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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 135 Records
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1976 (8) TMI 145
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... ... ..... . As a matter of fact, this statement, far from supporting the case of the Government, will support the case of the respondent in the present case. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the contract for sale is a contract whose main object is the transfer of the property in, and the delivery of possession of, a chattel as a chattel to the buyer. The contract entered into by the Universities and other educational institutions with the printer or any other person for printing question papers and supplying the same to the Universities and institutions cannot be said to be a contract whose main object is the transfer of the property in the question papers from the printer to the Universities and institutions. Therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court certainly cannot be of any assistance to the department s contention in the present case. Under these circumstances, the tax revision cases fail and they are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 144
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... ... ..... terial that the first sales had been effected by the assessee. This conclusion of the Judge (Revisions), therefore, appears to be purely conjectural. In fact, no reasons at all have been given by the Judge (Revisions) for this stray conclusion in his judgment. He appears to have reached this conclusion after holding that inasmuch as the U.P. dealers were not traceable, there was no transaction of sale at all between the sugar factory and those persons. From this, however, it does not follow that it was the assessee which made the first sales. This being so, the assessee would not be an importer within the meaning of rule 2(d-1) and no liability for sales tax in respect of untraceable U.P. dealers could be fastened on it. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. This order will govern S.T.R. No. 170 of 1973 also. Reference answered in the negative.
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1976 (8) TMI 143
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... ... ..... that we are pointing out in this case is that the Deputy Commissioner cannot refuse to exercise a discretion solely on the ground that the assessee had not been diligent enough to prefer an appeal, because, if he had been diligent enough in preferring an appeal, there would be no occasion for the assessee to invoke the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under section 32 of the Act at all, since, once the order complained of has been made the subject-matter of an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to revise that order under section 32 of the Act is ousted. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatever in holding that the Tribunal was right in the present case in remitting the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for disposal according to law, even though we uphold this order not on the ground mentioned by the Tribunal, but on a different ground. Under these circumstances, the tax revision case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed
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1976 (8) TMI 142
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... ... ..... can be no mandate for return of the documents seized, as such documents may have their relevance to the enquiry or investigation initiated by the appellants. We are, however, unable to accept such a contention, as the same is based on too broad a proposition. Such an issue was considered by this court and was expressly overruled in the case of Hindusthan Motor Ltd. v. T.N. KaulF.M.A. No. 280 of 1970 (Calcutta High Court). The relevant decisions on the issue were considered by this court in the case of Kesoram Industries v. S.K. Rattan 1974 78 C.W.N. 121, paras 31 to 33. That being the position and more because the appellants had a statutory obligation under the said Act itself to return those documents, this contention of Mr. Roy cannot prevail. All the points thus raised in support of this appeal fail. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at five gold mohurs. M.N. Roy, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 141
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... ... ..... and to make her look more attractive. The entry cosmetics and toilet requisites came up for interpretation before a Full Bench of this Court and following the decisions of the Supreme Court it has been held in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jai Shri Products, Varanasi 1974 34 S.T.C. 494 (F.B.) 1974 U.P.T.C. 146., that cosmetic means a preparation to beautify hair, skin or complexion or to alter appearance of the body or for cleaning, colouring, conditioning or protecting skin, hair, nails, eyes or teeth. In view of the above interpretation of the aforesaid entry by the Full Bench, there is no room for doubt that mehdi powder, being an item for beautification of the womenfolk, comes within the entry cosmetics and toilet requisites . In view of what we have stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is that mehdi is a cosmetic article taxable at 10 per cent. As nobody has appeared for the assessee there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (8) TMI 140
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... ... ..... the assessee himself as carpet and his own admission that the commodity was generally used for spreading on the floor (even though above a duree placed below) all lead to the same conclusion as arrived at by the taxation authorities that the commodity in question is covered by the term carpet . We also feel that in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. P. Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta 1971 80 I.T.R. 167 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1590., it was not permissible for the learned single Judge to disturb the finding of fact consistently arrived at by all the taxation tribunals in this behalf, nor was there any occasion for affording a benefit of doubt to the respondent. The appeal succeeds and the order of the learned single Judge dated 20th July, 1973, is set aside. Civil Writ Petition No. 3166 of 1971, in which the said order was passed, stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs of the appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (8) TMI 139
