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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 125 Records
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1976 (7) TMI 153
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... ... ..... R. 1975 S.C. 583. relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. That passage is as follows As the State Legislature was competent to pass the Act and as the Government is authorised under section 4 to levy the tax, the question of the motive with which the tax was imposed is immaterial. To put it differently, there can be no plea of a colourable exercise of power to tax if the Government had power to impose the tax and the fact that the imposition of the tax was for the purpose of eliminating competition would not detract from its validity. If an authority has power to impose a tax, the fact that it gave a wrong reason for exercising the power would not derogate from the validity of the tax. Therefore, there is no substance in the first contention. 7.. No other point was raised in these cases. In view of what is stated above, these original petitions fail and I dismiss the same. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 152
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... ... ..... ealment or the return furnished is inaccurate. The legislature has in the two sub-clauses mentioned two different categories and has also laid down different penalties in sub-clause (c). They deal with different situations, and the Sales Tax Officer in this case proceeded under section 15-A(1)(b) and from the amount of penalty imposed it is clear that he exercised his jurisdiction under section 15-A(1)(b) and not under section 15-A(1)(a). The language of the section clearly indicates that in a case where no return has been filed penal proceedings can be initiated only under section 15-A(1)(a). There are observations in a decision of the Supreme Court in Narain Das Suraj Bhan v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1968 21 S.T.C. 104 (S.C.)., which supports the view that we are taking. In the circumstances, the question referred is answered in the affirmative against the department and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (7) TMI 151
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... ... ..... e buyer for the purchase of the vehicles in question. In that context, the Supreme Court held that the sales in that case did not constitute sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. However, in the present case, as we have pointed out already, the movement of the goods from the factory of the petitioner at Madras to Andhra Pradesh took place by virtue of the indents placed by the indenting officers in Andhra Pradesh and, therefore, that decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the turnover in question was liable to be taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, representing sales which were deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, as provided in section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Accordingly, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty only). Petition dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 150
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... ... ..... es tax under the Act. Hence I dismiss this appeal. VIMADALAL, J.-Article 14 being inoperative in view of the subsistence of emergency, there Is no real question of vires now involved in this writ petition. If two sections of the same Act are inconsistent, inter se, as alleged by the learned Advocate for the appellant, neither of the sections becomes invalid. In such a case, the question would be purely one of construction for which the remedy would not be by way of a writ petition. It is not for the court to advise as to whether the proper procedure would be to make a reference, or what should be the nature of proceeding in such a case. Suffice it to say, in my opinion, the appellant has misconceived his remedy. With the addition of these observations, I agree with the judgment just delivered by my brother Gangadhara Rao, J. P.C. Appeal dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we, however, make no order as to costs of the appeal. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 149
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... ... ..... ed into between the growers and the petitioner, the petitioner has a right of rejection after the delivery of the goods at the factory site and, therefore, till the goods are delivered and accepted In the factory site, there will be no concluded sale between the parties. We are unable to hold that the right of rejection at the factory site will necessarily involve the consequence that at no stage prior thereto, the property in the goods can pass from the seller to the buyer. If even after the property in the goads has passed, certainly it is open to the buyer to reject the goods and if the rejected goods had not been taken back and replaced by the seller, the right to claim compensation therefor is always available to the buyer. Under these circumstances, we are unable to hold that any error of law has been committed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in the present case. Accordingly, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 148
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... ... ..... ed in our mind whether the stock of cotton yarn held by the assessee on 1st August, 1958, in the case of Harsaran Das had suffered the tax in the hands of manufacturer or importer or not. We sent for the paper book. After looking into it we are satisfied that in that case also the cotton had suffered tax at the hands of the importer and manufacturer. The facts in both the cases were more or less identical. We also agree with the reasoning given by the Division Bench that cotton became taxable under section 3-AA from 1st August, 1958, as a fresh charge has -been created by section 3-AA and the point on which the tax is leviable is different from section 3-A. In the circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee by saying that the turnover of yarn was taxable under Notification No. 2934/X-902 dated 1st August, 1958. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (7) TMI 147
