's appeal is dismissed
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