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... ... ..... from rice by the legislature and by the State Government. It may be that both rice and these commodities are made out of paddy, but that does not mean that the legislature and the State Government are bound to treat them alike. They are fully justified in treating them as different commodities in the light of the distinctive features between them. Therefore, we hold that parched rice and puffed rice do not come within the ambit of entry 66 of Schedule 1 of the Act. Consequently, the writ petitioners are not entitled to claim that these commodities of rice should be taxed only under entry 66(b) of Schedule I of the Act. In the result, the assessee s appeal, W.A. No. 1 of 1975, and the assessee s petition, i.e., W.P. No. 6909 of 1974, are dismissed and the State s appeal, i.e., W.A. No. 61 of 1976, is allowed and the decision of Chennakesava Reddy, J., is set aside. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1976 (8) TMI 138
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... ... ..... has affirmed the findings recorded by the appellate court and the assessing authority. It was not necessary, therefore, for the Judge (Revisions) to give detailed finding on every aspect of the case. Sri V.D. Singh, the learned standing counsel, has brought to our notice a decision reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Kraya Bikraya Samiti, Chitbaragaon 1976 38 S.T.C. 548 1975 U.P.T.C. 722. , where the question of law was answered by this court on the findings recorded by the appellate court. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit in this submission. In view of our foregoing discussions, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the department. Our answer to the question is as follows On the facts found, the assessee was a dealer as defined under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (8) TMI 137
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... ... ..... for under that entry. We are of the view that neither of these decisions is of any assistance to the case of the assessee in the present case. The entry referred to above is both exclusive and inclusive. In view of this feature, it must be held that the entry is exhaustive. It is said to Include tapes, niwars and laces and, therefore, it is quite possible that this court when it rendered the decision in the two cases referred to above was guided by the use of these expressions in the entry. As far as the present case is concerned, banners, hangers and flags are commercially different entities known and recognised as such and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the same cannot fall within the scope of entry 4 of Schedule III. Consequently, we allow this revision case, set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and restore the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, bringing the said turnover to tax. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1976 (8) TMI 136
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... ... ..... y show that it constitutes the legislative recognition of what the assessing authorities and the Tribunal have done in the present cases. We have already indicated that the action of the assessing authority and the Tribunal in the present cases clearly fell within the scope of section 16 itself. In that context, the enactment of section 16-A may be said to be only declaratory of the law as flowing from section 16 with a view to place the position beyond all doubt. This section (section 16-A) constitutes merely an express provision of what is already impliedly contained in section 16 read with section 7 and section 3 of the Act. Under these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the enactment of section 16-A in any way gives an indication that section 16 did not apply and was not intended to apply to cases covered by section 7 of the Act. Hence, these tax revision cases fail and they are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each of the cases. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 135
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... ... ..... assessment year 1962-63, it (the survey) could not be made the basis for rejecting the account books of the assessee for that year. The same principle has been laid down in another decision, Umraolal Shiv Ratan Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P., Lucknow 1973 31 S.T.C. 609 1972 U.P.T.C. 726. The sales tax authorities have not referred to any other material to discredit the account books of the assessee. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the sales tax authorities erred in rejecting the assessee s account books only on the basis of the survey dated 29th April, 1964, which did not contain any incriminating material for the year in dispute. In the circumstances, our answer to the question referred to us is as follows In the facts and circumstances of the case, the survey dated 29th April, 1964, could not be used for the assessment pertaining to the year 1962-63. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (8) TMI 134
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... ... ..... dvanced by the learned counsel is that the entry says all arms including rifles, revolvers, pistols and, in this case, the hand grenades and bicat strips are neither rifles, revolvers nor pistols and, therefore, they will not come into the scope of entry 12. Here again, we are unable to appreciate the argument. The entry having opened with the general expression all arms merely by way of illustration uses the inclusive portion by reference to rifles, revolvers and pistols. Therefore, even if a particular article is not a rifle or revolver or pistol, yet if it falls within the scope of arms, certainly it will come within the entry. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that. the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct and no error of law can be said to have been committed by the Tribunal in the present case. Accordingly, these tax revision cases are dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to the costs of this reference, one set. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 133