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... ... ..... ude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The learned Civil Judge, in my opinion, was right in holding that on account of non-examination of M/s. Dass Electrical in spite of the plaintiff s categorical assertion that he never sold any goods to M/s. Dass Electrical, there was clear violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Mere secret gathering of information behind the back of the assessee, could not be a substitute for such examination of M/s. Dass Electrical. In view of such violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the learned Civil Judge has rightly set aside the orders of assessment and I do not see any good ground to interfere with his judgment. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 146
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... ... ..... related to the assessment for the year 1949-50 before the Central Sales Tax Act was passed. After the promulgation of the Central Sales Tax Act, if the contract of sale occasions the movement of the goods or the title to the goods passes while they are in movement from one State to another, the sale is not a local sale but an inter-State sale. In the present case, inasmuch as the goods were sent after the dealer had contracted with the U.P. parties for despatch of goods outside U.P. it would clearly be an inter-State sale. In any event, inasmuch as the railway receipts were endorsed after the goods had been handed over to the railway, and there is nothing to indicate that the goods had not moved, it would be a case covered by section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1976 (7) TMI 145
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... ... ..... , para 94 (2) Cooley s Constitutional Law, 4th Edition, page 192 and (3) Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan 1959 35 I.T.R. 190 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149. When this legal position was pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellants, he did not press further the challenge on merits against the orders of assessment. In our opinion, the learned single Judge should not have pronounced on the constitutionality of sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the Act, since, on admitted facts of the case, the assessment orders are not open to challenge on the ground of violation of article 286(3) of the Constitution read with section 15(a) of the Central Act. We, therefore, do not express any opinion on the question of validity of sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the Act and leave that question open. Since no other ground has been pressed before us, these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each appeal. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 144
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... ... ..... lings would not go to a timber-yard and ask for timber logs or vice versa. 8.. So far as sizes are concerned we are not aware of any such com. modity. If timber logs are cut into sizes to facilitate transport, stacking, etc., it cannot be said that commercial articles different from timber logs emerge. On the other hand, logs sized into beams, sleepers, etc., are different commercial articles which are sold and purchased as beams, sleepers, etc., and not as timber logs. 9.. T.R.C. Nos. 74 to 76 of 1975 and 20 of 1976 are by the department and the other, two by the assessees. In all these the question of law raised is the same as stated in the beginning of this judgment. In all these cases, the turnover of the respective assessee has to be recomputed in the light of this judgment. We, therefore, set aside the Tribunal s orders in these cases and remit them to the Appellate Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to suffer their costs. Cases remitted.
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1976 (7) TMI 143
Whether section 9(1) of the Central Act was applicable to the case enabling the State of Uttar Pradesh to levy and collect Central sales tax in respect of subsequent sales of coal effected by the company to consumers in Uttar Pradesh by endorsement of the documents of title?
Whether this error in the original order of assessment can be called an apparent error within the meaning of section 22 of the U.P. Act.?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In this case the company was not affected by the order under section 22 being communicated to it after the expiry of three years from the date of the order, because the limitation for an appeal from that order did not begin to run before the communication of the order. The provisions of section 9 of the U.P. Act make that clear.
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1976 (7) TMI 135
Whether there is any necessary exclusion from exigibility or other provision of immunisation which can be spelt out of section 2 or section 9 of Central Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Profit-making in the State Act, it was conceded by the counsel for the Union, was irrelevant in contrast to its pertinence in the Central Act. If this be the correct position in law, it follows that the State Sales Tax Officer is entitled to collect sales tax from the appellant in regard to intra-State sales even assuming that there is no profit-motive or profit-accrual. The reverse is the case so far as Central sales tax is concerned. Orders passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in all the six appeals, affirmed as it were by the High Court, are correct and these appeals deserve to be dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 126
Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet ... ... ... ... ..... rd of directors of this company in a prosecution under section 210(5) of the Act and rightly the learned judge distinguished the decision in Vulcan Industries case 1972 42 Comp. Cas. 326 (Ori.) on the footing that the conviction there was one under section 220(3) of the Act and relied upon the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1961 31 Comp. Cas. 1 (State of Bombay v. Bandhan Ram Bhandani) . For the reasons indicated above, we are satisfied that the acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate was on an erroneous view of the legal position. The prosecution has established the charge and the respondents are clearly guilty of the offence under section 210(5) of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of acquittal is vacated and the respondents are convicted under section 210(5) of the Act and each of them is sentenced to pay a fine of rupees fifty or in default suffer simple imprisonment for a term of one week. Mohanti, J. mdash I concur.
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1976 (7) TMI 125
Winding up - Costs of voluntary winding up, Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof, Preferential payments
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1976 (7) TMI 109
Winding up - Powers of liquidator, Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation
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1976 (7) TMI 100
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... avoured or unblended cocoa powder was not edible. There is no material produced by the Respondents to the contrary. 49. emsp In that view, of the matter, I hold that all the said orders passed by the authorities concerned cannot be sustained, and are liable to be set aside. There is also sufficient material on record to hold that only flavoured and blended cocoa powder was recognised by the traders and purchasers as lsquo cocoa powder rsquo and it was only such lsquo Cocoa Powder rsquo that was liable for excise duty under Item I-A. The authorities were therefore wrong in seeking to levy excise duty on unflavoured and unblended cocoa powder, under the said Item I-A. 50. emsp In the result, therefore, the Petitioners succeed. The Rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b). The Respondents to pay to the Petitioners costs of the Petition. 51. emsp The operation of the order stayed for eight weeks only to the extent of the amount mentioned in prayer (b) being refunded.
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1976 (7) TMI 95
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... ... ..... ram. In a case where the evidence on all overall appreciation, has not been found this be acceptable the assessee cannot be said to have not discharged the onus of proving that failure on his part to return the correct income did not arise for any gross or wilful neglect or fraud on his part. We therefore, agree with the submission of the assessee rsquo s representative that so far as the addition is concerned, there may be good justification but so far as the penalty proceeding is concerned, lack of a clear and definite finding, as in this case, that there has been concealment of income is a factor that has to be taken note of the charging the assessment with the suit of concealment or filing of inaccurate particulars. That being so, we are satisfied that no contumacious conduct or concealment of income on the part of the assessee is noticeable and, therefore, we feel that no penalty is justified. The penalty is accordingly cancelled. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (7) TMI 94
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... ... ..... eration of the entire facts of the case we are clearly of the opinion that the sum of Rs. 10,000 borrowed by the assessee from Smt. Ramarathnam Ammal on 6th July, 1970 was only her funds and that money was utilised by the assessee in his individual capacity in becoming a partner of M/s. Meenakshi Finance Corporation. In such a view of the matter the share income from M/s. Meenakshi Finance Corporation during the assessment year 1971-72 to the extent of Rs. 2,868 cannot be included in the H.U.F. assessment of the assessee. It follows from this finding that the firm of M/s. Meenakshi Finance Corporation is one in which the assessee was a partner only as an individual and not in the capacity of H.U.F so along with the H.U.F. So, our finding is that there is no basis to club the income from M/s. Meenakshi Finance Corporation during the assessment year 1972-73 along with the H.U.F. income of the assessee for that year. 8. In the result both the appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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1976 (7) TMI 91
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... ... ..... the drug business and that as soon as the assessee came to know about it filed a revised return offering the estimated income of Rs. 1,000. While the Income-tax Officer had enhanced of estimate from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000 we find that on appeal the estimate submitted by the assessee of Rs. 1,000 was accepted. The revised return was admittedly filed before the completion of the assessment. Having regard to the peculiar facts of this case we are of the view that the assessee family cannot be held guilty of concealment of the income from M/s. Palaniandavar and Co. Even the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has only found the assessee guilty of attempt to conceal. On a careful consideration of the entirety of the facts and circumstances to the case, we hold that there is no justification for retaining any penalty. We cancel the penalty of Rs. 1,000 sustained by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 11. In the result ITA Nos. 2374 and 2375 are allowed and ITA No. 2376 is dismissed.
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1976 (7) TMI 90
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... ... ..... to claim partition. If really the Parliament wanted to exclude female members who do not have the claim of partition nothing would have been easier than saying so. The omission of the words entitled to claim partition in para (1A) of the Schedule to the Wealth-tax Act brings out the intention of the Parliament very clearly. It is well settled that Court can only interpret the statute as per the words that are found in it and it is not competent for Courts to import words which are not found therein by trying to find out the intendment of the legislature. In other words Court have to enforce the law as they are found in the statute book and it is not competent for them to state what the law should be and decide matters accordingly. Para (1A) of part I of the Schedule to the Wealth-tax Act is pretty clear and there is no ambiguity therein as observed earlier. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the orders of the lower authorities. 8. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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