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... ... ..... 1976 38 S.T.C. 531. (T.R.C. No. 1 of 1976) on the ground of unreasonable delay in the service of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, each case must be judged on its own facts and, in our opinion, the delay of more than ten months in serving the order of revision is certainly unreasonable and inordinate. The Tribunal has pointed out that normally notices are served upon the parties within one week and there is no reason why a period of ten and a half months should elapse before the order of the Deputy Commissioner is served upon the assessee concerned. On this ground, therefore, this revision is allowed and the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is set aside. In view of the fact that this point was not urged before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, there will be no order as to costs. In view of the decision regarding the inordinate delay we are not dealing with the other contentions which have been put forth in the revision. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1976 (8) TMI 132
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... ... ..... he Deputy Commissioner upon the assessee, is upheld. It is because of this plea of inordinate delay that the Government s right to recover the tax is being affected, and it is obvious that until the order of the Deputy Commissioner is served on the assessee, no notice of demand in pursuance of that order can be issued and until that is done no tax can be collected. It is this gross indifference and inordinate delay in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, that would result ultimately in the delay in collecting the taxes levied on the assessee. Therefore, this argument that the right of the Government to collect the tax from the assessee would be affected if the contention of the assessee is upheld on this point is of no avail. The Government must organise its machinery carefully and efficiently. Since this point, which has succeeded before us, was not urged before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, there will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1976 (8) TMI 131
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... ... ..... Significantly, neither the word ashar nor the term khad padarth has been used in that notification. In common parlance the term cooked food or pakaya hua bhojan is generally understood as food, which is cooked and is taken in a meal or bhojan, i.e., breakfast, lunch or dinner. Biscuit is generally taken as a snack or along with tea and is not generally an item of food for a meal (bhojan). Taking the meaning of the term cooked food (pakaya hua bhojan), as understood in common parlance, biscuit does not, in our opinion, come under the category of cooked food . Hence, our answer to the question referred to this court is that biscuit does not come either under the category of cooked food (pakaya hua bhojan) or confectionery , but is only an unclassified item subject to tax at the general rate under section 3 of the Act. As the answer to the above question is not free from difficulty, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (8) TMI 130
Whether the transactions between the Commission and the Corporation amounted to a sale?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The delivery may be in Assam or in Bihar at Barauni but the movement of goods is the result of contract and as an incident to the agreement between the Commission and the Corporation. The State of Assam has lawfully levied the Central sales tax on the petitioner. The State of Assam is entitled to levy Central sales tax on the petitioner. The Commission has been paying sales tax since the commencement of sales. It is made clear that it is open to the Commission to make applications for refund, if any, in accordance with the sales tax law.
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1976 (8) TMI 121
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... g the direction or not. Furthermore, a long drawn-out enquiry as to who has got the books and who is responsible for the defaults of the company is most uncalled for, and will naturally delay the proceedings beyond all reasonable bounds. Already, the winding-up order is more than 2 5 years old. No statement of affairs has been submitted no books of account have been found, no assets-are in the hands of the liquidator. If the enquiry is to be held now, it seems that the liquidation proceedings will be stultified and rendered otiose at this initial stage. I would, therefore, prefer to pass an order directing the respondents to file the statement of affairs. I make it clear that it is not necessary that all of them must file a statement of affairs but any one of them may file it, which will be sufficient compliance with the section. However, if none of them file a statement of affairs, then all will risk a prosecution, subject, of course, to any defence that may be open to them.
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1976 (8) TMI 120
Winding up - Powers of liquidator, Discretion of liquidator, Exercise and control of liquidator’s powers
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1976 (8) TMI 105
Meetings and proceedings - Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice, Compromise and arrangement
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1976 (8) TMI 104
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... unit going into production on behalf of the new company, it cannot be said that either Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Ltd. or the sugar unit transferred to it was an undertaking . An entity which is not engaged in actual production of goods or supply of services is of no economic significance and has to be excluded from the purview of the Act. Hence, what may be done by an individual, firm or company in future has no present economic significance . (Emphasis supplied by us). The view which was sought to be canvassed on behalf of the Union of India by its learned advocate finds some echo in the minority judgment of Krishna Iyer J. But, in view of the majority judgment, we do not think that this contention is open to the learned advocate for the Union Government, In that view of the matter, therefore, we do not think that there would be any justifying reasons for us to interfere with the order of the learned single judge. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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